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Aristotle's *Categories* in the Early Roman Empire

Michael Griffin



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Aristotle's *Categories* in the Early Roman Empire

MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN

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ὅσσ' εἶδον ἐν τεκέεσσιν ἐφημίξαντο τοκεῦσιν

Proclus ap. Olymp. in *Phaed.* 1.5,16

Preface

This study began life as a dissertation submitted to the University of Oxford in 2009. That dissertation aimed, rather ambitiously, to settle a problem that Hans Gottschalk has neatly articulated as follows: '[i]t would be interesting to know why the *Categories* came to exercise so much fascination [in the first century BCE], but there is no evidence' (1987: 1103). Building on the later Neoplatonic sources, especially Simplicius (c.490–c.560 CE), I hoped to provide evidence for a solution of that puzzle. Along the way, I reconstructed the long and complex stratigraphy of commentary on the *Categories* before Porphyry, following (or at least muddling along) in the footsteps of scholars such as Paul Moraux (1973, 1984).

The present book differs from that dissertation in several respects. Most importantly, it has benefited from several years of critical feedback. It has also, for better or worse, been pared down to focus on a single story. Andronicus of Rhodes, I suggest, rescued the *Categories* from obscurity because he believed it was a good beginner's introduction to Aristotle's theory of demonstration (*ἀπὸ δεξιῆς*). But contemporary and later philosophers' confusion regarding its subject-matter—language, concepts, or reality?—helped to draw further attention to the treatise, fostering the development of subsequent ancient semantics. Those chapters that did not especially contribute to this story have been deleted, while the new chapter 2 (Andronicus of Rhodes) has been heavily revised and expanded. Chapter 3 (Eudorus and Pseudo-Archytas), chapter 4 (Lucius and Nicostratus), and chapter 5 (Athenodorus and Cornutus) have been moderately revised, while chapter 6 (Boethus of Sidon) has been reduced in scope, since some of my conclusions in 2009 have been corrected, or improved, by a series of recent, outstanding articles and edited collections on this period (see for example Rashed 2013, Chiaradonna 2013). At the time of writing, I was able to make only limited use of the new commentary on the *Categories* found in the Archimedes Palimpsest (Chiaradonna, Rashed, and Sedley 2013), but I have been able to add references to several supporting passages from that text.

I have incurred many debts of gratitude in the development of this project. I am especially indebted to Tobias Reinhardt, under whose

kind and patient supervision the dissertation gradually wound its way into being, and to Richard Sorabji and Peter Adamson, who carefully examined the entire manuscript at the dissertation stage, and have continued to discuss revisions with me in detail. I am also grateful to Professor Sorabji for many years of conversations about the philosophy of the commentators, which have greatly expanded my knowledge and appreciation of the period. The dissertation project was originally suggested by Michael Frede, my faculty adviser for the M.Phil. at Oxford from 2004 to 2006, without whom it would never have begun. Ben Morison, who kindly agreed to serve as my mentor for the Press, has been truly generous with his time and insightful commentary. I am also indebted to several careful readers of multiple drafts of the MS or individual chapters, including Jonathan Barnes, Sylvia Berryman, George Boys-Stones (who also kindly shared with me helpful unpublished work), Michael Chase, Riccardo Chiaradonna, Myrto Hatzimichali, George Karamanolis, Stephen Menn, Marwan Rashed, David Sedley, Robert Sharples, Richard Sorabji, and Thomasz Tiurnyn, as well as participants in conferences and lectures held at the University of Toronto, University College London, and the University of Trier. I am also grateful to Annie Hewitt for her painstaking and careful editorial work on the manuscript, which has significantly improved the final product and saved me from not a few embarrassing errors. None of these readers, of course, can be faulted for the remaining mishaps and errors, which are solely my own.

My graduate work at Oxford was generously supported by the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission of the United Kingdom and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The development of this book was also sponsored by an Insight Grant from the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada. I am very grateful to both bodies for their kind support from the beginning to the end of this process. Last but by no means least, I would like to thank my parents, Bruce and Jennifer, who have made everything possible, and sustained this effort from *archē* to *telos*.

Michael J. Griffin

The University of British Columbia
December 2013

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Abbreviations

ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
CAG	<i>Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca</i>
Cat.	<i>Categories</i>
DL	Diogenes Laertius
DPhA	Goulet, R. <i>Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques</i> . Volumes as cited in bibliography.
<i>in Cat.</i>	<i>On the Categories</i>
LS	Long, A. A., and Sedley, D. N. (1987). <i>The Hellenistic Philosophers</i> . Vols I–II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
LSJ	Liddell, H., Scott, R., and Jones, H. (1940). <i>A Greek–English Lexicon</i> (9th edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MorauX I	MorauX, P. (1973). <i>Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias—Erster Band: Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh. v. Chr.</i> (Vol. I). Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
MorauX II	MorauX, P. (1984). <i>Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias—Zweiter Band: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr</i> (Vol. II). Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
OSAP	<i>Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy</i>
Porph.	Porphyry (normally <i>in Cat.</i>)
RE	Wissowa, <i>Real-Enzyklopädie der klassischen Altertums-wissenschaft</i> (Stuttgart and Munich, 1894–1980).
Simplic.	Simplicius (normally <i>in Cat.</i>)
SVF	H. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> , i–iii (Leipzig, 1903–5; Vol. IV, index, compiled by M. Adler, 1924).

—Well, then, what is the reason that impelled the philosophers of old to engage in disputes of every kind with each other on the subject of this Aristotelian writing which we call the *Categories*? For as far as I can see, neither have more numerous controversies occurred about any other topic, nor have greater contests been stirred up, not only by Stoics and Platonists trying to undermine these Aristotelian *Categories*, but even among the Peripatetics with each other . . .

—It is because . . . the subject (σκοπός) of this book concerns the primary and simple expressions (λέξεις) <and the realities> they signify. So since λόγος is useful to all branches of philosophy, and the first principles of this are simple expressions and their objects of reference, it is natural that much controversy has arisen . . .

Dexippus, *On the Categories* 5,16–22
(tr. after Dillon 1990), fourth century CE

Es war ein eines scharfsinnigen Mannes würdiger Anschlag des Aristoteles, diese Grundbegriffe aufzusuchen. Da er aber kein Prinzipium hatte, so raffte er sie auf, wie sie ihm aufstießen, und trieb deren zuerst zehn auf, die er Kategorien (Prädikamente) nannte. In der Folge glaubte er noch ihrer fünf aufgefunden zu haben, die er unter dem Namen der Postprädikamente hinzufügte. Allein seine Tafel blieb noch immer mangelhaft.

It was an enterprise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to try to discover these fundamental concepts; but as he had no guiding principle he merely picked them up as they occurred to him, and at first gathered up ten of them, which he called categories or predicaments. Afterwards he thought he had discovered five more of them, which he added under the name of post-predicaments. But his table remained imperfect for all that . . .

Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason Transcendental
Doctrine of Elements*, A81/B107
(tr. N. Kemp Smith)

There is a theory called the theory of categories which in a more or less developed form, with minor or major modifications, made its appearance first in a large number of Aristotelian writings and then, under the influence of these writings, came to be a standard part of traditional logic, a place it maintained with more or less success into the early part of this century, when it met the same fate as certain other parts of traditional logic.

Frede 1987: 29

Introduction

The short, compressed philosophical essay that comes down to us under the name *Categories* (*Κατηγορίαι*) has exercised a special kind of fascination throughout the Western intellectual tradition. For two millennia of recorded study, the *Categories* was embedded in the fabric of philosophical education as an introduction to logic.¹ It played a crucial role in the Greek, Latin, and Arabic philosophical traditions, and subsequently received a thoughtful critique from the seminal philosophers of early modern Europe, among them Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant.² The *Categories* retired from its place as the gatekeeper of philosophy and higher education alongside the rapid transformation of modern European logic in the nineteenth century, but even its retirement years have been busy and fruitful: modern students of Aristotle have come second to none of their predecessors in working out novel and careful interpretations of the place of the *Categories* in Aristotle's philosophical system and intellectual development,³ and it continues to inspire new ideas, especially in metaphysics.⁴

The *Categories*' puzzling organization contributes to its difficulty and allure. As we have it today, the treatise is divided into three traditional sections. (1) The first section begins with a description of several ways in which multiple referents can share a name in ordinary language (ch. 1). The author then partitions meaningful speech into complete sentences and referring terms (ch. 2). Finally, he proceeds to

¹ Frede 1987: 29.

² See Gillespie 1925: 79 = Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji 1979: 1.

³ See for example Mann 2000, Wedin 2000, Bodéüs 2001: xi–clxxxviii, Barnes 2005a, and the contributions of Bruun and Corti 2005.

⁴ See for example Lowe 2006.

an influential division of being, which privileges individuals (items that are not the kinds, attributes, or modes of anything else) as exhibits of primary reality or substance (*οὐσία*) (ch. 3). (2) The second section, which is often treated as the heart of the treatise, lists ten items, perhaps kinds of predicates or predications (chs. 5–9). This list is comparable to the list that occurs at *Topics* 1.6, although there are differences. Here the list comprises REALITY (for example, man, horse), QUANTITY (four-foot, five-foot), QUALITY (white), RELATIVE (double, half), WHERE (in the marketplace), WHEN (yesterday, last year), IN-POSITION (lying down), HAVING (shod, armed), ACTING (cutting, burning), and BEING-ACTED-ON (being cut, being burned). Finally, (3) the third traditional section, which has occasionally (since antiquity) been viewed as an intrusion stitched into the treatise by a well-meaning editor, examines concepts like opposition, priority, and change. All three sections have attracted debate.⁵ (See below, ‘The Structure of the *Categories*’, and Appendix 3 for a more detailed account of the content of the book).

The *Categories* offers a series of interesting, separated reflections, some of which appear to belong to ontology, others to logic or to the grammar of a natural language or to semantics. This topical diversity has sometimes been interpreted as implying a systemic confusion of use and mention on Aristotle’s part;⁶ I argue in this book that it also led ancient philosophers to sharpen their own conceptual distinctions between these different sub-disciplines of philosophy. But who would compose such a treatise in the first place, and to what end? The *Categories* has certainly not come down to us in the form that Aristotle intended—if indeed Aristotle was the author of some of

⁵ For example, readers have continually puzzled over the compatibility of the *Categories*’ account of primary *οὐσία* with the hylomorphism of the central books of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (see Simplicius, in *Cat.* 78.4–20). There has rarely been a clear consensus about the origins of the central list of ten items, or about their nature (words, concepts, or things?) Even the Neoplatonist commentators, masters of consensus, were hard pressed to deliver a compromise that really fit the text.

⁶ Bäck (2000) remarks that the philosopher appears to ‘switch back and forth from speaking about words to speaking about real things’ and does so ‘quickly and blithely’ with confusing rapidity (133–4). Two recent approaches to this ambiguity are evident in Wedin (2000) and De Rijk (2002:1). As a policy, Wedin will ‘follow Aristotle’s practice of disregarding use-mention boundaries in formulating a number of his theses’ (12 n. 6). By contrast, De Rijk, who expresses this equivocation as ‘the absence of a clear-cut borderline between a linguistic expression [...] taken as a linguistic tool, and its significate’, proposes that Aristotle exploits it intentionally and systematically, and christens this ‘the rule of indiscriminate reference’ (63–4)—a necessary law and ‘main rule’ for his exegetical approach to Aristotelian semantics.

the text, which has sometimes been doubted.⁷ It has almost nothing explicit to tell us about its own goals as a philosophical treatise or lecture; nothing about its relationship to other treatises by any author; and it employs numerous locutions and arguments that do not occur elsewhere in Aristotle. Some time before the first century BCE, its editors (or its author) had complemented the text with numerous interpolations in order to construct a coherent treatise. Even the name *Categories* or *Predications* (Κατηγορίαι) was only one of many titles circulating in antiquity, each of them reflecting a different vision of the aim or subject-matter of the treatise.

If we do allow, with the consensus of most contemporary scholars,⁸ that at least the first nine chapter-headings of our *Categories* derive from an authentic treatise by Aristotle, then we are left with a number of difficult problems: for example, what kind of text it is, how Aristotle meant it to be read, whether it is internally consistent, when in his complex philosophical development it might have been composed, how it relates to the other surviving treatises by Aristotle, and so forth.

The present study does not set out to grapple directly with these problems, which attract new analysis on a regular basis and may well continue to do so for another two millennia, *σὺν θεοῖς*.⁹ Rather, this study explores an essential chapter in the history of how these problems were approached in antiquity. In particular, it seeks to recount how the readers of Aristotle during the age of the first

⁷ In the nineteenth century by Spengel 1845: 41; Prantl 1846: 646 and 1855: 90 n. 5; Rose 1854: 232; Gercke 1891: 424–41, esp. 437; and more powerfully in the twentieth century by Dupréel 1909 and Mansion 1949: 1097–1100.

⁸ For recent discussion of the authenticity of the *Categories*, see for example Bodéüs 2001: xi–clxxxviii, Frede 1987: 11–48, Husik 1952: 97–203, and De Rijk 1951. Its authenticity was not questioned in antiquity, with the exception of the postpraedicamenta. It is broadly accepted as Aristotelian today, and discussed as Aristotle's work by most critics, including for example Ackrill 1963, Barrington Jones 1972, Dancy 1975, Irwin 1981, Furth 1988, Rist 1989, Lewis 1991, Wedin 2000, Mann 2000, and Shields 2003.

⁹ The introduction to the edition of Bodéüs (2001: xi–clxxxviii) and the short essays by Frede (1987: 11–48) provide an excellent overview of issues relating to the function, title, authenticity, and composition of the treatise. The arguments that we should understand the *Categories* primarily as a dialectical handbook related to the *Topics*, and not as a contribution to first philosophy, seem strong (see Menn 1995); but it is also worth stressing its profound contribution to the shape and spirit of Aristotle's metaphysics (Mann 2000), whether or not it contains a metaphysical theory similar to or competitive with that of *Metaphysics* ZHΘ (see for example Wedin 2000).

philosophical commentaries—coincident with the rise and teetering of the Roman Empire—thought that these problems might have been solved, and what kinds of solutions they sought to offer, sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in competition. The interest of their solutions is intrinsically clear: for it was through their early accounts of the *Categories*, both polemical and exegetical, that this koan of a book initially came to exercise so much fascination in the ancient philosophical schools, and ultimately made its way to the forefront of the late antique curricula as a foundation of philosophical study, with substantial implications for the subsequent course of European philosophy.

Several studies have demonstrated the value of the history of commentary on the *Categories*. Over the centuries, changing treatments of the *Categories* tracked changing conceptions of logic and the goal of philosophy. Several scholars have pointed to the first century BCE as the crucible of its fascination. For instance, Robert Sharples (2008: 274) has remarked that

[t]he attention given to Aristotle's *Categories* in antiquity had major consequences for the future direction of philosophy. The prominence in subsequent discussion of the problem of universals, and more generally of questions concerning the relation between being, knowledge and language, is due in large part to the *Categories* coming in antiquity to occupy the place it did at the start of the philosophical curriculum. This has also affected approaches to Aristotle himself.

Marwan Rashed's innovative treatment of Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Essentialisme* (2007), has shown that Alexander (in the late second and early third century CE) interpreted Aristotle's *De Anima* and *Metaphysics* through the lens of the *Organon*, and especially the *Categories*.¹⁰ The Neoplatonist Porphyry explicitly defended the value of the *Categories* as an introduction to philosophy, and through his agency, centuries later, it had secured a place at the gateway of the Neoplatonic curriculum for Aristotelian studies. Subsequent scholarship on the *Categories* in the Latin West demonstrates its far-reaching influence on thinkers ranging from Boethius through Eriugena (c.800–c.877), Abelard (1078–1142), Aquinas (1225/6–74),

¹⁰ Sharples (2008) also points to the work of Arthur Madigan (1994), who suggests that Alexander read the *Metaphysics* 'in light of the *Categories* rather than vice versa' (90).

Roger Bacon (1214–94), Duns Scotus (c.1265/6–1308), William Ockham (c.1285–1347), and into the fifteenth century with Latin commentators such as Paul of Venice: for a recent overview, see Newton (2008). In the Arabic tradition, as Peter Adamson notes, the seminal philosopher and translator al-Kindī (c.800–70) took a special interest in the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*,¹¹ and al-Fārābī (c.872–c.950) commented on the *Organon* in full,¹² although Avicenna (c.980–1037) would later offer the definitive replacement for much of the traditional *Organon*. Nevertheless, even early modern and current trends in Arabic and Persian philosophy, following Avicenna, demonstrate as strong an interest in the *Organon* as may be found in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy.¹³

But the chapter of the story that precedes Alexander—that is, the reception of the *Categories* during the period spanning the gap from the alleged ‘rediscovery’ of Aristotle’s esoteric works in the first century BCE to the first extant commentaries on the *Categories* in the third century CE—has not yet been treated in a comprehensive study.¹⁴ It was during this period that the *Categories* came to acquire its location at the beginning of the Aristotelian curriculum, which it held by the late second century. And it was also during this period that many of the familiar later difficulties regarding the *Categories* were framed, such as its relationship to the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle and the core problem of defining its subject-matter. Of more general historical interest, perhaps, this period saw a crucial shift of philosophical activity from a more oral, geographically centralized practice to a textual, geographically diverse enterprise that relied increasingly on commentary (see Frede 1999, Boys-Stones 2001, Hatzimichali 2013). The change is effectively summarized by Sedley (2012: 1–2):

¹¹ Adamson (2007b), 15, 26–8.

¹² McGinnis and Reisman (2007), 65.

¹³ A recent discussion as to whether the categories properly belong to ontology or logic (noted in Ziai 2005) demonstrates that the *aporiai* of antiquity remain vital across cultures, languages, and centuries.

¹⁴ The brief survey in Bodéüs (2001) and Gottschalk (1987), together with the longer treatment in Moraux (1973, 1984) are all invaluable in introducing the period and the relevance of the *Categories* in it; for the historical background, see now Schofield (2013), and for a selection of primary texts in translation, Sharples (2010).

The first century BCE is the period in which philosophy loosened its historic moorings in the great philosophical schools of Athens and entered the Roman world, often attaching itself to such cultural centres as Alexandria and Rome. It is no exaggeration to say that the character of philosophy as an intellectual activity was permanently changed by this transition. Cut adrift from the historic institutions which had linked them to their revered founders, the major philosophies shifted their efforts increasingly onto the study of their foundational texts. The Roman imperial age was thus an age in which philosophy centred on the newly burgeoning industry of textual commentary, above all commentary on the writings of Plato and Aristotle.

The philosophers with whom the present study is primarily concerned lived between about this time and the middle of the third century of our era.¹⁵ Since, with few exceptions, the lives of the principal authors are not securely dated, the bounding dates of this study are rather arbitrary. To keep things simple, in the title I have referred to the ‘early Roman empire’: our protagonists were active mainly during and after the beginning of Augustus’ principate in 27 BCE, and our story ends after the reign of Marcus Aurelius. A little more precisely, I attempt to collect and examine the first preserved fragments of views related to the *Categories* after Theophrastus, which appear to have been formulated in the first century BCE during a tremendous upsurge of interest in Aristotelian studies and the original texts of Aristotle’s school-treatises, a transformation which is frequently associated with the name of Andronicus of Rhodes. I conclude before the third century, excluding Alexander of Aphrodisias and Galen as primary subjects, but making use of their work and later work as sources. My sources include related subject matter by Alexander, responses to the *Categories* itself by Plotinus and Porphyry, followed by Iamblichus and Dexippus in the third and fourth century, Ammonius and Boethius in the fifth and sixth, and Simplicius and Olympiodorus in the sixth.

¹⁵ Griffin and Barnes (1989), Barnes and Griffin (1997), Long and Sedley (1987), and Sorabji and Sharples (2007) provide overviews of the literature on the intellectual life of the early Roman empire and the second sophistic. Authoritative studies on the Peripatetic school in our period are discussed below.

I. THIS STUDY: THE *CATEGORIES* IN THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE

Hans Gottschalk, in a valuable survey, wrote that '[i]t would be interesting to know why the *Categories* came to exercise so much fascination [in the first century BCE], but there is no evidence' (1987: 1103). This study will attempt to reconstruct a tentative narrative of early interest in the treatise (roughly from the first century BCE to the early third century CE), drawing upon the fragmentary evidence of later Neoplatonist sources. Part A (chs 2–3) considers evidence for an initial surge of interest in the *Categories*, which I credit primarily to Andronicus of Rhodes in the middle of the first century BCE. Part B (chs 4–5) traces critiques of the treatise by Platonist and Stoic readers. Part C (chs 6–7) surveys responses to those criticisms by Boethus of Sidon, and subsequent developments. I will credit the turning-point in the career of the treatise *Categories* to Andronicus (ch. 2) and his emphasis on its value as a pre-technical primer for the Aristotelian science of demonstration (*ἀποδείξις*).

But I also stress in chs 2–3 the evidence for earlier analysis and criticism of the *doctrine* of the ten categories in the Old Academy, perhaps as a subdivision of the Platonic distinction of Absolute from Relative.¹⁶ I argue in ch. 3 that Eudorus of Alexandria drew upon that Academic tradition during the first century BCE and promoted a ten-categorical scheme compatible with it, and that either Eudorus or Andronicus may be independently responsible for resurrecting a 'categorialism' attributed to both the Old Academy and Aristotle. Andronicus in turn published a new catalogue of Aristotle's technical works that foregrounded the treatise *Categories*, which may in turn have earned it a new readership.

The history of the reception of the treatise begins before Andronicus and Eudorus. It may have been known in the Hellenistic period under the title *Before the Topics*,¹⁷ either as a rhetorical or dialectical handbook.¹⁸ In this time, it might have been criticized as a poor

¹⁶ *Sophist* 255D; cf. Xenocrates fr. 12 Heinze/95 Isnardi Parente.

¹⁷ *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων*, for which see Simplicius in *Cat.* 379,9–11, Andronicus ap. Boethius in *Cat.* 263B, Porphyry in *Cat.* 56,22–31. *Πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν* may have been preferred by Adrastus (Simplic. 15,30, 16,14).

¹⁸ For the later Peripatetic division within logic between persuasive dialectic and rhetoric (on the one hand) and demonstrative analytic (on the other), see for example DL 5.28; for a similar Stoic subdivision, see DL 7.43, and for a Middle Platonist

organization of *linguistic* items (like nouns, verbs, and conjunctions) by Athenodorus, a Stoic who interpreted the treatise as an unsophisticated contribution to rhetorical or linguistic theory.¹⁹ In the first half of the first century BCE, scholarly interest developed in Aristotle's 'esoteric' corpus (that is, the school-treatises which we possess today, in contrast to the popular dialogues that we have now largely lost),²⁰ represented in the activities of bibliophilic men like Apellicon and Tyrannio (Strabo, *Geog.* 13.1.54). Several philosophers, prominently including Andronicus and Ariston, embarked on a serious study of the texts, resulting in Andronicus' much-debated publication, the putative 'Roman edition' of Aristotle and his influential catalogue (*πίνακες*) of the books of Aristotle.

Road Map

The story of the treatise *Categories*, as I argue in ch. 2, properly begins with Andronicus, who played a crucial role in bringing the study of the treatise into vogue. His new catalogue, which soon became a standard reference (Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1–2, Porphyry *VP* 24.7), foregrounded the text that had previously been obscure, and known under the title *Before the Topics*. Andronicus retitled this treatise *Κατηγορίαι*, 'Predications', and brought it to the front of his reading list. He did so, I suggest, in order to draw attention to what he regarded as its pedagogically and epistemologically valuable content and methods. Andronicus found the treatise useful, not merely as

version, see Alcinous, *Handbook* 3.2. The *Categories* might have been read as offering a source for a handbook division of kinds of questions, similar to the ten *elementa* represented in Quintilian *Inst.* 3.23–34, or already (as I argue Andronicus would later read it) as a useful heuristic guide for finding the genus of a given term (cf. Menn 1995), supporting defences against fallacies based on category errors like those represented in Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 22 and *LS* 37H (a coat is manly, but to be manly is brave, so the coat is brave; or again, a body is white, but white is a colour, so a body is a colour; cf. Simplicius *in Cat.* 24.6–25.10, Bobzien 2005, Atherton 1993: 180–3).

¹⁹ See for example Porphyry, *in Cat.* 18, 26 and 59, 5–14, Simplicius *in Cat.* 62, 24–8, and ch. 5 below. Both Athenodorus and Cornutus seem to have critiqued the text's division of various lexical categories, as if *Cat.* set out to be a textbook of 'logic' in the Stoic sense at the first (rhetorical or grammatical) level, rather than the second (dialectical) level (cf. *DL* 7.43, and *LS* §31). I also attempt to offer some arguments in favour of this interpretation in Griffin 2013b; see ch. 5 below.

²⁰ For more on the distinction between the esoteric and exoteric treatises by Aristotle, see ch. 2 below.

a handbook for dialectical engagement (see for example Simplicius in *Cat.* 379,9–11),²¹ but as a preliminary to genuine scientific demonstration (ἀποδείξεις; cf. Philoponus, in *Cat.* 5,15–20). On Andronicus' view, as I will argue, the *Categories* introduces us to the genera of predication in a 'pre-philosophical' manner appropriate to beginners, by deploying sketch accounts or delineations (ὑπογραφαί) to tease out or 'articulate' (διαρθροῦν) our untutored preconceptions (προλήψεις) of the ten genera,²² drawing on the resources available in ordinary language before we can carve out a more exact and scientific vocabulary. Thus Andronicus valued the *Categories* for its ability to introduce us to predication (κατηγορία) in a pre-philosophical and non-technical manner.²³ More precisely, the *Categories* helps us to distinguish between essential and accidental kinds of

²¹ See also Boethius in *Cat.* 263B. Andronicus jettisons the final five chapters or 'post-paedicamenta' for this reason (*Cat.* §§10–15 retail subjects like contrariety, priority, and the different senses of 'having', which Andronicus judges irrelevant to the primary function of the text, although useful for approaching the dialectical methods of the *Topics*).

²² I ascribe this argument to Andronicus as well as Boethus of Sidon; thus I suggest that Andronicus relies on a basically Stoic and Epicurean account of the nature of preconceptions (for the role of such pre-definitional accounts in Hellenistic thought, see for example Brittain 2005). For my attempt to trace this argument to the first century BCE and to Boethus of Sidon, see in particular Porphyry in *Cat.* 59,17–33, Herminius' second-century CE 'compressed' (διὰ βραχέων) articulation of the view that the *Categories* caters to the young (νέοις, 59,21) and teases out the sorts of preconception (προλήψεως, 59,27) that are a pre-philosophical prerequisite for a more rigorous study of the genera of predication, beginning from the *sunêtheia* or ordinary language available to *hoi polloi*. Porphyry has just previously (59,17–18) suggested that Herminius is compressing the view adopted earlier by Boethus of Sidon. See also Simplicius in *Cat.* 159,10–15, where Boethus also argues that it was not possible to give proper, formal definitions of the primary genera at the early stage represented by *Cat.*, but that Aristotle provides ὑπογραφαί that can actuate or 'stir up' (ἀνακινεῖν) our concept (ἐννοία) of a category like the Relative. For the further attribution to Andronicus behind Boethus, my argument also draws on passages like Simplicius in *Cat.* 21,15–22,1, where Andronicus is associated with the necessity of a πρόληψις of homonyms which the *Categories* articulates, and Porphyry's response (379,12–20) to Andronicus' disconnection of the post-paedicamenta at 379,8–11, where the argument against Andronicus assumes that he, like Porphyry himself, is committed to regarding the treatise, especially in the 'onymies', as teasing out ('articulating', διαρθρωσις) our προλήψεις; and 154,3–6, where Porphyry follows Andronicus in 'articulating' our ἐννοία of the unit or one in treating the category of quantity.

²³ For instance, if I would like to know whether Socrates is an individual substance, *Cat.* 2a11–14 provides rules to test whether I apply the name 'Socrates' as if it labelled an entity said-of or in another (cf. Simplicius in *Cat.* 75,23–76,1).

predication²⁴ (without having trained in logic in advance)²⁵ in order that we can begin to study division (*διαίρεσις*) and eventually construct proper definitions based on essential features of the object rather than its accidental attributes.²⁶ Andronicus interprets the *Categories*' fourfold division (1a20–b9) and its sketch of the attributes that characterize substances (*οὐσίαι*, 2a12–4b19) in contrast to non-substantial predicates (4b20–11a39) as a useful framework for applying Aristotelian essentialism in the practice of dialectic. That is, he employs the structure of predication in the Greek language as a rough guide to the structure of reality.

What does that mean, exactly? A student who grasps the *Categories*' lessons will be equipped to distinguish the features that mark a thing out for *what it is*, and so properly belong in its definition, from those incidental features that merely describe *how* it is that way.²⁷ (Indeed, Andronicus will criticize 'earlier' Peripatetics for failing to recognize the importance of this distinction in dialectic and definition²⁸—much as later Aristotelians would take the Stoics to task for failing to distinguish between an essential definition and a proprium,²⁹ perhaps implying that Stoic dialectical practices were a

²⁴ So the attribution to Andronicus by Boethius (evidently following Porphyry) of praise for the usefulness (*utilitas*) of division (*De Div.* 4,3–5 Magee); Andronicus also seems to have cultivated the recognition of the distinction between *secundum se* and *secundum accidens* predication in division (*De Div.* 48,26–50,5, if Andronicus is to be identified, as Magee argues ad loc., with *posterior . . . Peripatetic secta* at 48,26). And, as I argue below, this seems like the right context in which to understand Andronicus' subsumption of the ten categories under the 'absolute' and the 'relative' (*Simplic. in Cat.* 63,22–8). On Andronicus in the *De Divisione*, see now Magee 1998: xxiv–lvii; on Andronicus' use of the absolute-relative division from *Sophist* 255D, see Reinhardt 2007. The later tradition treats the division of substance and accident as the 'primary division' in the *Categories*; see for example Alexander in *Metaph.* 242,15–243,3 (τῇ πρώτῃ διαίρεσει τῶν ἐν Κατηγορίαις).

²⁵ Instead offering heuristic tests (presupposed by other works in the *Organon*) for determining the genus to which a term belongs. See Bodéüs 2001: xxxix and Menn 1995: 319–20, to which I refer often below.

²⁶ Compare Aristotle *An. Post.* 2.13, Boethius *De Div.* 18,4–19 Magee (and following) for the principle, and 34,16–36,26 for an extended sample (although there is no good reason to suppose that this sample is Andronican).

²⁷ For a similar essentialist reading of the *Categories*, see Loux 1991: ch. 1 (33), and Sirkel forthcoming. For the *Categories* as a key text elaborating the distinction between 'things' and their features, see Mann 2000.

²⁸ In Boethius *De Div.* 891–2, 48,26–50,5 Magee; see ch. 2 below for the attribution to Andronicus.

²⁹ Alexander in *Top.* 42,27–43,2, LS 32E. This is not to say that the Stoics really did fail to make such a distinction, only that they were perceived as vulnerable on this point by some Peripatetics after Andronicus.

target of Andronicus' critique and that his new emphasis on the *Categories* would provide an essentialist framework for demonstration). In addition, Andronicus treats the clear distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* predication as a prophylactic against various fallacies that trade on equivocation,³⁰ some of which had been used earlier in the first century to threaten the value of dialectic (compare Cicero, *Academica* 2.91–2). Thus the *Categories* is rightly re-titled *κατηγορίαι*, on Andronicus' view, because it helps us to 'predicate' successfully—that is 'to apply a simple significant expression to what it signifies'³¹—as a key building-block in the construction of a scientific definition. The curriculum builds from the correct predication of such 'uncombined' or simple terms through the study of sentences and syllogisms to the art of demonstration taught in the *Analytics*,³² and this is reflected in Andronicus' proposed version of the opening lines in his paraphrase, which makes the treatise about simple or 'uncombined' expressions, the proper treatment of which begins with equivocity (21,15–22,1).

If this interpretation is correct, then Andronicus' influence on the future course of Aristotelian philosophy was profound. The appearance of the previously obscure treatise *Before the Topics* at the front of an important new catalogue and publication of Aristotle's esoteric treatises drew attention from different philosophers, who interpreted the treatise according to their own framework and interests. An important example is Eudorus of Alexandria, who developed similar moves in the interpretation of the text, bringing the ten categories

³⁰ For examples and discussion, see Bobzien 2005.

³¹ Thus Porphyry delineates 'predication' or *κατηγορία* in the course of a defence of the title which, as I argue, might be traced back to Andronicus' arguments against the alternative title *Before the Topics*. In defending this interpretation, Andronicus anticipated his pupil Boethus' influential interpretation of the *Categories* as a treatise about semantics ('φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἁπλῶν καθὸ σημαντικαῖ εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων', Porphyry in *Cat.* 58,5–6); and since fallacies of equivocation belonged to a wider class of ambiguities that had seemed to some to threaten to derail, on sceptical grounds, the power attributed by Antiochus to dialectic (cf. Cic. *Ac.* 2.92–6 = LS 37H), Andronicus' emphasis on the *Categories*, and its rules for successful predication, might also have taken aim at one weapon in the sceptical arsenal that had been deployed against Antiochus. Within a few generations, at least, we begin to notice the 'ten categories' playing a basic role in defenses of the value and methodology of division, definition, and demonstration, not only in Peripatetic sources but also among Platonists (see for example Plutarch *De Proc. An.* 1023D–F, Alcinous, *Didasc.* 6, 159,43–160,30).

³² See Bodéüs 2001: xiv–xvi for Andronicus' potential reliance on Stoic sources for the progression of terms, statements, syllogisms, and demonstrations.

under the Platonic bifurcation of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ (*Sophist* 255D), and praising the practice of division (*διαίρεσις*) as useful for gaining knowledge—although Eudorus contrasted Aristotle’s (or Andronicus’ Aristotle’s) interpretation of the ten categories unfavourably to a different interpretation, which he might have drawn independently from the Old Academy. But there was an important difference. Andronicus had found methodological and pedagogical value in the *Categories* based on a more or less Stoic pedagogical and psychological framework, since it was helpful for refining untutored preconceptions or concepts, leading ultimately to scientific demonstration. Eudorus, by contrast, read the *Categories* ontologically, as a direct map to the genuine tenfold structure of reality (perhaps, as I tentatively suggest in ch. 3, to both sensible and intelligible reality). In so doing, Eudorus inspired an influential Pythagorean reinterpretation of the work (by the author we now call Pseudo-Archytas), but also stimulated criticism from other Platonists (in particular the shadowy figure Lucius, sometime in the first century BCE or CE, who was later followed in the main by Nicostratus and Plotinus).

In the next generation, Boethus of Sidon elaborated the interpretation of the *Categories* that I have attributed to Andronicus, who was probably a teacher or associate of Boethus.³³ Boethus agreed that the treatise was appropriate to novices, whose *πρόληψις* of the genera of predication required articulation,³⁴ and he also maintained that the treatise offers helpful ‘delineations’ or *hupographai* of the genera, sketches that are able to ‘stir up’ our concepts (Simplicius *in Cat.* 159,10–15) and begin to articulate them. But Boethus refined Andronicus’ view considerably in response to a growing chorus of Platonist critics of Aristotle’s *Categories*³⁵—or more precisely, of Andronicus’ version of Aristotle’s categorialism. Boethus stressed that the treatise dealt strictly with sensible being, because it offered an account of significant verbal expressions that signify (in the first

³³ I treat Boethus as Andronicus’ pupil, on the strength not only of the biographical tradition (e.g. Philop. *in Cat.* 5,19) but also based on his adaptation and revision of Andronicus’ ideas, both in the *Categories* and elsewhere (e.g. Aspasius *in Eth.* 44,24).

³⁴ This line of argument is attributed to the Peripatetic Herminius, in turn following Boethus, at Porph. *in Cat.* 59,17–33.

³⁵ Such as those attributed to ‘Lucius’ in Simplicius. For Boethus as a respondent to Andronicus’ challenges to the positions of Aristotle in *Categories*, see Moraux 1973: 147.

imposition) *sensible* things (Simplic. *in Cat.* 78,4–9): in Boethus' formulation, the book is about 'simple words significant of simple things, qua significant' (cf. Porph. *in Cat.* 58,3–7). Boethus contended that these referents must be perceptible (*αἰσθητά*), so that some of the criticisms offered by Lucius, which have to do with intelligible beings (*νόητα*), are irrelevant. Boethus' formulation also would have addressed (possibly earlier) 'linguistic' criticisms levelled by the Stoic Athenodorus, which treated the *Categories* as dealing with verbal expressions as such or *λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις* (Porph. *in Cat.* 59,10–14 and Simplic. *in Cat.* 18,28–19,1), a view that Boethus seems to reject explicitly; but there is not very strong evidence that he actually *did* respond to Athenodorus by name or directly.

Boethus also developed, corrected, and improved Andronicus' interpretations on many particular points, and introduced several of the most important and penetrating questions about the *Categories*' intent and scope, including his contrast of its account of substance with that found in the central books of the *Metaphysics*; indeed Boethus was prepared to consider the *Categories* a work of first philosophy *from a certain perspective*, that is, insofar as it treated real beings through the medium of words that successfully referred to them. (He also may have rehabilitated the *De Interpretatione* and with it a new, Aristotelian semantics that supported Andronicus' view of the value of the *Categories* in terms of the sketch of a theory of meaning found in the first chapter of *De Int.*, creating a role of concepts mediating between words and things: for this argument, cf. Griffin 2012a).

In conclusion, I briefly suggest how Boethus' view prevailed in later antiquity, among teachers of Alexander of Aphrodisias like Herminius, how it influenced Porphyry, and how later Neoplatonists entertained a position that Eudorus may have favoured, that the ten categories did offer a map of intelligible being and not merely of sensible being.³⁶ Eudorus took the view, I think, that the *ten categories* were correctly applicable to reality, but Aristotle's *description* of them (presumably in *Cat.*) was in some respects inadequate; see ch. 3.

³⁶ For the Neoplatonist discussion from Plotinus onward, see for example van den Berg 2008 and Chiaradonna 2002.

Goals, Methods, and Materials

There are several merits in such a close study of the testimonies to the reading of the *Categories* belonging to this era. One is the reconstitution of fragmentary evidence, which has not previously been comprehensively collected and analysed: the more time is spent combing through the later sources for (sometimes implicit) testimonia and imitations, the more information about the lost works might be obtained. Another is the influential nature of these early interpretations. At least as the later tradition beginning with Porphyry represents them, the commentators of the first and second centuries CE established the boundaries of how the *Categories* might be read, why it might be important, and what function it served within Aristotle's philosophy. Many of their ideas and arguments have been recapitulated throughout the tradition of subsequent commentary on the *Categories*, and recent scholarship is no exception. Moreover, there may be some room to point out places where the preconceptions of the first-century commentators, once these are identified, have continued to shape the readings of the text until the present. While such broad implications are partly outside the scope of this study, it is hoped that the analysis here may provide a useful basis for further research along these lines.

This study proceeds through a close study of the fragments and testimonia for several of the key personae spanning the period under consideration, in particular: Andronicus of Rhodes, Boethus of Sidon, Lucius, Nicostratus, Athenodorus, and L. Annaeus Cornutus. A briefer treatment is offered for several other personae, in particular: Eudorus of Alexandria, Ariston of Alexandria, 'Archytas', Aspasius, Adrastus, Taurus, Herminus, and Sosigenes. Several other Peripatetics, Stoics, and Platonists are treated in passing. The historical figures under consideration are listed fully below ('Personae'), and discussed in detail throughout the main body of the study.

The majority of the important philosophical fragments are drawn from the later Neoplatonic commentaries on the *Categories* in Greek: in particular, from Porphyry's shorter surviving commentary, from Dexippus' commentary (which, according to Simplicius, is effectively a selective rendition of two lost commentaries, namely Porphyry's longer *ad Gedalium* and Iamblichus *in Cat.*), from Simplicius' own commentary, and from the later Alexandrian commentaries, mainly those of Ammonius, Olympiodorus, and David (Elias). Simplicius'

voluminous surviving commentary is the backbone of these fragments, and often provides attributions where the others lack them. I have used a number of other sources in Greek for philosophical fragments and testimonia—Plutarch, Aspasius, and Plotinus, for example—but most of the earlier Greek texts, such as Strabo and Lucian, have been deployed for historical and biographical detail. In Latin, Boethius' commentaries have also proved to be a useful philosophical source, but most of the other Latin sources found in the Appendix—such as Cicero and Persius—have been deployed here just for historical and biographical detail. I have occasionally been able to draw on Arabic sources, as in the chapters on Andronicus and Herminius; in these cases, I have been reliant on editors' translations and previous commentators. At time of writing, I was not able to consult in detail the exciting new commentary on the *Categories* found in the Archimedes Palimpsest (Chiaradonna, Rashed, and Sedley 2013), although I have been able to make reference to a few supporting passages from the text.

Secondary literature is cited separately for each chapter and collected in the bibliography. Like all students of the Peripatetic tradition in the early empire, I am frequently indebted to Paul Moraux's foundational *Aristotelismus* I (1973) and II (1984), even (or especially) where I have ventured an alternative interpretation of the scarce evidence. Among more recent surveys of the period in question, I am especially reliant on those by Gottschalk (1987) and Sharples (2008, 2010). Schofield (2013) is an outstanding new contribution to the philosophical developments of the first century, which I have found very valuable in correcting and developing ideas developed in my earlier work (Griffin 2009). For the collection of Neoplatonic sources on Aristotle, I have made liberal use of the three-volume *Sourcebook* recently published by Richard Sorabji (2005), especially volume 3, for subjects as distant from each other (at least to the modern eye) as homonymy and Iamblichean 'noeric exegesis'. With respect to the Neoplatonic approach to Aristotle, I have also appreciated the perspectives of Ilsetraut Hadot (e.g., 1991) and Rainer Thiel (2004). More generally, I have been fortunate to rely on a number of penetrating essays in two recent survey volumes edited by Richard Sorabji and Robert Sharples (2007), among which I may mention in particular those by Barnes, Reinhardt, Sorabji, and Sharples, and in the earlier volume *Aristotle Transformed*, also edited by Richard Sorabji (1990). On subjects of Middle Platonism, I have

gained a great deal from the classic treatment of Dillon (1977, repr. 1996) and the more recent work of George Karamanolis (2006).

Where the fragments have demanded the traversal of difficult conceptual terrain, I have found a number of guides very useful; these are cited in the footnotes and bibliography as they occur, but here I can mention papers by Barnes and the seminal work of Patzig translated by him (for passages relating to the syllogism), several classic texts by Sorabji such as *Time, Creation, and the Continuum* (1983), Marwan Rashed's innovative *Essentialisme* (2007), and multiple articles on the Hellenistic theories of language in the volume *Language and Learning* (Frede and Inwood 2005). I have also found useful materials in the Australian 'Reception of Categories' project,³⁷ and I am grateful to Professor Harold Tarrant for drawing these materials to my attention, as well as sharing his own valuable survey (2008). Last but by no means least, I have profited greatly from the tremendous array of close commentaries and translations of nearly all of the source texts in the ever-growing *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* series now published by Bloomsbury Academic. Unless otherwise cited, translations from the commentators are from the *Ancient Commentators* series.

II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CATEGORIES

A short refresher on the content of the treatise *Categories* may be helpful before beginning this study of its reception. (See Appendix 3 for a fuller survey.) The *Categories* was divided into three sections, probably prior to Andronicus' publication,³⁸ and perhaps by an editor who compiled scraps of text from different places to create our treatise (cf. Frede 1987: 11–17):

- (1) The first section is traditionally called the **ante-praedicamenta** ('what comes before the predicates'). It includes (ch. 1) a description of three linguistic phenomena called homonymy (equivocity), synonymy (univocity), and paronymy, followed

³⁷ Accessed online at <<http://categories.org.au>>.

³⁸ Since Andronicus protested the attachment of the *postpraedicamenta*, and defended the inclusion of the *antepaedicamenta*. See below.

by (ch. 2) a twofold division of things said (*λεγόμενα*), based on whether they are said ‘without combination’ (nouns or verbs interpreted as significant in isolation) or ‘with combination’ (sentences). Next (ch. 3) comes a celebrated, fourfold division of beings (*ὄντα*) determined by their role in the predicate position of a sentence, where, roughly, they may either name a *kind* to which the subject belongs (in Aristotle’s language, be SAID-OF the subject), or name some property that inheres in the subject but is not its kind (be IN the subject, in a certain sense that Aristotle attempts to define technically). This section sparked many ancient debates and fruitful lines of inquiry. For example, (a) in ch. 2, the division of ‘things said’ and ‘things that are’ helped to fuel a debate over the proper subject of the *Categories*—words, concepts, or things?—which culminated in a compromise solution offered by Boethus of Sidon: the treatise concerns *semantics*, how words signify things. And (b) Andronicus of Rhodes, as I argue below (my ch. 2) found much use in the distinction between items SAID-OF and IN a subject, and leveraged this distinction to reinvigorate Aristotelian essentialism. This chapter, after all, suggests that there is something *essential* about kinds, and that one might be able to use predicative practices in natural languages as a kind of heuristic guide for recognizing the essences of things.

- (2) The second section is traditionally called the **praedicamenta** (‘predicates’ or ‘categories’). It includes (ch. 4) a list of ten ‘things said without combination’, roughly translatable as REALITY (for example, man, horse), QUANTITY (four-foot, five-foot), QUALITY (white), RELATIVE (double, half), WHERE (in the marketplace), WHEN (yesterday, last year), IN-POSITION (lying down), HAVING (shod, armed), ACTING (cutting, burning), and BEING-ACTED-ON (being cut, being burned): this has struck many readers as a list of the most universal, or ‘ultimate’, genera of being (a list which then ought to be distinguished carefully from the ten types of predicate that are sketched in *Topics* 1.9, with Frede 1987: 35–6, although our commentators were perhaps less sensitive to this distinction). The list is then followed by a sketch of distinguishing features of *some* of these, namely (ch. 5) REALITY, (ch. 6) QUANTITY, (ch. 7) RELATIVE (appearing out of order, compared to ch. 4),

(ch. 8) QUALITY, (ch. 9) ACTING and BEING-ACTED-ON. These ‘sketch accounts’ or *ὑπογραφαί* were (as I argue below, especially in chs. 2 and 5) understood by some ancient Peripatetics, like Andronicus, Boethus, and Herminius, as valuable tools used to ‘stir up’ our preconceptions (*προλήψεις*) of the highest genera, and therefore are especially useful for beginners to philosophy: this argument may have underwritten the case for the *Categories* as a novice’s introduction to the subject of philosophy. Be that as it may, Aristotle’s examinations of these individual categories attracted swathes of discussion in their own right, now largely preserved in Simplicius’ commentary; Boethus of Sidon, for instance, composed a whole book *On the Relative*. The praedicamenta conclude with a later interpolation briefly filling in the remaining categories and explaining that not much needs to be said about them. Perhaps the original manuscript trailed off here, and an editor felt compelled to insert a short passage explaining why.

- (3) The third section is called **the post-praedicamenta** (‘what comes after the predicates’), and includes (chs 10–15) relatively disconnected discussions of opposition, priority, simultaneity, movement, and the usage of the word ‘have’. Andronicus, as we will notice in ch. 2, treated the first two parts as a coherent and interdependent whole, but maintained that a later editor, who was confused, had added the final section to the treatise in error.

Appendix 3 outlines these sections in more detail. For a fuller treatment of the *Categories* itself readers may refer to a number of excellent introductions (including Bodéüs 2001: xi–clxxviii, Wedin 2000, and Ackrill 1963).

Part A

Rediscovery and Endorsement: Andronicus and Eudorus

Andronicus of Rhodes

In this chapter, I argue that a late ancient interpretation of the *Categories* can be traced to Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BCE. According to this interpretation, the treatise helps to train us in the demonstration of truth (ἀπὸ δειξίς), and not merely in the practice of persuasive rhetoric or dialectic.¹ Andronicus sought to breathe new life into Aristotle's vision of demonstrative science, and he found the *Categories* especially valuable for this function. In particular, Andronicus believed that the *Categories* helps us to distinguish *per se* predications whose subject and predicate both fall in the first category (for instance: 'Socrates is a man') from *per accidens* predications whose predicate falls in one of the non-substance categories (for instance: 'Socrates is pale', 'tall', or 'hungry').² The former, Andronicus argues, can be used to construct good definitions and so to engage in the rudiments of demonstration by way of division (διαίρεσις), while the latter cannot. This interpretation partially explains Andronicus' motivation for placing the treatise in so prominent a position in his catalogue of the Aristotelian corpus and rechristening it,

¹ The dichotomy between demonstration and persuasion was, I think, treated as exhaustive by Andronicus, following the Hellenistic tradition (compare Diogenes Laertius 5.28, discussed below: rhetoric and dialectic are treated as proper subdivisions of persuasion, and both as distinct from demonstration of the truth). If my interpretation is correct, Andronicus treats the *Topics* as concerned with the latter, and used the word 'dialectic' in the sense of DL 5.28, as a subdivision of persuasion, not in the Stoic sense, where it might include demonstrative proofs.

² Based on the examples that I draw from Boethius *De Div.* below, I think this argument was made primarily about the definition of substances (for example, 'man is an animal'); defining non-substances ('black is a colour') seems to have been regarded as less interesting by Andronicus, or at least is less represented in the fragmentary sources. As I also discuss below, Andronicus seems to have treated the first category as (more or less) a category of substance (οὐσίαι).

promoting the title *Categories* in place of the apparently earlier title *Before the Topics*.

I suggest that Andronicus found the *Categories* to be suitable for beginners in philosophy, primarily due to the relatively non-technical manner in which Aristotle wrote about the categories themselves—the central descriptions of the features of substances or real beings (ch. 5), quantities (ch. 6), relatives (ch. 7), qualities (ch. 8), and several other non-substance categories. I argue further that on Andronicus' view, the descriptions of the ten κατηγορίαι in the central chapters of the *Categories* articulate the beginner's innate preconceptions (προλήψεις) of the most general kinds of being. The *Categories* is particularly effective in this introductory capacity because it offers only ὑπογραφαί, 'sketch accounts' or 'delineations', of each genus rather than attempting to provide formal definitions (which would be difficult for the beginner, and impossible to provide for the highest genera). Thus pedagogical considerations, underwritten by a more or less Hellenistic epistemology, also underwrite Andronicus' value for the treatise. In addition, there is some pragmatic value in the *Categories* for use in debate: its ὑπογραφαί provide simple heuristics for checking the genus to which a given term belongs, enabling us to defeat various sophistical arguments that turn on equivocation by distinguishing clearly between essential and accidental modes of predication.

This way of exploiting the *Categories*, I think, helps to explain why Andronicus found the work interesting and relocated it to the front of his influential catalogue and publication of Aristotle's treatises. That relocation in turn drew attention to the work and spurred wider interest in it. I do not want to argue that Andronicus' substantive *ideas* about the treatise were *themselves* the source of that interest, but I do suggest that there are signs of engagement with Andronicus' thought in the contemporary and later exegetical tradition on the *Categories*. His interpretation may have been followed in the main by Boethus of Sidon (see ch. 6), and in turn influenced Porphyry and the later Neoplatonist tradition. I also argue in ch. 3 that there are signs of philosophical engagement with Andronicus in the evidence for Eudorus' interpretation of the *Categories* (and perhaps vice versa). And even if Andronicus did not think that the *Categories* was a work of ontology, his emphasis on the distinction that it drew—on his view—between talk of real beings (picked out through *per se* predication) and their accidents (picked out only in their relation to other

things) anticipates the ontological reading of the *Categories* that would become common even to the present.

I. LIFE AND HISTORY

Ἄνδρες δ' ἐγένοντο μνήμης ἄξιοι πολλοὶ στρατηλάται τε καὶ ἀθληταί, ὧν εἰσι καὶ οἱ Παναετίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόγονοι τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ λόγους καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὃ τε Παναίτιος αὐτὸς καὶ Στρατοκλῆς καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων καὶ Λεωνίδης ὁ στωικός.

Many men worthy of remembrance, commanders and athletes, were born [on Rhodes]. Among them are the forebears of Panaetius the philosopher. Among the statesmen, rhetoricians, and philosophers are Panaetius himself; Stratocles; Andronicus the Peripatetic; and Leonides the Stoic.

Strabo 14.2.13

Regrettably, we remember relatively little of Andronicus the Peripatetic, ἀνὴρ μνήμης ἄξιος.³ From Strabo we know that he was born on

³ For a review of Andronican studies for the better part of the twentieth century, see in particular P. Moraux, *Aristotelismus I* (Berlin, 1973), 45–141 and J. Barnes, 'Roman Aristotle', *Philosophia Togata II* (Oxford, 1997), 1–69. Now see also Sharples (2008), Hatzimichali (2013), and to Barnes, contrast Primavesi, 'Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: Vier Kaptiel zur frühen Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum' (2007). Formative treatments include F. Littig, *Andronicus von Rhodos*, 3 vols (Munich, 1890; Erlangen, 1894, 1895) and M. Plezia, *De Andronici Rhodii studiis Aristotelicis* (Cracow, 1946). See also E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, T. III: *Die Nacharistotelische Philosophie* (Fotomech, Nachdr. der 5. Aufl., Leipzig 1923), 1, 642 and following; K. O. Brink, 'Peripatos', *Paulys Realencyclopädie*, suppl. 7 (1940), cols. 899–949; I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957), 412–25; F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (2nd ed. Basel, 1967–9); H. B. Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD', *ANRW II.36.2* (1987), 1079–174, esp. 1097–120; R. Goulet in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* (Paris, 1989), 200–2; R. W. Sharples, 'The Peripatetic School', in D. J. Furley (ed.), *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol 2: *From Aristotle to Augustine* (London, 1997), 147–87; and L. Taràn's significant review of Moraux, 'Aristotelianism in the 1st century BC', in L. Taràn, *Collected Papers* (Leiden, 2001), 479–524. On the relationship of Andronicus *De Div.* to Boethius *De Div.*, see also G. Pfligersdorffer, 'Andronikos von Rhodos und die Postprädikamente bei Boethius', *Vig. Christ.* 7 (1953), 98–115 and J. Shiel, 'Boethius and Andronicos of Rhodes', *Vig. Christ.* 11 (1957), 179–85. On the work *de passionibus* ascribed to A., see A. Glibert-Thirry, *Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodos: Περὶ παθῶν = Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum*, suppl. 2 (Leiden, 1977).

Rhodes, a centre of Peripatetic learning since Eudemos; his later eponym δ ρ δ ι $\omicron$ ς (Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1, 9) is consistent with this origin, and his philosophical affiliation is suggested in epithets such as δ ϵ κ τ ω ν π ϵ ρ ι π α τ η τ ι κ $\omicron$ ς by Strabo, Galen (*An. Corp.* 4.782 Kühn), and Porphyry (*VP* 24,7). His work was sufficiently familiar to later Peripatetic commentators that he could be mentioned as $\text{\AA}$ ν δ ρ $\omicron$ ν ι κ $\omicron$ ς without prior introduction or qualification (Alexander *in An. Pr.* 161,1; Porphyry *in Cat.* 125,22), and his lucidity as an exegete of the Aristotelian text was respected in late antiquity, particularly following Porphyry: he wins praise from Themistius (*in De. An.* 32,22–4), and Ammonius refers to him as a successor to Aristotle in the Peripatetic scholarchate (*in De Int.* 5,29).⁴ The tradition about his scholarchate seems to presuppose a degree of respect for Andronicus as a Peripatetic philosopher, either from his contemporaries (if the testimony is literally accurate) or from Ammonius' later sources (if the testimony was invented, or a product of guesswork). The sources for Andronicus' life and thought extend from the first century BCE to the sixth century CE, with their focus shifting from (1) biography and bibliography with Strabo and Plutarch (I BCE–I CE)⁵ to (2) psychology with Galen, Aspasius, and Themistius (I–IV CE)⁶ before coming to

⁴ But the credibility of Ammonius' testimony has been doubted; elsewhere, he bestows the same number ('eleventh [scholarch] after Aristotle') on Boethus of Sidon (*in An. Pr.* 31,11): cf. Lynch (1972), 203–4 and Brink (1940), 938–40.

⁵ Strabo, the only contemporary source, mentions Andronicus as a 'noteworthy' Rhodian philosopher (14.2.13). A century later, Plutarch (*Sulla* 26.1–2) remarks on the reported role of Andronicus in the recovery and organization of the Aristotelian texts, completing the tale curiously left unfinished in (our text of) Strabo's thirteenth book (13.1.64). Later, Porphyry (*VP* 24.7) is clearly interested in Andronicus as a bibliographer of Aristotle, and renews Strabo's and Plutarch's intrigue with the fate of the Aristotelian and Theophrastan library and Andronicus' *pinakes*.

⁶ Galen (*Quod animi mores* 782,14) refers to an Andronican account of the soul as a 'blend' ($\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota\varsigma$) or 'power' of the body: as we shall see, this doctrine is plainly expressed in a Stoic context. The Christian apologist Hippolytus (if he is the author of *Ref.* 5.21.1–5) curiously notes Andronicus' doctrine of 'blending' as an authoritative resource for the Gnostic Sethians in describing the relationship of soul to matter. Aspasius (*in Eth.* 44,18–45,5) focuses on Andronicus' account of pathos as a *hypo-lēpsis* of the soul, echoed by the pseudo-Andronican *Peri Pathōn*, itself a highly Stoicizing work. In the fourth century, Themistius (*in An.* 31,1–32,34) provides a first-hand quotation from Andronicus in defence of Xenocrates' doctrine of the soul as a self-moving number. In this full paragraph Andronicus describes psychic $\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ in his own words, explaining that 'the [self-moving] soul is the cause of the blend' of 'the primary elements in accordance with specific ratios and numbers'.

rest upon (3) logic with Porphyry⁷ and the later Neoplatonists (III–VI CE).⁸

Andronicus is *μνήμης ἄξιος* because his name is attached to a prodigious expansion in the study of Aristotle's 'esoteric' texts during the first century BCE, whose causes are not yet clearly understood.⁹ (The label 'esoteric' applies to the technical treatises by Aristotle that we now possess, such as the *Topics* and *Physics*; it is used to contrast these treatises against Aristotle's 'exoteric', published *Dialogues*, which were popular in antiquity but have survived only in fragments. Andronicus himself, in drawing attention to a series of letters attributed to Aristotle, may have done something to popularize the distinction and privilege the esoteric texts).¹⁰ Andronicus' attachment

⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias (*in An. Pr.* I 160,28–161,1), with later sources such as Ammonius (*in De Int.* 5,28 and 7,13) and Philoponus (*in Cat.* 27,18–26 and 45,8–12), takes an interest in Andronicus' opinion, evidently unique in antiquity, that the *De Interpretatione* was not written by Aristotle. Porphyry famously develops an abiding interest in the *Categories*, and in this he seems to have taken his cue from Andronicus. Indeed Andronicus is quoted in Porphyry's commentary by *Question and Answer* (125,22); and Porphyry's full *Commentary on the Categories* addressed to Gedalius must have contained many more references, to judge by the array of named citations in Simplicius (including *in Cat.* 21,21–4; 26,17; 30,3; 54,8–21; 63,22–8; 134,5; 142,34–143,1; 144,7–15; 150,31–151,7; 153,29–155,2; 157,18–22; 159,32; 202,5; 214,22; 258,15; 163,19–22; 266,6; 269,21; 270,2; 332,15; 342,23; 347,6; 357,28; 359,16; 379,9–11; 385,3–9). The *De Divisione* of Boethius, which draws on an essay by Porphyry in his *Sophist* commentary, cites Andronicus and may be modelled on an Andronican publication of the same name (Andronici . . . de diuisione liber editus, 4,3–11 Magee).

⁸ We know that Iamblichus followed Porphyry's lead in commenting on the *Categories*, and a notice in Simplicius indicates that Iamblichus 'followed Andronicus' in at least one point of exegesis (*in Cat.* 144,7–14). Simplicius himself offers the most prolific preserved resource for Andronican doxography in his own *Commentary on the Categories*; Simplicius appears to be heavily dependent on Porphyry, and the names of Andronicus and Boethus do not frequently occur except in Porphyry's company. The later Neoplatonists, including John Philoponus (*in Cat.* 5,19) and Ammonius, offer some biographical details that have been doubted due to their late date, including Andronicus' putative scholarchate and his relationship to Boethus of Sidon.

⁹ See for example Moraux (1973) I; Gottschalk (1987), 1089–97; Tarán (1981); and Sharples (2008).

¹⁰ On the distinction between exoteric works and esoteric (or 'acroamatic') works, and their respective readership in the Hellenistic period, see for example Barnes 1997: 12–16; Hatzimichali 2013: 12, 26. There is already some evidence in Aristotle for the distinction, for instance in *Eudemian Ethics* 2.1 1218b34 ('All goods are either outside or in the soul, and of these those in the soul are more desirable; this distinction we make even in our popular discussions'). On the role of Andronicus' publication of the 'letters' in helping to cement the distinction and privilege the esoteric works, see

to the expansion of interest in Aristotle's 'esoteric' treatises is first explicitly attested, in our record, by Plutarch (*Sulla* 26); a century earlier, Strabo, while speaking in markedly similar terms (*Geog.* 13.1.54),¹¹ describes the sorry state of Aristotle's works in the hands of inferior booksellers, but stops short of mentioning the editorial rescue allegedly mounted by Andronicus¹²—whom Plutarch credits with a corrected, usable publication of Aristotle and Theophrastus. This collection served to revitalize a Peripatos previously incapacitated, on Strabo's account, by the loss of its founder's school texts. Coupled with the report of Porphyry (*VP* 24) that Andronicus organized the corpus into its contemporary form, these texts have traditionally substantiated the legend of a Roman 'critical edition' woven in Andronicus' hands, constituting the foundation of our modern Aristotle. The evidence for this tradition is scanty,¹³ especially if we understand textual criticism to be the central activity of an editor;¹⁴ but if we understand the cataloguing and organization of the Aristotelian canon as Andronicus' primary achievement, his claim to fame seems valid. This leads to the central point that I hope to highlight in the following sections: whatever the status of Andronicus' editorial achievement, his organization of the reading order of the Aristotelian treatises had a lasting impact, as Plutarch (*Sulla* 26.1–2) and Porphyry (*Life of Plotinus* 24.7) both attest. Andronicus' relocation of a (then little-known) Aristotelian treatise to the forefront of his catalogue deserves to be treated as an influential event in the history of philosophy.

Hatzimichali 2013: 26; Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights* 20.5) links Andronicus to the correspondence attributed to Aristotle. I am grateful to Stephen Menn for comments on an earlier draft that helped to clarify this issue.

¹¹ On the possibility of a common source, see Moraux I: 21–4, with Barnes 1999: 9, 19–20.

¹² Perhaps, as Barnes suggests, because the text is corrupt. In that case, Plutarch may be simply reporting Strabo. On the other hand, H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879) 216 proposed that Plutarch simply fabricated a connection between Strabo's Apellicon story and the fact that the current catalogue of the day carried the name of Andronicus. See Moraux I: 48 and following for discussion.

¹³ See Barnes (1997), with discussion below.

¹⁴ For the division of 'editorial' work into textual criticism and canon-organization, see Hatzimichali 2013:1, 18–23. Note for example that Andronicus did not read *λόγος τῆς οὐσίας* in the opening lines of the *Categories* (*in Cat.* 54,8–21: his text omits *τῆς οὐσίας*, perhaps in keeping with his wider point that predication of a subject is not limited to the first category), and was not followed in the later tradition.

When did Andronicus live and work? This is a knotty problem. It is widely agreed that he was active in the first century BCE. According to John Philoponus (*in Cat.* 5,16–19), Andronicus taught Boethus of Sidon, himself a ‘brilliant’ scholar (*θαυμάσιος*, Simplicius *in Cat.* 1,18) whose ‘quick-witted’ (*πολλῆς ἀγχινοίας*, 11,23) defences and exegeses of Aristotle’s *Categories* might appear, to a loyal reader of Simplicius, to have left his mysterious Platonizing opponent Lucius intellectually far behind. If we trust Philoponus, we can set a reasonably sure date for Andronicus’ activity. Boethus ‘philosophized with’ Strabo (*συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν*, *Geog.* 16.2.24) as a teacher or a fellow-student,¹⁵ and Strabo’s birth can be fixed around 63/64 BCE.¹⁶ That might place Boethus’ activity, as a student of Andronicus, not much before the middle of the first century BCE, and consequently establish Andronicus’ *floruit* around the late seventies (Moraux)¹⁷ or sixties (Gottschalk).¹⁸ (Boethus’ plain adaptation and defence of Andronicus’ definition of *pathos* (Aspasius *in Eth.* 44,24) lends weight, I think, to the biographical claim that he was Andronicus’ pupil.)

We might be reluctant to rely upon Philoponus’ isolated notice, however, which was composed centuries after the fact.¹⁹ Düring, following Brink,²⁰ would view Andronicus and Boethus as near contemporaries, and date Andronicus’ publication of Aristotle and Theophrastus around the thirties BCE: after all, Cicero would surely have mentioned Andronicus had a seminal Peripatetic publication circulated under his name before 43 BCE, yet Cicero calls another man, Cratippus of Pergamon,²¹ the leading Peripatetic in Athens (*Off.*

¹⁵ The ambiguity turns on the force of *συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν* + dat. in *ὃ συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν ἡμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια*; it could imply ‘as a teacher’, or ‘as a fellow-learner’.

¹⁶ On Strabo’s dates, see W. Aly, ‘Strabo (3)’, *Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* 4 (1932), 76–155.

¹⁷ P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 1, Berlin 1973, pp. 45–55.

¹⁸ H. B. Gottschalk, ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD’, in H. Temporini and W. Haase, *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, vol. 36. 2, Berlin 1987, pp. 1079–174, in particular pp. 1095–6.

¹⁹ It has been argued that the later Neoplatonists, such as Philoponus and Ammonius, really knew nothing about Andronicus, save what they read in the sources available to us: see L. Tarán, ‘Aristotelianism in the 1st century BC’, in Tarán, *Collected Papers*, Leiden/Köln/Boston 2001, pp. 479–524, in particular pp. 495–7.

²⁰ Düring (1957), 420–5 proposes a date between 40 and 20 BCE; for earlier views see C. O. Brink in *RE* suppl. 7 (1940), 938.

²¹ On Cratippus see Moraux I: 223–56.

1.1.1, 3.2.5; *Tim.* 1.1). Conversely, if Barnes (1997) is right to doubt whether Andronicus' work made any 'splash' at all during his lifetime, this line of reasoning loses its speculative bite; and Gottschalk (1987) casts doubt on it for other reasons. We shall return to this problem in more detail below.²²

Where did Andronicus do his research, after an early life presumably (on Strabo's testimony) occupied on Rhodes? If Ammonius of Alexandria is telling an historical truth when he claims the eleventh Peripatetic 'scholarchate' for Andronicus,²³ then it is possible to infer, with Gottschalk and others, that Andronicus' activity centred around Athens. Adopting the later chronology, it has been proposed that Strabo, Andronicus, and Boethus attended the same lectures,²⁴ and even met as young men in Alexandria, where Strabo spent time (2.3.5); perhaps it was there that Strabo heard Tyrannio at some point in the middle forties (cf. 12.3.16). But this is pure speculation. It had at one point seemed fairly clear that Andronicus had to visit Italy in order to produce his collection, the putative 'Roman edition' of Aristotle. However, it is not self-evident from Plutarch's text (*Sulla* 26) that Andronicus obtained physical access to the particular copies in Sulla's library, as Tyrannio did.

What we do learn from Plutarch's source, speaking in *oratio obliqua*, is that Andronicus had 'ready access' to the copies (*τὰ*

²² In this context (*De Off.* 1.1, 3.2) Cicero is praising a tutor who was 'like a father' to his son (cf. *Ad Tironem* xxi): even if word of Andronicus' work had already reached him at the time of this composition, and even if he viewed these improved texts as philosophically important, why should Cicero retail the scholarly merits of Cratippus' contemporaries or rivals here? There is no reason to suppose that one of the greatest contemporary Peripatetics (Cicero, *Tim.* 1.1), renowned as a teacher, would lose his mystique as soon as booksellers replaced Tyrannio's lousy text with a better edition. The argument *ex silentio* is more persuasive: but I do not see that an Andronican 'edition' or 'collection' could not have been published before 43 BCE just because Cicero fails to mention it (despite his readiness to give names); if Triclinius' groundbreaking work on Greek tragedy and comedy, fifteen centuries later, is a fair comparandum, it could easily take decades until a critical mass of scholars—the sources of the tradition reported by Strabo and Plutarch—recognized the importance of such a work of close philology. There seem to be two variables in play: (1) when Andronicus made his collection public, and (2) when the sources of the tradition reported by Strabo and Plutarch resolved that it was a superior text, and worthy of primary attention. I return to this point below.

²³ On which see Brink 1940: 938–40; against the report, see Lynch 1972: 203–4. Barnes (2007) discusses the issues without commitment, including Littig's simple, perhaps too simple, emendation at *in An. Pr.* 31,11.

²⁴ Düring (1957), 413, condemned by Barnes (1997: 3) as a 'garbled invention'.

ἀντίγραφα) from Tyrannio, and proceeded to publish them (put them εἰς μέσον), himself writing up (ἀναγράφαι) the catalogues current in Plutarch's day. This language might suggest, with room for uncertainty, that Andronicus spent time in Italy; but these ἀντίγραφα might just as well have been sent to him elsewhere, say, in Athens or even Rhodes. Following Gottschalk, one might imagine Andronicus making his copies in Italy, and elsewhere across the Aegean, before retiring to Athens, where his research rightly won over Ariston of Alexandria—who followed him on several points of interest in the exegesis of the *Categories*—as well as Cratippus of Pergamon from the Academy (although this should likely not be regarded as a traumatic 'apostasy' of any kind, but a natural development).²⁵ On the other hand, if Andronicus' research was not understood as epoch-making or even as especially important in his own lifetime, this story is evidently less attractive. It is also important to note that the very earliest signs of interest in Aristotle's 'esoteric' treatises (discussed above), including the antecedent efforts of Apellicon and Tyrannio, appear to predate Andronicus' activity.²⁶

II. WORKS AND EDITORIAL ACTIVITY: BEGINNING WITH THE *CATEGORIES*

A number of works have been attributed to Andronicus, including his catalogue of the treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus, a paraphrase of the *Categories*, a book *On Division* (which was read by Plotinus and Porphyry, and later on influenced Boethius through Porphyry), and a spurious, surviving treatise *Περὶ Παθῶν* (ed. Glibert-Thirry 1977).²⁷ But scholarly interest naturally focuses on reports of his 'Roman edition' of Aristotle. The available sources for this editorial activity can be read with varying results. Jonathan Barnes' scepticism about the sources is surely healthy,²⁸ and sounds a cautionary note about

²⁵ See Blank 2007: 92 and Chiaradonna 2013: 39–40, with Moraux 1973: 225–6 and Donini 1977: 247–8.

²⁶ For this point see Hatzimichali 2013: 17–18.

²⁷ For a brief review of these works with references, see Appendix 2.

²⁸ J. Barnes, 'Roman Aristotle', *Philosophia Togata* II (Oxford, 1999), esp. pp. 24–44.

the preconceptions latent in the earlier consensus broadly shared (with some differences) by Gottschalk, Düring, and Moraux.

Here I would like to focus on the evidence for the claim that Andronicus relocated the *Categories* in his catalogue of Aristotle's works, and that he had philosophical reasons for doing so. (A more detailed overview of the issues relating to the 'library' of Aristotle's esoteric works can be found in Appendix 2).²⁹ For these purposes, we can leave aside the attractive image of Andronicus as textual critic and compositor of treatises, and focus on his status as a publisher and a cataloguer, and most importantly organizer, of the corpus. The order in which Andronicus presented the works, and the arguments that he made in favour of that order, appear to have been among his most lasting contributions to Peripatetic thought. He certainly published a catalogue (πίνακες) of Aristotle and Theophrastus. It was the source of the catalogues current in Plutarch's day, on the cusp of the second century (τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας, *Sulla* 26.1–2), and it would function as an influential model for Porphyry in the third century, as discussed below. The catalogue of 'Ptolemy the Unknown'³⁰ shows that a catalogue carrying Andronicus' name also possessed 'canonical' status in Ptolemy's own lifetime (whenever that might have been), and that it was not like the Hellenistic catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.22–27)—which, notably, omits our *Categories* (under that title) altogether.³¹

More than a century after Plutarch, Andronicus' stylistic example was followed by Porphyry—and presented, as the *Life of Plotinus* (24.7) implies, in order to underwrite and *justify* Porphyry's own approach to the *Enneads*. Porphyry famously observed that he followed Andronicus who 'divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises and collected related material together' (τὰ

²⁹ If indeed there was a single library: see Y.L. Too, *The Idea of the Library in the Ancient World* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 25–31. Natali and Hutchinson (2013: 101–4) offers a clear summary of the story of Aristotle's library.

³⁰ See the edition of the catalogue of Ptolemy by Hein (1985); I am indebted to Stephen Menn for pointing me to this work. The name 'Ptolemy the Unknown' or 'the Stranger' likely derives from the misunderstanding of Πτολεμαῖος Χένος as Πτολεμαῖος Ξένος; see Rashed 2005: ccvii, Hatzimichali 2013: 19 n. 57. The catalogue had at least five books, if not more (see item 97 in Düring 1957: 230); Littig 1894: 18–25 offers a reconstruction, and Plezia 1946: 16–35 studies it in detail, as does Moraux 1973: 58–94. For the importance of Diogenes' catalogue, and the fact that it is more than a mere 'library list', see Hatzimichali 2013: 23–4.

³¹ See Moraux 1951: 131, Düring 1957: 69, and Gottschalk 1987: 1103.

Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διείλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγόν). This does not mean that Andronicus invented treatises by pulling together previously unrelated material and adding bridge passages, but that he pulled related treatises together, and within each collection organized the treatises, likely in such a way that easier or 'lighter' material came first (as Porphyry characterized his own practice: ἐκάστη δὲ ἐννεάδι τὰ οἰκεία φέρων συνεφόρησα δὺς καὶ τάξιν πρῶτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, 24.14–16). This final point, I think, deserves somewhat greater emphasis than it usually receives: giving τάξιν πρῶτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, the *starting* position to the *lighter* material, is also the reasoning that Porphyry endorses in explaining the location of the *Categories* at the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum (in *Cat.* 59,21–22), and the argument that Porphyry provides for the introductory nature of his own *Isagoge* (1,8–9) as a precursor to the study of categories (εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν, 1,2–3).

We can infer from later reports that Andronicus' catalogue opened with the *Categories* and the other books that comprise the *Organon* (probably including *De Interpretatione*, although this may have carried a mark of dubious authorship),³² and that here, or elsewhere, Andronicus provided some justifications for the position of 'logic' at the propylaea of Aristotelian studies (discussed below); this organization of the corpus was also to prove influential. Indeed, it was one area where the later tradition, including Porphyry and the Neoplatonists, favoured Andronicus' view over that of his 'pupil' Boethus (cf. Philop. in *Cat.* 5,15–20), who recommended commencing the study of Aristotle with physics. As we have at least some evidence that Andronicus felt the need to *argue for* the usefulness and importance of logic in his effort to build an Aristotelian 'system' based on the corpus, we may infer that this was not taken for granted, and that Andronicus played something of an original role in asserting (or reasserting) the importance of logic in Peripateticism, and of

³² Andronicus might have included *De Int.* in his catalogue, and maintained its usefulness, while 'athetizing' it as the work of another author. That is, he might consistently have endorsed the views represented in *De Int.* as useful and integral to the project of the *Organon*, while denying that Aristotle wrote it. In this context, it is worth considering that Andronicus did not think that the truth was coextensive with Aristotle's written views: for instance, Andronicus appears to have disagreed with Aristotle concerning the names and functions of the categories 'where' and 'when'.

Peripatetic logic in general. This would be supported by the evidence that Andronicus paid special attention to the *Categories*, if this is not merely an artifact of the later sources.³³

III. ANDRONICUS ON THE CATEGORIES

Next is the third heading, where in Aristotle's writings one should start. Well, Boethus of Sidon says that one should always start from the treatment of physics, since this is more familiar and knowable for us, and one should start from the things that are more clear and knowable. But his teacher, Andronicus of Rhodes, examining [the issue] more exactly, said that one should first begin with logic, which is concerned with demonstration. (Philoponus, *in Cat.* 5,15–20, tr. Sharples 2010, lightly modified)³⁴

When Andronicus and his pupil Boethus defended their respective teaching routines, it was a commonplace that philosophical discourse (ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος) fell naturally into three provinces: logic, ethics, and physics.³⁵ Antiochus of Ascalon had traced the tripartition to the Old Academy in the fourth century BCE (Cicero, *Ac.* 1.19; for the attribution to Xenocrates, see also Sextus, *Adv. Math.* 7.16).³⁶ But its lasting influence was mediated by the Hellenistic Stoa,³⁷ where the

³³ We are aware that Andronicus provided a 'paraphrase' of the *Categories* (so Porphyry via Simplicius: *in Cat.* 26,17, 30,3), and we are not directly aware of any other such 'paraphrases'; this may merely be an accident of preservation, but in other cases where Andronicus' 'readings' are cited, such as the *Physics* (cf. Simplic. *in Phys.* 440,13), it appears that Andronicus has offered a reading of the Aristotelian text rather than an interpretive paraphrase. This too might suggest some special concern with logic.

³⁴ Τρίτον ἦν ἐφεξῆς κεφάλαιον τὸ πόθεν δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων. Βόηθος μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Σιδώνιος δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἄρχεσθαι πραγματείας ἅτε ἡμῖν συνηθεστέρας καὶ γνωρίμου, δεῖν δὲ αἰὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σαφεστέρων ἄρχεσθαι καὶ γνωρίμων. ὁ δὲ τούτου διδάσκαλος Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ρόδιος ἀκριβέστερον ἐξετάζων ἔλεγε χρῆναι πρότερον ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἄρχεσθαι, ἥτις περὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καταγίνεται (ed. Busse 1898).

³⁵ See for example Ierodiakonou 1993. Aristotle divides ethical, physical, and logical propositions at *Topics* 1.14 (105b19 ff.).

³⁶ Although Sextus may be partially dependent on Antiochus in some of his doxography. See Sedley 2012: 88–93 (and against this Brittain in Sedley 2012: 108–13).

³⁷ DL 7.39–41/LS 26B. Academics used sceptical puzzles to undermine the foundations of 'logic'; Peripatetics treated it as a *tool* (*organon*) of theoretical and practical

order of study had also attracted healthy debate: Zeno and Chrysippus, for instance, had introduced philosophy with logic, Panaetius and Posidonius with physics. Colourful analogies competed in support of each position, as philosophy was represented as an egg with logic for its shell, or a living being with physics for its flesh.

Andronicus would not have accepted the tripartition in such terms, since he treated logic as a tool serving philosophical inquiry rather than a proper part of it (see below). Nevertheless, in disputing the order of study Andronicus and Boethus were both conscious of contributing new arguments to an old debate. Boethus' case against Andronicus builds on Aristotle's text (λέξις)—a characteristically Boethian strategy. The quest to understand principles, as Aristotle suggests, begins from what is familiar to us, and proceeds toward what is knowable by nature (see for example *Physics* A.1 184a17–21),³⁸ a course that runs from the particular and perceptible toward the universal and intelligible (*An. Post.* A.2, 71b33–72a5). The particular and perceptible objects of physics (and of the *Physics*) are undeniably *σαφέστερος* and *γνώριμος*. So we should begin there.³⁹

Andronicus, on the other hand, seems to have argued for logic's pedagogical priority based on the familiar Peripatetic characterization of logic (cf. DL 5.28) as an instrument or tool (*ὄργανον*):

[W]here to start on Aristotle's writings . . . Andronicus of Rhodes, the eleventh of the successive heads of the Aristotelian school, said with logic . . . Those who said that one should begin with logic asserted that logic is an instrument (*organon*), and that one should first know the instrument and then, on this basis, where the instrument should be used. For that is how it is in the case of the crafts; the trainee carpenter first learns the *organa*, for example the augur and the gimlet, and then

philosophy rather than a proper *part* (cf. DL 5.28); and Epicureans simply denied that it had any real function (e.g. Cicero, *Ac.* 2.97).

³⁸ See Sharples (2010), 43.

³⁹ Andronicus might also have summoned up some textual support for his alternative view: *Metaphysics* Z.4–5, for instance, might be interpreted as suggesting that logical (*logikōs*) considerations are more 'knowable to us' and are the natural place to begin philosophical inquiry (1029b7–13). But there is no evidence that Andronicus relied on such textual authority; cf. Peramatzis 164. The *Topics* also presents dialectic as useful to a wide range of disciplines: *περί παντός τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων* . . . (A.1, 100a18–24).

on this basis begins on the [craft] of carpentry itself. (Elias, *in Cat.* 117,17–118,31, tr. Sharples 2010)⁴⁰

That analogy, though firmly rejected by the Stoics,⁴¹ illustrated a carefully considered Peripatetic position⁴² that probably developed in response to Stoic doctrine.⁴³ The analogy highlights a preference for developing logic just so far as it is *useful* (χρήσιμον: cf. Alex. *in An. Pr.* 2,35–4,29) to two real domains of philosophical inquiry, namely practical and theoretical philosophy, while stopping short of Stoic hair-splitting and empty formalism.

Like these Peripatetics, and like Antiochus of Ascalon earlier in the first century (cf. Cic. *Ac.* 1.30–32, 2.91–92), Andronicus' interest also

⁴⁰ τίς ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων... Ἀνδρόνικος δὲ ὁ Ῥόδιος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ὁ ἐνδέκατος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους σχολῆς ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἔλεγε... οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἀρχεσθαι ἔφασκον ὅτι ὄργανον (20) ἡ λογικὴ καὶ δεῖ πρῶτον εἰδέναι τὸ ὄργανον καὶ εἶθ' οὕτως ποῦ δεῖ χρῆσασθαι τῶ ὀργάνῳ· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ βαναύσων τεχνῶν ἔχει· ὁ γὰρ φοιτήσας εἰς τέκτονα πρῶτον μανθάνει τὰ ὄργανα, οἷον τρύπανον τέρετρον, καὶ εἶθ' οὕτως ἀρχεται αὐτῆς τῆς τεκτονικῆς (ed. Busse 1900).

⁴¹ Generations of Stoics had already rejected the general thrust of this Peripatetic argument, denying that logic was merely an instrument (e.g. LS 26E): instead, it was the child of mother philosophy; or the shell of an egg; or the wall of a garden; or the bones of a living being.

⁴² The view that logic was a tool of philosophy seems fairly unlikely to have originated with Andronicus, as Gottschalk (1990: 66 and 1987: 1099) suggests, if the Stoics considered and refuted the possibility, and especially if the doxography in DL 5 is Hellenistic.

⁴³ Alexander's treatment in the preface to his commentary on the *Prior Analytics* (1,3–2,34) might suggest that the exchange ran along the following lines: Zeno (who took logic to be a part of philosophy: DL 7.39) resisted an earlier Peripatetic systematization that subsumed logic under theoretical philosophy, by objecting that the subject-matter proper to logic was independent (1,10–2,2); the Peripatetics in their turn introduced their 'instrumental' language (*organon* not being deployed in this sense by Aristotle, at least in his school-treatises—unless, as Barnes et al. point out, *Topics* 163b9–11 provided them with inspiration) and maintained against the Stoa that logic was not an independent object of study, because it served a useful *purpose* apart from itself, as a hammer facilitates carpentry but is not a *part* of carpentry; the Stoa rejoined that philosophy *produces* logic as a parent produces a child (Ammonius *in An. Pr.* 8,20–22, 9,1–2 = LS 26E), whereas tools are not the *product* of the crafts which they serve; to which the Peripatetics replied that nothing in fact prevents a tool from being the product of its own craft, still maintaining the inclusion of logic under theoretical philosophy (where the doxography in DL 5 still finds it). The course of the debate—and its reliance on the details of an analogy—may seem a little silly and tendentious, but it does encode a crucial point: the Peripatetics felt that logical formalism, pursued too far in its own right (on the perceived line of the Stoics), could become empty and useless if it was divorced too far from its *purpose*. See also Sharples et al. Theophrastus 31.

ran toward the *utility* of logic (the demonstrative sort of logic that Antiochus called ‘dialectic’, although Andronicus likely reserved that title for the practice of the *Topics*).⁴⁴ What exactly was logic useful for? Hellenistic Peripatetics had developed the view that logic served two functions, namely persuasion and judgement; so runs the (probably Hellenistic) doxography in Diogenes Laertius:

Logic is developed . . . as a tool (*ὄργανον*). [Aristotle] clearly proposed that it has two goals, what is persuasive and what is true. He used two capacities for each of these, dialectic and rhetoric for what is persuasive, analytic and philosophy for what is true . . . With a view to discovery, he handed down [to us, in] the *Topics* and *Methodics*, a multiplicity of premises, from which one may have an abundance of persuasive arguments . . . For judgement [he handed down] the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*. (DL 5.28)⁴⁵

Andronicus, as we shall see below, appears to have divided logic along similar lines (for he argued that a logical treatise by Aristotle, the *Categories*, must belong either to dialectic or to demonstration, but not to both). According to such a view, if you divide *logos* in two you will find persuasive speaking, on the one hand, and demonstrative proof, on the other; a Peripatetically minded student with access to Aristotle’s school-treatises might choose to study the *Topics* for the first, and the *Analytics* for the second.

⁴⁴ As an essential ‘judge of truth and falsehood’; similar views can be found (for example) in Simplicius’ commentary on the *Categories*. Thus, for example, Andronicus celebrated the utility of division (*diairesis*) as it was practised by the Peripatetics, and Porphyry followed him (Boethius *De Div.* 875D): ‘Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia dividendi, quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam, semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronici, diligentissimi senis, de divisione liber editus . . .’

⁴⁵ Καὶ τοσαῦτα μὲν αὐτῷ πεπραγμέναι βιβλία. βούλεται δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τάδε· διττὸν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον, τὸν μὲν πρακτικόν, τὸν δὲ θεωρητικόν· καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸν τε ἡθικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν, οὗ τὰ τε περὶ πόλιν καὶ τὰ περὶ οἶκον ὑπογεγράφθαι· τοῦ δὲ θεωρητικοῦ τὸν τε φυσικὸν καὶ λογικόν, οὗ τὸ λογικὸν οὐχ (5) ὡς ὅλου μέρος, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὄργανον προσηκριβωμένον. καὶ τούτου διττοὺς ὑποθέμενος σκοποὺς τὸ τε πιθανόν καὶ τὸ ἀληθές διεσάφησε. δύο δὲ πρὸς ἑκάτερον δυνάμειν ἐχρήσατο, διαλεκτικὴ μὲν καὶ ῥητορικὴ πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀναλυτικὴ δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία πρὸς τὸ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν ὑπολειπόμενος οὔτε τῶν πρὸς εὖρεσιν, οὔτε (10) (29.) τῶν πρὸς κρίσιν, οὔτε μὴν τῶν πρὸς χρήσιν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν εὖρεσιν τὰ τε Τοπικά καὶ Μεθοδικὰ παρέδωκε <καὶ> προτάσεων πλῆθος, ἐξ ὧν πρὸς τὰ προβλήματα πιθανὸν ἐπιχειρημάτων οἶόν τε εὐπορεῖν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν κρίσιν τὰ Ἀναλυτικά πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα (ed. Long 1964).

1. The *Categories* introduces demonstration, not dialectic

Bearing in mind this division of persuasive dialectic from rigorous proof, we can trace a more sophisticated complex of concerns running behind Andronicus' organization of the *Organon*, concerns which are reflected in Philoponus' comment that Andronicus began philosophy from 'logic, which is concerned with demonstration (ἀποδείξις)' (in *Cat.* 5,15–20). Andronicus' basic concern, I think, is suggested by his attempt to dissociate the *Categories* from the *Topics* and dialectic, and associate the treatise instead with the *Analytics* and demonstration.

During his researches into Aristotelian manuscripts, Andronicus found something like our text of the *Categories* prepended to Aristotle's *Topics* and entitled 'Preliminary to the *Topics*'.⁴⁶ This title and positioning struck him as a mistake, made by the same troublemaker who

entitled this book *Preliminary to the Topics* because he thought these things [the post-praedicamenta⁴⁷ beginning at *Cat.* 10, 11b17 discussing opposition, priority and posteriority, simultaneity, change, and the senses of 'having'] necessary for that work [*Top.*] in the same way as the *Categories* themselves help with understanding the *Topics* . . . Thus far Andronicus.⁴⁸ (ap. Boethius in *Cat.* 263B, tr. Sharples 2010: 48)

Andronicus reasonably replied that the *Topics* already has an introduction and does not need another one. More surprisingly, he also contended that association with the *Topics* ran 'against the purpose (παρὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν)⁴⁹ of the book that he would retitle *Predictions*

⁴⁶ Πρὸ τῶν τόπων: Simplicius in *Cat.* 379,9–11; cf. Πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν at 15,30, 16,14 and Porphy. in *Cat.* 57,13.

⁴⁷ So called because they follow after (post) the central list of ten categories (praedicamenta).

⁴⁸ qui hunc libellum Ante Topica <in>scripserit, quod haec ad illud opus necessaria esse putaverit sicut ipsae Categoriae prosint ad scientiam Topicorum . . . Sed haec Andronicus (after Shiel 1957 and Moraux 1973: 100 n. 12, correcting Migne 1891).

⁴⁹ Prothesis, which Porphyry seems to have used in the same sense as Iamblichus' later prevalent *skopos*, is an Aristotelian usage: for example, the *Topics* plainly proclaims that its *prothesis* is 'to discover a method by which we will be able to syllogize from *endoxa* about every problem we encounter . . .' (A, 100a18–20); in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle considers that he will accomplish his *prothesis* when he has gone through each of the subjects he promised to discuss (957a30); and the *Categories* itself uses the word in a somewhat similar sense ('someone might say' that Aristotle has gotten off the beaten track by discussing relatives when 'we proposed to discuss quality [ὅπερ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους, 11a20–1]').

or *Categories* (Simplic. in *Cat.* 379,9–10), perhaps in order to emphasize its role as a training-text in predication, itself a propaedeutic to division and demonstration. His latter remark invites scrutiny: while it is easy to grant to Andronicus that the *Categories* was not written for the purpose of introducing the *Topics*, it is odd to conclude that the *Topics* is irrelevant or somehow distracting from the purpose of the *Categories*. The *Categories*, after all, could be read as an elementary handbook for an important component of the practice that Aristotle calls ‘dialectic’ in the *Topics*: it offers intuitive tests for establishing under which genus any term falls.⁵⁰

A parallel passage in Porphyry’s shorter surviving commentary on the *Categories*, I think, expresses what Andronicus had in mind (56,22–31):

It would be absurd to call the book *Introduction to the Topics*, for why call it *Introduction to the Topics* rather than *Introduction to the Analytics* or *Introduction to On Interpretation*? It is not for the sake of studying the *Topics* that one first has to learn about predications (κατηγορίαι), but also for the sake of learning about the *Analytics* and about categorical propositions and just about any other subject. This work is the most elementary one, and serves as an introduction to all the parts of philosophy.⁵¹

Some later Peripatetics rejected this view and defended the title *Πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν*.⁵² But this passage and its counterparts in Simplicius and Boethius seem like (a precis of) the only serious argument preserved *against* that title.⁵³ Andronicus appears to be the strongest

⁵⁰ On the association, see Menn 1995, Bodéüs 2001: lxiv–lxxxix.

⁵¹ *Πρὸ μὲν τῶν τοπικῶν ἀτόπως ἂν τις ἐπιγράφοι· διὰ τί γὰρ Πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον Πρὸ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν καὶ Πρὸ τοῦ περὶ ἐρμηνείας; οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν τῶν τοπικῶν διδασκαλίαν προμανθάνειν δεῖ τὰ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν κατηγορικῶν προτάσεων μάθῃσιν καὶ σχεδὸν διὰ τὰς ἄλλας πᾶσας μαθήσεις· στοιχειωδέστατον γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ εἰσαγωγικὸν εἰς πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ βιβλίον. καὶ μάλιστα πρὸ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἂν εἴη μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἢ πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν· φύσεως γὰρ ἔργον οὐσία, ποῖον καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Περὶ δὲ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν οὐδαμῶς χρὴ ἐπιγράφεω (ed. Bodéüs 2008).*

⁵² See Simplicius’ discussion at in *Cat.* 15,26–16,5, and Elias in *Cat.* 241,30.

⁵³ On Porphyry’s view, the preliminary study of predications is useful *both* for the *Analytics* and the *Topics*. Andronicus would presumably have allowed this as well: it would have been very odd for him to insist that the study of predications was useful *only* for the *Analytics*. But he clearly rejected an exclusivist position that the study of predications was useful *only* for the *Topics*. (It is not clear that anyone ever held such a position, but Andronicus took some such argument to underwrite the title *Before the Topics*.) For Andronicus’ role in the title controversy, see Bodéüs (2001: xxv). The

candidate for the origin of the argument,⁵⁴ although Porphyry does not name him here.⁵⁵ The point is simply that the *Categories* is not (only or primarily) an introduction to the *Topics*' dialectic, the art of reasoning from plausible *endoxa* without self-contradiction. Instead, its primary function is to introduce demonstrative argument—that is, the *Analytics*. It is not yet clear why this should be so, but it does seem clear that Andronicus wishes to associate the *Categories* with demonstration and to dissociate it from dialectic, or anything else 'against its purpose' (Simplic. *in Cat.* 379,9–10), perhaps including rhetorical uses more broadly. (Indeed, the list of ten categories may well have been in rhetorical use already.)⁵⁶

Furthermore, there seems to be a good deal at stake for Andronicus pedagogically in this association, since he thinks that philosophy begins with logic precisely because logic includes an education in demonstration (Philop. *in Cat.* 5,19), and that training in this 'tool' will enable us to apply judgement and discover the truth in theoretical and practical philosophy (for this view, cf. Simplicius *in Cat.* 6,4–5,

argument is matched, with trivial variations, at Simplic. *in Cat.* 15,26–35 (and, renewed in response to Adrastus, from 15,36–16,16), and Boethius *in Cat.* 162C–D, 263B, etc.

⁵⁴ Andronicus, one might suggest, must have offered an argument; if he offered the only argument in the tradition, this is it; if someone else offered an importantly different argument, we could reasonably expect to find them both preserved, but this is all we find.

⁵⁵ Porphyry here mentions *On Interpretation*, which Andronicus athetized; but the substance of the argument has nothing to do with *De Int.*, focusing instead on the function of *Cat.* as an introduction to the *Analytics* and demonstration, designedly contrasted against the *Topics* and dialectic. It is also worth noting that *De Int.* is mentioned *after* the *Analytics* here and in the parallel passages; if Andronicus had argued that the *Cat.* constituted a good argument to the *Analytics* and demonstration, a later commentator steeped in the tradition that embraced *De Int.* between *Cat.* and *An.* might easily have added '... or Introduction to *On Interpretation*' to the skeleton of Andronicus' case against the title *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων*. (It might also be added that Andronicus only marked the *De Int.*'s authorship as questionable: he would not have deleted it from his catalogue, and he need not have deleted it from his logical curriculum; he was, after all, prepared to introduce other non-Aristotelian innovations.) It is perhaps interesting to note that the *De Int.* itself has been read as a work primarily about dialectic and the study of contradictory premises; if Andronicus interpreted it along similar lines, he might have supposed it had no place between *Categories* and *Analytics*, both being concerned with demonstration and not with dialectic.

⁵⁶ Quintilian, at least, bears witness that the list of categories were in rhetorical use close to Andronicus' lifetime: *Inst.* 3.23–34. cf. Bodéüs 2001: xxii.

Ammonius 6,3–8, Olympiodorus 9,9–11), whereas dialectic will be less useful for this function. Thus Andronicus, like many later students of Aristotle, strives to highlight a method ‘stronger’ than dialectic in Aristotle.⁵⁷

Can we obtain any insight into the reasons behind Andronicus’ association of the *Categories* with demonstration? First, to set the scene, we should notice that the endorsement of logical demonstration as a way to the truth, emphasizing division and definition, was a long-lasting Stoic commonplace. The Stoics had championed the value of dialectic through the Hellenistic period, including ‘definition and division and neat syllogistic proof’ (e.g. Cicero *Ac.* 1.5), in order to get at the truth of things. Antiochus endorsed this Stoic methodology and wrapped it into the collective practice that he attributes to the ‘Old Academy’, embracing Plato and Aristotle as well as the Stoics themselves (Cicero, *Ac.* 1.30–2; cf. Karamanolis 2006, 62–71); Antiochus stressed how the followers of Plato pursued definitions, and etymology, in order to obtain more certain knowledge (*scientia*) than was unavailable in the transient realm of particular things.⁵⁸ (Cicero, speaking on behalf of Philonian scepticism, believes that sophistical puzzles turning on ambiguity represent a serious challenge to the Antiochean celebration of dialectic. Similar puzzles resurface later in criticism of the *Categories*.)⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Compare for example Irwin 1988, who distinguishes between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ dialectic.

⁵⁸ Cicero introduces the notion of species (*idea*) and explains that the ‘Old Academics’—including Platonists and Aristotelians—‘approved the method of defining things’ (*definitiones rerum*) in order to gain knowledge (*scientia*) unavailable from the transient world of particulars, and thus ‘approved the explication of words (*verborum explicatio*), the statement of the reason why each class of things bears the name that it does—the subject termed by them *etymologia* . . . and under this head was imparted their whole discipline of Dialectic’ (tr. Rackham/van den Berg 2008).

⁵⁹ Cicero offers the following reply to this Antiochean celebration of dialectic. The pro-dialectic crowd, he suggests, has not yet managed to resolve sophistical puzzles turning on ambiguity—such as the sophistical syllogism proposing that a coat is manly, but being manly is brave, so a coat is brave—nor puzzles turning on equivocation, nor old chestnuts like the liar or sorites, nor other cases of ambiguity, in response to which Chrysippus had famously advocated a policy of ‘quiescence’ (*ἡσυχάζειν*): *Ac.* 2.92–6 = LS 37H; cf. Atherton 1993, 180–3, and Bobzien 2005 for the Stoic response to puzzles of this kind. Note that Nicostratus cites such a puzzle against the *Categories* in the newly discovered fragmentary commentary (Chiaradonna, Rashed, Sedley, and Tchernetska 2013, 1,26–3,1).

Andronicus will inhabit this Antiochean atmosphere,⁶⁰ exhibiting confidence in the value of dialectic and division, and demonstration, and tracing these methods to the ancient authority of the Old Academy. Andronicus too is sympathetic to the methods of dialectic in this Stoic sense,⁶¹ and particularly *divisio* or *διαίρεσις*, as we have seen both in the Greek sources and will see below in Boethius (*De Divisione*). Andronicus is also explicitly sympathetic to some views adopted by the Old Academic Xenocrates (cf. Simplic. *in Cat.* 63,22–8, Themistius *in De An.* 31,1–32,34). In the generations following Andronicus, however, there is something new, not (so far as our evidence suggests) to be found in Antiochus: where the virtues of division and demonstration are extolled, the ‘ten categories’ are now described a crucial tool, whose value was anticipated by *both* Plato and Aristotle. Plutarch (perhaps drawing here on Eudorus of Alexandria) and Alcinous offer illustrative examples of this development:

Again he [Plato] gives indications of the ten categories both in the Parmenides and elsewhere, and in the Cratylus he goes thoroughly into the whole topic of etymology. In general, the man was supremely competent in, and a connoisseur of, the procedures of definition, division <and analysis>, all of which demonstrate particularly well the power of dialectic. [...] The imposition of names is according to the nature (*φύσις*) of the reality (*πράγμα*). [...] The name is an instrument which teaches about and divides the essence of each reality, as the shuttle does for the weaving of cloth [cf. *Cratylus* 388B13–C1].⁶² (Alcinous, *Didasc.* 6, 159,43–160,30, tr. Dillon, 1993).

Not only do the souls of mortal beings possess the capacity to know the sensible (*γνωστικὴν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ δύναμιν*), but [Plato] adds that the

⁶⁰ For Antiochus and his ‘Platonism’, see Chiaradonna 2013, Bonazzi 2012, and for an overview of his philosophy in general terms Sedley 2012. For Antiochus’ possible influence on Andronicus, see Donini 1982: 83–4 and 90–1 on Andronicus’ ‘Platonism’; for general similarities between Andronicus, Boethus, and Antiochus, see Karamanolis 2006: 82.

⁶¹ On Stoic dialectic, see LS 31; for the Stoics’ treatment of earlier ‘dialectic’, see Brunschwig 1991.

⁶² Καὶ μὲν τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ἐν τῷ Παρμενίδῃ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπέδειξε, τὸν ἐτυμολογικὸν τε τόπον ὅλον ἐν τῷ Κρατύλῳ διεξέρχεται· ἀπλῶς δὲ ἱκανώτατος ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ θαυμαστῆς τῆς τε ὀριστικῆς καὶ διαιρετικῆς πραγματείας, αἱ πᾶσαι δείκνυνται μάλιστα τὴν δύναμιν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς [...] ὥστε εἶναι παντὸς ὄνομα κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῇ τοῦ πράγματος φύσει κείμενον [...] Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα ὄργανον πράγματος οὐχ ὁ ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατάλληλον τῇ φύσει· καὶ διὰ τούτου διδάσκουμεν ἀλλήλους τὰ πράγματα καὶ διακρίνομεν αὐτά, ὥστε εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα διδασκαλικόν τι καὶ διακριτικόν τῆς ἐκάστου οὐσίας ὄργανον, ὡς ἡ κερκὶς τοῦ ὑφάσματος (ed. Whittaker 1990).

soul of the cosmos—whenever she touches the scattered being or the undivided being of anything—is moved throughout her entire being and announces what the object is identical with, and from what it is different, and in what relation (*πρὸς τί*), and where and how, and when, it comes about that each thing exists (*εἶναι*) and is acted upon by others (*πάσχειν*), both in the sphere of becoming and in that of the ever-one. In these words he is also giving an outline of the ten categories; likewise in what follows, he makes the case more clearly . . . ⁶³ (Plutarch, *de proc. an.* 1023D–E)⁶⁴

There is at least a *prima facie* case that Andronicus may have played a role in this development, absent in Antiochus but growingly important in the following generations, by ‘foregrounding’ the *Categories* in his catalogue of Aristotle’s technical treatises, representing it as a crucial tool for demonstration and division. I think that this case can be strengthened and clarified by exploring the role that division plays in Andronicus’ view of demonstration.

2. The *Categories* introduces demonstration by cultivating the use of division to construct essential definitions

This section falls into two parts. (a) In the first part, I offer a more general exploration of the fragmentary sources for Andronicus’ interest in the value of division, focusing on the importance of distinguishing *per se* from *per accidens* predication, and drawing primarily on Boethius’ treatise *De Divisione*.⁶⁵ Evidence for the relationship of

⁶³ καὶ μὴν οὐ μόνον αἱ τῶν θνητῶν ψυχὰι γνωστικὴν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ [E] δύναμιν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φησὶν [*Tim.* 37A] ἀνακυκλούμενην αὐτὴν πρὸς ἑαυτήν, ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τινος ἐφάπτεται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγειν κινουμένην διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς, ὅτῳ τ’ ἂν τι ταῦτόν ᾗ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὃ τι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ἕκαστον <ἕκαστα> εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν. ἐν τούτοις ἅμα καὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν ποιούμενος ὑπογραφήν ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐφεξῆς διασαφεῖ (ed. Hubert 1954).

⁶⁴ This text mentions Eudorus several times previously, in connection with the transmission of Academic views on the *Timaeus* and the construction of the soul, and quotes or cites Eudorus at several points in the treatise; as we know from other sources that Eudorus was interested in the *Categories*, expounded his interest Pythagorically (based on the tenfold nature of reality), and influenced or was influenced by Andronicus of Rhodes, this attribution of the ten categories to Plato here might also be ascribed to Eudorus. For Eudorus’ possible influence here, see also Bonazzi 2013.

⁶⁵ On the evidence in Boethius for a monograph by Andronicus *On Division*, see the excellent introduction to Magee’s 1998 edition, with Moraux 1973: 120 ff. Donini

these views to the *Categories* is circumstantial, but bolstered, I believe, in the following section. (b) In the second part, I examine the sources specifically for Andronicus' overarching division of the ten categories into two, absolute and relative (*καθ' αὐτό* and *πρὸς τί*), and suggest that the motivations for this division might be understood in terms of the sources offered in part (a); in this discussion I rely primarily on the evidence of Simplicius. Broadly, I argue that, on Andronicus' view, the *Categories* helps us to distinguish between essential and accidental kinds of predication without prior training in logic, in order that we can begin to study division, and eventually construct good definitions based on essential differentiae rather than accidental features. The *Categories*' fourfold division (1a20–1b9) and sketch of the attributes that characterize substances (*οὐσίαι*, 2a12–4b19) in contrast to non-substantial predicates (4b20–11a39) are understood as a framework for the application of Aristotelian essentialism in dialectic or demonstration.

(a) Andronicus on division

Good ancient evidence strongly suggests that Andronicus saw division as crucial for the construction of good definitions, and so for demonstration (cf. Donini 1982: 90–2, Gottschalk 1987: 1115). Combined testimony from Boethius, Porphyry, and Simplicius offers helpful guidance for deducing Andronicus' position. Recall, Boethius informs us that Andronicus especially praised the art of division (*scientia dividendi*, *διαίρεσις*):

The book *On Division* published by Andronicus, a most diligent scholar of old (*diligentissimi*), treats of the considerable advantages the science of dividing brings to scholars and of the high esteem in which this branch of knowledge was always held within the Peripatetic school. Plotinus, a most profound philosopher, thought highly of Andronicus' book and Porphyry adapted it in his commentary on Plato's dialogue entitled *The Sophist*. It was also Porphyry who acknowledged the utility of his *Introduction to the Categories* with reference to this science.

1982: 90–2 and Gottschalk 1987: 1115 argue that Andronicus intended to connect division and definition. Mansfeld 1992: ch. 5 offers a very helpful excursus on substance, division, and the *Categories*, including the early commentary tradition: see 74–5 on Andronicus' *De Divisione*.

For he says that a knowledge of genus, species, difference, property, and accident is a necessary prerequisite to, among other things, partitioning, which is of the greatest utility.⁶⁶ (*De Div.* 875D–6D, lightly modified from 5,1–11 Magee, 1998)

Andronicus' evaluation of division as a useful technique for philosophy⁶⁷ may be partially motivated by the appreciation that he expresses for demonstration (*ἀπόδειξις*). As we have seen above, Andronicus believed that mastering Aristotle's *Analytics* would be fundamental to a grasp of scientific demonstration, and as a good reader of the *Analytics*, he would certainly have come away with the impression that the art of division and demonstration are closely intertwined (see for example *An. Post.* 2.5, 2.13), even if division cannot alone achieve all the results that the Academics had claimed for it (cf. *An. Pri.* 1.31). Andronicus' appreciation for *διαίρεσις* also proved highly influential into late antiquity.⁶⁸ his influence on Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, especially Porphyry, is also attested in other contexts (cf. Wilberding 2005: 452). I argue here that this emphasis on division will help to understand Andronicus' reasons for treating the *Categories* as a crucial introduction to the *Analytics*.

Of particular relevance for us here, in a passage from the same treatise *On Division* that John Magee (1998) has persuasively argued to reflect Andronicus' views, Boethius writes:

The later sect of Peripatetic wisdom [sc. Andronicus]⁶⁹ discerned in the most diligent manner (*diligentissima*) the difference between divisions:

⁶⁶ Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque apud Peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronici diligentissimi senis De diuisione liber editus; et hic idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus et in Platonis libri qui Sophistes inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab eodem per hanc Introductionis laudata in *Categories* utilitas. (ed. Magee 1998).

⁶⁷ See also Donini 1982: 90–1.

⁶⁸ Marwan Rashed has also drawn attention to the influence of Andronicus' views on *διαίρεσις*, as preserved in Boethius, on his ontology, as it was criticized by Alexander of Aphrodisias in two unedited fragments surviving in Arabic (Rashed 2004). Porphyry's appreciation for 'division' in the *Isagoge*, where he follows various 'old masters' (1.8, 1.15), might follow the same source as his discussion of division in his *Sophist* commentary alluded to by Boethius.

⁶⁹ On the association with Andronicus, see Magee 1998 ad loc. (167–8) and his introduction. The evidence is circumstantial, but strong. Boethius, reporting a tradition that presumably stems from Porphyry, believes 'that the later sect and Andronicus form a unity... although the historical accuracy of his view is in the end a question of the reliability of his source, Porphyry, or of his interpretation thereof'

it separated division *per se* and division *secundum accidens* from one another, and distributed them both. Its predecessors, on the other hand, indiscriminately employed both an accident in place of the genus and accidents in place of species, or differentiae.⁷⁰ (*De Div.* 891–2, 48,26–50,5 Magee)

The closing sentence of this passage suggests a criticism of earlier Peripatetics' lack of care in distinguishing between *per se* and *per accidens* predication, which in some way vitiated their practice of division. By contrast, the later Peripatetics methodically organized the differentiae used in divisions into the correct silos, recognizing which apply *per se* and which apply *per accidens*, and further subdividing these two classes (I take this to be the force of *distribuit* at 48,28–50,1, perhaps generating the kind of 'tree' offered by Boethius himself in the *De Divisione*).⁷¹

Some illustration will be useful here. Suppose that I am investigating what a human being (*ἄνθρωπος*) really is (see for example *Metaphysics* 7.17, 1041a25–32), that I have arrived at the genus 'animal', and that I plan to divide this genus using differentiae in order to arrive at a specific definition (cf. *Topics* 6.4, 141b26). Suppose next that I use differentiae such as the following: sleeping, sitting, standing, being awake, curly-haired, and grey-eyed.⁷² I will not get far in Aristotelian science this way, for these accidental or incidental differences—attributes that an animal might lose or gain without ceasing to exist as a member of its kind—are unsuitable for arriving

(Magee 1998: 167). *Diligentissimus* described Andronicus at 4,5 Magee, 'which suggests that Andronicus is the figure intended here as well' by the descriptive *diligentissima* at 48,27. Other sources suggest that the division of 'later' Peripatetics (*posterior . . . Peripateticae secta*) belongs to the first-century BCE (based on Strabo *Geog.* 13.1,54 and Aspasius in *Eth. Nic.* 44,20). I would add the passage Simplic. in *Cat.* 63,22–6, quoted below, where Andronicus is associated with a division of the *Categories* into absolute and relative, or substantial and accidental; I will discuss this further below.

⁷⁰ Posterior quidem Peripateticae secta prudentiae differentias diuisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidens ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuit, antiquiores autem indifferenter et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis utebantur . . . (ed. Magee 1998).

⁷¹ *Diuisio secundum se* may be *genus in species, totum in partes, uox in significationes; diuisio secundum accidens* may be *subiectum in accidentia, accidens in subiecta, accidentis in accidentia* (6,17–10,27 Magee).

⁷² Such is the list of *per accidens* differentiae at Boethius *De Div.* 18,4–8 Magee, combining a list of regularly departing (*statim relinquentes*) and consequent (*consequentes*) accidental differences.

at definitions (see for example *Ar. An. Post.* 2.5 and 2.13, with commentary in Barnes 1993; *Ar. Parts of Animals* 1.2–3; *Ar. Topics* 1.5, 101b38, Boethius *De Div.* 880D–1D, 16,16–20,19 Magee). Instead, when I undertake to define a reality or substance (οὐσία), I should be careful to predicate only in the first of the ten categories, τί ἐστὶ ('what it is'; note that Andronicus may not have distinguished carefully between the *Categories*' and *Topics*' accounts of the first category, as briefly noted below). Consider Aristotle's exploration of how we might exhibit the essence of a subject demonstratively using division (*An. Post.* 2.13, 96a20–97b2): to predicate only in the first category, as Aristotle puts it, requires that I 'establish things through the genus' (διὰ τοῦ γένους κατασκευάσαι, 97a27–8), discarding incidental features in the other nine, non-substantial categories like 'musical', 'pale' (73b5), and the colourful examples cited above by Boethius, and focusing just on what the thing is 'in itself' or per se (καθ' αὐτό; cf. *An. Post.* 1.4, 73a34–b5). (When Andronicus speaks of per se predication, he seems to have in mind predication in the first category, which he also treats as a category of substance (οὐσία; see also *Simplic. in Cat.* 63,22–6, discussed below). Thus Andronicus mostly has in mind examples like 'the human being is an animal' when he speaks of 'per se predication', while he has in mind examples like 'the human being is pale' when he speaks of 'accidental predication'. Andronicus, perhaps like Aristotle in his later development, might restrict the category of 'what-it-is' to substances.)⁷³

On this interpretation, when I focus just on essential predicates belonging in the first category, focusing my investigation on what belongs to the substantial subject per se, these predicates will prove to represent features that are basically explanatory of my subject and possessed by it in the special sense that, if the subject were to lose those features, the subject would cease to exist. If I investigate the question carefully as it relates to the example of 'human' above, I will find that *rationality* is such a fundamental or essential feature of humanity, a *sine qua non* for being a human being. That is to say, it holds of a human being 'in itself', and I would be able to narrow down a scientific definition of humanity from genus and difference: for example, 'rational animal'.

⁷³ See Frede 1987: 45, and more broadly, 29–48, on the development of the 'doctrine of categories'.

There are various ways in which Aristotle thinks that we could go awry in executing this kind of project and so fail to lay the correct groundwork for a good scientific definition, but the first and foremost error is to fail to distinguish those terms that belong to the first category, *τί ἐστί*, and therefore can be predicated of my subject *per se*, from those terms that refer to accidents or incidental features. This seems to be the kind of failure with which Andronicus charges 'earlier' Peripatetics: possibly he criticized them much as later Aristotelian commentators would criticize the Stoic practice of division and definition, as taking 'the definition to be no different from the representation of the peculiar characteristic' or *proprium* (Alex. *in Top.* 42,27–43,2: see LS 32E), and thus allegedly losing track of essentialism altogether. A counter-offensive in favour of Aristotelian essentialism, at least in the practical task of developing definitions, *might* have begun with Andronicus, whose treatment of at least some Aristotelian categories—such as the relative, discussed further below—shows evidence of possible Stoic influence.⁷⁴

Be that as it may, we are primarily interested in the role of the *Categories* in Andronicus' view. The core of the treatise that Andronicus came to call *Categories* (the so-called *praedicamenta*) offers a series of heuristic recipes for just this kind of practice, namely, determining which terms fall under which genera and so enabling the construction of essential definitions. (Indeed, the *Categories* may be the only place in the corpus where one can go for a sustained account of such a series of recipes for the categories.)⁷⁵ Andronicus would have found here a wealth of relatively non-technical outline accounts (*ὑπογραφαί*)⁷⁶ of the genera for getting this right. For

⁷⁴ It might seem surprising for Andronicus to accuse Peripatetics of ignoring such a fundamental Aristotelian position as essentialism, and I would not want to push this point too far. But (a) it may well be that he regarded his predecessors as endorsing something like Stoic logic over Aristotle's (and, as Alexander would also stress, the Stoics fail to distinguish between essential and accidental features), and (b) if Andronicus himself had anything to do with promoting the story that his predecessors had disregarded or underemphasized the 'esoteric' treatises that he was now publishing, it would stand to reason that Andronicus might also accuse them of ignoring important doctrines in those treatises.

⁷⁵ For this function of the *Categories*, once again, see Bodéüs 2001: xxxix and Menn 1995: 319–20.

⁷⁶ As Jonathan Barnes has suggested to me in correspondence, a *ὑπογραφή* of Fs is a proposition of the form 'Fx iff Gx' which is informative and true, but not a definition. I argue below that Andronicus took such *ὑπογραφαί* as more accessible to the beginner than a definition, easily explained in terms of everyday experience.

instance, I can test whether the item referred to by a given term is a secondary substance or a non-substantial feature by checking whether it is IN the subject, in the technical sense that it is in it ‘not as a part, and unable to exist apart from what it is in’ (*Cat.* 1a24–25): if the answer is affirmative, we have here a non-substantial attribute, such as a quality (say, the *paleness* of Socrates’ body, or the universal quality *colour* to which that paleness belongs), which will not help us to construct a scientific definition. If we were not equipped to make these clear distinctions—that is, if we were unable consistently to locate the category to which a term belonged—the central demonstrative project of definition would become impossible; and in this way, having lost our capacity to construct definitions, we would be prone to slip up in many ways.

The *Categories* has often appeared to be useful for making it possible to speak about the essential features of ordinary, perceptible things (see Mann 2000: 184–204). In general, someone like Andronicus who wished to emphasize the distinction between essential and accidental predication would find particular value in promoting *Cat.* 2 (1a20–1b9)’s celebrated fourfold division of items SAID-OF a subject and IN a subject (the following table is adapted from Reinhardt 2007: 515, also discussed above in the Introduction):

<i>Cat.</i> 2, 1a20–b9	Beings IN a subject	Beings not IN a subject
Beings SAID-OF a subject	Genera and species of non-substantial items	Genera and species of primary substances (i.e. secondary substances)
Beings not SAID-OF a subject	Individual non-substantial items, such as ἡ τις γραμματική (‘some particular knowledge of grammar’)	Primary substances, individuals, e.g. ὁ τις ἀνθρώπος (‘some particular human being’)

In the project of generating divisions that construct good definitions, in turn facilitating demonstration, the *Categories* would appear useful on several fronts. The reader may learn to narrow down what counts

I stress the word ὑπογραφαί here because I will argue below that this ‘non-technical’ nature of the descriptions of the genera in the *Categories* made it especially useful for Andronicus’ introductory purposes.

in the first category, building from the *Categories*' clear, pre-technical outline accounts or *ὑπογραφαί* for recognizing the genus under which a given term falls, especially the fundamental fourfold division here in *Cat.* 2 and the account of *οὐσία* in ch. 5. Moreover, the cautionary division of homonymy from synonymy and paronymy in ch. 1 would help the reader to resist sophistical puzzles based on ambiguity and equivocation—the kinds of puzzles which, as we noticed above, may have troubled Antiochean advocates of dialectic and demonstration.

(b) *Andronicus on the reduction of ten categories
to absolute and relative*

Moreover, Simplicius tells us that on Andronicus' view, the ten categories described in the central section of the *Categories* were embraced by two broader headings, absolute (*καθ' αὐτό*) and relative (*πρός τι*) (perhaps adopting a view previously adopted by Xenocrates⁷⁷ based on the fundamental division of absolute from relative in Plato *Sophist* 255D). Simplicius explains that:

Xenocrates and Andronicus and their followers seem to include all [the ten categories] in [the opposition] 'by itself' (*καθ' αὐτό*) and 'relative' (*πρός τι*) . . .⁷⁸ [they say] that accidents are 'relative' as [being] always of other things, and that substance is by itself.⁷⁹ (Simplic. in *Cat.* 63,22–6)

⁷⁷ On the relation between Andronicus and Xenocrates, see also Tarán 1981: 741–2 (commenting on Moraux's view). For a reconstruction of Xenocrates' own position, see Dillon 2003: 150–1.

⁷⁸ Simplicius suggests that Andronicus and Xenocrates thought the division into ten was excessive or 'superfluous', but Moraux and others have shown, I think persuasively, that Andronicus did not seek to *replace* the ten categories with two, as he also maintained the validity of the tenfold division. Rather, he seems to have sought to understand the tenfold division in terms of a twofold division. After all, Aristotle himself at *Metaph.* Δ 5 (1017a23–30, below) makes a first division of being into the *kata sumbebēkos* and *kath' hautō*, before classifying the *skhēmata tēs katēgorias* under the *kath' hautō*; once the *kata sumbebēkos* is identified with the *pros ti*, it seems simple to find the subordination of the ten to the two in Aristotle himself. If Andronicus maintained that the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* express one and the same doctrine, he presumably would not have regarded such a subordination as a betrayal of the project of the *Categories*.

⁷⁹ οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτη καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὐτό καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ τοσούτον τῶν γενῶν πλήθος. ἄλλοι δὲ εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συμβεβηκὸς διατέμνουσιν· καὶ οὗτοι δὲ ταῦτόν πως δοκοῦσι τοῖς προτέροις λέγειν τὰ συμβεβηκότα πρὸς τι λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄλλων ἀεὶ ὄντων, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καθ' αὐτό (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

Andronicus, then, subsumes the ten *κατηγορίαι* under these two broad classes as the ‘highest division’ in the *Categories*, a move that his successors would endorse and follow.⁸⁰ Moreover, Simplicius goes on to charge Andronicus and Xenocrates with reducing *all* of the genera of accidents to the relative (*in Cat.* 63,28–30), suggesting that in some way Andronicus lumped quantities, qualities, and the rest together as relatives. The passages from Boethius discussed in part (a) above might help us to make sense of this view: Andronicus wishes to distinguish carefully between items predicated of a subject essentially, in the first category (*τί ἐστι*) (which Andronicus may restrict to substances), and items predicated of a subject accidentally, in the nine non-substance categories. Naturally (given that he believes that *Categories* mirrors *An. Post.* and that *τί ἐστι* is the first category of both), he finds the *Categories* to be a useful place to look for elaborating this distinction.

But we have conflicting evidence about the exact position adopted by Andronicus concerning the status of the category of the relative (*πρός τι*), and there has been considerable debate over where he stands.⁸¹ On the one hand, as we have seen, Andronicus sought to reduce the number of categories to two, absolute and relative. On this view, if ‘relative’ is taken as amounting to ‘accidental’ (see above, 63,22–6), there would be just two ways in which one might predicate a feature of Socrates: either in the first category (for instance, ‘Socrates is human’) or accidentally (‘Socrates is wise’ or ‘pale’). Then again, Andronicus also aimed to *preserve* the number of ten categories (Simplic. 342,21–5), so that he did not want to jettison quantity,

⁸⁰ While this has the historically important effect of integrating the ‘Platonic’ [*Sophist* 255D] and ‘Aristotelian’ categories, it also has some Aristotelian support: see *Metaph.* 17, 1017a23–30, and Bodéüs 2001: lxxxi–ii. Andronicus’ move was very influential: we have later evidence that the ‘Andronican’ division prevailed in the subsequent tradition as the ‘highest cut’ in the *Categories*, perhaps with substance functioning as absolute and the accidents as relative. Pseudo-Archytas, who may have written in the first century BCE as a near contemporary of Andronicus and follower of Eudorus (cf. Szlezák 1972), divides being into subjects and *sumbebēkota* just before rostering the ten categories. Alexander also called this the ‘highest division’ in the *Categories* (*τῇ πρώτῃ διαίρεσει τῶν ἐν Κατηγορίαις*, *in Met.* 242,15–16 and 243,3), as does Porphyry (*in Cat.* 71,28). Indeed, Alexander, Porphyry, and the subsequent Neoplatonic ‘consensus’ seem to follow Andronicus’ basic view about the *Categories* here, as Boethius suggests, and Andronicus may well be one of the ‘older masters’ followed in Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (1,3–17).

⁸¹ See Mansfeld 1992: 59–61 for a helpful summary, and Reinhardt 2007 for an especially clear and succinct presentation of the issues.

quality, relation, and the rest as valid kinds of predicates. And yet again, he regarded the relative as a kind of ‘offshoot’ that belonged after the other categories (157,18–22; cf. Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* 1.6, 1096a21), so that it seems on the face of it unlikely that he simply meant (say) to subordinate the remaining eight non-substance categories *under* the relative, so that he could have his cake (maintaining quantity, quality, relation, and so forth) and eat it too (subsume these under a single umbrella, relation).

Also relevant here is Andronicus’ proposal (shared with his contemporary Ariston) to amend Aristotle’s second definition of the category of the relative (πρός τι) at *Cat.* 8a31, in order to require that the item described exists only insofar as it relates to something *different* from itself.⁸² The ostensible purpose for this revision is to avoid vicious circularity, which could be a reasonable motive in its own right; but the correction also brings Aristotle’s (second) definition of the relative into concinnity with the fourth ‘category’ developed by the Stoics, the relatively disposed (πρός τι πως ἔχον). This has led some scholars (such as Tarán 1981: 741–82) to suggest that Andronicus is directly influenced by the Stoics.⁸³

There are several ways in which we might make sense of the differing evidence for Andronicus’ view.⁸⁴ I propose the following

⁸² From items ‘for which being is the same as being somehow related to something’ (πρός τι) to items ‘for which being is the same as being somehow related to something else (πρός ἕτερον)’ (see Simplic. *in Cat.* 201,34, Porph. *in Cat.* 125,14–23).

⁸³ On this ‘category’ and for what follows, see Menn 1999. This kind of property is weaker and, in a sense, further removed from real being than the other Stoic ‘categories’, such as the ποιόν, in the following sense: some attribute *F* (say, the attribute of being someone’s sibling) is a πρὸς τι πως ἔχον just in case any item that is *F* has no intrinsic difference from an item that is not *F*. Such attributes are such that ‘they can belong to something and then not belong to it without any change or alteration in the thing’ (Simplic. *in Cat.* 166,17–19, discussed by Menn 1999: 232), like a case of what we might now call Cambridge change. But, Richard Sorabji points out to me in conversation, David Sedley has shown (2000) that the Academy had already introduced the concept of the πρὸς τι πως ἔχον deployed by Aristotle at *Cat.* 8a31–2; Andronicus may be reflecting earlier Academic views here—like those of Xenocrates—rather than Stoic doctrine. (Not too much weight should be placed on the phrase πρὸς τι πως ἔχον itself; as Jonathan Barnes reminds me in correspondence, it is just a natural expansion of the abbreviated phrase πρὸς τι.)

⁸⁴ I am indebted for this discussion to conversations with Tobias Reinhardt and Richard Sorabji; see Sorabji, *Sourcebook* III, 3(c) and Reinhardt 2007 for a helpful summary of the issues. To fill out the inconsistency: (1) on the one hand, Simplicius at least *interprets* Andronicus and Xenocrates as if they complained about the multitude of ten categories (περιττὸν εἶναι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ τοσούτων τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος, 63,22), and encompassed the ten in two (πάντα τῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν).

tentative reconstruction. (i) Andronicus accepted that there were substantial beings, which could properly be predicated per se in the first category; (ii) he also accepted a *broad* sense of 'relative', which could accommodate quantities, qualities, and perhaps most of the other non-substance categories, and (iii) a *narrow* sense of 'relative', which accommodated Aristotle's strictly defined relatives and perhaps also accommodated Andronicus' rechristened categories of time and place. These would break down in the following way.

- (i) **Beings in the first category.** Andronicus accepted and interpreted a version of Aristotle's story in *Cat.* ch. 2 about what made an item a *real, substantial being* (οὐσία). Such a substantial item could not be discovered residing IN any other item, in the way that, say, paleness is IN Socrates' body. Clearly Socrates here (the primary οὐσία) is not IN anything (in the technical sense of *Categories* 1a24–5), and humanity (the secondary οὐσία) is also not IN anything. As a basic test, humanity (the substance SAID-OF Socrates) cannot be removed from Socrates

Nonetheless, (2) Andronicus appears to preserve the number of ten categories (Simplic. in *Cat.* 342,21–5). And (3) he declares that the relative is a kind of 'offshoot' or 'sucker' which belongs in order after all the other categories (in *Cat.* 157,18–22). How will this evidence hang together? Moraux (1973: 103) suggests that Andronicus did not intend to reduce the number of categories in this way, so that Simplicius is representing him inaccurately or polemically, or else (107) that the evidence misrepresents Andronicus altogether, and he never posited such a bipartition. Huby (1981: 406) suggests that Andronicus allowed for two 'supercategories' of substance and relation (and that he placed time under the supercategory of relation, as the measure of movement, which would make him the natural target of Simplicius' rebuttal to that position at 134,25). Reinhardt (2007: 522) offers a nuanced alternative: Andronicus may have (i) allowed for ten categories—one category of substance and nine distinct non-substance categories—from a logical point of view, since kinds of properties are logically or linguistically distinct from one another, and at the same time, (ii) Andronicus may have collapsed all of the non-substance categories into one from an ontological point of view, because for all of them 'being amounts to existing in relation to something else, namely the subject they are "in"'. (Thus Andronicus would have anticipated Boethus, further discussed in ch. 6, in distinguishing between an ontological, epistemological, and linguistic interpretation of the *Categories*). Then when Simplicius tells us of Andronicus' reduction of the categories and shunting of relation to the end of the list, he refers to his ontological view; when he tells us that he maintained the list of ten, he refers to his linguistic view. (One challenge for this interpretation, perhaps, is the lack of clear evidence for an 'ontological' reading of the *Categories* offered by Andronicus as distinct from Boethus' contribution; but it is certainly possible that Andronicus' view was adopted more or less wholesale by Boethus in a revised form, and not preserved as distinct in the later tradition).

without Socrates ceasing to exist, but paleness (the quality IN Socrates) can be so removed, causing qualitative change in Socrates, but not his disappearance.

- (ii) **Broad ‘relatives’: quantity, quality, and perhaps being-in-a-position, having, doing, being-affected.** But other, non-substantial items are in a broad sense parasitic on *οὐσίαι*: this includes items in most of the remaining categories (possibly excluding time and place, Andronicus’ relabelled categories of when and where: see below). These are *relative in a broad sense* (perhaps similar to the *secundum dici* account at *Cat.* 6a36–7), spoken about primarily in their relation to other things, viz. the *subjects*, the *οὐσίαι* in which they inhere, in a *per accidens* way. For example, it might seem impossible to describe Socrates’ paleness without speaking of Socrates, or colour in general without speaking of body in general.
- (iii) **Strict ‘relatives’: Relation, under which might also fall place and time (and perhaps other categories).**⁸⁵ Finally, Andronicus understood another kind of Relative (in a *strict* sense, following his revised definition of the relative at *Cat.* 8a31) to be an item whose entire being consisted in its disposition toward something else (cf. Porph. *in Cat.* 125,14–23)—a very ‘weak’ kind of being, comparable to the Stoic ‘category’ of the relatively disposed (*πρός τι πως ἔχον*). Items that were relative in this last, strict sense, such as (say) the property of *being on the right*, could alter without anything *intrinsically* changing about the subject—unlike, above under (ii), a proper quality such as paleness, whose alteration would at least imply a significant change in the subject. On this model, Andronicus did indeed reduce the number of ten categories to two, insofar as he made all the nine non-substance categories broadly ‘relative’ (perhaps following

⁸⁵ Without complicating this picture too much, we may also wonder about the place of the other, lesser categories, such as being-in-a-position and having: they may fall under the ‘broad’ relative, as basically similar to *ποιά*, which is how I have described them here, or possibly—since Andronicus’ scheme already answers to the Stoic picture in parts—we might wonder whether he allowed some of these to answer to the third Stoic ‘category’, the *πως ἔχοντα* or items disposed in certain ways, as Simplicius himself describes ‘on the right’ and ‘to be shod’ (the latter an example of ‘having’ in *Ar. Cat.* 4, 1b24–2a4) as cases of *πως ἔχοντα*. See Menn 1999 on the Stoic categories.

Xenocrates). Yet he also maintained the number of ten (since the nine non-substance categories are still distinct from one another, although they are all in a loose way relative to substance). Finally, he made the relative in the *strict* sense properly posterior to substance *and* the other eight non-substance categories, since it was a kind of ‘off-shoot’ or ‘appendage’.

It might be added that Andronicus may have regarded time as relative in either a broad or strict sense, insofar as it is the measure of movement (so Huby 1981: 406 suggests). If he treated time as a subcategory of the relative in the *strict* sense, and moved time to the end of the list of categories along with the strict relative, that might have provided an impetus for the posterior position of time and place at the end of the list of categories in other writers such as Philo of Alexandria and ps.-Archytas (see ch. 3). There *may* also be some trace of Stoic influence on Andronicus’ thinking here, since the Stoics treated time as an incorporeal and thus less ‘real’ than corporeal things; but that is pure speculation, and most arguments relating to the order of the categories cannot be pressed too far: Aristotle himself sometimes orders time at the end of the list (*Metaph.* Δ7, 1017a23–30).

If this interpretation is accurate, Andronicus’ exegesis of Aristotle was basically different from that of the later Neoplatonist commentators such as Simplicius, who take Aristotle to believe that one can predicate in all the non-substance categories per se, except the relative (cf. Simplic *in Cat.* 174,14–175,11; compare also Aristotle’s distinction of accidental and absolute predication at *Metaph.* Δ7, 1017a8–30). But as we will see (ch. 3), the first-century Academic Eudorus will criticize Aristotle as if he treated all the non-substance categories as relative. Eudorus may be responding to an interpretation like Andronicus’, or Andronicus may be influenced by Eudorus, or each may be independent of the other (see ch. 3).

We should also bear in mind the possibility that Andronicus was encouraged by the text of *Cat.* ch. 7 to admit two rather different accounts of the relative. One possibility, as Reinhardt tantalizingly suggests (2007: 522), is that Andronicus was prepared to regard the nine non-substance categories as *ontologically* identical (in that for them, existence just is having a certain relationship to something else)

yet *logically or linguistically* differentiable.⁸⁶ This would be especially intriguing if it implied that Andronicus anticipated the distinction between a linguistic and ontological reading of the *Categories* that would so preoccupy the later tradition.⁸⁷ For our purposes here, however, I have suggested only that Andronicus analyzed the *Categories*' two accounts of the relative (6a36–7 and 8a31–2) as somehow 'looser' and 'stricter' senses,⁸⁸ respectively applicable to the non-substance categories in general and the category of relation itself, in which he may have recognized (something like) the Stoic *πρός τι πῶς εἶναι*, or a set of Academic categories used by Xenocrates or Hermodorus.⁸⁹

(c) *The Categories, in introducing demonstration,
helps to avoid equivocation and fallacy*

Returning to Andronicus' catalogue and arguments for the place and title of the *Categories*, we remember that Andronicus brought the *Categories* to the fore of the curriculum and dissociated it from merely 'persuasive' dialectic, emphasizing its value for demonstration and the pursuit of truth. It would be attractive to speculate that Andronicus saw in the core of the text (but not in the latter third of it, the 'post-praedicamenta' beginning with ch. 10) a useful handbook for resisting fallacies that turned on ambiguity and equivocation—especially those that did not recognize the proper difference between synonymous and homonymous predication. Thus Andronicus, who was happy to jettison the last third of the treatise, carefully maintained, paraphrased, and explained the first part, re-articulating

⁸⁶ After all, Andronicus would hardly have denied that the nine non-substance categories were logically distinct, but he could have denied that those distinctions picked out any real difference between real beings.

⁸⁷ But against that approach to the distinction in Aristotle himself, see Sedley 2002: 332–4. We might furnish some additional support to this interpretation from the two definitions or descriptions of the relative offered by Aristotle in the *Categories*, respectively 'those which, whatever things they are themselves, are said to be of other things, or in some other relation to another thing' (6a36–7), and 'those for which being is the same as to be relatively disposed to something' (8a31–2)—if we were to understand these as respectively suggesting (to Andronicus' ear) a *de dicto* and *de re* account of relation.

⁸⁸ Similar to David Sedley's language (2002) of 'soft' and 'hard' relativity applied to the passage in Aristotle, although I suggest that Andronicus' interpretation is somewhat different.

⁸⁹ On which see Sedley 2002: 348–51, Fine 1993: 176–82.

the initial statement distinguishing homonyms from synonyms and defending its importance for the entire treatise (cf. Simplicius in *Cat.* 21,21–4). Without the recipes that the *Categories* offers, we might also fail to distinguish between homonymous and synonymous predication in general, as Boethius, perhaps channelling Andronicus by way of Porphyry, stresses at *De Div.* 880C–D, 17,24–18,1 Magee.⁹⁰ That could make our definitions and demonstrations vulnerable to various sophisms or lead us into mistaken metaphysics—errors like assuming that every term that referred to many things picked out a universal essence. Moreover, then, a work that *began* by setting out the distinction between homonymous and synonymous predication would appear especially useful. This is the interpretation that I will attempt to develop below.

The *Categories* might have been seen as useful for solving the kind of puzzles that Cicero, speaking for Philo, levelled against Antiochus' loyalty to dialectic. Of more direct relevance for us here, it might have been seen as useful for the kinds of puzzles that Simplicius raised as problematic for 'the dialecticians' who simply recommended 'quiescence'—that is, for the Stoics—but soluble for the dialectician who made use of the *significata* described in the *Categories*:

Some people . . . rightly say that it is from the realities (πράγματα) that homonyms become clear to us: viz., when the same name is spoken, I project one concept in conjunction with the name, while you project a different one. For example, if someone says the name 'dog', I might conceive of the land-animal, while you might conceive of a sea-dog. This is why the dialecticians recommend that we become quiescent when faced with syllogisms based on homonymy, until the questioner transfers the name to one of the *significata* . . . Moreover, Aristotle himself presents his teaching on homonyms, because the discussion (λόγος) of homonymy is also . . . immediately consequent upon the goal (σκοπός) of the *Categories*. For his part, Plato states that it becomes clear from realities whether the same name is borne by different things homonymously or synonymously, for he says in the *Sophist*, 'for now, you and I have the name in common with regard to this matter, but perhaps we each privately keep the fact (ἔργον) that we are naming to ourselves; [however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument (διὰ λόγων) rather than about the mere name without argument.]' (*Soph.* 218C). Thus, it is

⁹⁰ For the pervasive uses of homonymy in Aristotle's philosophy, see Shields 1999.

when it becomes known that each individual has his own particular *ἔννοια* of a common name that it becomes clear that the name is homonymous... the nature of homonyms and synonyms is in the *ἔννοια*... of human beings as they converse and name things.⁹¹ (Simplicius in *Cat.* 24,6–25,9)

This explanation seems to suggest the value that the dialectician should place on recognizing equivocation. It also implies that a list of the significata, the *summa genera*, could be a helpful tool for defeating some sophistical challenges, including some that troubled the Stoics (cf. Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 22, 178a4–5, involving sophisms that entail the confusion of one category for another, like *ποιόν* for *πόσον* or *ποιούν* for *πάσχον*).⁹² It might also contextualize the interest in distinguishing accidental from essential predication attributed to Andronicus in Boethius' *De Divisione*, which also illustrates how this distinction—including the distinction of differentiae per se and per accidens—can be deployed to help determine what is univocal and what is equivocal, a crucial aid in the construction of good definitions

⁹¹ Ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ διὰ τί, καίτοι περὶ λέξεων προθέμενος εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅμως περὶ ὁμωνυμίας μὲν οὐδὲν λέγει, περὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμωνύμων διδάσκει, καίτοι προηγουμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν ἐννοίας, εἴπερ ἀπ' ἐκείνης τὰ ὁμώνυμα. καὶ λέγουσιν καλῶς, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται δῆλα τὰ ὁμώνυμα, ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος (10) ῥηθέντος ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλην ἔννοιαν, σὺ δὲ ἄλλην περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος προβαλλώμεθα, ὥσπερ τοῦ κύων ὀνόματος ῥηθέντος ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν χερσαῖον, σὺ δὲ τὸν θαλάττιον ἐννοήσεις. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ὁμωνυμίαν συλλογισμοῖς ἡσυχάζειν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ παρακελεύονται, ἕως ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλο σημανόμενον ὁ ἐρωτῶν μεταγάγῃ τὸ ὄνομα· οἷον, εἴ τις ἐρωτᾷ εἰ ὁ χιτῶν ἀνδρεῖος, (15) εἰ τύχῃ ἀνδρεῖος ὢν, συγχωρησόμεθα· κἂν ἐρωτήσῃ εἰ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εὐψυχος, καὶ τοῦτο συγχωρησόμεθα, ἀληθὲς γάρ· εἰ δὲ συναγάγῃ ὅτι ὁ χιτῶν ἄρα εὐψυχος, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν τοῦ ἀνδρεῖου διαστείλασθαι καὶ δεῖξαι [τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἥγουν τὴν εὐψυχίαν] ὅτι ἄλλως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ χιτῶνος, ἄλλως δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχοντος λέγεται, ὥστε τὰ πράγματα κυρίως, οὐχὶ τὰ (20) ὀνόματα ποιεῖ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων ποιεῖται τὴν διδασκαλίαν συνακολουθοῦντος πάντως τῷ σκοπῷ εὐθὺς καὶ τοῦ περὶ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας λόγου. καὶ ὁ Πλάτων δὲ ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων δηλοῦσθαί φησιν, εἴτε ὁμωνύμως κατὰ πλείονων φέρεται τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴτε συνωνύμως· [p. 25] λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ· “νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ καγὼ τοῦτου περὶ τοῦνομα ἔχομεν κοινῇ, τὸ δὲ ἔργον, ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν, ἑκάτερος τάχα ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν”, ὥστε ὅταν γνωσθῇ ὅτι τοῦ κοινῇ λεγομένου ὀνόματος ἰδίᾳ ἐστὶν ἔννοια παρ' ἑκατέρω, τότε γίνεται δῆλον, ὅτι ὁμώνυμον τὸ ὄνομα. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν τὰ ὁμώνυμα καὶ τὰ συνώνυμα (5) τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τῶν διαλεγόμενων καὶ ὀνομαζόντων παρηλλαγμένῃ ἐννοίᾳ ἡ συμφωνοῦσι ἡ τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων ἐστὶ φύσις. καλῶς δὲ τὸ λέγεσθαι εἶπεν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

⁹² See also Menn 1995: 320.

(*De Div.* 16,24–18,3 Magee). This is certainly an application of the main division that Andronicus wanted to expound.

We might again deduce from this evidence that Andronicus valued division as a tool serving demonstration, as we have seen above. Certainly many of his contemporaries and successors did.⁹³ Indeed, Andronicus may have turned to Aristotelian resources after recognizing a lack in Stoic logic, which Atherton points out:

a feature . . . conspicuous by its absence from the Stoic context, in comparison with the Platonic–Aristotelian: any systematic use of homonymy, ambiguity, or related concepts as general instruments for identifying and solving philosophical problems, or for analysing, constructing, and disarming philosophical arguments. (Atherton 1993: 102)

(d) *The Categories begins from pre-technical outlines
(ὑπογραφαί) of the genera that actuate our innate
preconceptions of them, making it a
suitable work for beginners*

The association may be pressed further. Simplicius tells us that Andronicus maintained that we require a *πρόληψις* or ‘preconception’

⁹³ Some examples are cited below. Aristotle himself diminishes the value of division unlike Plato (*An. Pr.* 1.31, 46a31–2) and explicitly places limits on its usefulness. Ryle agrees with Aristotle, for example in ‘Plato’s Parmenides II’, *Mind* 48 (1939), 302–25, reprinted in R.E. Allen (ed.), *Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 97–147 and in *Plato’s Progress* (esp. 102 ff.) J. L. Ackrill, by contrast, offers a careful ‘Defence of Platonic Division’ (orig. pub. 1970) in *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997. For Aristotle, famously (e.g. Cherniss 1944: ch. 1, Balme 1987), division does not ‘prove’ anything (*Pr. An.* 46a31–9, *An. Post.* 91b12–15, 96b25–97a6). As Marguerite Deslauriers stressed, Aristotle does value division, and he wants ‘to demonstrate the coherence of the logical and ontological functions of form’ (1990: 216); cf. Deslauriers 2007:15 ff.

The following point may also be relevant: Simplicius credits to Andronicus (*in Cat.* 54,8) the observation that we predicate attributes of subjects transitively, in the sense described by Aristotle in *Cat.* 1b10–15, not *only* in the first category or essentially (*ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν*), but *also* in the other categories, as when we call a subject ‘cultured’ or ‘Athenian’: thus for example ‘Socrates is philosophical’, ‘philosophers are knowledgeable’, so ‘Socrates is knowledgeable’ (Simplicius, *in Cat.* 54,8–21; cf. Moraux 1973, 104, and see the anonymous commentary in the Archimedes Palimpsest, 6,9–7,7 Chiaradonna, Rashed, and Sedley 2013, with commentary and references). As Simplicius goes on to show, this kind of argument can lead to fallacies of equivocation that turn on category errors: for instance, this body is white, and white is a colour; therefore, this body is a colour. Andronicus might have thought that such inferences turned on a failure to distinguish between accidental and essential predication (this body is white per accidens, but white is a colour per se).

about homonyms (more on this below) in order to grasp the core function of the book *Categories*, and this is why the ‘onymies’—the opening chapter’s account of homonyms (items that share only a name in common, but not a definition), synonyms (items that share both a name and a definition in common), and paronyms (items that get their name from something with a difference of ending)—should come first in the treatise (*in Cat.* 21,21–4). In a passage that derives from Porphyry, Simplicius gives an example of how

... ‘man’ and ‘horse’ participate in the same substance, that of ‘animal’, which is predicated of them synonymously, and they are therefore placed under the same category. Socrates and the painted Socrates, however, do not both participate in the substance of ‘animal’: but one participates in substance, while the other participates in ‘colour’ or ‘surface figure’. Thus, they are not placed under the same category, but Socrates comes under the category of Substance, while the painted Socrates comes under the category of the Qualified.

It was thus necessary to give preliminary teaching about homonyms and synonyms. The necessity of having a preliminary notion (πρόληψις) of homonyms was also shown by Andronicus, who made the initial phrase of the *Categories* read as follows: ‘Of things said, some are said without combination, others with combination. Of those without combination, those which have the name alone in common are called homonyms.’ Thus, a preliminary notion (πρόληψις) of homonyms is clearly necessary, both for the above-mentioned reasons, and because, since there is a great deal of controversy about whether or not Being is a genus, [the answer] can be known by means of homonyms and synonyms.⁹⁴ (21,15–22,1, tr. Chase 2003, lightly modified)

After Porphyry and Simplicius’ endorsement of Andronicus’ view (and paraphrase), Simplicius adds that ‘there is nothing as effective as a precise definition of names to counteract sophistical quibbling’

⁹⁴ τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ζώου μετέχοντες συνωνύμως αὐτῶν κατηγορουμένης ὑπὸ μίαν ἀνάγονται κατηγορίαν, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἅτε μὴ τῆς οὐσίας ἀμφω τοῦ ζώου μετέχοντες, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας, ὁ δὲ χρώματος ἢ σχήματος ἐπιπολαίου, οὐχ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγονται κατηγορίαν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὁ δὲ γεγραμμένος ὑπὸ τὸ ποιόν. ἔδει τοίνυν προδιᾶξαι περὶ τοῦ ὁμωνύμου καὶ συνωνύμου. ὅτι δὲ χρειώδης ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ὁμωνύμων πρόληψις, ἐδήλωσεν Ἀνδρόνικος προτάξας “τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν ἀνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται, τὰ δὲ μετὰ συμπλοκῆς· καὶ τῶν ἀνευ συμπλοκῆς ὁμώνυμα μὲν λέγεται, ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν”. ὥστε χρειώδης ἡ τῶν ὁμωνύμων φαίνεται πρόληψις διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ ὅτι πολλῆς οὐσῆς ἀμφιβολίας, εἴτε γένος τὸ ὃν εἴτε μὴ, ἐκ τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων γινώσκεται (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

(22,10-11), followed by a Speusippian division of homonymy, polyonymy, synonymy, heteronymy, and paronymy, and the ‘manly cloak’ example cited above—already familiar from Stoic dialectic and the challenges levelled against it. Similar challenges were later cited by Nicostratus against the *Categories* (specifically, against the ‘transitivity principle’ of 1b10-11; see Chiaradonna, Rashed, Sedley, and Tchernetska 2013: 1,26-3,1).

Simplicius here preserves Porphyry, who perhaps preserves in his turn Andronicus’ own argument for the usefulness of a sketch at the outset of the *Categories*—introducing the notions of equivocal and univocal predication by excavating a ‘preconception’ or *πρόληψις* of them. (I take it that Porphyry did not merely read Andronicus’ paraphrase of the opening of *Categories* and redeploy it as a proof text for his own reasoning about the value of the ‘onymies’, but that he built on an argument by Andronicus. Thus in 379,8-11 below I think that we can see traces of Porphyry’s response to an earlier Andronican argument for the value of the ‘onymies’, and Herminius [ap. Porph. in *Cat.* 59,17-33], who is there ‘compressing’ Andronicus’ pupil Boethus of Sidon, demonstrates that the argument for the *Categories* as useful for teasing out and correcting *πρόληψεις* is pre-Porphyrian and dates to the first century.)

What notion of *πρόληψις* could Andronicus build upon (if indeed he uses the word in a technical sense here)? In a broad Epicurean and Stoic usage, a *πρόληψις* is a rough preconception that arises naturally in the course of the use of our senses: in Epicurean usage, for instance, repeated sense-impressions of a dog will generate the preconception ‘dog’, which is a kind of rough, natural sketch of what we have grasped about dogs (*εἰληφέναι*) prior to (*πρό*) a scientific or precise inquiry.⁹⁵ Based on this—as the Neoplatonists, too, agreed⁹⁶—we are able to bootstrap a process of conversation or dialectic. For the Stoics, on one interpretation (Brittain 2005: 179), *some* of these preconceptions are common conceptions or *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*—or they *become* common conceptions once they are properly excavated or articulated (Dyson 2009: 53-71)—and it takes a process of working from a rough sketch or *ὑπογραφή* toward a precise definition to ‘excavate’ their

⁹⁵ See Asmis 1984: 22 for this suggested etymology, and Brittain 2005 and Dyson 2009 for the Stoic and Epicurean usage more broadly.

⁹⁶ For the Neoplatonic reception of *πρόληψεις* following Plotinus, see Van Den Berg 2009 and Helmig 2012: 141-342.

content. This process of excavation is called *διάρθρωσις* or ‘articulation’ (for which see for example Helmig 2012: 280, Brittain 2005: 186): a commonplace of Stoic, Platonist, and other traditions (compare for example Anon. *in Theaet.* col. 46, 43–9), it involves shifting from *ordinary* linguistic usage, our day-to-day language, toward a more precise, clearly defined usage that has been hardened by philosophical articulation (cf. Brittain 2005: 157).

Did Andronicus have some such Stoic infrastructure in mind? That he did is implicit, I think, in a response later offered by Porphyry *against* Andronicus’ disconnection of chs. 10–15, the so-called ‘post-paedicamenta’, from the rest of the *Categories* (mentioned by Simplicius at 379,8–11). Andronicus should not have rejected that part of the treatise, Porphyry explains, because he *ought* to have recognized that these later sketches of opposition, priority and posteriority, and so on were necessary *for the same reason* as the onymies at the beginning of the treatise:

Others, including Porphyry, opine that these investigations [i.e. the post-paedicamenta] contribute to [the] clarity [of the work], because, among the names which receive mention in the *Categories*, those which were not anticipated (*προειλημμένα*) by the common conceptions (*κοινὰς ἐννοίας*) Aristotle took right at the beginning and articulated (*διήρθρωσεν*) them, as for example in the account concerning homonymous and synonymous things, while those which were indeed anticipated in the common conceptions, but which required further articulation (*διαρθρώσεως*)—of these Aristotle analysed [in each case] the confused [name] belonging to the preconception (*προλήψεως*) after the completion [of the *Categories* proper], in order not to chop up the continuity of the account by inserting the articulation (*διάρθρωσιν*) of these [names] into the midst [of the main account].⁹⁷ (Simplicius *in Cat.* 379,12–20, tr. Chase 2003).⁹⁸

⁹⁷ ἄλλοις δὲ καὶ Πορφυρίῳ ἀρέσκει πρὸς σαφήνειαν συντελεῖν τὰ θεωρήματα ταῦτα, διότι τῶν ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις μνήμης τυχόντων ὀνομάτων, ὅσα μὲν οὐκ ἦν κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας προειλημμένα, ταῦτα ἐν ἀρχῇ προὔλαβεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ διήρθρωσεν, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων λόγον, ὅσα δὲ ἦν μὲν ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις προειλημμένα, διαρθρώσεως δὲ πλείονος ἔδειτο, τούτων τὸ συγκεχυμένον τῆς προλήψεως μετὰ τὴν συμπλήρωσιν διήρθρωσεν πρὸς τὸ μὴ διακόπτειν τὸ τοῦ λόγου συνεχὲς μεταξὺ τὴν τούτων διάρθρωσιν παρεμβάλλοντα. οἱ δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντες λέγουσιν μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε τῆς ὅλης αἰτίας περικρατοῦσιν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

⁹⁸ Compare also Philoponus *in Cat.* 167,21–168,3 and Ammonius *in Cat.* 93,9–12.

I would interpret Porphyry as here endorsing an Andronican argument that the *Categories* begins—in the first third, or prepraedicamenta—by capturing and teasing out a *πρόληψις* of equivocation, of which we *lack* a common notion.⁹⁹ Andronicus' error is in failing to recognize that the *Categories* does just the same thing in the last third, or postpraedicamenta, this time focusing on teasing out and excavating our *πρόληψεις* of things of which we *have* a common notion, on the basis of which we were able to read the text. That would suggest that Andronicus had some notion of 'articulation' (*διάρθρωσις*) along the lines of the Stoic excavation of preconceptions, and Porphyry, while accepting his basic premises, thinks that he has failed to apply it to the postpraedicamenta as he applied it to the prepraedicamenta or onymies (above, 21,15–22,1).

There is another link between Porphyry and Andronicus on the methodology of the 'articulation' of concepts through dialectic that suggests this. In his discussion of quantity, Simplicius comments that:

Porphyry tries, on this question, to follow Andronicus in articulating the concept (*διαρθροῦν . . . τὴν ἔννοιαν*) of the one, the unit and the point, not when spoken of in terms of Ideal Forms but when evident in terms of perception or reasoning (which the present undertaking is concerned with), let us too try to follow what he says.¹⁰⁰ (154,3–6, tr. Fleet in De Haas and Fleet 2001)

The 'articulation' follows. Porphyry begins from a perceptible, everyday example, the unity of a body (154,7–12):

When we say that a length or a breadth or a depth is one, we must consider in what way we mean 'one'. Now it is clear that when someone looks at a body which is a continuous whole in itself containing all its parts, but is circumscribed individually and separated from all other bodies, we call such a continuous body 'one' and the continuity of its parts with each other 'a unity'. In this way we conceive of what is numerically one.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ For Porphyry's reception of earlier, Hellenistic concepts of *prolēpsis* and *ennoia*, see Chase 2010 and 2000: ch. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθα διαρθροῦν ὁ Πορφύριος ἐπιχειρεῖ τῷ Ἀνδρονίκῳ κατακολουθῶν τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ τε ἐνὸς καὶ τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς στιγμῆς, οὐ τῶν κατ' ἰδέας λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν ἢ διάνοιαν ἐναργῶν, περὶ ὧν καὶ ἡ παρούσα πρόθεσις πραγματεύεται, φέρε καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς λεγομένοις παρακολουθήσωμεν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

¹⁰¹ ὅταν γάρ, φησὶν, ἐν λέγωμεν ἡ μῆκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος, σκεπτέον πῶς τὸ ἔν φαμεν. ἢ ὅλον ὡς ὅποταν τις σῶμα θεάσῃται συνεχὲς μὲν ὅλον ἑαυτῷ περὶ πάντα τὰ

'Pumping our intuition' of unity in this fairly ordinary way, which requires no technical expertise, he proceeds to offer a more technical example (154,12—13):

[W]e recognize what is one in species and of the same species <as other things> by separating off what is accidental to the individuals according to the differentiae in them.¹⁰²

Porphry's 'articulation' of the *έννοια* of unity here is no doubt a commonplace, and nothing special; but Simplicius says that he has it from Andronicus, which presumably implies that Porphyry himself credited this particular 'articulation' to Andronicus. It might illustrate just the kind of 'excavation' of an *έννοια* that Andronicus deployed the *Categories* to facilitate. That is, Andronicus might have suggested that the *Categories*, with its relatively non-technical delineations of the highest genera, does for our innate concepts of 'relation' or 'quantity' something like what he does here for our concept of 'unity'.¹⁰³ (If this is right, we should also note that Andronicus sometimes tries to improve on the treatise, as when he amends the wording of the *Categories*' account of the *πρός τι* [Simplic. *in Cat.* 202,5].)

I think that we can strengthen this interpretation from other sources, tracing this approach to the *Categories* to Herminius in the second century CE, who in turn follows Boethus of Sidon in the first century. To develop this case, we now return to the argument in favour of the title *Categories* preserved in Porphyry's shorter commentary. For a long stretch in the opening pages of the commentary, Porphyry contends that the treatise should not be called *Before the Topics* but instead *Κατηγορίαι*, because it is about *κατηγορίαι*, simple significant expressions. This argument about the title, as I proposed above, should likely be attributed to Andronicus, on the strength of coordinate passages like Simplicius *in Cat.* 379,8–11. In Porphyry's commentary, it is backed by a variety of stronger points about the nature of language acquisition grounded, not in Aristotle, but in Stoic

μόρια, περιγεγραμμένον δὲ ἰδίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτον συνεχὲς ὀνομάζομεν καὶ τὴν τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέχειαν ἔνωσιν. καὶ οὕτως τὸ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν νοοῦμεν...

¹⁰² τὸ δὲ τῷ εἶδει ἐν καὶ ὁμοειδὲς γινώσκομεν τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς ἀτόμοις κατὰ τὰς ἐνούσας διαφορὰς χωρίζοντες.

¹⁰³ Compare 26,17 for Andronicus' use of a concept of unity.

and Epicurean philosophy of language,¹⁰⁴ which I think may be a hallmark of Andronicus' approach. (Boethus, on the other hand, shows signs of adopting the semantics of *De Interpretatione* as a new framework for interpreting the *Categories*; see ch. 6.)

Porphyry states that everyday language lacks precise names for certain real things dealt with by philosophy, but the *Categories* can aid us in acquiring a new vocabulary (cf. Porph. in *Cat.* 55,3, Simplicius in *Cat.* 74,4), thereby bringing our language closer to reality. The *Categories* requires just a few coined or 'technical' terms to introduce philosophy properly (λέξεις καιναι, for which cf. Porphyry in *Cat.* 55,12 and the 'five words' of *Isag.* 1,4–5). Porphyry credits the general thrust of his argumentation to Boethus of Sidon, and then adds that Herminus (the second-century CE Peripatetic who lectured to Alexander) takes the same view as Boethus and himself, namely that:

[T]he subject of the [*Categories*] is not the primary and highest genera in nature, for instruction in these is not suitable for young persons, nor the issue of what the primary and fundamental differentiae of things said are, since in that case the discussion would seem to be about the parts of speech. Rather it is about the sort of predication that will properly belong to what is said in each of the genera of being. Hence it also became necessary to touch in some way upon the genera to which the predications in question correspond, for it is impossible to recognize the kind of signification that is proper to each genus without some preconception (πρόληψις) of it. This also accounts for the title Predication (κατηγορία), which means 'the proper mode of signification connected with each genus'.¹⁰⁵ (Herminus ap. Porphyrium in *Cat.* 59,17–33, tr. Strange 1992, lightly modified)

¹⁰⁴ See Frede and Inwood 2005: 14–54; I have also tried to explore this question further in Griffin 2012b.

¹⁰⁵ Λέγει τοίνυν ὁ Ἑρμίνος προκείσθαι οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πρώτων καὶ γενικωτάτων γενῶν (οὐ γὰρ νέοις προσήκουσα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων διδασκαλία) οὔτε τίνες αἱ πρώται καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῶν λεγομένων διαφοραί, ὥς τὸν λόγον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τῆς καθ' ἑκάστων γένος τῶν ὄντων οἰκείας ἀνέσσοι τῶν λεγομένων κατηγορίας· διὸ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο ἀμωσγέπως ἄσθασθαι τῶν γενῶν, ἐφ' ἅπερ ἡ τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἀναφορά· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν ἐκάστου οἰκείαν σημασίαν γινώσκον εἶναι μηδεμιᾶς αὐτῷ προλήψεως προυποκειμένης. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ Κατηγορία, δηλωτικὴ οὕσα τῆς ἐκάστω γένει συνημμένης οἰκείας σημασίας. ὅτι δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τὸν ἀριθμὸν δέκα, προῖων ὁ λόγος δηλώσει· ταύτῃ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῶν κατηγοριῶν δέκα. ὁ δὲ ἐπιγράφων Περὶ δέκα γενῶν οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀπεικότως, εἰ μόνον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ γένη ἀναφορὰν ποιοῖτο τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι προηγουμένως περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν νομίζοι (ed. Bodéüs 2008).

This is evidently a compressed version of Boethus' interpretation (Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εἴρηκεν ταῦτα καὶ Ἑρμῖνος βραχέως, 59,17–18). It seems to represent a similar reading of the *Categories* as a text to be used for teasing out or articulating *προλήψεις*. Perhaps most importantly, it is extremely suggestive of a justification for beginning the philosophical curriculum with the *Categories*, because this treatise is uniquely well adapted to help to articulate precisely these *προλήψεις*. A similar view is attributed to Boethus in Simplicius' commentary:

It was not feasible to give *definitions* (ὁροι) of the primary genera . . . But it was possible, by means of a general sketch account (ὑπογραφή), to actuate (ἀνακινεῖν) our conception (ἐννοίαν) that fits (συναρμόζουσιν) with the relative. [Aristotle] does this by following Plato according to the first rendering (ἀπόδοσις) [of the definition of the relative], as Boethus [of Sidon] tells us. For Plato is said by him to have given the following rendering about relatives: 'whatever are said to be just what they are [as being] of other things'.¹⁰⁶ (Simplicius 159,10–15, translation Fleet 2002, lightly modified)

I take this passage to suggest that Boethus, for his part, located the *Categories*' value in the core chapters' 'sketches' or ὑπογραφαί of the genera, stirring up our concepts about them without requiring the capacity to construct a technical definition (which would also be impossible, in the absence of any higher genera). (The verb ἀνακινεῖν has a storied philosophical history in the Platonic tradition,¹⁰⁷ but that does not prevent Boethus from having used it in commenting on Aristotle; at any rate, the following passage shows that the central point about ὑπογραφαί is Boethus' own.) Another useful passage in this connection, I think, is Simplicius in *Cat.* 163,28–9. Boethus remarks that the first account of the relative (*Cat.* 6a36–7) looks circular, which is no good in a definition; Simplicius rebukes him

¹⁰⁶ Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἰόντες λέγομεν ὅτι ὅρον μὲν ἀποδιδόναι τῶν πρὸς τι ἀδύνατον ἦν· τῶν γὰρ πρώτων γενῶν ὅρους ἀποδιδόναι ἀμήχανον ἦν διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας πρότερον αἰτίας· δι' ὑπογραφῆς δὲ τινος τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐννοίαν ἀνακινεῖν τὴν συναρμόζουσιν τοῖς πρὸς τι δυνατὸν ἦν· καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ τῷ Πλάτῳ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τὴν πρώτην ἀκολουθῶν, ὡς φησιν Βόηθος· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων οὕτως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀποδοῦναι περὶ τῶν πρὸς τι· 'ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται' (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

¹⁰⁷ See Plato, *Meno* 85C, and for the Platonic context, Chiaradonna 2007c. It is certainly possible that Boethus did not use this exact verb, but it is paraphrased by Simplicius or his source.

for failing to recognize that Aristotle is not offering a proper *definition*, but a sketch account or *ὑπογραφή*. The rebuke stings because:

[Boethus] *himself* goes on to claim in his defence that it is necessary to present sketch accounts (*ὑπογραφαί*) of the primary genera by means of the things which are posterior to them as well as [by means of] themselves.¹⁰⁸ (*in Cat.* 163,28–9, tr. Fleet 2002, lightly modified)

Boethus stressed that the primary genera should be described by *ὑπογραφαί*. (It would, after all, appear to be impossible to furnish a formal Aristotelian definition of the highest genera, since a formal definition would comprise a genus and differences.)¹⁰⁹ All of these passages suggest that this broad approach to the *Categories* belongs to the first century and to the first generations of interest in the treatise. Even if this view originated with Boethus, I think it is a good candidate for elucidating the interest in the *Categories* among the earliest generations of commentators. And as I began to argue above, I think there is also some circumstantial evidence that Boethus was here following Andronicus.¹¹⁰

On the Stoic view, the difficulty about using such ‘sketches’ to actuate preconceptions from ordinary language was that they capture only *accidental*, not *essential*, features of the world (Brittain 2005: 196–200—like the merely ‘*ennoematic*’ definitions described by Galen, *Diff. puls.* 4, 708,16–709,5). To arrive at an *essential* account that was not merely expressed in terms of accidental attributes—that was not a mere sketch but a proper definition—would require, for the Stoic, a systematic dialectical process of articulation (*διάρθρωσις*), as noted above. The *Categories*, I think, is construed as bridging this gap. Consider, for example, Simplicius’ preface to Aristotle’s description of the first category, *οὐσία*:

Earlier <Aristotle> enumerated all genera in order, and he provided an outline elucidation (*ὑποτυπωτικὴν . . . διδασκαλίαν*) of them by means of examples; now he takes in hand each of the genera and gives a more detailed account as best as one can, by pointing out their conceptual

¹⁰⁸ καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ προελθὼν ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν τὰς ὑπογραφὰς ἀποδιδόναι (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

¹⁰⁹ I am indebted to Marwan Rashed for this point: see Alexander, *Quaestio De differentia* II [12!](a), translated in Rashed 2007: 64–5.

¹¹⁰ It might also be worth noting that the rendering preferred as a *ὑπογραφή* here by Boethus is close to Andronicus’ and Ariston’s preferred account of the relative as disposed to another (Simplic. *in Cat.* 202,5).

content by means of a sketch account (*ἔννοιαν δι' ὑπογραφῆς ἐπιδεικνύων*), and by clarifying their attributes (*παρακολουθοῦντα*) and distinguishing characteristics (*ἴδια*). Archytas proceeded in this way as well.¹¹¹ (Simplic. *in Cat.* 75,28–31, tr. de Haas and Fleet 2001, lightly modified)

Here, again, is the fundamental pedagogical value attributed to the *Categories*: Aristotle begins from relatively informal, everyday, perceptible ‘examples’ of the genera and then clarifies their *παρακολουθοῦντα* and *ἴδια*, not requiring prior experience in the technicalities of constructing definitions. Thus Aristotle’s *Categories* simply offers an articulation of familiar terms, approaching a more exact understanding:

Aristotle’s aim here is to teach us about the words mentioned in the doctrine of categories that require some articulation (*διάρθρωσις*) and explanation.¹¹² (Ammonius *in Cat.* 93,9–12, tr. Cohen and Matthews 1991)

The Neoplatonists will later adapt this basic Aristotelian notion—that the *Categories* is beginning from the familiar and proceeding to the unfamiliar, from what is known to us to what is known by nature—to accommodate a doctrinally valuable restriction of the *Categories*’ scope, establishing that it concerns itself only with sensible being. Thus Simplicius contends that:

[Aristotle in the *Categories*] is talking about perceptible things (*αἰσθητά*), which are also what is investigated by the ordinary person (*ὁ πολὺς ἄνθρωπος*) . . . he seeks the difference in accordance with those meaningful words which were first and most properly assigned to sensible things, and which are familiar to the ordinary person.¹¹³ (Simplicius, *in Cat.* 74,3–17)

¹¹¹ Πρότερον μὲν ἐν τάξει πάντα τὰ γένη καθριμῆσατο, ὑποτυπωτικὴν αὐτῶν τὴν διδασκαλίαν διὰ παραδειγμάτων ποιησάμενος· νῦν δὲ ἕκαστον προχειρίζομενος τὴν ἀκριβεστέραν ὡς οἷόν τε παράδοσιν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖται, τὴν τε ἔννοιαν δι’ ὑπογραφῆς ἐπιδεικνύων καὶ τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἀνακαθαίρομενος. οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀρχύτας ἐποίησεν . . . (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

¹¹² Σκοπὸς ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει διδάξαι ἡμᾶς περὶ τῶν φωνῶν, ὧν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐμνημόνευσεν, οὐ παντάπασιν μὲν ἡμῖν ἀγνώστων οὐσῶν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, δεομένων δὲ ὅμως τινὸς διαρθρώσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας (ed. Busse 1895).

¹¹³ Ἐπεὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαλέγεται, περὶ ὧν καὶ ὁ πολὺς ἄνθρωπος τὴν ἐπίσκειψιν ποιεῖται, δηλόν ἐστι πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τὴν παρὰ πᾶσι λεγομένην οὐσίαν προχειρίσασθαι, ἔπειτα ἐξ ὧν δυεῖν οὐσίαι μνημονεύσας, αἰσθητῆς τε καὶ διανοητῆς, εἰς δὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ ταύτας μὴδὲ ἀνελθὼν ὅλως τὴν αἰσθητὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι τῆς διανοητῆς φησιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σκέμματι προηγούμενον ἔχουσιν

[Aristotle in this treatise] is not concerned with discussing the intelligible substances . . . this he made clear by the <word> ‘called’ (λεγομένη, *Cat.* 2a12). For in ordinary language (συνήθεια) intelligible substance is not spoken of, nor is it known to the multitude (οἱ πολλοί), but sensible substance is.¹¹⁴ (Simplicius, in *Cat.* 82,2–20)

In fact, Boethus of Sidon had already developed the basic argument that the *Categories* is concerned with the sensible world addressed by speech, in response to criticisms raised by a predecessor of Nicostatus and Plotinus (ap. Simplic. in *Cat.* 78,4–20: perhaps Eudorus, as Chiaradonna 2009: 104 suggests, or Lucius).¹¹⁵ (For Plotinus, on the other hand, language primarily addresses the intelligible;¹¹⁶ I argue in ch. 3 that Eudorus of Alexandria may also have maintained that language addresses both intelligible and sensible realms.)

I think this is a suggestive bundle of evidence supporting an early reading of the *Categories* as ‘articulating’ *προλήψεις* in something much like the Stoic sense, also illustrating and grounding its forward position in the curriculum as the ‘first book’ of philosophy and logic. The *Categories* alone offers the ‘honing’ of our natural preconceptions of the highest genera that the later Aristotelian curriculum—and dialectic in general—depend upon: as a dialectical handbook, it offers and describes a short list of *summa genera*, including simple linguistic ‘tests’ that we can use to help determine to which category a given term really belongs. (As I suggested above, this might also have been emphasized as an important practical step in tackling sophistical

λόγον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ διανοητὴ οὐσία οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν, ἣν ἔχει πρὸς τὴν αἰσθητήν, (10) καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς αἰσθητῆς εἰς τὴν διανοητὴν ἀναβαίνειν δυνάμεθα, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς διανοητῆς τὴν αἰσθητήν καίτοι πολλῆς ἀπειρίας καὶ ἀοριστίας ἀναπλησθεῖσαν ὄρω περιλαμβάνομεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ μερικὰ τῶν καθόλου καὶ διανοητῶν προτάττει, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως ποιεῖ, κατὰ τὰς σημαντικὰς (15) φωνὰς τὴν διαφορὰν μετιών, αἱ πρῶτως καὶ κυρίως ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐτάχθησαν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσι γνώριμοι . . . (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907)

¹¹⁴ ἡ ὅτι οὐ πρόκειται αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν οὐσιῶν νῦν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὴν φύσιν καὶ τάξιν παραδοῦναι, ὅπερ καὶ διὰ τοῦ λεγομένη ἐνεδείξατο· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ οὐδὲ ἔγνωσται τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐκείνη, ἀλλ’ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσθητή (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

¹¹⁵ See ch. 6.

¹¹⁶ See Chiaradonna 2002: 263–7; van den Berg 2008: 72 (referencing Dexippus in *Cat.* 41,25–30).

challenges that turn on equivocation).¹¹⁷ I think the attribution of some such interpretation of the *Categories* to the first generation of commentators, especially Boethius, is fairly strong, on the basis of the evidence treated here.

I think that there is further reason to trace it to Andronicus, given his apparent innovation in foregrounding the *Categories* in the corpus of Aristotle, his interest in distinguishing accidental from essential predication (as preserved in Boethius), and his associations with the terminology of *προλήψεις* and *διάρθρωσις* in Simplicius. The *Categories* will activate our preconceptions of the highest genera and also correct them, and—crucially—will begin us on the road to using our honed concepts in scientific demonstration or *ἀπόδειξις*, not merely in the rhetorical applications of ‘dialectic’ in the *Topics*’ sense. The use of the *Categories*’ simple tests helps us to avoid the mistake of confusing accidental with essential predication, and so trains the budding dialectician to resist sophistical puzzles turning on equivocation (and such puzzles, to judge from Cicero’s criticisms, may still have troubled Antiochus’ school before Andronicus). But it will not be enough for this process simply to apply in rhetorical contexts: philosophers would merely be ‘declaiming *θέσεις*’ or rhetorical theses maintained in dialectical practice (which, interestingly, is just what Strabo says they were limited to doing before the recovery of the esoteric treatises: *Geog.* 13.1.54). This is what Peripatetics and Academics had done before (cf. Brittain 2001: 329–42 and Reinhardt 2003: 347).

Andronicus perhaps argued that Aristotle provided the resources that the ‘dogmatist’ required to articulate our innate *ἐννοιαί*—a long road that began with the *Categories*’ (pre-technical) training in the predication of simple terms, and ran through propositions and syllogisms to the *Analytics* and *ἀπόδειξις*. Our everyday speech, based on our words’ conventional relation to everyday things, still encodes something of the truth about things, a truth that Aristotle’s articulations help to decode.¹¹⁸ The proof that predication is possible—that words could successfully refer to things, once we are able to bring

¹¹⁷ *Topics* 1.9 and *Soph. El.* 22 presuppose such tests, as Menn 1995: 320 points out, but do not provide the tools to practise them; the *Categories* does provide just such tests.

¹¹⁸ The later Neoplatonist commentators would develop such a reading of its value: see Simplicius in *Cat.* 12.10–13.12 with Hoffmann 1987. I have also explored some issues relating to the Neoplatonists’ pedagogical use of the *Categories* in Griffin 2013a.

every term under the correct genus—would lie in our subsequent agreement in employing the predications that the *Categories* articulated.¹¹⁹

Be that as it may, Andronicus certainly insisted that the *Categories* contributes to demonstrative knowledge (*ἀπόδειξις*) and not merely to rhetorical competence, and in this he was not alone. There are many traces of early interest in the value of formal division and definition for finding the truth, focusing on the indefiniteness or ‘uncountability’ of particulars.¹²⁰ Antiochus already crafts an ‘Old Academic’ consensus that definition and division can be used to overcome the vagueness of sensible reality (Cic. *Ac.* 1.5, above). The *Categories* is represented as a solution to that same ‘vagueness’ of the perceptible world in Porphyry’s shorter commentary on the *Categories*, building on the earlier discussion of the appropriateness of the title *Κατηγορίαι*:

For things and expressions are both practically infinite in number. But his intention is not to list expressions one by one—for each one signifies one particular being—but since things that are many in number are one in species or in genus, the infinity of beings and of the expressions that signify them is found to be included under a list of ten genera. Since beings are comprehended by ten generic sorts, the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so classified. Thus predications (*κατηγορίαι*) are said to be ten in genus, just as beings themselves are ten in genus.¹²¹ (Porph. *in Cat.* 58,5–13, tr. Strange 1992, lightly modified)

The most general items, then, are ten; the most special are of a certain number, but a definite one; the individuals—that is to say, the items after the most special items—are infinite. That is why Plato advised those who descend from the most general items to the most special to

¹¹⁹ For that kind of argument, an argument from our consensus about (properly articulated) *κοινὰ ἔννοια*, see for example Obbink 1992, Brittain 2005 (with passages cited above).

¹²⁰ I have also argued this point in Griffin 2012a and 2013b. For the Neoplatonist reception of this idea, see Chase 2011.

¹²¹ ἄπειρα μὲν <γαρ>σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμὸν. ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς κατὰ ἀριθμὸν πρόκειται διελεῖν λέξεις· ἐκάστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν<έν> σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων· ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ πολλὰ ἔστιν ἐν ὄντα τῷ εἶδει ἢ τῷ γένει, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν σημαινουσῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὗρηται περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι. εἰς δέκα τοίνυν γενικὰς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γεγόνασιν κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐτὰ περιληφθεῖσαι. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ γένει δηλονότι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει (ed. Bodéüs 2008).

stop there, and to descend through the intermediates . . . and he tells us to leave the infinities alone, for there will be no knowledge of them. So when we are descending to the most special items, it is necessary to divide and to proceed through a plurality, and when we are ascending to the most general items, it is necessary to bring the plurality together into one.¹²² (Porph. *Isagoge* 6,10—16, tr. Barnes, modified)

Alexander of Aphrodisias similarly, in commenting on *Topics* 1.12, (*in Top.* 86,25–7), suggests that the difficulty about getting to know the infinite particulars lies in our inability to ‘work through’ (ἀδιεξίτητα) them ‘part by part’ (κατὰ μέρους), itself a nice echo of *An. Post.* 1.22. Alcinoüs has a similar view (*Didasc.* 25, 3.6). And as we have discussed, this approach to articulating the value of the *Categories* seems likely to be traced, through Herminius, to Boethius of Sidon, and perhaps earlier to Andronicus. Pseudo-Archytas—writing perhaps in the first century BCE¹²³—argues that:

Beings are spoken of in two ways: for some are subjects, others inherent in subjects or accidental to them [. . .] And it is clear that οὐσία and ποιότης and ποσότης, and the other thoughts and signifiers [mentioned previously in the list of ten κατηγορίαι at 22,14] will have been spoken of in just the same number of ways [. . .] All knowledge, then, takes its starting-points (ἀρχομένη) from the limited (πεπερασμένων) and gets to know the unlimited (ἀπείρων); and this is even more true of the knowledge of beings [. . .] Every craft and every form of knowledge has a certain rank and definition, and anything like this is in a numerical sequence (ἀριθμὸς): and the entirety of number is ten . . . Now other men have language (λόγος) by accident (for they use it without knowledge), but the wise have it in an absolute manner. That is because, once

¹²² δέκα μὲν οὖν τὰ γενικώτατα, τὰ δὲ εἰδικώτατα ἐν ἀριθμῷ μὲν τινι, οὐ μὴν ἀπείρων τὰ δὲ ἄτομα, ἅπερ ἔστι τὰ μετὰ τὰ εἰδικώτατα, ἅπειρα. διὸ ἄχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατιόντας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι, κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ μέσου διαιρούντας ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς· τὰ δὲ ἅπειρά φησιν ἔαν, μὴ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. κατιόντων μὲν οὖν εἰς τὰ εἰδικώτατα ἀνάγκη διαιρούντας διὰ πλήθους ἵέναι, ἀνιόντων δὲ εἰς τὰ γενικώτατα ἀνάγκη συναρεῖν τὸ πλήθος εἰς ἓν (ed. Busse 1887).

¹²³ So Szlezák 1972. Certainly the associations of the text, including Andronicus and Eudorus, belong to the first century, and there is no trace of the dominant later discussions that we encounter in (say) Sosigenes in the second century (cf. Dexippus, 7,1 and following). Hippolytus (170–236 CE) seems to allude to the text in his *Refutations* (6.24), and Iamblichus uses it extensively in commenting on the *Categories*.

they grasp reality and witness real beings, they apply the fitting meanings absolutely.¹²⁴ (31,6–32,23 Thesleff)

This passage seems to express a similar common position, including the emphasis on transcending vagueness and ignorance, and on distinguishing accidental from essential predication, with additional Pythagorean undertones.¹²⁵ I suggest that Andronicus developed this position in the first place, stressing the value of the *Categories* as a crucial initial tool for undertaking the kind of division necessary for generating formal definitions—shifting from mere *προλήψεις* based on vague sensible particulars to properly articulated *ἐννοιαι*—and defended its value on this basis.

(e) Other testimonies on the *Categories*

I have focused here on testimonies to Andronicus' interest in the general function and purpose of the *Categories*, and its goal or target

¹²⁴ The text runs as follows (excerpted from Szlezák 1972): ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ὄντα διχῶς λέγεται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὰ δὲ συνυπάρχοντα ἢ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις· καὶ τῶν συνυπαρχόντων ἢ συμβεβηκότων τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἔστι ποιότης, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐξῆς καὶ ὁμοίως· [...] (30) Τὸ μὲν οὖν σύστημα τοῦ παντὸς λόγου, τὰ συνυπάρχοντα αὐτῷ τίνα τε καὶ ὅποσα καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλεκόμενά τε καὶ διαιρούμενα δεδήλωται. ἐκ δὲ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος κανὼν [p. 32] ἔστι καὶ σταθμὴ τῆς ὄντως ἐπιστήμης καὶ γέγονε πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἅπασαν ἀλήθειαν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε σύμφυτόν τε καὶ συγγενὴ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παντὸς εἶχε τὴν καταρρύθμισιν, δι' ἧσπερ καὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ γενησόμενα ἐρμηνεύεται καὶ διασημαίνεται· πάντα γὰρ ἢ ἐν τούτοις ἢ διὰ τούτων ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων ἔχει τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας ὁ λόγος ἢ περὶ τῶν συνυπαρχόντων αὐτῇ καὶ ἴτοι περὶ σώματος ἢ ἀσωμάτου καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἴτοι τοῦ ἐν ποιότητι ἢ τοῦ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τοῖς ἐξῆς.

(10) Ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν πᾶσα ἐκ πεπερασμένων ἀρχομένη [τῶν ἰδίων στοιχείων] τῶν ἀπείρων γίνεται [ἀρχῇ] γνωστική· οὕτω δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, (εἰ) καὶ δι' ὀλίγων γνωρίζει. ἢ δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμη καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον· ἀπείρως γὰρ τὰ τε ὄντα καὶ τὰ γενόμενα καὶ τὰ γενησόμενα γνωστική· τοῦτο εἰκότως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς δύο ταῦτα συνέστη, (15) πρὸς τε τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλῶς εἶναι· καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ εἶναι τέχνην ἐμνηστεύσατο, ἧς χεῖρες ἀρχιτέκτονες, πρὸς δὲ τὸ καλῶς εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ λόγον προσεκτίησατο· ἔστι δὲ τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη πᾶσα τεταγμένον τι καὶ ὠρισμένον· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἀριθμῷ. ὁ δὲ σύμπας ἀριθμὸς ὁ δέκα· εἰκότως καὶ τὰ ἀκρωτήρια τοῦ σώματος ἔχει δέκα καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα (20) τοῦ παντὸς λόγου δέκα ἔστιν ἀληθῶς. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχουσι τὸν λόγον (οὐ γὰρ εἰδότες χρώνται), οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ καθ' αὐτούς· ἀντιλαμβάνόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ θεωροῦντες τὰ ὄντα ἐπιφέρουσι κατ' αὐτῶν σημασίας ἀρμοζούσας.

¹²⁵ 'Archytas', like Eudorus, privileges the absolute over the relative (see ch. 3).

in the later Neoplatonist vocabulary (*πρόθεσις, σκοπός*).¹²⁶ Andronicus' other reflections on the text illustrate his attitude to Aristotle—in general, he engages him more or less as an equal, without the sort of reverence that characterizes even Boethus' treatment (Moraux, *Arismetelismus* I: 99). For example, he famously replaced Aristotle's categories of Where and When by Place and Time (Simplic. *in Cat.* 134,5, 342,23, 357,28). He added a fifth kind of quality to Aristotle's own list (263,19–22). He seems to have suggested—if this is not a textual criticism but a philosophical point—that Aristotle could have expressed himself more clearly at *Cat.* 6a37, as his extant definition of the relative is circular (202,5).¹²⁷ All of these innovations sparked defences of Aristotle by Andronicus' successors, especially Boethus.

IV. CONCLUSIONS: ANDRONICUS' RELATIONSHIP TO THE 'ANCIENT EXEGETES' OF CATEGORIES

Based on the limited material at our disposal, there is no strong evidence of Andronicus responding critically to alternative interpretations of the *Categories*, such as those offered by Lucius (discussed in ch. 4). The only alternative reading of the treatise that Andronicus is clearly concerned to rebut is that which pegs it as an introduction to the *Topics*, and so to plausible dialectic rather than scientific demonstration. Still, we might attempt to develop a tentative narrative of the course of influence of Andronicus' promotion of the *Categories*, focusing on the 'ancient', or first-generation, readers of the text (Simplicius *in Cat.* 159,33: *τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητὰς*).¹²⁸ In this section, in anticipation of chs. 3–6, I sketch this narrative. (Again, I would like to stress at the outset that I do not take

¹²⁶ On which see for example Mansfeld 1994: 1–9, 20, Hoffmann 1987, Hadot 1991.

¹²⁷ I attempt to set out some of Andronicus' other contributions more generally in Griffin 2009: ch. 3.

¹²⁸ Namely, Boethus of Sidon and Ariston (Peripatetics), Eudorus of Alexandria (who may be called an 'Academic', or Pythagorean; cf. Bonazzi 2013, 160–2), and Athenodorus (a Stoic), to whom we might add the shadowy critic Lucius, who is mentioned only by Simplicius and is not listed among 'the ancients', but seems to belong there chronologically, since Boethus responds in some detail to his critique.

Andronicus' *ideas* about the text to be especially influential on his contemporaries, with the exception of Boethus of Sidon; rather, I argue that his simple promotion of the text—from relative obscurity as a preface to the *Topics* to the fore of his catalogue—may have been the primary motivator of wider interest in the treatise *Categories*.)

Peripatetics

Let us turn first to Andronicus' Peripatetic near-contemporaries, Boethus and Ariston. Since there is good evidence of Boethus of Sidon either correcting or defending and expanding Andronicus' interpretations of Aristotelian philosophy (Aspasius in *Eth.* 44,24), and plentiful evidence of his response to Andronicus' reading of the *Categories* in particular, we can support the ancient tradition (e.g. Philoponus in *Cat.* 5,19) that Boethus was influenced by Andronicus, and perhaps in some formal sense his pupil. We can locate Boethus after Andronicus—not necessarily chronologically, but simply in terms of influence, suggesting that Andronicus' publication, paraphrase, and foregrounding of the *Categories* helped to attract the kind of detailed interest that Boethus displays in the treatise. In particular, as I argue below in the chapter on Boethus, Boethus adopts Andronicus' vision of the *Categories* as a useful introduction to philosophy for beginners.

There is very little evidence to tell us much about Ariston (likely of Alexandria), a newly-minted Aristotelian¹²⁹ with whom Andronicus

¹²⁹ On Ariston, see for example I. Mariotti (1966) and Moraux I, 181–93, with Caujolle-Zaslowsky and Richard Goulet, 'Ariston d'Alexandrie', in Goulet (1989) and Gottschalk (1987), 1110 and 1120–1. For his 'conversion' to Aristotelianism, see now Blank 2007: 92 and Chiaradonna 2013: 39–40, with Moraux 1973: 225–6 and Donini 1977: 247–8. Strabo (Geog. 17, 1, 5) is a chief witness for the life and chronology of Ariston. He must have lived during or before Strabo's own life. Fraser (489) argues that Strabo was unlikely to have known Ariston during his own sojourn to Alexandria in and after 24, as the latter was a pupil of Antiochus (and his brother), and there is a lapse of forty years between the probable death of Antiochus in 69 and Strabo's residence in Egypt. The information about Ariston's relationship to Antiochus depends on Philodemus, *Index Acad. Herc.* col. 35. The Philodeman *Index* has Ariston move from the Academy to the Peripatos with Cratippus. It is not demonstrable that the Academic–Peripatetic Ariston mentioned in the papyrus alongside Cratippus is the same Ariston of Alexandria mentioned by Strabo. It was assumed, e.g. by Moraux (1973: 57), although Moraux also recognizes the uncertainty of the identification (182; cf. Tarán 499). If they are the same, certainly this is some help; Cratippus' activity was contemporary with Cicero, who mentions him as the leading Peripatetic in Athens (cf.

shared a bid to revise the definition of the Relative at *Cat.* 8a31 to avoid circularity; Andronicus, Ariston, and Boethus are all credited with this argument,¹³⁰ although perhaps the fact that Porphyry mentions only Andronicus (*in Cat.* 125,20) is mildly suggestive in his favour as its originator. This evidence, I think, only points to the possibility that Andronicus was one of several contemporary Peripatetics, like Ariston and Cratippus, who grew increasingly interested in the Aristotelian esoteric texts and in working out and correcting the ideas contained in the *Categories* in particular—though they were not yet driven by the commentarial, line-by-line approach that Boethus would subsequently adopt.

Platonists

Before turning to Eudorus, let us consider Lucius, a very influential critic of the *Categories* (discussed in more detail in ch. 4). Lucius, who has Platonist sympathies, forcefully objects to the *Categories* on the grounds that it professes (but fails) to offer a compelling account of being, since it omits any discussion of intelligible being at all: in other words, it's a failed shot at a system of first philosophy, or ontology. While 'Lucius and Nicostratus' refer to Andronicus in the course of their objections to the *Categories* (ap. Simplic. *in Cat.* 134,4, in the set of *aporiai* at 127,11–140,30)¹³¹ and they rely on some of Andronicus' interpretations, we have no evidence that Andronicus was in turn aware of the interpretations and challenges to the text offered by Lucius. Boethus of Sidon, however, certainly was; he responds to their objections systematically (see ch. 4). We might, then, suggest this

De Off. 3.2, *De Div.* 1.3, etc.—although as Gottschalk and others stress, this need not imply that he was 'scholarch'); thus the close attachment of Cratippus with Ariston could also weight Ariston's activity before the later forties BCE.

¹³⁰ Simplicius (*in Cat.* 201,34) states that Ariston and Boethus changed *ti* to *heteron* in the definition of the Relative at *Cat.* 8a31 to avoid circularity; Andronicus appears to have done the same. Simplicius subsequently states οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος, although it is not clear who follows whom: there is perhaps a superficial reason to favour Andronicus, who is mentioned alone at Porphyry, *in Cat.* 125,20 ff. I think there is no immediate reason to doubt that Andronicus here originated the interest in the discussion of the relative from an Aristotelian standpoint, and shared this interest with Ariston. Tarán 1981: 742, suggests Stoic influence on Ariston; Gottschalk 1987: 1106 n. 138, points to Aristotelian sources instead.

¹³¹ This, however, does not prove very much chronologically, since Simplicius often reports Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus as if they presented a united front.

rough sequence of events: Andronicus' new emphasis drew serious attention to the *Categories* outside the circle of scholars like himself, Ariston, and perhaps bibliophiles like Tyrannio; Lucius represents a critical response from a Platonist standpoint (which would imply a relatively early date for Lucius; on this, see ch. 4); Boethus, belonging to the next generation, replied to Lucius' objections while also developing a more subtle reading of the text's metaphysical implications and amending Andronicus' views accordingly.

But why did Lucius respond so vigorously against an interpretation of the *Categories* that simply—with Andronicus—made it into a useful, introductory handbook for teasing out our 'preconceptions' and developing demonstrative technique, a foundation for logic? What threat was there in that? For an answer, we must turn to Eudorus, a near contemporary of Andronicus who shares his analysis of the *Categories* under the broader subdivision of the absolute and the relative, and the conviction that its study can lead to demonstrative knowledge (these affinities are discussed further in the following chapter). Eudorus, followed in several important respects by Pseudo-Archytas, adopted these insights in a Pythagorean and Platonist framework, arguing that the *Categories* offers an accurate map of the structure of reality, both intelligible and sensible, once it is lightly amended (for example, to position quality before quantity, representing the Monad before the Dyad). It appears to be *this* kind of interpretation, not Andronicus', that sparked objections from the school represented by Lucius. It is difficult to judge the direction of influence here, although Andronicus' motivations for treating the *Categories* as he did display no evidence of Eudorus' specifically Pythagorean innovations or concerns. We might then suppose that they evolved independently and that the attention that Andronicus drew to the treatise helped to attract interest in Alexandria, although others introduced a very different, metaphysical and ontological set of concerns, which then in turn attracted critical engagement from other Platonists. Eudorus may well have developed his interests in the *Categories* entirely independently from Andronicus, and for different reasons (see ch. 3).

So perhaps we might update our suggested narrative as follows: Andronicus' methodological and pedagogical concerns motivated his foregrounding of the *Categories* in his catalogue, which in turn helped to draw attention to the text; Eudorus represents a growing Alexandrian school of interest in the *Categories* as a metaphysical or

ontological treatise offering a map of reality, which in turn attracted other Platonist interest and critics such as Lucius; Boethus responded to them in turn, arguing in his turn that the *Categories* was only intended to offer a map of sensible reality, and metaphysicians would be better off exploring its relationship to the central books of the *Metaphysics*. Boethus' view, of course, would prevail through Porphyry, with Plotinus adopting the Lucian and Nicostratan critique in the meanwhile.¹³²

Stoics

This narrative omits just one of the 'ancient' readers of *in Cat.* 159,22, namely the Stoic Athenodorus. There is no clear evidence, I think, that Athenodorus' interest in the *Categories* was stimulated by Andronicus; in fact, there is some *prima facie* reason to doubt that, since Athenodorus' worry about the treatise is that it does a poor job of analysing natural language into its component parts. That is to say, it is a bad textbook of grammar, in the sense that the tenfold division seems to be the wrong number (cf. Simplicius *in Cat.* 62,24–6) to capture everything from conjunctions to prepositions, nouns to verbs (for this argument, see ch. 5). This would be a very odd and blinkered response to the Andronican interpretation that this treatise is about meaningful predication (*katēgoria*), especially the clear and precise distinction of absolute from relative predication, functioning as an aid to definition and demonstration, and that the book provides an on-ramp to philosophical demonstration through the articulation of our innate *προλήψεις*.

Perhaps, instead, we might locate Athenodorus as an *earlier*, Stoic respondent to Aristotle's theory of ten kinds of predication, understood as useful for rhetoric or grammar, compatible with its earlier reading under the rubric of the *Before-the-Topics* or the rhetorical interpretation found, for instance, in Quintilian *Inst.* 3.23–34. (This might make it chronologically less likely, though not impossible, that the 'Athenodorus' mentioned by Simplicius is Athenodorus Calvus, the tutor of Augustus, but there are other, earlier alternatives for that identification.)¹³³ There is a little evidence for Boethus of Sidon

¹³² See Chiaradonna 2002: 263–7.

¹³³ I argue this in more detail below and especially in Griffin 2013b.

responding to Athenodorus' concerns, but not very much: Boethus responds, here elaborating and adding precision to Andronicus' view, that the treatise is not trying to analyse verbal expressions *as such* (λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις) but instead simple verbal expressions *qua* significant of being—that is, it is a work of semantics. This influential Boethian interpretation would prevail through Porphyry. (There is also some evidence, as I suggest in ch. 4, that later Stoics like Cornutus agreed that the *Categories* belonged to the primary part of dialectic in the Stoic sense, dealing with λεκτά and not with grammar as such, although there are also passages, such as 359,1, that speak against this.)

The following chapters aim to develop and elaborate this narrative.

‘Pythagorean’ Support: Eudorus and Pseudo-Archytas

There are strong traces of interest in Aristotle’s ten categories—and the treatise *Categories*—in Pythagorean circles roughly contemporary with Andronicus, beginning with Eudorus of Alexandria. This interest seems broadly similar in temperament to Andronicus’, treating the ten categories as a crucial aid in transcending the vagueness of particulars and arriving at the more precise knowledge of intelligibles, but with a new, Pythagorean emphasis on the symbolism of the number ten and the recognition of the distinction of the intelligible world from the sensible (compare passages cited above, especially Pseudo-Archytas, *Περὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων ἥτοι τῶν κατηγοριῶν*, 31,6–32,23). I will briefly trace this interest here, which has been studied in full detail recently, especially by Mauro Bonazzi (2007, 2012, 2013).

I. EUDORUS OF ALEXANDRIA (FL. c.50 BCE?)¹

Life and History

We have several hints regarding the life and chronology of Eudorus, suggesting that he was active around the middle of the first century BCE. The chief evidence is Strabo (64 BCE–19 CE), who mentions

¹ The fragments and testimonia for Eudorus of Alexandria have been collected by C. Mazzarelli, ‘Raccolta e interpretazione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti del medioplatonico Eudoro di Alessandria’, *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 77 (1985), 197–209 and 535–55; see also A. N. Zoubos, ‘Εὐδωρος ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς’, *Athena* 62

(Geog. 17.1.5) that Eudorus and Ariston both wrote similar books *On the Nile*, and Eudorus accused Ariston of plagiarism. We can infer that Eudorus and Ariston were active before or during the lifetime of Strabo himself. As Strabo declares that he cannot tell which book really came first (ἐν Ἀμμωνος εὔροι τις ἄν!), we may also infer that Eudorus was relatively well known in that time.² With respect to his school affiliation (on which see also Bonazzi 2013), Eudorus appears to have been regarded as an ‘Academic’ by his near-contemporaries, and represents his own sympathies as Pythagorean.³

Works

(1) Eudorus is said (by Arius Didymus ap. Stobaeum, loc. cit.) to have written a *Διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου*. According to Arius, this text was arranged *προβληματικῶς*, by topic or problem. Arius preserves a portion of the ethical section of the work,⁴ and praises it as a work well worth purchasing (βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον). This is the only

(1958), 194–203 (with modern Greek commentary). Literature and discussion of Eudorus during the past century is collected in Goulet (2000:292–3). Tarrant (2008) has specifically explored Eudorus’ polemical posture with regard to the *Cat*. On Eudorus see in particular Dillon (1977, 1996, and 2000) and recently Chiaradonna (2009 and 2013), Bonazzi (2007), Fraser (1972), Dörrie (1944), Tarrant (1985 and 2008), Rist (1986), and Napolitano (1985).

² Unlike Ariston, Eudorus is not mentioned by Cicero. This could suggest that he was less conspicuous in the years before 43 BCE, but this is inconclusive: for example, as Dillon points out (1977/1996: 115), Cicero may not have been in contact with Alexandria’s latest developments of philosophy in the years leading up to 43. It is difficult to guess when Eudorus produced the book that brought him into conflict with Ariston, or for that matter when he produced major publications (see below) that could have drawn him to the attention of a figure like Cicero. We may, however, hazard one speculation about his relationship to Ariston; it seems unlikely that Eudorus was a relative unknown, a newcomer to the Alexandrian scene, when he accused Ariston of plagiarism; it seems from Strabo’s report that both persons were fairly well known in Alexandria.

³ Arius Didymus, who was also active in the first century BCE (if he is to be identified with the confidant of Augustus: on Arius, see Runia in *Der Neue Pauly* and Goulet, *DPhA* s.v.) calls Eudorus an ‘Academic’ (Ἀκαδημικοῦ φιλοσόφου, ap. Stobaeum, *Ecl.* 2.42,7 ff. Wachsmuth-Hense), as does Simplicius (ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκός, in *Cat.* 187,10). Eudorus himself also appears to have traced his views to those of the Pythagoreans (see for example Simplic. in *Phys.* 181,10), and to have sought to reconcile representatives of the Old Academy within a shared Platonic tradition (Plutarch).

⁴ Meineke (1859) initially attributed the ethical passage in Stobaeus to Arius. On Arius and his identification with the Stoic contact of Augustus, see David Runia in *Der*

work of Eudorus', as it happens, that we know by title. Several further works and commentaries are inferred from fragments and testimonia, but I take it that, in reality, any of the following testimonies may equally well derive from essays in the *Διαίρεσις*. (2) Eudorus also commented on Plato's *Timaeus*, as we learn from Plutarch *On the Generation of the Soul* (see 1013B5, 1019E6, 1020C3; several passages are discussed below). (3) Eudorus wrote about the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, as we learn in Alexander of Aphrodisias (*in Met.* 59,7, where he proposes an emendation, perhaps to show that in Plato's more esoteric or secret doctrine, God is the first cause of both the Forms and Matter). (4) Eudorus wrote about the *Categories* of Aristotle, as discussed below; again, however, it is unclear whether this represents a separate commentary. (5) A papyrus about optics (POxy 1609) mentions a *Timaeus* commentary by the same author, and there is a chance that this could refer to Eudorus (see Dillon 2000).⁵ (6) The book *On the Nile* mentioned above, concerning the cause of the river's flooding, is presumably another independent work by Eudorus, and (7) he produced a work of commentary on astronomy, perhaps on Aratus (see Dörrie and Baltes, 2002: 290).

Philosophy

Eudorus has often been labelled an exemplary 'Neo-Pythagorean' (e.g. Fraser 1972: 493), and he was labelled an 'Academic' in antiquity (see Bonazzi 2013: 161–2). Indeed, Dörrie suggested that he originated the Pythagorizing 'rebirth' of Platonism in the first century (32–4, referencing Simplic. *in Phys.* 181). With Dillon (1996/1977; cf. Dillon 2000), we might see him as motivated to return to the doctrines of the 'old' Pythagoreans, Archytas and Philolaus, and the 'old' Academics, Speusippus and Xenocrates, thus sharing a common motivation with Antiochus of Ascalon. (This is one respect among many in which Eudorus' sympathies are remarkably close to Andronicus', as we shall also find below: the latter's sympathetic treatment of Xenocrates' psychology at Themistius *in An.* 31,1–32,34, and

Neue Pauly, Brad Inwood s. v. 'Arius Didymus' in Goulet (1989), and Moraux (1973:259–450).

⁵ Burnyeat (2005) has recently argued that the original Archytas of Tarentum founded the Greek science of optics, beginning a tradition in which Eudorus may have worked.

affiliation with Xenocrates at Simplic. *in Cat.* 63,22–8, represent a similarly favourable attitude toward the ‘Old Academy’).

Eudorus marks an early example of the strong preference to ‘harmonize’ canonical philosophers that thrived in ancient philosophy from the first century onward.⁶ Plutarch provides an example of Eudorus’ approach to the Old Academy. Here Eudorus is represented as seeking to harmonize the definitions of the soul promoted by Xenocrates and Crantor in order to produce a unified account of the soul.⁷ Eudorus’ own view is not entirely clear, but what Plutarch does make clear is that Eudorus seeks to show that Xenocrates and Crantor were not at odds, and that neither was altogether mistaken. We can be reasonably confident that he thought the Academics were on the right track, and he wanted to show that they were not at odds.

An instance of Eudorus’ exegetical approach to earlier ‘Pythagoreans’ can be found at Simplicius *in Phys.* 181,7–30, a verbatim quotation in which Eudorus ascribes to οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι the view (which he himself endorses) that there exist a ‘Monad’ and a ‘Dyad’ under which all the Opposites are ranked. The ‘Opposites’ refer here to the Pythagorean opposites such as (on the one hand) limit, odd, male, light, and (on the other) unlimited, even, female, dark. But above the Monad and the Dyad reigns a supreme One, which may be described as the ‘transcendent God’ (ὑπεράνω θεός), and is the cause both of Matter (ὕλη) and of all created things.⁸

⁶ On this tendency in general, see for instance Boys-Stones (2001) and Karamanolis (2006).

⁷ See also Bonazzi (2013: 164–71). Dörrie, *Hermes* 79 (1944), 27–8 argues that Eudorus reconciled Xenocrates’ symbolic exegesis with Crantor’s more ‘literal’ exegesis. (Xenocrates argued that the soul was a ‘number moved by itself’, while Crantor described it as a mixture of *noētē ousia* with ‘that which forms impressions of perceptible objects by means of opinion’.)

⁸ Eudorus ascribes the view that the One causes Matter, as it seems, to Plato himself as well. Thus we learn from a controversial passage of Alexander *in Met.* (59,7), in which Eudorus—preserved for Alexander via Aspasius—is said to have amended the text at Aristotle, *Met.* 1.6, 988a7–12 to indicate that—for εἰδόσι, i.e. ‘those who know’ the true doctrine of Plato—the One is the cause of all things, even of Matter, being superior to the Forms (discussing *Met.* 1.6, 988a7–12). Moraux has discussed the text in detail in ‘Eine Korrektur des Mittelplatonikers Eudoros zum Text der Metaphysik des Aristoteles’, *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben*, Berlin, 1969, vol. 2, 592–04. Bonitz had proposed to amend the variant quotation at 59,1–2 to print εἶδεναι for εἰδόσι (cf. *Met.* 988a10–11), but εἶδεναι does not seem compatible with what Alexander says next. Moraux would take καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ as outside the variant reading, to read something like: ‘it is clear that [Plato] used only two causes, the essence (for the Forms are causes of the essence for the other things, [and],

Treatment of the *Categories*

Eudorus applies these views to his reading of the *Categories*. We have some direct evidence, and Philo of Alexandria's use of the *Categories* provides an indirect source.⁹

1. *The categories fall under the absolute and the relative*

First, at Simplicius, in *Cat.* 174,14, Eudorus suggests that the ten categories can be grouped into two major classes, the Absolute (*καθ' αὐτό*) and the Relative (*πρός τι*)¹⁰—adopting a similar view to that of Andronicus (see ch. 2).¹¹ These two 'Platonic categories' can perhaps be traced to Xenocrates (fr. 12 Heinze),¹² who is also mentioned in concert with Andronicus by Simplicius, raising the possibility that Andronicus joined in a wider reflection on Old Academic dialectical

for those who know, the One), and matter'. If that reading is right, Eudorus did not attempt to interpret Aristotle's account of Plato according to a more 'Middle Platonic' view; Moraux 503). But Dillon suggests (1977:128 n. 1) that Eudorus intentionally makes the One the cause of *hulē* as well as the *eidē*, noting that this 'Eudoran' monism appeals to Philo and appears later in the Chaldaean Oracles (e.g. fr. 34 Des Places and Psellus *Hypot.* 27).

⁹ On Philo, see Runia in *Der Neue Pauly* [I 12], with extensive bibliography. On his use of Peripatetic material, see Gottschalk, 1141 and 1145–6. Philo, a key representative of Hellenic Judaism, is not mentioned by the later commentators in association with the *Categories*, and his voluminous corpus does not include any systematic commentary on the Aristotelian text. For instance, he is not one of the 'ancients' named by Simplicius (in *Cat.* 159,32–3). However, it is worth mentioning at least briefly that Philo makes some use of the theory of categories, within a Pythagoreanizing framework (The index in Borgen et al. 2000 is very useful for identifying references; Dillon (1977: 178–82) usefully summarizes key passages.) In one passage, Philo claims that there is 'nothing that does not participate' in the ten categories (cf. *Dec.* 30 and following). In particular, like Eudorus, Philo uses the order Ousia–Quality–Quantity for the categories (cf. *Dec.* 30 and following); in the same text, he gives the name *topos* and *chronos* for Place and Time—not retaining 'Where' and 'When'. But Philo locates Time and Place at the end of the list—as does 'Archytas', whilst Eudorus places them immediately after Quantity. This passage suggests that Philo's source for the *Categories* is working in the same tradition as Eudorus and Philo.

¹⁰ On Eudorus' comments here, cf. Szlezák (1972:130) and Sharples (2008:282).

¹¹ The twofold division is also found in the *Divisiones Aristoteleae* (DL 3.108 and following = Cod. Marc. 97, p. 39 Mutschmann). Tarán, in reviewing Moraux I, suggests that Andronicus is influenced by Stoics as well as Xenocrates; Gottschalk (1990:72) disagrees.

¹² Dillon (1977:133) points out that the view may be traced to Plato himself (on the testimony of Hermodorus ap. Simplic. in *Phys.* 248,2 Diels); in the *Sophist* 255C, Plato distinguishes *auta kath' hauta* from *pros alla*.

thinking, which might even have been spurred in the first place by Alexandrian Academics like Eudorus. For all we know, the ten-categorical scheme that we associate with Aristotle’s *Categories* may also have been defended by Xenocrates, with important differences. I would stress here the distinction between the *doctrine* that the ten categories helpfully subdivide the absolute and the relative, and therefore accurately carve reality, which Eudorus and Andronicus share, and Aristotle’s discussion of the ten categories in the *treatise Categories*, which Eudorus may have criticized more heavily than Andronicus.¹³ It is important to notice, also, that Eudorus’ move to bring the ten categories under the Academic scheme of two is not necessarily a piece of school polemics. As Chiaradonna succinctly observes, ‘maintaining the Platonic–Academic twofold division of categories along with Aristotle’s list cannot in any way be seen as a sign of anti-Aristotelian allegiance’ (2013: 47–50): there is no evidence here that Eudorus was treating the *Categories* from a hostile standpoint.

The later Pythagoreans followed (a view that they understood to be) orthodox ancient Pythagoreanism when they mapped the two Platonic categories, absolute and relative, to the two columns of the Table of Contraries—ten opposed pairs organized in a table, *κατὰ συστοιχίαν* (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 986a22–6):

Absolute (καθ’ αὐτό)	Relative (πρός τι)
Limit (πέρας)	Unlimited (ἄπειρον)
Odd (περιττόν)	Even (ἄρτιον)
One (έν)	Plurality (πλήθος)
Right (δεξιόν)	Left (ἀριστερόν)
Male (ἄρρεν)	Female (θῆλυ)
Resting (ἡρεμοῦν)	Moving (κινούμενον)
Straight (εὐθύ)	Curved (καμπύλον)
Light (φῶς)	Dark (σκότος)
Good (ἀγαθόν)	Bad (κακόν)
Square (τετράγωνον)	Oblong (ἑτερόμηκες)

¹³ I am very grateful for correspondence with George Boys-Stones that has helped me to clarify this distinction.

For instance, absolute and relative correspond respectively to odd and even, and limit and unlimited.¹⁴ We also know from Simplic. *in Phys.* 181,7–30 that Eudorus maintained that this division of the opposites was the orthodox Pythagorean view, which he appears to endorse.

There is no reason, I think, to suppose that this table is designed to *compete* in any way with the Aristotelian ten categories, although it does suggest a common interest in the number ten—in this case, the perfect number of the Pythagorean tetraktys—as capturing a comprehensive model of reality. The table simply illustrates the two Academic categories using terms drawn from a Pythagorean lineage, to emphasize the antiquity and authenticity of the Academic scheme (for common moves of this kind beginning in the first century BCE and CE, see for example Boys-Stones 2001: 101); the same Academic categories can also be used to explain and illustrate the ten categories that we associate with Aristotle without conflict or competition. (One possible, speculative connection between the two is the stress laid on division through *contraries* by Aristotle, for example at *An. Post.* 2.13, 97a14–23; I have suggested above that the account of division and definition in these chapters of *An. Post.* 2 was at any rate influential for Andronicus. If we are to divide by differences, we ought to use ‘opposites with nothing between them’: for example, ‘line’ might be divided into ‘straight’ and ‘curved’. Possibly having a list of fundamental contraries could be seen as useful for this project).

Eudorus also (Simplic. *in Cat.* 174,14–175,11) criticizes Aristotle for treating only *οὐσία* as ‘absolute’, and for examining the remaining categories solely in ‘relative’ terms. Referring back to our discussion of Andronicus in ch. 2, this might imply that Eudorus read Aristotle roughly as Andronicus did, that is, as treating the non-substantial genera in the *Categories* as all relative (*πρός τι*) in either a broad sense or a strict sense. (Perhaps Eudorus was responding to Andronicus’ interpretation of Aristotle, or perhaps both were relying on a common source, or again perhaps Andronicus was influenced by Eudorus’ critique). Nevertheless, as we will find below, Eudorus clearly maintained the outline of the ten-categorical scheme that we associate with Aristotle’s *Categories*, while arguing that the non-substance categories, with the exception of relation strictly speaking (which he, like Andronicus, treated as an appendage or offshoot of

¹⁴ See for example ‘Callicratidas’ *De Dom. Fel.* 103,12–13 Thesleff.

the others: 174,18, 174,25), should be understood in their own right, as predicable *per se*.

What is the point at issue between Andronicus and Eudorus here? Andronicus may have presented Aristotle's scheme as a model in which one could only predicate 'pale' or 'wise' *per accidens* or (in Andronicus' 'broad' sense) as *relative* to the substantial subject in which that qualitative feature inheres—as inherent, say, in Socrates. When stressing how *per se* predication and *per accidens* predication ought to be distinguished, Andronicus seems to have had in mind cases where, on the one hand, substances are predicated *per se* of substances ('animal' of 'human', 'human' of 'Socrates'), or, on the other hand, qualities or other non-substances are predicated *per accidens* of substances ('coloured' of 'body', 'wise' of 'Socrates' soul'). Clearly distinguishing these two kinds of predication is where Andronicus' focus fell, perhaps in order to play up the explanatory merits of Aristotelian essentialism against the Stoic view. This Stoic position was criticized by later Peripatetics, possibly following a line of argument inaugurated by Andronicus, for failing to distinguish essential features from accidental features.

But it seems, based on the limited evidence available, that Andronicus did not spend as much time in explaining cases of *per se* predication in the *non-substance* categories (for example, 'virtue' of 'courage', or 'colour' of 'white', or for that matter self-predication, such as 'beautiful' of 'beauty'), and this omission may have been perceived by Eudorus as the suggestion that Andronicus simply failed to account for such cases. Aside from presenting problems for a logical system, that would present a doctrinal stumbling-block for Eudorus as an Academic, for whom qualities, as homonymous with Platonic forms, ought to be self-predicating: wisdom (*σοφία*) is, after all, wise (*σοφός*), and wise *par excellence*, and beauty (*καλλός*) is beautiful *par excellence*.¹⁵ Eudorus, then, may have found himself arguing more like Simplicius, when Simplicius rebuts as follows Andronicus' position that the non-substance categories are all somehow relatives: 'if we were . . . to refer an accident back to its subject . . . taken in an absolute sense it is its own kind of nature' (*εἰ οὖν οὕτως καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἀναφέροιμεν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν*,

¹⁵ For which see for example *Phaed.* 100C, *Parm.* 128E–129B, *Symp.* 211B.

ἐπεὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ φύσις ἰδίᾳ ἐστίν, 63,33–64,1).¹⁶ As the argument against Andronicus continues, just matter (ὅλη), as the substrate itself, should be considered *properly* relative (64,2)—that is, perhaps in the strict sense, as properly having its existence *only* in its relationship to other things, namely, the structures of quality, quantity, and so forth that inform it. (And even matter, treated as a principle rather than as a substrate, can be discussed per se: 64,3). Thus we should really understand all the non-substance categories *except* relative (in the strict sense) as predicable per se, which will suit the Academic reader better than the Andronican interpretation.

This argument against Andronicus (for which Simplicius indicates that he is following Porphyry and Iamblichus, 64,3–4) *might* even be traced back to Eudorus, with the important caveat that for Eudorus, this argument counts against *Aristotle's version* of the ten-categorical scheme, since he *does* make the non-substance categories relatives. For the later Platonists, the trouble is with an (Andronican) misinterpretation of Aristotle, grounded in inspiration from Xenocrates, and not with Aristotle himself. This presents us with the simple possible interpretation that Eudorus read Andronicus' interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*, recognized the value of the ten-categorical scheme offered by Aristotle, but 'corrected' Aristotle to make the doctrine 'safe for the Academy' (whatever 'Academy' might imply doctrinally here. I have suggested above that it might imply, at least, the requirement that qualities and the like could be self-predicating). Others, perhaps responding to Eudorus or acting on their own, felt that only a correction of *Andronicus'* interpretation was required. But this would leave to one side the fact that Andronicus was apparently *already* influenced by Academic thought, at any rate by the Old Academy of Xenocrates, in bringing the scheme of ten categories under the rubric of the absolute and accidental—he just did so a little differently. Eudorus was obviously steeped in Xenocrates (I also discuss this relationship a little further below), and Andronicus, too, had read and occasionally defended Xenocrates (see ch. 2). There is a fair possibility, then, that both Eudorus and Andronicus were directly or indirectly familiar with Old Academic treatises interpreting and revising the ten-categorical scheme shared by Aristotle's *Categories* (and by Aristotle's use of the ten categories throughout his thought).

¹⁶ See Dexippus 31,28ff. Of course, it is also perfectly legitimate to say that 'pale exists' (so Simplic. *in Cat.* 42,21–2) or 'wisdom exists'.

Whether or not we entertain this possibility, it is also, of course, perfectly reasonable to suppose that Eudorus’ and Andronicus’ interest in the scheme of ten categories was independent; or again, it is also possible that at least one of the two was aware of the work of the other.¹⁷

But if indeed Andronicus’ interest in the treatise *Categories* was motivated by a recognition of the value of distinguishing absolute from relative predication, and that recognition was in turn inspired by interpretations and revisions of the ten-categorical scheme in the Old Academy, then we can draw the following interesting if speculative conclusion: perhaps a resurgence of Academic thought in general in the first century—as represented by Eudorus—can also be credited with the first burst of interest in the treatise *Categories*.

2. *The order of the Categories: evidence for an ontological interpretation*

At Simplicius, in *Cat.* 206,10–15, Eudorus focuses on the ordering of the ten categories, placing quality after οὐσία, then where and when, which he relabels Place and Time (as did Andronicus):

Eudorus too says that the discussion of Quality is closely linked with that of Substance, and that the discussion of Quantity belongs after that; for Substance coexists with Quality and Quantity, and it is after these that the categories of Time and Place are introduced: for all substance is somewhere and at some time [viz. sensible substance] (tr. Fleet 2002, lightly modified).¹⁸

Eudorus’ following explanation seems to be clear: after οὐσία, the remaining ten categories should be organized based on the closeness of their relationship to οὐσία. Quality should come second (a view also taken by Lucius and Nicostratus) because οὐσία cannot exist without Quality; Quantity follows for the same reason; and because

¹⁷ If the story that Eudorus accused an Ariston of plagiarizing his book *On the Nile* refers to the Ariston who is closely linked to Andronicus as one of the ‘ancient commentators’ on the *Categories*, that offers some circumstantial colour to this suggestion.

¹⁸ καὶ Εὐδωρος δὲ τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὸν περὶ τῆς ποιότητος λόγον καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ συνεξέυχθαί φησιν· τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἅμα τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ποσῶ συννφίστασθαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὴν χρονικὴν τε καὶ τοπικὴν κατηγορίαν παραλαμβάνεσθαι· πᾶσαν γὰρ οὐσίαν ποῦ τε εἶναι καὶ ποτέ, δηλονότι τὴν αἰσθητήν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

all οὐσία exists in Space and Time, these should be fourth and fifth. We could infer from this that Eudorus takes the *Categories* to be concerned with *sensible* οὐσία; as a Pythagorean, we might reason, he would hardly claim that intelligible οὐσία is in space and time. Indeed, Simplicius' passage includes the gloss *δηλονότι τὴν αἰσθητὴν* after οὐσίαν (206,14–15) to make this clear, although it is not obvious that the gloss is Eudorus', or that Eudorus insisted that the *Categories* addressed only sensible οὐσία. He may, for example, have allowed for an *intelligible* time and place in which intelligible substance might subsist, as Iamblichus would later propose (see Dillon 1997). (I have also suggested below some tentative reasons why Eudorus might have allowed for the ten categories to apply to the intelligible world; on this debate see Chiaradonna 2009b: 99.) By way of contrast, the author we call 'Pseudo-Archytas', also discussed below, very clearly focused on the sensible world alone as the scope of the *Categories*—at least its account of the non-substance categories.¹⁹ (Interestingly, however, 'Archytas' placed time and place at the end of the list, like Philo of Alexandria, perhaps representing the view that these are relatives; see ch. 2.)

Why did Eudorus concern himself with the order of the ten categories and their respective degrees of distance from οὐσία? He may have anticipated Pythagoreans like Moderatus, who would metaphysically rank Quantity as identical with the Dyad, with Quantity serving as matter (ἔλη) for Form (see Moderatus and Porphyry in Simplicius *in Phys.* 230,35–231,35); in such a framework, it might well be appropriate to prioritize Quality as identical with Form and the Monad.²⁰ And like Moderatus, Eudorus postulates a 'One' transcending both Monad and Dyad (cf. *Alex. in Met.* 59,7); he may have regarded this One as the primary οὐσία, the first of the categories. Then Eudorus may have advanced a system of ten categories descending from a

¹⁹ So Szlezák (1972). 'Archytas' takes it as given that the non-substance categories concern just the sensible world (cf. 22,31 and 30,21–3 and 31,5 Thesleff, *Simplic. in Cat.* 378,1–3, also Dillon 134–5 for discussion: I am very grateful to Riccardo Chiaradonna for directing me to the relevant passages here, although any misunderstandings are my own). 'Archytas' agrees with Andronicus in separating the post-praedicamenta, and with Andronicus and Ariston in changing Aristotle's definition of Relation (*Simplic.* 202,2). Archytas also differs from Eudorus on the ranking of Relation, Space, and Time. He puts Relation fourth, after Quality and Quantity, and Space and Time at the end of the list, in which he is followed by Philo.

²⁰ See Dillon 1977/1996: 346–51.

transcendent One or οὐσία (corresponding to the first category), to a Monad (quality) and Dyad (quantity), which in turn cascade through the remaining categories as a table of Opposites falling somehow under the Absolute and the Relative (cf. *Simplic. in Cat.* 174,14).²¹ That explanation would help to interpret both Eudorus’ concern for the order of the ten Aristotelian categories and the careful distinction that he draws between the One, on the one hand, and the Monad and Dyad, on the other:

I affirm then that the followers of Pythagoras leave the One as principle of all things, but in another way introduce the highest elements as two. They call these two elements by many names. For one of them they name ordered, definite, knowable, male, odd, right, light; the contrary of that not-ordered, indefinite, unknowable, female, left, even, dark, so that because in one way the One is principle, but in another the One and the Indefinite Dyad are elements, both One[s] being alike principles, and it is clear that the One as principle of all things is quite distinct from the One opposite to the Dyad, which they also call Monad.²² (Eudorus ap. *Simplicium in Phys.* 181,22–30, tr. Baltussen et al. 2012)

But Eudorus also maintained that Aristotle, in the *Categories*, had delivered an incomplete account, one which treated the non-substantial categories only in relative terms, and not in their own right or absolutely (καθ’ αὐτό):

Eudorus is critical, asking why, although the relative (πρός τι) is contrasted with the per se (καθ’ αὐτό), Aristotle has discussed the relatives and not the per se. It must be said that the [other] nine categories are considered as being [within the realm of] what is per se. Therefore establishing the per se throughout these nine categories he adds that of the Relative as an appendage (παραφυσωμένην) to these nine. For relative is considered as being among the other nine with some ambivalence in

²¹ Such a Pythagorean account of the categories might even have found support in Aristotle’s definition of οὐσία as ‘One and the same in number’ and ‘receptive of the Opposites’—which suggests both the descent of opposites from a Monad and Dyad, and the ‘One’ that transcends both.

²² φημι τοίνυν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν τὸ μὲν ἐν πάντων ἀρχὴν ἀπολιπεῖν, κατ’ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω στοιχεῖα παρεισάγειν. καλεῖν δὲ τὰ δύο ταῦτα στοιχεῖα πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὀνομάζεσθαι τεταγμένον ὠρισμένον γνωστὸν ἄρρεν περιττὸν (25) δεξιὸν φῶς, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἄτακτον ἀόριστον ἀγνωστον θῆλυ ἀριστερὸν ἄρτιον σκότος, ὥστε ὡς μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ ἐν, ὡς δὲ στοιχεῖα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος дуάς, ἀρχαὶ ἄμφω ἐν ὄντα πάλιν. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων, ἄλλο δὲ ἐν τῷ τῇ δυάδι ἀντικείμενον, ὃ καὶ μονάδα καλοῦσιν (ed. Diels 1882).

the case of Substance, as he will say, but with none in the case of the others; for example ‘state’ [is found] in Quality, ‘double’ in Quantity, ‘further and nearer’ in Where [...] in Substance there is ‘father-son’. Therefore they think, that, since the category of the Relative is an appendage to the others, it is supervenient, although it is prior and considered in terms of its own differentia.²³ (Simplic. in *Cat.* 174,14–26, tr. Fleet 2002)

(If the report of Eudorus’ view continues throughout this passage, he seems here to agree with Andronicus in calling the Relative an ‘appendage’ or ‘offshoot’ of the other nine categories, another example of their correspondence: cf. Simplic. in *Cat.* 157,18–22. But it was a commonplace that Aristotle himself regarded the relative as an ‘appendage’: see *Metaph.* 14.1, 1088a23, *EN* 1.4, 1096a21–3.)

Perhaps Eudorus’ critique of Aristotle’s *Categories* should be taken as implying that Eudorus (as a Platonist) insisted on the independent and absolute reality of qualities (such as Justice and Beauty), quantities (such as mathematical entities), and so on, whereas Aristotle treated these merely as attributes of primary and secondary substances. Also, we should note that Philo of Alexandria, whose treatment of the ten categories closely mirrors Eudorus and Pseudo-Archytas,²⁴ treats the characteristic of ‘being human’ as falling under Quality, not the first category: possibly Eudorus had the same idea, arguing on a Platonic line that (at least some of) Aristotle’s secondary substances are really intelligible qualities or Forms, which can be predicated per se. The same may have gone for quantities: certainly some of the early readers of the *Categories* worried about whether

²³ Αἰτιᾶται δὲ ὁ Εὐδωρος, διὰ τί ἀντιδιηρημένον τοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῷ πρὸς τι περὶ μὲν τοῦ πρὸς τι διείλεται ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, περὶ δὲ τοῦ καθ’ (15) αὐτὸ οὐκέτι. καὶ ῥητέον ὅτι ἐν τῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἱ ἑννέα κατηγορίαι θεωροῦνται· τὸ οὐν καθ’ αὐτὸ λαβὼν κατὰ τὰς ἑννέα κατηγορίας τὴν τοῦ πρὸς τι προστίθησιν ὡς παραφνομένην ταῖς ἑννέα. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἑννέα θεωρεῖται, ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἀμφιβόλως ὡς ἔρει, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναργῶς, ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ποιού ἢ ἕξις, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ διπλάσιον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πού (20) ἐπέκεινα, ἐπὶ τὰδε, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτὲ πρεσβύτερον, νεώτερον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν καύσις, τμήσις, ἐφ’ ὧν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πείσις ὁμώνυμοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κείσθαι ἐπὶ κείται, ὑπόκειται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν, ἀφ’ ὧν τὸ ἔχειν παρωνύμως λέγεται, ὡς ὑπόδεσις· καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας δὲ πατήρ, υἱός. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὡς παραφνομένην ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις τὴν τοῦ (25) πρὸς τι ἐπεισοδιώδη νομίζουσιν καίτοι προηγουμένην οὔσαν καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν οἰκεῖαν θεωρουμένην (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

²⁴ Philo adopts the Eudoran order οὐσία–quality–quantity when he mentions the categories (*Dec.* 30) and, like Eudorus and Andronicus, he replaces Where and When with Time and Place (although like ‘Archytas’ and unlike Eudorus and Andronicus, he places these categories last).

Aristotle's framework could embrace intelligible numbers and entities like the 'monad' (Simplicius in *Cat.* 65,20–1). That interest seems to have been associated with the question whether the text could adequately address the 'intelligible world' at all (see Lucius and Nicostratus ap. Simplicium in *Cat.* 73,15–76,16, with Boethus' response, discussed further in ch. 4).

As alien as this kind of reading may appear now, it clearly did help to inspire interest in the metaphysical and ontological meaning of the *Categories*. Eudorus (like later Platonist readers of the *Categories* such as Lucius) examines the *Categories* as concerned at least partly with an account of *beings*, an ontology that can be 'mapped' to Pythagorean and Platonic metaphysics. By contrast, Andronicus treated the *Categories* primarily as a logical instrument, a competitor for the throne of Chrysippean dialectic and not (as it seems) for Platonic metaphysics.

3. *The Categories may treat both intelligible and perceptible objects*

A third text about the *Categories*, Plutarch, *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus* 1023D–1024A, although not explicitly ascribed to Eudorus, may strengthen the suggestion that Eudorus interpreted the *Categories* in a Pythagorean framework. Regardless of whether Eudorus is indeed Plutarch's main source in that treatise, as has sometimes been suggested, this passage occurs quite close to Eudorus' discussion of Xenocrates and Crantor, and given Eudorus' interest in the scheme of ten categories, I think it is reasonable to consider its candidacy as an imitation of Eudorus.²⁵ This suggestion is quite tentative, but I hope worth spelling out. (See Chiaradonna 2009b for a very thoughtful and detailed exploration of Eudorus' role in this debate).

Plutarch is launching an inquiry into the soul's capacity to apprehend sensible objects (yielding opinion and belief) by contrast to the soul's capacity for pure intellection (yielding real knowledge). In order to illustrate that the soul of the cosmos is capable of judging not only intelligible things, but also perceptibles (1023C), he cites Plato, *Timaeus* 37A–B, which runs as follows:

²⁵ On the passage and Eudorus' role in Plutarch's treatise, see for example Bonazzi (2013: 163–70).

[Whenever the soul] comes into contact with something whose being is scatterable or else with something whose being is indivisible, it is stirred throughout its whole self. It then declares what exactly that thing is the same as, or what it is different from, and in what respect and in what manner, as well as when, it turns out that they are the same or different and are characterized as such.²⁶

Plutarch paraphrases this passage, and then adds the gloss that ‘in these words, [Plato] is also giving an outline of the ten categories; he makes himself even clearer in what follows’ (*ἐν τούτοις ἅμα καὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν ποιούμενος ὑπογραφὴν ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐφεξῆς διασαφεί*, 1023E7–9). The passage mentions both divided and indivisible objects, and Plato himself goes on to state that this statement about the soul’s declarations ‘applies both to the things that come to be, and to those that are always changeless’ (37B2–3).²⁷ The most natural reading, I think, is that on Plutarch’s view, the declarations that Plato attributes to the soul—about *both* partitioned (perceptible, coming-to-be) objects *and* partless (intelligible, changeless) objects—can be mapped to the scheme of ten categories.

Plutarch then paraphrases *Tim.* 37B–C, where Plato ‘makes himself clearer’. Here Plato has Timaeus state:

And when this contact gives rise to an account that is equally true whether it is about what is different or about what is the same... whenever the account concerns anything that is perceptible, the circle of the Different goes straight and proclaims it throughout its whole soul. This is how firm and true opinions and beliefs come about. Whenever, on the other hand, the account concerns any object of reasoning, and the circle of the Same runs well and reveals it, the necessary result is understanding and knowledge. And if anyone should ever call that in which these two arise, not soul but something else, what he says will be anything but true.²⁸

²⁶ ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τινος ἐφάπτεται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἐαυτῆς ὅτω τ’ ἂν τι ταῦτόν ᾗ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὅτι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὅποτε συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γινόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα ἀεί (ed. Burnet). The final words (37B2–3) are omitted in Plutarch’s paraphrase.

²⁷ While Plutarch does not paraphrase these words directly, I think that the remainder of his discussion makes clear that he has the distinction between intelligible and sensible being in mind.

²⁸ λόγος δὲ ὁ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀληθὴς γινόμενος περὶ τε θάτερον ὃν καὶ περὶ τὸ ταῦτόν, ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ’ αὐτοῦ φερόμενος ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἡχῆς, ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται καὶ ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ἰὼν εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγυγέλη,

As Plutarch continues to explain this passage (1023F), the soul may settle on the sensible (τὸ αἰσθητόν) in the ‘circle of the other’, establishing opinion and belief; but when the soul settles on reasoning (τὸ λογιστικόν) in the ‘circle of the same’, knowledge is fulfilled (ἐπιστήμη ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται). These two different motions of the soul are then distinguished as apprehending ‘what is subject to sense’ (ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ) and an intelligible motion that culminates in knowledge (ἐτέραν τῆς νοητικῆς ἐκείνης καὶ τελευτώσης εἰς ἐπιστήμην, 1024A).

The key question for us is what Plutarch means when he says that Plato is offering an outline account or ὑπογραφή of the ten categories in *Tim.* 37A–B, and that he clarifies his account further in *Tim.* 37B–C. In particular, is the ten categories’ scope of application meant to be limited to perceptible things, or does it extend also to intelligible things? The most natural answer, I think, is that the ten categories apply to the soul’s activity of predication in *both* ‘motions’. Granted that the passage as a whole aims to show that the soul is not restricted to apprehension of intelligibles, the point is not that the soul is restricted to the apprehension of sensibles either; Plato is said to be describing the soul’s two different motions, one underwriting sensation and opinion, the other intellection and knowledge, and ‘in these words’ (ἐν τούτοις, 1023E7) he is providing an account of the ten categories.

If this passage does reflect not only Plutarch’s view but also Eudorus’, it may suggest the following further interpretation of the fragments of Eudorus in Simplicius. Eudorus may have considered the ‘circle of the same’ as reflecting the kind of *absolute* predication that could apply to the ten categories in and of themselves (for example, predicating ‘animal’ of ‘human’ and ‘colour’ of ‘pale’), while the ‘circle of the different’ reflected *relative* or *accidental* predication (for example, ‘pale’ of ‘Socrates’). Also, οὐσία could always be in some sense measured by Time and Place, and yet still be intelligible οὐσία, in intelligible Time and Place. This was also the view of Iamblichus, who talks of ‘intelligible time’ and ‘intelligible space’,

δόξαι καὶ πίστεϊς γίνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς, ὅταν δὲ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ᾗ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ταύτου κύκλος εὐτροχος ὦν αὐτὰ μνηύσῃ, νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται. τούτω δὲ ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἂν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἄλλο πλὴν ψυχῆν εἴπῃ, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰληθὲς ἐρεῖ (ed. Burnet).

and claims dependence on 'Archytas' for his interpretation; so it may be reasonable to associate Eudorus with this view via Archytas. It is certainly true that Archytas raises questions about whether the *Categories* deals with the sensible world, or which categories do apply to the sensible and which to the intelligible (see 22,31; 30,19 Thesleff, with Szlezák ad loc.), and that these are later taken up by Lucius and Nicostratus.

Aside from this, the *An. proc.* passage could shed light on two further points:

- (a) Eudorus believed that Aristotle offered an inadequate account of the non-substance categories, in that Aristotle fails to describe them in their *Absolute* sense, only in their *Relative* sense. This would not make much sense if Eudorus supposed that the *Categories* was solely concerned with sensible being: it seems unlikely that he would have argued that sensible Quality was absolute or per se. But he might well have argued that *intelligible* Quality has an 'absolute' sense that needs accounting for. Thus Eudorus might have treated the category of 'per se' or absolute as corresponding to Aristotelian οὐσία—including intelligible being (cf. Bonazzi 2013: 182).
- (b) Second, the later line of criticism against the *Categories* maintained by Lucius and Nicostratus suggests that the *Categories* is not an adequate account of intelligible reality. This case would be difficult to make for a critic who already assumed that the *Categories* was not *meant* to be an account of intelligible reality at all: if Eudorus influenced Lucius, then (as seems chronologically probable), it appears unlikely that Eudorus restricted the scope of the *Categories* to the sensible world, which would make Lucius' attack on it look quite misguided (see ch. 4). We might alternatively suppose that Lucius followed Eudorus in supposing that the schema of ten categories was *itself* a good guide to both sensible and intelligible reality, but that Aristotle's account was lacking. Later criticism certainly continued to question the viability of the ten-categorical scheme as an account of intelligible substance, *if* that is what it was meant to do (through to Plotinus *Enn.* 6.1–3).

Relationship to Andronicus

We have noticed a number of similarities between Eudorus and Andronicus above, such as their common relabelling of Where and When as Place and Time, their common reversion to the Academic categories of Absolute and Relative as a useful umbrella for the ten categories, and their common treatment of the *πρὸς τί* as an 'offshoot' or 'appendage' of the other nine categories. Did Andronicus respond to Eudorus, or Eudorus to Andronicus, or neither?²⁹ I have argued above that Andronicus may well have introduced the *treatise Categories* to a wider readership, but Eudorus may have worked independently on the *doctrine* of the ten categories, and both may independently (or in dialogue and debate with one another) have attempted to integrate and relate the two categories of absolute and relative with the ten categories. Perhaps, again, since Xenocrates is a common influence on Eudorus and Andronicus elsewhere in their philosophical oeuvre, we might look to Xenocrates as a common source for shared factors in their interpretations of the ten categories (if not necessarily the text *Categories*), just as Boethus would turn to Speusippus as a useful source in interpreting the 'onymies' (Simplic. *in Cat.* 38,19–23), and Speusippus even appears, at one point, to have essayed an interpretation of the opening of the *Categories* (29,5).³⁰

Since the influence and novelty of Andronicus' text are unclear (see ch. 2 and Appendix 2), we do not have to assume that his work preceded Eudorus'. And the early critic Lucius, and later Nicostratus (see ch. 4), who seem to follow Eudorus in entertaining an ontological or metaphysical reading of the *Categories*, show no obvious signs of knowledge of Andronicus' distinctive reading of the treatise:³¹ in fact, if Andronicus' introductory phrase (τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται...) ³² suggested verbal or logical subject-matter,

²⁹ Dillon 1977/1996 also points out that Eudorus may have reacted to Ariston's commentary, in which case—if it is correct to give Andronicus tentative preference over Ariston (see ch. 2)—Ariston might have mediated Andronicus' interpretation to Eudorus.

³⁰ Fr. 68b Tarán = 32b Lang; see Chase 2003: 117 n. 310, Tarán 1978b.

³¹ As illustrated by the suggestion, referring to Simplic. *in Cat.* 1,19–20, that Lucius is not criticizing a text that lacks the words τῆς οὐσίας at *Cat.* 1a1–2, as Andronicus' text (according to Simplicius) did.

³² Moraux 1973: 102–3 pieces together the full preamble of Andronicus' paraphrase from Simplicius *in Cat.* 21,22–4, 26,18–19, 30,3–5 and Dexipp. *in Cat.* 21,18–19. See also Sharples (2008: 280).

Lucius' criticism of the *Categories* as failing to address intelligible being at all seems to miss the mark.³³ Perhaps most tellingly, Lucius and Nicostratus claim that Aristotle *opens by discussing πράγματα* (Simplic. *in Cat.* 21,2–25,9); if they read the text through an Andronican lens, under the influence of Andronicus' paraphrase, this would be a curious assertion to make (although given the fragmentary nature of the evidence for Lucius and Nicostratus, little is certain). Moreover, we know from Simplicius that Andronicus' text (or paraphrasis) of the *Categories* did not include the full phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας at *Cat.* 1a1–2, but included only the word λόγος. But Nicostratus, likely 'taking over' a point of Lucius (ὑποβαλλόμενος, cf. Simplicius *in Cat.* 1,19–20), criticized *Cat.* 1a1–2 as suggesting that homonymy only applies to the first category (29,23–30,5). Considering these points, it seems at least plausible that Lucius and Nicostratus were not reliant on Andronicus' presentation of the *Categories*, but worked from (something more like) Eudorus' interpretation of the text.

In fact, we might treat Andronicus' choice to reframe the text by the introductory phrase τῶν λεγομένων . . . , together with his choice to introduce the curriculum with the *Categories* as a work of *logic*, as a *reaction* to the kinds of problems raised by Eudorus and (perhaps later) Lucius—namely, problems about the function of the *Categories* as a work about *beings*. By asserting that the *Categories* was a work about *words*, and publishing it with a 'paraphrasis' that supported this assertion, Andronicus might have addressed those problems, as Boethus later did (ch. 6), while paving the way for *new* (or resurrected) issues about its inadequacy as a work about language, raised by Stoics like Athenodorus and Cornutus (cf. ch. 5). These Stoic problems may in turn have necessitated the response of Boethus. On such a scenario, one could see Andronicus as reactive to the Platonizing or Pythagorean reading of the *Categories* in Alexandria—taking over *from Eudorus* elements like the overarching focus on the Absolute and the Relative, among other factors.³⁴ At the same time, he clearly resituated the *Categories* as a work of 'logic' that introduced the *Organon*, even as

³³ Lucius and Nicostratus clearly grant (Simplicius 73,15–76,16) that the text is about beings when they inquire whether it concerns both intelligible and sensible beings.

³⁴ Such as the replacement of 'When' and 'Where' with 'Time' and 'Space', discussed above.

important features of Eudorus' reading—such as the reliance on the *Sophist's* distinction of absolute from relative as the 'overarching' division under which the ten *κατηγορίαι* fell—were carried across into his interpretation.

When Eudorus evinced interest in the *Categories*, he appears to have represented Aristotle as a genuine, if sometimes errant, expositor of a Pythagorean world view, a picture of how the world was actually structured. We may add that some later Neoplatonic sources, such as Elias [David] *in Cat.*, refer to Aristotle as a 'true Pythagorean' (*Puthagoreiōi kat' alētheian gegonoti*, 107,6 Busse), a claim which is echoed in the anonymous *Life of Pythagoras*, where Aristotle is described as the tenth *diadokhos* of the Pythagorean school, following Archytas and Plato. Such reports could reflect a desire on the part of earlier, first-century Pythagoreans to 'appropriate' Aristotle into the Pythagorean tradition, as some (such as Bonazzi 2007) have suggested; if so, this movement could have played an important role in the birth of interest in the *Categories*, a text which Eudorus and the authors of the Archytan treatises clearly saw as susceptible of Pythagorean exegesis.

II. PSEUDO-ARCHYTAS (FL. c.50 BCE?)

Archytas of Tarentum was a Pythagorean contemporary of Plato, who appears to have studied a number of specialized problems in music, mathematics, and mechanics. His association with the Academy is documented in the Seventh Letter ascribed to Plato;³⁵ according to Philodemus' *Index Academicorum* (col. 6, 12) he was Plato's student. While the works of Archytas himself were subsequently lost, centuries later a wide array of Pythagorizing texts were published under the name Archytas, evidently in a bid to associate a number of key doctrines with the 'ancient' Pythagorean school.³⁶ The bid was largely successful, certainly by late antiquity; with the exception of a notice in Themistius (ap. Boethius *in Cat. PL* 64, 162A), the

³⁵ On which see Lloyd 1990.

³⁶ For what follows, see the introduction to T. A. Szlesák (1972). I have also found the synopsis in Dillon (1977) and Bonazzi (2007) very useful.

Pseudo-Archytan works seem to have found wide acceptance as genuinely 'Pythagorean'.³⁷

Several of these pseudepigrapha focused on the *Categories*: (I) 'On the Universal Account' (*peri tou katholou logou*); (II) 'The Ten Universal Statements' (*katholikai logoi deka*, which is evidently a much later, and simpler, text); (III) 'On Opposites' (*peri antikeimennōn*). The first two texts are extant (ed. Thesleff; see Szlezák, 1972); the third is lost, but preserved in fragments in Simplicius. All that we now possess in full is a *koinē* version of the first and substantial fragments in Doric of all, the latter preserved by Simplicius and other later commentators.³⁸

Here I would like to review very briefly the place of Pseudo-Archytas in the early discussions that we have been surveying so far, simply with a view to showing that he also represents a broadly favourable, 'Pythagoreanizing' interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories* (and categories) which does not aim at rejecting them, but at exploiting them as a valuable resource on the road to knowledge (cf. Bonazzi 2013: 179–83). Szlezák (1972) argued that Pseudo-Archytas is reacting to the developments of the first generation of commentators, beginning with Andronicus. For example, 'Archytas' assumes that the 'categories' concern only the sensible world (22,31 and 31,5 Thesleff: cf. Simplic. 76,20), which may differ from Eudorus' interpretation. He separates the last portion of the *Categories*, the post-*praedicamenta*, from the rest of the text in (I) above, but (III) examines them as Pythagorean; as Frede points out (*Der Neue Pauly*), it seems unlikely that a single author is behind both (I) and (III). 'Archytas' also agrees with Andronicus and Ariston in improving on Aristotle's definition of the Relative (Simplic. 202,2).

Is Pseudo-Archytas also drawing on the work of Eudorus?³⁹ As we have seen in our brief review of Eudorus, this is almost certainly the case; for example, 'Archytas' provides similar Pythagorean reasoning

³⁷ Indeed, by the fourth or fifth century BCE, 'Pythagorean' effectively meant something that modern scholars tend to call 'Neoplatonic'; see for example the proem to Syrianus in *Met*.

³⁸ The fragments of the latter are edited by Thesleff 1965: 15–18; the first by Thesleff 1965: 21–32 and Szlezák 1972: 34–57. The latter prints the two versions separately. The *katholikai logoi deka* is edited by Thesleff 3–8 and Szlezák 61–8.

³⁹ So Dillon (1977: 134 and 2000) suggests, alongside Szlezák and Theiler. Conversely, Dörrie 1976: 300 suggests that Eudorus is opposed to Aristotelian innovations in Platonism.

for the order of the categories (cf. Szlezák 1972: 116). But there are differences: 'Archytas' puts Relation fourth in the order of categories, after Quality and Quantity, and Space and Time at the end of the list. Philo of Alexandria, perhaps drawing on Eudorus, does the same. Several points worth stressing here are 'Archytas' view that the *Categories* concerns sensible entities (cf. 31,3–5 Thesleff: 'πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα φυσικῶς οὐσίας καὶ σωματικῶς συμβάματά ἐντι, ἀλλ' οὐ νοατῶς καὶ ἀκινήτω καὶ προσέτι γε ἀμερέως'), and his view that man is the measure of knowledge 'because he is endowed by nature with the capacity to *enumerate* the principles by means of which all things are known' (31,32–32,33). All knowledge, as 'Archytas' goes on to explain, seeks to apprehend the infiniteness of reality by means of principles limited in number; as all number is in the number ten, so there should be ten kinds of being and predication, and human beings have ten fingers on which to count them. These arguments, or ones very much like them, are later ascribed to Herminius: both reality and words are infinite, and we use the ten predications to help apply limit to the unlimited (Porphyry, in *Cat.* 58,9–20). Our capacity to apply such a limit comes through our power to *enumerate* (ἀπαριθμεῖν) the ten modes of predication (Simplicius, in *Cat.* 62,7–23). I have suggested above that Andronicus may have built on the same central ideas; and it is clear from Pseudo-Archytas that these notions go back well before Porphyry.

Thus both Eudorus and Pseudo-Archytas are prepared to integrate the ten categories into their own philosophy as an ontological theory, not merely as a dialectical or logical one. They also seem, based on our limited evidence, to have made some direct use of our text of the *Categories* to develop that speculation. This attitude lies in contrast to Lucius and Nicostratus, who also spring from a Platonist background, but focus on developing criticisms of the *Categories*, ranging from doubts about its scope to criticisms of its organization and content. But I hope to have shown that Eudorus and Pseudo-Archytas developed a plainly metaphysical reading of the text, treating it as a useful account of *being*, and that this in turn may have grounded the kind of interpretation that Lucius and Nicostratus (ch. 4) felt it necessary to rebut.

Part B

Early Criticisms: Platonists and Stoics

Lucius and Nicostratus

In this chapter, I argue that Lucius, a critic of the *Categories* named by Simplicius, criticized the *Categories* as an inadequate treatment of ontology, and that his criticisms attracted a response from Boethus of Sidon (see ch. 6). I also attempt to show that the criticisms offered by Lucius and Nicostratus—two figures often conflated by Simplicius—can be at least provisionally distinguished from one another.

Others were content to write only puzzles (ἀπορίαι) against what is said: this is what Lucius did, and after him Nicostratus, who appropriated the considerations of Lucius. These two vied with each other in providing objections (ἐνστάσεις) to nearly everything said in the book, and they did not go about their task with respect, but rather in a violent and shameless manner. Nevertheless, we must be grateful to them, too, both because the puzzles they set forward had, for the most part, a basis in fact (πραγματιώδεις), and because they provided their successors with starting-points both for the resolution of the puzzles, and for the development of many other excellent theories.¹

Simplicius, in *Cat.* 1,18–2,2 (tr. Chase 2003, lightly adapted)

¹ ἄλλοις δὲ ἤρεσεν ἀπορίας μόνας γράβαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅπερ Λουκίος τε πεποίηκε καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν Νικόστρατος τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ὑποβαλλόμενος, σχεδὸν τι πρὸς πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον ἐνστάσεις κομίζειν φιλοτιμούμενοι, καὶ οὐδὲ εὐλαβῶς, ἀλλὰ καταφορικῶς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀπηρυθριακότης· πλὴν καὶ τούτοις χάρις, καὶ ὅτι πραγματιώδεις τὰς πολλὰς τῶν ἀποριῶν προεβάλοντο καὶ ὅτι λύσεώς τε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν θεωρημάτων τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐνδεδώκασι (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

Lucius² and Nicostratus³ are shadowy figures, known to us through their recurring role as antagonists in the pages of Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*. They are made to portray the antithesis of Simplicius' sketch of the capable exegete of Aristotle (7,23–8), who exercises impartial criticism (κρίσιν ἀδέκαστον) by homing in on the essential agreement of philosophical schools (συμφωνίαν αὐτῶν ἀνιχνεύειν) without indulging in 'disputatious twaddle' (cf. ἐριστικὴν φλυαρίαν, 8,1). By contrast, Nicostratus and his followers are represented as eager polemicists (φιλονεικοῦσιν, 268,19) who deploy Platonic doctrines and Stoic linguistics as sticks with which to beat Aristotle, and exploit the letter of the text without regard for its deeper intent (νοῦς: cf. 7,31).⁴ They accuse Aristotle of 'useless talk' (ματαιολογίαν, 58,15), charge him with ignorance (αἰτιᾶται... ἀγνοεῖ, 231,21), and 'waste time' (370,1) with their 'accusations' (406,6; 410,25), managing to 'bury the truth' completely (370,8). Their errors are 'easy' to recognize (ῥᾶδιον συνορᾶν, 428,3).

There are no direct references to 'Lucius' and 'Nicostratus' outside Simplicius in *Cat.*⁵ Even in those cases where their criticism of the *Categories* appears to be implicit in other texts—for example, in Plotinus, *Enneads* 6.1, Dexippus, and Porphyry's commentary by *Question and Answer*—we are reliant on Simplicius' testimony to

² We know of Lucius only from eight references in the pages of Simplicius in *Cat.* On him see Capelle 1927, Praechter 1922 = 1973: 101–37, and more recently the excellent entry in Goulet (2005) by Concetta Luna, as well as Dillon 1977: 344–5, and Strange 1987: 956 n. 8. The difficulty of distinguishing Lucius from his apparent successor, Nicostratus, has been noted by Gottschalk 1987: 1104; see also Moraux II: 528–63. His floruit is typically dated to the second century CE, but Sedley 1997: 117 n. 26 points out that the evidence is very loose.

³ Simplicius describes Nicostratus as 'following' Lucius and as 'taking over' his positions (1,19). On him see recently Gioè 2002: 155–219; Dillon 1977: 233–6; Praechter 1922 = 1973: 101–37; K. von Fritz, 'Nikostratos 26', *RE* 17.1 (1936), cols 547–51; Moraux II: 528–63. Nicostratus lived in Athens, and Praechter identifies him persuasively with the Nicostratus honoured in an inscription at Delphi (*Sylloge* II³ Nr. 868). See also Zeller 1990: III.1 [4], for whom Nicostratus was a Stoic.

⁴ In addition to the commentator's force of the 'sense' or 'point' of the language (LSJ s.v. νόος), this remark may echo the 'noeric' interpretation, or higher criticism, that Iamblichus is credited with introducing to the study of the *Categories*. On Iamblichus' noeric analysis, see for example Dillon 1997: 65–77, I. Hadot's commentary on Simplicius 2,11 and related samples of Iamblichus' criticism in *Commentaire sur les Catégories* I–III (Leiden, 1990), and the introduction to Michael Chase's translation of Simplicius in *Cat.* 1–4 (2003). Sorabji (2005c), Vol. 3, very usefully summarizes the relevant passages.

⁵ As Moraux 1984: 530 points out, this compels us to acknowledge the exclusive influence of Simplicius in selectively shaping their representation.

identify them. As we have them, then, ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’ are essentially constructs of Simplicius’ text.

It is widely held that the views of Lucius and Nicostratus cannot be usefully distinguished from each other within the text of Simplicius.⁶ This consensus is certainly justified by the limited nature of the primary evidence. In the course of this chapter, however, I shall argue that passages ascribed to οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον consistently betray a different set of concerns from those ascribed to Nicostratus, and that these two sources, as Simplicius represents them, *may* be usefully separated and discussed in isolation. I shall maintain this position through a close analysis of the identifying cues that Simplicius uses to introduce and contextualize their views. For this purpose, a key part of this chapter (which will also be useful in following chapters) is the Table of Responses, showing the (historical or constructed) ‘dialogue’ between aporists and defenders of the *Categories*. (For a more detailed treatment, see Griffin 2009: ch. 3).

The approach of this chapter is therefore to explore the manner in which Simplicius portrays these two figures and their polemical relationships with other sources, including Boethus, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus.⁷ Primarily, the present chapter aims to argue that the views of Lucius—which challenge the value of the *Categories* as a treatise in ontology or first philosophy—are answered by Boethus of Sidon. I construct a typology of these references in the main body of the paper, and attempt to establish several conclusions about the differing interests of the ‘Lucius’ source and the ‘Nicostratus’ source, and to characterize the anonymous and named sources who respond to them. Specifically, I argue that οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον are primarily concerned about ‘doctrinal’ points in the text, involving (for example)

⁶ Moraux 1984: 528–63 stresses the difficulty of usefully distinguishing these two sources. Hoffmann and Hadot (1990: 4 n. 11) point out that ‘il lui paraît impossible de distinguer la pensée de Lucius de celle de Nicostrate’. Gottschalk (1987: 1104) notes that Lucius as a persona ‘is only known through his association’ with Nicostratus, a point that I acknowledge and expand in my discussion of historicity below.

⁷ This chapter is thus primarily concerned with the identification and distinction of sources as represented by Simplicius. While it is not my primary concern to evaluate the validity of Lucius and Nicostratus’ views as such, or their usefulness as an interpretation of the relevant passages in the *Categories*, I have endeavoured to provide cross references to more detailed discussions of certain passages in other chapters.

the distinction of intelligible from sensible reality. The Nicostratans, on the other hand, demonstrate a broader set of textual, rhetorical, and logical concerns, which seem to have interested Atticus (30,16–22) as well as Porphyry and Iamblichus.

I. USING THE NEOPLATONIST SOURCES

In the course of this study, I shall analyse the identifying cues that Simplicius uses to introduce and contextualize the views of Lucius and Nicostratus. There are just four: (1) οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον; (2) οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον; (3) ὁ Νικόστρατος; (4) οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον δὲ καὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον.

The name of Lucius appears in eight contexts throughout the first third of Simplicius *in Cat.* (1,19; 48,1; 62,28; 64,18; 73,28; 125,16; 127,30; 156,17), and abruptly ceases to be cited after Simplicius' discussion of Quantity. There is no singular ὁ Λούκιος source (except for the passage in the proem cited above), and even verbatim quotations are often ascribed to a plural collective of οἱ περὶ Lucius or οἱ περὶ Nicostratus. (The locution οἱ περὶ τὸν X might, of course, simply refer to X as the originator of a tradition rather than a literal 'school'⁸—although, as I suggest below, its later ancient use need not necessarily imply the existence of an historical figure). Nicostratus is cited more frequently, on thirty occasions balanced throughout the entirety of the *in Cat.* Like Lucius, he is often the focus of a school of followers (οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον), but he is also a lone speaker on many occasions (e.g. Νικόστρατος ἐγκαλεῖ, 370,1; ἤμαρτεν Νικόστρατος, 381,23; ἀντιλέγει Νικόστρατος, 390,15). He is also cited alone ([ὁ Νικό]στρατος) in the new fragmentary commentary, plausibly attributed to Porphyry, in the Archimedes Palimpsest (Chiaradonna, Rashed, Sedley, and Tchernetska 2013, 2,26–31).

Regardless of the introductory cue, Simplicius frequently continues a 'dialogue' argument simply with 'them' (φάσιν, with the speakers' identity carried over from previous citations), even if the first cue is

⁸ On the locution itself, see Radt 1988: 35–40. I am indebted to Prof. Dirk Obbink for drawing this reference to my attention.

singular; he seems to have little interest in drawing a distinction between the parties. He is even content to roll Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus together as a single interlocutor, as at 73,28 and following.

Simplicius traces certain of Plotinus' arguments in *Enneads* 6.1 directly to Lucius and Nicostratus. In many cases, the stratigraphy of Simplicius' text clarifies the places where Plotinus picked up aspects of their argument and developed their thought, and this sheds additional light on their interests.⁹ Simplicius has Plotinus endorse, and sometimes spearhead, the criticisms ascribed to Lucius and Nicostratus (for example at 127,11–128,10). He describes their criticisms in similar language: for example, Plotinus provides τὰς πραγματειωδестаτας ἐξετάσεις (2,3), whereas Lucius and Nicostratus deliver πραγματειώδεις considerations (1,22) alongside their polemics. Simplicius sometimes appears to contrast such πραγματειώδεις exegesis with the 'noetic' approach ascribed to Iamblichus (at *in Cat.* 2,9 and following; see also Dillon, 1997). I note each of the explicit correspondences with Plotinus, and some implicit correspondences, below.

Lucius' and Nicostratus' 'schools' are explicitly cited by name throughout the first third of Simplicius' commentary, appearing as a source for the discussions of Substance, Quantity, and Quality. But the name of Lucius ceases to be cited after the discussion of Quantity, and his last appearance is on page 156 of Kalbfleisch's text. Nicostratus and his 'school' continue to be cited by name throughout Simplicius' entire commentary, and are distributed throughout his discussions of the ten categories.

⁹ It remains an open problem whether Plotinus repeats the assertions of Lucius and Nicostratus in *Enneads* 6.1 in order to criticize the scheme of ontological genera that he takes the *Categories* to present, or simply in order to show that the *Categories* does not purport to describe a scheme of ontological genera at all (contrary to the view of some commentators), and may therefore be compatible with the scheme of genera that Plotinus himself will present for the intelligible world and for the sensible world in 6.2–3 respectively. Both positions were recently sketched by de Haas and Chiaradonna in Celluprica and D'Ancona (2004, with earlier bibliography in both articles); Chiaradonna maintains the 'differenza netta tra le tesi di Plotino e Porfirio' against the arguments of Strange (1987) and de Haas (2001), whereas de Haas maintains that 'the echoes in Plotinus of . . . Lucius and Nicostratus do not testify to his agreement with the critical tradition, but to his exploitation of it for his own purposes.' See also Chiaradonna (2002) on the earlier origins, perhaps with Lucius and Nicostratus, of Plotinus' arguments against the Aristotelian genus.

II. LIFE AND HISTORY

Lucius

Excluding Simplicius' notices in his *Categories* commentary, there is no evidence whatsoever for Lucius as an historical figure. In fact, even Simplicius' direct references cite a school of associates (οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον) rather than an individual.¹⁰ Moraux notes that no known Imperial philosopher can be identified with Simplicius' 'Lucius'.¹¹ Dillon (1977/1996: 344–5) observed the 'remote possibility' that Simplicius' Lucius should be identified with the Etruscan Pythagorean represented by Plutarch (QC 8.7–8) as active during the nineties CE. However, if we do accept that Lucius was a real person, I suspect that he flourished before the death of Boethus, who is represented by Simplicius as 'replying' to the embarrassments presented by Lucius' school; given the evidence that makes Boethus a contemporary of Strabo, born around the sixties BCE or earlier (Strabo, *Geog.* 16.2.24), it would be a difficult stretch to extend the activity of his historical interlocutor into the nineties CE. It is also interesting that Simplicius does not mention Lucius among the 'ancient exegetes' of the *Categories* (in *Cat.* 159,32–3), although there are various reasons that Lucius might not appear in that list; he may not have been viewed by Simplicius or his source as an ἐξηγητής of the text as such, or he may simply not have adopted the view on the relative that Simplicius is ascribing to the other 'ancient exegetes', namely Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus, Eudorus, and Athenodorus.

On the other hand, I have been tempted to speculate that this Lucius was not originally a single historical figure carrying this name; perhaps the name served, in some philosophical or doxographical work, to represent a broadly Pythagorean or Platonist school of thought, or was a pseudonym representing another person whose name we know better. For example, if Boethus of Sidon composed a

¹⁰ Of course, the phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον may simply convey the force 'Lucius and his followers'. It is noteworthy, however, that Simplicius varies the personal name with the οἱ περὶ X locution often in the case of Nicostratus (contrast Simplicius in *Cat.* 30,16–22; 231,19–23; 368,1–371,27; 385,9–15; 388,1–13; 390,14–19; 402,11–403,5; 406,5–407,14; 410,25–411,28; 414,23–415,15; 428,3–13; 429,13–430,4 against [with οἱ περὶ] 21,2–25,9; 26,21–28,1; 29,23–30,5; 257,31–6; 268,19–32), but never in the case of Lucius.

¹¹ Moraux 1984: 529.

commentary in 'question and answer' format, which could have been an indirect model for Porphyry's own commentary *κατὰ πᾶσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν*, it might have featured an inquisitor of this name. The name Lucius itself might imply literary origins, and would be a suitable fictive name to convey Pythagorean or Platonic associations.¹² Such an interlocutor's 'questions' (which may have extended only through the discussions of Substance, Quantity, and Quality, for his name is no longer cited by Simplicius after *in Cat.* 156,17) might then have been taken up and developed by—among others—the historical philosopher Nicostratus in the second century.¹³ But there are problems with this hypothesis.¹⁴

¹² 'Lucius' was a common name for protagonists in contemporary literature, and might even be viewed as a Roman 'Smith' or 'Jones': see for example H. J. Mason, 'The Distinction of Lucius in Apuleius' "Metaphorophoses"', *Phronesis* 37.2 (1983), 135–43. For a sophisticated audience, the name might have carried some particularly Pythagorean (and Platonic) connotations. The passage of Plutarch (*Table Talk* 728B) mentioned earlier is one example: Plutarch's 'Lucius' lives in accord with strict Pythagorean *symbola*, and follows Moderatus of Gades.

¹³ Although purely speculative, such an hypothesis could be carried further: for example, the name 'Lucius' might have masked a better-known contemporary or predecessor of Boethus, or collected an agglomeration of real and invented tendentious positions that Boethus set out to confute, much as Porphyry's interlocutor functions in his commentary *By Question and Answer*. If 'Lucius' indeed referred to a fictional figure, or masked a better-known contemporary of Boethus, his literary origins could easily have been lost to Simplicius, who seems to have had only indirect access to the text of Boethus, and may have simply followed the habit of his sources—such as Porphyry's lost commentary *Ad Gedalium* and Iamblichus' lost *in Cat.*—in referring to Lucius by name. I also discuss this possibility in the chapter on Boethus.

¹⁴ For one, as Marwan Rashed has pointed out to me, it would seem very odd for a Roman name to be chosen to represent a philosopher of any persuasion in the first century CE. A person could, of course, happen to have a Latin name and do philosophy: for instance, Plutarch several times mentions Publius Nigidius Figulus as a philosopher (*Cicero* 20.3, *An seni resp. gerend. Sit* 797D). But the name 'Lucius' would hardly have been a natural indicator to take from the air without an historical referent. It may be worth noting that Plutarch identifies a 'Lucius' as an Etruscan student of the Pythagorean Moderatus of Gades in *Table Talk* 7 (727B; cf. Dillon 1997/1996: 345), and to some extent goes on to caricature this Lucius' strict interpretation of Pythagoreanism. Plutarch may have chosen this name and historical identity to represent literalist Pythagoreanism because he had met Lucius and Lucius had made an impression upon him, or because Lucius' ideas were reasonably well known (although he is not otherwise discussed, as far as I know); and as Dillon (1977/1996: 345) points out, there is no reason other than the name to associate this Lucius with the commentator on the *Categories*. The passage does at least provide a link between the name and Pythagoreanism, and Moderatus, this Lucius' teacher, may have taken some interest in the doctrine of ten categories following Eudorus (see ch. 3 below). But this is all speculation.

Regardless of Lucius' historicity or identity, a locution like 'the followers of Lucius' (οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον) may refer most generally to the group of doctrines that were growing in prominence with the Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic revival of the early first century CE,¹⁵ and to which Plotinus (who took up these arguments in *Enneads* 6.1–3)¹⁶ was clearly sympathetic. This 'school of Lucius' was active in the lifetime of Boethus, as Simplicius explicitly describes Boethus' responses to their criticisms.¹⁷

These doctrines may be recognized in the critical concerns of 'the Lucians' in the pages of Simplicius; they are not so prominent among 'the Nicostratans', as I seek to show below. The Lucians are concerned with the possible failure of the ten categories to distinguish the intelligible and sensible worlds (73,15–76,6), with Intelligible Number (129,27), and with the substantiality of the Monad and the Point (65,13–14), which they suspect Aristotle fails to recognize. They wish to show that Quality is proximate to *ousia*, and is more descriptively useful than the Relative in the sense that Socrates is better described by his qualities than his relationships (156,16, cf. 49,31–50,3).¹⁸

Unlike Nicostratus and his 'school', it is difficult to contextualize the 'Lucians' more precisely than this.

¹⁵ On the doctrinal context in Rome, see now Hadot 2007: 119–200.

¹⁶ In the following sections, I note Plotinus' views as they are reported by Simplicius, especially where these reports are relevant to Simplicius' account of the *aporiai* set forth by Lucius and Nicostratus. Although a full discussion of *Enn.* 6.1–3 falls outside the scope of this chapter, I have summarized in my opening chapter (1) my position on Plotinus' status as a source, and specifically the problem of his supposed hostility to the *Categories* and reliance on Lucius and Nicostratus (see de Haas and Chiaradonna in Celluprica and D'Ancona 2004).

¹⁷ In general, Simplicius seems to position the 'dialogues' he portrays in chronological order, but he sometimes interjects strikingly anachronistic discussions, such as the first-century Boethus 'replying' to problems raised by the third-century Plotinus. I have sought to show in the preceding chapter that those passages concerning Boethus, Lucius, and Nicostratus do represent a genuine historical discussion.

¹⁸ See Moraux (1984: 548–50), and further discussion below.

Nicostratus

In contrast to Lucius, Karl Praechter has presented attractive evidence for the historical Nicostratus,¹⁹ identifying him with the Claudius Nicostratus who is honoured on a Delphic stone (*Sylloge* II³ 868) shortly after 'Gaius, son of Xenon' and shortly before the philosopher Taurus. As this Gaius is probably to be identified with the Platonist Gaius, and Taurus was another prominent philosopher of the Platonic school, we may conjecture with Dillon that Nicostratus was 'in more or less the same position as Taurus was later', and we may also follow Dillon in 'seeing in all this a tendency on the part of the Delphians (perhaps as a result of the influence of Plutarch) to honour prominent Platonists' (1977: 234). There was not likely to have been any formal 'Academy' of which Nicostratus was 'head', but there would be reasons, judging solely from his associations on this stone and his attitudes toward Aristotle and the 'intelligible world' in the pages of Simplicius, to identify him as a 'Middle Platonist'. Conversely, some aspects of his methodology point to a Stoic background, although he seems to use Stoic language merely as a polemical device to trip up Aristotle (see for example his discussion of homonymy at 26,22): it is certainly not clear whether he was committed to any Stoic doctrines.

Simplicius makes it plain that Nicostratus postdates Boethus (cf. 23,29 and following), whose floruit may have extended into the early first century CE, and that he antedates Atticus (cf. 30,16–17), whose floruit fell in the 170s CE. Thus the textual evidence supports a date for Nicostratus as flourishing close to the early second century CE, as the Delphic inscription honouring Claudius Nicostratus would indicate.

Nicostratus' doctrinal concerns appear less prominent in Simplicius' pages than are those of the 'school of Lucius'. Nicostratus is interested in raising puzzles (*aporiai*) about the structure of Aristotle's text (see 21,2; 24,6; 25,9), his style and rhetoric (58,14–28), and imputed textual inconsistency (368,1–371,27). By contrast, the 'Lucians' often criticize Aristotle's positions because they do not see these positions as complying with certain *a priori* doctrines—for example, the setting of the intelligible world and the substantiality of intelligible Number and Quality (73,15–76,16). But

¹⁹ Praechter 1922 = 1973: 101–37.

Nicostratus and his school seek to exploit perceived weaknesses in the internal consistency of Aristotle's logic or the text (e.g. 30,16–22); an excellent example of Nicostratus' own method is the long, evidently verbatim, passage from Nicostratus (supported by Plotinus, and rebutted by Simplicius and Iamblichus) at 368,1–371,27.

III. DISTINCT PORTRAYAL AS CRITICS

Simplicius paints Lucius and Nicostratus primarily as polemical figures, creators of 'puzzles' or of 'questions' (ἀπορίαι). Simplicius initially describes them as 'content' (ἡρρεσεν) to be aporists: 'some were content to write only *aporiai* against what is said: this is what Lucius did, and after him Nicostratus' (1,19).²⁰ In summary, Simplicius commonly describes the activity of the 'Lucians', the 'Nicostratans', and Nicostratus himself through the aporetic verb ἀπορίζω or through the polemical verbs ἐγκαλέω and αἰτιάομαι.

Nicostratus and his 'school' are represented, especially early in the commentary, as interested in a common set of rhetorical and logical issues. In the examples that we have cited, the 'Nicostratans' suggest that the text is poorly structured (21,2–25,9), that Aristotle's definitions of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy in *Categories* ch. 1 are insufficiently precise or self-contradictory (26,21–8,1, 29,23–30,5, 30,16–22), that Aristotle is being too wordy (58,14–28), and that he is being sloppy and inconsistent in describing his own key terms, such as 'having' (368,12–369,14). They find fault with Aristotle's use of illustrative examples for various reasons, sometimes on grounds of style (58,14–28), sometimes on grounds of appropriateness (429,13–430,4). Elsewhere, in the newly discovered fragment from a commentary that may be attributed to Porphyry,²¹ Nicostratus raises a familiar puzzle about the 'transitivity principle' at *Cat.* 1b10–11:²² if Socrates is a man, and man is a species, then the transitivity principle yields the absurd conclusion that Socrates is a species. Here as

²⁰ I have explored their representation in more detail in Griffin 2009: ch. 4.

²¹ Chiaradonna, Rashed, Sedley, and Tchernetska 2013, 2,26–31.

²² If A is predicated of B as of a subject, then any C predicated of A will also belong to B. For example, if man is predicated of Socrates as of a subject, and animal is predicated of man, then animal is also predicated of Socrates.

elsewhere, Nicostratus is pointing out inconsistencies and problems in the formulations used by the *Categories*' author. In general, Nicostratus and the 'Nicostratans' demonstrate a broad interest in the *Categories* as a treatise, tackling the minutiae of many categories such as Having (as Plotinus appears to take some cues from Nicostratus in 368,1–371,27) as well as the theory of contraries and contradictories. Their criticisms occur throughout the text, albeit with a definite bias towards the first three categories, which may be a bias of Simplicius' intermediary sources rather than their own bias.

The 'Lucians', on the other hand, appear to approach the *Categories* with a more specific set of doctrinal concerns in mind. They are disturbed about the demotion of Forms and Qualities to the status of accidents, and strive to reduce this position to absurdity (48,1–50,3); in general, perhaps following the view adopted by Eudorus, they find that qualities are undervalued in Aristotle's order (156,16). They argue that the system of the *Categories* is insufficiently rich to encompass intelligible reality as well as sensible reality (73,15–76,16). They find no place in Aristotle's system for the Monad and the Point, those essential Pythagorean entities, and roundly criticize Aristotle for this omission (65,13–14). (Notably Boethus, in his response to the Lucians, is represented by Simplicius as accepting a certain substantiality for the Monad: ἡ μονὰς διττή, ἡ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀριθμῷ . . . , 65,20–1).²³ The Lucians are also accustomed to a philosophical framework that establishes 'body' (σῶμα) as substantial, and they are puzzled to find it demoted to the status of a Quantity (125,16). All of this suggests that the Lucians ascribed some ontological value to the *ordering* of the ten categories, and commenced a tradition of criticism that would continue in Plotinus 6.1.

IV. QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

The puzzles put forward by Lucius and the Nicostratans are never final. Simplicius presents their criticisms and questions, and then describes the various solutions provided by his predecessors—

²³ This well-known and somewhat controversial passage is discussed in detail in my chapter on Boethus below, specifically with reference to the debate of Moraux and Tarán regarding Boethus' position on intelligible number.

especially Boethus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus. As a result, we are left with the strong impression that the schools represented by ‘Lucius and Nicostratus’ sparked a long tradition of historical dialogue around the *Categories*, and that the organization of the ‘historical dialogue’ (as described in the concluding remarks of the next chapter) provides some insight into the stratigraphy of Simplicius’ sources. However, the stratigraphy is not always or necessarily chronological. For ease of reference, I number the texts below.

Table of responses: Lucius, Nicostratus, and their respondents

Ref.	In Cat.	Primary aporist	2nd aporists	Respondent	2nd respondents
T1	1,19	Not applicable: Simplicius’ description of Lucius and Nicostratus’ tactics.			
T2	21,2–25,9	<i>Oi Peri N.</i>	‘they’	Porphyry	Iamblichus
T3	26,21–28,1	<i>Oi Peri N.</i>	‘they’	‘Some [commentators]’	
T4	29,23–30,5	<i>Oi Peri N.</i>		Porphyry	
T5	30,16–22	Nicostratus	Atticus	Porphyry	
T6	48,1–50,3	<i>Oi Peri L.</i>		Porphyry	Boethus
T7	58,14–28	<i>Oi Peri N.</i>	[<i>Oi Peri L.</i>]	Boethus	Simplicius
T8	62,28–65,14	<i>Oi Peri L. & N.</i>		Simplicius	Boethus
T9	73,15–76,16	Plotinus	<i>Oi Peri L. & N.</i>	Simplicius	Boethus, Porphyry
T10	125,16	<i>Oi Peri L.</i>		Simplicius	
T11	127,11–128,10	<i>Oi Peri L. & N.</i>	Plotinus	Simplicius	Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus
T12	156,16	<i>Oi Peri L.</i>		Simplicius	Porphyry
T13	231,19–23	Nicostratus		Iamblichus	
T14	257,31–6	<i>Oi Peri N.</i>		Iamblichus?	
T15	268,19–32	<i>Oi Peri N.</i>		Iamblichus	
T16	368,1–371,27	Plotinus	Nicostratus	Simplicius	Iamblichus
T17	381,3–32	‘Peripatetikoī’		Iamblichus	
T18	385,9–411,28	Nicostratus		Simplicius	
T24	(<i>passim</i>)				
T25	414,23–415,15	Nicostratus		<i>Oi Peri ton Porphyriou</i>	
T26	428,3–430,4	Nicostratus		Simplicius	

In each instance, Simplicius tends to open the discussion with a problem posed by the ‘Lucians’ or by Nicostratus’ school, and then describe, often in a generalized dialogue form, the positions taken by various historical commentators with respect to this problem. In some cases the dialogue is represented as a single question and single

answer. (For a survey of Boethus' role in this pattern of dialogue, see also ch. 6).

As the table shows, explicit references to the Lucius source appear to trail off after the discussion of substance (up to 155,30—and 156,16 is also a reference to quality, not to relation); this admittedly scanty evidence might imply that Lucius was not conducting a line-by-line commentary on the whole text, but may have been especially interested in the category of substance. Nicostratus' concerns seem more wide-reaching. But this may represent Simplicius' (or his sources') own selection from their predecessors, rather than the focus of the Lucius and Nicostratus sources themselves.

Respondents to the Nicostratans

The core set of problems credited to the Nicostratans tends to be handled directly by Porphyry (T2, T4–T6 in the numbering of the table in the preceding section), and in one case by 'Porphyry's followers' (T25). For example (T2):

Nicostratus and his followers raise the following problem: 'Why is it that Aristotle, having proposed to speak about the categories, does not teach us about them right away, but rather about the other things; viz. homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms?'

Porphyry gave a fine reply to these objectors, saying that in the case of almost every theoretical field of study, some things are written beforehand, which tend to clarify what is to follow, as for instance, definitions, axioms and postulates in geometry (21,2–7, tr. Chase 2003).²⁴

As is often pointed out, it seems likely that Simplicius' source for these Nicostratan problems is Porphyry's commentary *Ad Gedalium* and Iamblichus' commentary. Moreover, Porphyry appears to be Simplicius' source for the sequence of dialogue with other historical figures such as Boethus (see for example T9) and Atticus, who, in Simplicius' view, develops and improves upon Nicostratus' *ἀπορία* that homonyms are synonyms (see T5 and Anton 1969:16).

²⁴ Ἀποροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, τί δήποτε περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν εἰπεῖν προθέμενος οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκει τῶν τε ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων καὶ παρωνύμων. πρὸς οὓς καλῶς ὑπήντησεν ὁ Πορφύριος, ὅτι καθ' ἑκάστην σχεδὸν θεωρητικὴν πραγματείαν προγράφεται τινα πρὸς σαφήνειαν τείνοντα τῶν ἐξῆς, ὡς ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ οἱ ὅροι καὶ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ αἰτήματα. (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

Simplicius highlights the reliance of certain passages in Plotinus *Enneads* 6.1 upon Nicostratus, particularly later in the commentary. In several long back-and-forth exchanges (e.g. T9, T11, and T16) Simplicius sketches a complex stratigraphy of question and answer, from which one sometimes derives the peculiarly atemporal impression that Nicostratus developed certain problems raised by Plotinus, until Boethus helped to solve them. Particularly where Plotinus is involved, however, and in the discussion of the later categories, Simplicius becomes less concerned with the discussion of ‘historical’ figures, and strikingly begins to respond directly to ‘Nicostratus’ rather than the previously favoured locution οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον. In these later passages where the new language predominates, Porphyry appears less prominent: Simplicius frequently cites Iamblichus as his source for solutions (T13–T15, T17), and also introduces the previously unused locution οἱ περὶ τὸν Πορφύριον (T25). In these later parts of the commentary, it seems probable that Porphyry’s *Ad Gedalium* is being read through the lens of Iamblichus’ commentary (perhaps more than it was earlier), as Simplicius’ own introductory remarks (*in Cat.* 3,1–4) suggest.²⁵

After these Iamblichus citations are introduced, Simplicius gradually ceases to cite explicit sources for the solutions to Nicostratus’ problems. Instead, Simplicius offers solutions to the final Nicostratan problems in his *own* voice—but these solutions likely belong to Iamblichus as well, as described by Simplicius in the proem to his commentary:

Now, I have read some of the aforementioned writings, and, following Iamblichus as carefully as possible, I wrote them down, often even using the philosopher’s very words. [...] I wished to reduce this man’s lofty spirit, inaccessible to the common people, until it was more clear and commensurate [with the common understanding] (Simplic. *in Cat.* 3,2–10, tr. Chase 2003).²⁶

²⁵ Simplicius’ account of his own practice, given in the opening pages of his commentary (1–3), suggests that he recognized an historical progression of commentators including Themistius, Alexander, Herminius, Maximus, Boethus, Lucius, Nicostratus, Plotinus, Porphyry, Dexippus, and Iamblichus, and that his primary (direct) source was the commentary of Iamblichus, supplemented with ‘some’ (3,1) direct reading of the earlier sources that Iamblichus cited.

²⁶ ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐνέτυχον μὲν καὶ τισι τῶν εἰρημένων συγγράμμασιν, ἐπιμελέστερον δὲ ὡς οἶός τε ἦν τοῖς Ἰαμβλίχου παρακολουθῶν ἀπεγραψάμεν, καὶ αὐτῇ πολλοῦ τῇ λέξει τοῦ φιλοσόφου χρησάμενος. ὁ δὲ σκοπὸς ἦν μοι τῆς ἀπογραφῆς ἅμα μὲν ὡς ἂν

A good example of this system of questions and responses is 368,1–371,27 = T16. Nicostratus notes that it is unclear which, if any, among the senses of ‘having’ at *Cat.* 15b17–30 answer to the category. He goes on (368,26–369,14) to break down the senses in detail, assigning the first (state, condition) to Quality; the second (size) to Quantity; the third, fourth, and seventh (things-around, as on a part, as a possession) to Relation; the fifth (as a part) to Relation or Substance; and rejecting the eighth (as husband to wife),²⁷ and concluding that none of these answers to the category. Simplicius now brings Iamblichus on stage, who retorts that the force of the category is concealed in the third sense (things-around) and the fourth sense (on a part), and that Nicostratus is simply insufficiently graced with *ἀγχνόιοι* to notice this (370,5).

The subsequent introduction of Plotinus (*Enn.* 6.1.23) at 370,11—portrayed as if he is jousting with a contemporary Iamblichus across the room, in a classic sample of ‘Simplician dialogue’—likely derives from Iamblichus’ own commentary, and perhaps, through it, from Porphyry. Thus it is inserted here after Iamblichus’ initial response to Nicostratus and before the longer discussion of *Metaphysics* 5.23 on the senses of having (largely a paraphrase of 1023a8 and following). This entire back-and-forth, including a report of Boethus, is then wrapped up at 374,7 where Simplicius mentions that Iamblichus has just completed *τὴν τοῦ ἔχειν τεχνολογίαν*, and will now proceed to deliver a higher criticism, *τῆς νοεράς περὶ αὐτοῦ θεωρίας ἀντιλαβόμενος*. Iamblichus’ search for an ‘intelligible’ account of the category, then, begins from a critical engagement with Nicostratus and Plotinus, both of whom are concerned with the problem whether the *Categories*’ analysis of substance attempts to account for both intelligible and sensible substance (76,14–17; cf. Plotinus 6.1.2).²⁸

The ‘wrap-up’ at 374,7 strongly suggests that Simplicius is drawing on Iamblichus throughout the preceding pages, including the report

δυναίμην ἐκ τοῦ γράφειν ἀκριβεστέραν (5) τῶν εἰρημένων κατανόησιν προσλαβεῖν, ἅμα δὲ τὸν ὑψηλὸν νοῦν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄβαντον ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερόν τε καὶ συμμετρώτερον καταγαγεῖν, ἐκ τρίτων δὲ καὶ τὸ πολὺ πλῆθος τῶν πολυειδῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπ’ ἑλαττον ὁπωσοῦν συστείλαι, οὐχ οὕτως ὡς ὁ φιλοσοφώτατος Συριανὸς εἰς ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ μηδὲν ὡς δυνατὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων παραλιπεῖν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

²⁷ Nicostratus does not appear to comment on the sixth sense (*ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ*).

²⁸ van den Berg 2008 offers an excellent overview of the later Neoplatonist debate from Plotinus to Proclus.

and criticism of Nicostratus and the dialogue with Plotinus. Indeed, I note a problematic section (371,23–4) where Simplicius has been interpreted from the context²⁹ to cite Plotinus via *φησίν*, although these words do not occur in our text of Plotinus 6.1.23 (*ἀλλ' ἄτοπος, φησίν, ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸ λέγειν ἔχουσαι γυναῖκα σύνηθες ὄν*). It seems plausible that *φησίν* here could alternatively represent Iamblichus, presenting a point of view (not necessarily Plotinus' own) in the voice of a rhetorical interlocutor.³⁰

Respondents to the Lucians

The situation is rather different with the first portion of the commentary, throughout Simplicius' representation of respondents to the 'school of Lucius'. Boethus figures heavily here, as in T6, T7 (implicitly; see discussion below), T8, and T12.

An especially important passage for the relationship between Lucius and Boethus is 73,15–76,16 = T9, and I would like to begin here. In this passage, Lucius (followed by Nicostratus and Plotinus, if the citation at 73,27–8 is read chronologically) question whether the ten Aristotelian categories can describe intelligible as well as sensible beings. It appears that Lucius or his school may have been the first to raise this problem (which was amplified by Nicostratus and Plotinus). Simplicius, Boethus, and Porphyry are among the respondents, with Porphyry correcting Boethus.

If someone wonders whether Aristotle here divided and enumerated sensible and generated things alone, or whether he did so with all beings, whatever their mode of existence; and, in general, whether the intelligible genera are different from the sensible; or whether some are the same, and others different. After all, if they are different, the intelligible genera have been completely omitted. If, however, they

²⁹ See Gaskin's translation (2000), 106 and note 550.

³⁰ There is also an argument advanced by P. Henry (1987: 123 and following) that Porphyry had access to oral lectures of Plotinus, and that passages that appear to be Plotinian, yet are not presented using the exact text of the *Enneads* (such as 73,15 and following) could represent these lectures. Michael Chase (2003: 152) suspects that the mediation of Porphyry's *Ad Gedealium* commentary, and of Iamblichus' commentary, is sufficient to explain the difference of text. Certainly, on my view in the case of the present passage, Iamblichus may have (nearly) paraphrased the arguments of Plotinus without clearly endorsing or rejecting them, before providing his own 'intellective' interpretation.

are identical, sensible things will be synonymous with intelligible things. But how could there be commonality (*κοινωνία*) in the same substance among things in which there is something 'prior' and 'posterior', and one of which is a model (*παράδειγμα*), the other an image? If the ten categories are said homonymously of the intelligibles, they will not be the same, since they will have in common only the same name; but there will be more genera, since the intelligible things have not been included. Moreover, how can it be other than incredible that 'being-affected' (*τὸ πάσχειν*) and the 'relatives' (*τὰ πρὸς τι*) are in the intelligibles, when the latter are immutable; or that which resembles an offshoot (*παραφυνάδι*) among things which stand primarily in self-identity? If, however, some are common to intelligibles and sensibles, and some are peculiar (*ἰδίᾳ*), their articulation (*διάθρωσις*) has been omitted. Such, then, are the problems raised by the most divine Plotinus, as well as by the followers of Lucius and Nicostratus.³¹ (73,15–28, tr. Chase 2003)

This launches a long doxographical passage that mingles the concerns raised by Plotinus, Nicostratus, and Lucius with several layers of responses that must date from different points in the commentary tradition. (The question whether substance can be a single genus is reiterated at 76,13–15, now attributed only to Plotinus and Nicostratus; but the earlier passage above seems to suggest that Lucius also offered a similar puzzle, which Nicostratus and Plotinus refined). Simplicius subsequently offers a response developed by Boethus (78,4–20, subsequently rebutted by Porphyry beginning at 78,20), which chronologically seems certain to be directed at a reader before Nicostratus (most likely Lucius, who has already been named at the end of 73,15–28, my T9 above):³²

³¹ *Εἰ δέ τις ἀπορεῖ, πότερον τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνα καὶ γενητὰ διείλιν ἐν (15) τούτοις ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ἀπηριθμήσατο ἢ πάντα τὰ ὁπωσοῦν ὄντα, καὶ ὅλως πότερον ἄλλα ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ γένη ἢ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἢ τινὰ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ, τινὰ δὲ ἕτερα· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἄλλα, παραλείπεται πάντῃ ἐκεῖνα· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ, συνώνυμα ἔσται τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς· καὶ πῶς ἔσται κοινωνία τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας, ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον ἔστιν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ μὲν (20) παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ εἰκὼν; εἰ δὲ ὁμωνύμως λέγονται ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν αἱ δέκα κατηγορίαι, οὐκ ἔσονται αἱ αὐταί, εἴπερ ὀνόματος μόνου τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πλείω ἔσται τὰ γένη, οὐ περιληφθέντων τῶν νοητῶν. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἀπίθανον ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀτρέπτοις οὐσιν εἶναι τὸ πάσχειν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι, παραφυνάδι ἑοικότα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ προηγουμένως ἐστῶσιν; εἰ δὲ τὰ (25) μὲν ἐστὶ κοινὰ νοητοῖς καὶ αἰσθητοῖς, τὰ δὲ ἴδια, παραλείπεται ἡ τούτων διάθρωσις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ὁ θειότατος Πλωτίνος ἀπορεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ Νικόστρατον (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).*

³² As Plotinus and Nicostratus (with Praechter's identification) lived too late for Boethus to have responded to their criticisms directly; see ch. 6 below. Chiaradonna

However, Boethus considers these questions redundant here, since <he believes that> the discussion is not concerned with intelligible substance. Rather, he says, one should have raised the additional problem that in other works <Aristotle> divides substance into three: he said that substance is spoken of in one way as matter, in another as form, and in yet another as the composite, but that here he posits substance as one category. What is this substance, and how will <Aristotle> arrange the three <substances> under it, given that they are not called substances in virtue of one account (λόγος)? In answer to these problems Boethus claims that the account of primary substance fits both matter and the composite... matter and the composite will be subsumed under the category of substance, but the form will be outside the <category of> substance, and will fall under a different category, either quality or quantity or another one.³³

This passage, I think, also illustrates the tone of Lucius' ἀπορίαι, in contrast to Nicostratus': where the later problems raised by Nicos-tratus *alone* (without evidence of a Lucian predecessor) often focus on the rhetoric and structure of the treatise, as discussed above, Lucius' concerns tend to be more direct and doctrinal, specifically focused on the nature of substance in the *Categories*.

The associates of Lucius appear at 48,1–50,3 = T6 to argue that (A) 'the things which complete substance' (τὰ συμπληρωτικά τῆς οὐσίας) cannot be 'in a substrate', certainly not without being 'parts', and moreover that (B) Aristotle's definition would make even Socrates appear to be 'in a substrate'. Porphyry answers the first problem (with some additional commentary by Simplicius himself). Here, for reference, is that exchange:

[T6 (A). 48,1–49,30] Lucius and his circle, however, also raise the following objection against the fact that what is in a substrate is said

2009: 104 develops an appealing case for Eudorus as the target of Boethus' reply. See also Barnes 2005a.

³³ 'Ο μέντοι Βόηθος ταῦτα μὲν παρέλκειν ἐνταῦθα τὰ ζητήματα βούλεται, μὴ γὰρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον· μάλλον δὲ ἔδει, φησὶν, (5) προσασπορεῖν ὅτι ἐν ἄλλοις τὴν οὐσίαν διελόμενος εἰς τρεῖς ἄλλως μὲν τὴν ὕλην, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ εἶδος, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ συναμφοτέρον οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι εἶπεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ μίαν τίθεται κατηγορίαν τὴν οὐσίαν. τίνα οὖν ταύτην, καὶ πῶς αὐτῇ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποτάξει τὰς μὴ καθ' ἓνα λόγον λεγομένας; ἀπαντῶν δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Βόηθος τὸν τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας λόγον καὶ τῇ (10) ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ ἐφαρμόττειν φησὶν... ἀλλ' οὕτως μὲν, φησὶν ὁ Βόηθος, ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ὑπαχθῆσονται τῇ τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορίᾳ, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἐκτὸς ἔσται, ὅπ' ἄλλην δὲ πεσεῖται κατηγορίαν, ἥτοι τὴν ποιότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ ἄλλην τινά (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

to be ‘not as a part’ [at *Cat.* 1a24–1b3]. ‘For if,’ they say, ‘we say that things which complete a substance are parts of that substance, and that which simply completes the being of a sensible body is colour, figure, magnitude, and simply quality and quantity (since there could be no colourless or figureless body), and of this particular body, snow, for instance, whiteness and coldness [sc. complete the substance], then one of two things is necessary: either not to say that these things are in a substrate, or [to say that] it was not correct to deny of things in a substrate that they are like parts. How, moreover, is it possible for completers (τὰ συμπληρωτικά), in general, to be said to be in a substrate? For Socrates’ shape (μορφή) is not in Socrates as its substrate; rather, if anything, it would be those things which enter into already complete things from outside which would be in them as their substrate.’

Porphyrus solves this difficulty in the following way: ‘There are,’ he says, ‘two kinds of substrate. . . . Qualityless matter, which Aristotle calls “potential body”, is the first meaning of “substrate”, and the second is that which comes into existence as either a commonly qualified thing or as something individually qualified. . . . Therefore,’ he says, ‘many of the things which inhere are in a substrate with regard to the first substrate; for instance, all colour and all figure and all quality are in prime matter as their substrate, not as parts of it and incapable of existing apart from it. In the case of the second substrate, however, not all colour nor all quality is in a substrate, but [they are so only] when they are not completers (συμπληρωτικά) of substance.’³⁴ (tr. Chase 2003)

³⁴ Αποροῦσι δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὡς μέρος λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ “εἰ γὰρ τὰ συμπληρωτικά τῆς οὐσίας, φασί, μέρη αὐτῆς εἶναι λέγομεν, συμπληροὶ δὲ ἀπλῶς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ εἶναι χρῶμα σχῆμα μέγεθος καὶ ἀπλῶς ποιότης καὶ ποσότης (ἄχρουν γὰρ καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον οὐκ ἂν εἴη σώμα), τοῦδε δὲ τοῦ σώματος (5) οἶον χιόνος λευκότης καὶ ψυχρότης, ἀνάγκη δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ μὴ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποφάσκεισθαι τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μὴ ὡς μέρη εἶναι. πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὅλως τὰ συμπληρωτικά δυνατὸν λέγεσθαι; οὐ γὰρ ἡ Σωκράτους μορφή ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν τῷ Σωκράτει, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἄρα, τὰ τοῖς ἡδὴ τελείῳ ἐξῶθεν ἐπεισιόντα, ταῦτα ἂν εἴη ἐν (10) ὑποκειμένοις αὐτοῖς”.

ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπορίαν λύων ὁ Πορφύριος “διττόν, φησίν, ἐστὶν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοιᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἢ τε γὰρ ἄπειρος ὕλη, ἣν δυνάμει καλεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, πρῶτόν ἐστιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαίνον, καὶ δεύτερον, ὃ κοινῶς ποῖον ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται· ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκός ἐστιν (15) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης τοῖς ἐπιγινωμένοις ἢ κατηγορουμένοις κατ’ αὐτῶν. πολλὰ οὖν, φησίν, τῶν ἐγγινωμένων ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον πᾶν χρῶμα καὶ πᾶν σχῆμα καὶ πᾶσα ποιότης ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν τῇ πρώτῃ ὕλῃ, οὐχ ὡς μέρη αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατα χωρὶς αὐτῆς εἶναι· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου ὑποκειμένου οὐ πᾶν χρῶμα οὐδὲ πᾶσα (20) ποιότης ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὴ συμπληρωτικά εἴσι τῆς οὐσίας. (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

But Boethus is cited as directly answering the second problem. Here, then, is another fairly clear-cut case of Boethus replying to a ‘Lucian’ problem:

[T6 (B). 49,31–50,9] ‘But why,’ they say, ‘will not individual substances, such as Socrates and Plato, be subsumed under the account (λόγος) of the things “in a substrate”, and be accidents, since Socrates is also “in something” —for he is in time and space—and not as a part, and it is impossible for him to exist apart from time and space? For even if he were to change from this particular place, he will still be in some other, as was said in the case of fragrance.’

Boethus thought he solved the difficulty based on place, when he said that things in motion are, in general, never in the place in which they were, for this was proved in the *On Motion*. By the same reasoning (λόγος), however, neither would they be in partial time. For since time flows constantly, it is always other; so that if anything, they are in universal time. Boethus, however, provides a solution for this, too. In the first place, he says, universals are not even in existence (ἐν ὑποστάσει) according to Aristotle, and even if they were, they are not a determinate thing (τι). Yet Aristotle said ‘in some thing’. Therefore, that which is ‘in something’ cannot be in a universal.³⁵ (tr. Chase 2003)

The followers of Lucius may be making this case in order to prove that qualities are ‘substantial’ in a way that, on his view (like Eudorus’), Aristotle’s argument would not allow.³⁶

At T8, Simplicius begins a comprehensive description of commentators who ‘opposed the division’ of the ten categories. He describes the Nicostatans among those who declared the division deficient, and continues this view to the followers of Lucius. They, according to Simplicius, held that Aristotle wrongly omitted conjunctions, articles,

³⁵ Ἀλλὰ πῶς, φασίν, οὐχὶ καὶ αἱ ἄτομοι οὐσίαι, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων, τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὑπαχθήσονται καὶ ἔσονται συμβεβηκότα, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶν ὁ Σωκράτης (ἐν τόπῳ γὰρ καὶ χρόνῳ) καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου καὶ χρόνου; κἂν γὰρ τοῦδε [p. 50] μεταστῇ τοῦ τόπου, πάντως ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔσται, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς εὐωδίας ἐλέγετο.

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου λύειν ὁ Βόηθος ἔδοξεν εἰπὼν τὰ κινούμενα μὴ εἶναι ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπος· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως δεδεῖχθαι. τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ εἴη ἂν μερικῶν· βέοντος γὰρ συνεχῶς τοῦ χρόνου, ἄλλος αἰεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἐστίν, ὥστε, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν τῷ καθόλου (5) χρόνῳ ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο λύων ὁ Βόηθος πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲ εἶναι τὸ καθόλου ἐν ὑποστάσει κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην φησίν, εἰ δὲ καὶ εἴη, οὐ τι εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τινὶ εἴπεν· ὥστε οὐ δύναται τὸ ἐν τινὶ ὄν ἐν τῷ καθόλου εἶναι. (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

³⁶ cf. 156,16 = T12 in the table above, and my discussion of Eudorus’ possible argument in favour of intelligible qualities and quantities perceived absolutely, ch. 3.

negations, privations, moods of verbs, the monad, and the point (64,13–65,14). (I believe that the linguistic concerns in 64,18–20 may be wrongly ascribed to the Lucians, for reasons I argue in ch. 5 in treating Athenodorus and Cornutus;³⁷ however, 65,13–14 is, I believe, correctly assigned.) Simplicius appears to respond directly to the linguistic omissions from 64,18–65,3, presumably relying on Iamblichus and Porphyry. But for the objection at 65,13–14, namely the complaint that the categories will not embrace the monad and the point, and similar (presumably ‘intelligible’) entities, we have a reply by Alexander and by Boethus; Boethus’ response offers a distinctive solution that accords some substantiality to these mathematical and geometrical entities, including an argument that these entities may be *both* substance *and* quantity.

‘But what about the one,’ they say, ‘and the monad and the point? How can they not fall outside the categories? They are not, as one might think, quantified, for they are neither continuous—since they are without parts—nor are they discrete. But it is fitting that everything quantified should be either continuous or discrete, and if discrete, then either odd or even.’³⁸

The answer is, as Alexander also holds, that they will be placed among the Relative, both as principle (*ἀρχή*) of numbers and as measure. If, however, number is twofold—one incorporeal, the other corporeal—then, as Boethus would say, the monad will also be twofold: one which is substance (*οὐσία*), and is in intelligible number—Aristotle

³⁷ There are some oddities in this passage, and, in ch. 5, I propose that it may be wrongly ascribed to the followers of Lucius. While some of the discussion in that chapter is specific to Athenodorus and Cornutus, two points may be briefly made here. First, Lucius is unusually named here *apart* from Nicostratus, and most strangely, he is named immediately *after* Nicostratus *with a differing view*. Simplicius does not elsewhere set ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’ against one another in this way, nor in this order. Second, just after the ascription to Lucius, but before the Porphyrian answer that is elsewhere associated with the *Stoics*, our text of Simplicius has a lacuna. This issue is discussed in further detail in ch. 6.

³⁸ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔν, φασί, καὶ ἡ μονὰς καὶ τὸ σημείον πῶς οὐκ ἔξω πίπτει τῶν κατηγοριῶν; οὐτε γὰρ ποσὸν ἔστιν, ὡς ἂν τῷ δόξειεν· οὐτε γὰρ συνεχὲς ἔστιν, ἅτε ἀμερὲς ὄν, οὐτε διωρισμένον· πᾶν δὲ ποσὸν ἢ συνεχὲς ἢ διωρισμένον εἶναι προσήκει, καὶ εἰ διωρισμένον, ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον. ἢ καὶ ὡς ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ ὡς μέτρον ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι καταταχθήσεται, ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοκεῖ. εἰ δὲ διττὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὁ μὲν ἀσώματος, ὁ δὲ σωματικός, ἔσται, ὡς καὶ

ὁ Βόηθος ἂν φαίη, καὶ ἡ μονὰς διττή, ἡ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ (20) ἀριθμῷ (τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ), ἡ δὲ πρὸς τι ἢ ποσόν. ὕστερον δὲ φησιν ὁ Βόηθος μήποτε ἄμεινον εἶναι ποσὸν φάναι· ὡς γὰρ λευκότης ἔχει πρὸς λευκόν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ δυὰς πρὸς τὰ δύο· εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνα ἄμφω ποῖον, καὶ ταῦτα ποσόν. (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

also thinks that this one exists—and one which is a relative or a quantified. Later, however, Boethus says that perhaps it is better to call it a quantified, for as whiteness is to white, so is the dyad to two. If, therefore, the former are both qualified, then the latter are also quantified. (65,13–24, tr. Chase 2003)

Here, too, it looks as if Boethus may be defending against a problem initially posed by Lucius.

Early during the discussion of Quantity, Simplicius replies directly and in his own voice to the Lucians (125,16 = T10) when they question why Aristotle transfers body to the category of Quantity rather than substance. His solution is markedly similar to that ascribed to Boethus at 65,19–21 = T8: much like the monad and the point, body is *both* substance *and* quantity. It is possible that the Boethan *both-and* response implicitly underlies the comparable solution to T10 as well. Similar issues arise in other discussions of the category of Quantity.³⁹

I think we can also find less clear-cut but still promising examples of Boethus replying to a Lucian problem. At 58,14–28 = T7, for example, the Nicostratans are (A) credited with a rather tendentious attack on Aristotle's 'unnecessary verbiage' (ματαιολογία), and 'they' (third person plural) are further credited (B) with an objection to the Aristotelian position that the substrate has all the differentiae of the predicate: how, they ask, can the rational animal inherit both 'rational' and 'irrational' (τὸ τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον) from the genus 'animal'?

[T7 (A). 58,14–22] Nicostratus and his followers reproach Aristotle with indulging in useless verbiage in this passage. 'For who,' he [*sc.* Nicostratus] says, 'is unaware that knowledge could never differ from another knowledge by being two-footed or four-footed, as is the case with "animal"?' In the first place [Simplicius replies], even if this much

³⁹ In the broader issues regarding Quantity in a very complex passage (127,11–128–10 = T11; see discussion in Griffin 2009: ch. 4), the Lucians are included with the Nicostratans and Plotinus as holding that magnitude is not a quantity, but a 'so much'—because only Number, properly understood, is truly Quantity. They also wonder why sensible number is not substance, whereas intelligible number is. Their doctrinal interest seems to follow T9 (and to a lesser extent T8) where the Lucians are also concerned with the intelligible–sensible distinction and whether Aristotle has fully grasped its significance—and are particularly interested in his treatment of 'substantial' quantities, including 'Number' in an almost Pythagorean sense (129,27 = T11) as well as the Monad and the Point (T8) and 'body' itself (T10).

is clear, it is not so obvious that ‘there is nothing to prevent the differentiae of subordinate genera from being the same’ . . . (tr. Chase 2003)⁴⁰

[T7 (B). 58,23–8] They also object to [Aristotle’s] statement that, in subordinate genera, ‘however many differentiae there are of the predicate, there will be just as many differentiae of the substrate’ . . . Now Boethus gave in to this problem, and suggested emending the text as follows: ‘so that however many differentiae there are of the subject, the predicate will have the same number.’ (tr. Chase 2003)⁴¹

Boethus is said to have ‘given in’ to the latter problem (*ἐνδοὺς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ*) by amending the text.⁴² But it seems chronologically unlikely for Boethus to have literally ‘given in’ to a problem first discovered by Nicostratus.⁴³ With the exception of T7, Boethus replies to ‘Lucian’ arguments but does not reply to ‘Nicostratan’ arguments. I believe that the third person plural at T7B (but not T7A) refers loosely and implicitly to the Lucians, and not to the Nicostratans. This would not be unprecedented, as Simplicius elsewhere introduces a position ascribed to Nicostratus’ school and then continues the same position to *οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον* as if it makes no difference (64,13–20 = T9). Thus T7B is, like T6B, an example of Boethus responding directly to

⁴⁰ *Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον ματαιολογίαν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἐν τούτοις· τίς γάρ, φησὶν, ἀγνοήσει ὅτι ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἂν ποτε τῷ δίποδι διενέγκοι ἢ τετράποδι, ὥσπερ τὸ ζῶον· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, καὶν τοῦτο σαφές, οὐκέτι καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὁμοίως δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὑπάλληλα οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι διαφοράς· ἔδει δὲ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ἅμα τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰπεῖν. ἔπειτα ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμῖνον τὸ ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα οὐ καλῶς ἐξεδέξαντο, (20) νομίσαντες δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλα ὄντα ὑφ’ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ γενέσθαι οὕτως οὐκ ἦν πρόχειρος ὁ λόγος, καὶν τὰ παραδείγματα καλῶς ληφθέντα σαφὴ τὸν λόγον ποιῇ* (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

⁴¹ αἰτιῶνται δὲ καὶ <ὅτι> ἐν τοῖς ὑπαλλήλοις γένεσιν ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου φησὶν διαφοραί, τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἔσσονται· ὄντων γὰρ ὑπαλλήλων τοῦ ζῶου καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῶου, (25) ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ζῶου διαφοραὶ εἰσι τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον, πῶς οἶόν τε τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῶου τὸ μὲν εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον; ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Βόηθος ἐνδοὺς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ μεταγράφειν ἡξίου τὴν λέξιν οὕτως· (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

⁴² See the discussion under ‘Differentiae’ in my chapter on Boethus, below. Boethus reverses the order of the terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ at 1b23–4 to give ‘however many differentiae there are of the subject (*ὑποκειμένου*), there will be just as many differentiae of the predicate (*κατηγορουμένου*)’. Ackrill, in his commentary (1963:77) adopts a similar approach.

⁴³ First, Boethus’ birth is (as securely as possible) dated to the sixties BCE, and we have discussed fairly firm, if conjectural, reasons to date Nicostratus’ floruit to the second century CE. Moreover, there are other instances in Simplicius, such as 29,23–30,5 = T4, which seem to make it clear that Nicostratus cannot have been active (or, at least, active and widely known) before Boethus or contemporary with him. There Nicostratus criticizes a reading at 1a1–2 that Boethus clearly did not know.

the ‘Lucians’; it is also an example of Simplicius roughly conflating the Lucian and Nicostratan positions (cf. Moraux 1984: 528–63) in such a way that Lucius appears to underlie Nicostratus.

The final problem explicitly raised by the ‘Lucians’ involves the substantiality of Quality (156,16–25 = T12). Much as the Lucians were previously concerned with the substantiality of quantities, they are here concerned to demonstrate that Quality is closer to Substance than is the Relative:

And it has greater affinity with Substance, as the followers of Lucius also object, for [they say that] it is more apt to reveal Socrates from his snub nose, protruding eyes and pot belly—which are qualities—than from his being on the right hand, his being a friend and his other features which are relative. Besides, they say, if things that are spoken of are divided into two, —into what is per se and what is relative to something else—when [Aristotle] started to talk about what is per se, which includes Substance and Quantity, he ought to have added Quality and in this way to have proceeded to Relatives. If according to Aristotle himself that which is relative is like an offshoot and supervenes on what is conceived of as per se, as something posterior, how could [Relatives] fail to be after Quality? (tr. Fleet 2002).⁴⁴

Simplicius responds directly and at length to this concern, drawing on Porphyry’s defence of the Aristotelian order, although that may in turn derive from Boethus.

Summary of Treatment by Respondents

In those passages where the ‘Lucians’ are directly cited, they tend to underlie the positions of Nicostratus (and often Plotinus), particularly in complex passages such as T11. When Boethus is cited early in the commentary, he tends to respond directly to issues raised by the

⁴⁴ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ δὲ οἰκειότερον, ὥς καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον ἐγκαλοῦσιν· οἰκειότερον γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη δηλῶσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ σιμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐξοφθάλμου καὶ προγάστορος, ἄπερ ἐστὶν ποιὰ, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ καὶ φίλου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τι. ἄλλως τέ, φασίν, εἰς δύο διαιρουμένων τῶν λεγομένων, εἰς τε τὸ καθ’ (20) αὐτὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον, ἀρξάμενον περὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ἐν οἷς ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ἔδει καὶ τὸ ποῖον προσθέντα οὕτως ἐπὶ τὰ πρὸς τι μεταβῆναι. εἰ δὲ καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη παραφνᾶδι εἴκειν τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τοῖς καθ’ αὐτὰ νοουμένοις ὥς ὕστερα ἐπιγίνεται, πῶς οὐκ ἀνεῖν μετὰ τὸ ποῖον; (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

Lucians; on the occasion when he appears to be made to reply to Nicostratus (T7), it is likely that the Lucians *still* underlie the argument and it is to them that he is responding. (Simplicius is not especially concerned to represent the argument in chronological order, as the organization of for example Herminus, Athenodorus, Cornutus, Lucius, and Nicostratus [T8] makes clear.) It is later in the commentary when other figures, especially Iamblichus, respond directly to 'Nicostratan' points taken over by Plotinus.

The Lucians are concerned with metaphysical issues of Platonic doctrine. Their concerns are often shared by Plotinus (and by extension, in some passages, by the Nicostratans). They worry about the substantiality of attributes like quantities and qualities; the distinction of intelligible from sensible reality; and whether the *Categories*' system is capable of describing these distinctions and making metaphysical room for entities such as intelligible, substantial Number. These concerns are shared with Eudorus specifically, and more generally with Neo-Pythagoreanism and Middle Platonism. We might speculate that Lucius was an early proponent of Eudorus' views, and that Lucius proceeded to apply Eudorus' critique directly to the Aristotelian treatise in a targeted, critical treatise. Perhaps that treatise elicited a direct reply from Boethus. The responses that Boethus offered (as Simplicius represents him) suggest that even Boethus was prepared to grant a kind of substantiality to certain quantities in response to Lucius (see ch. 6 for discussion). Moraux (1973: 155) suggests that Boethus is influenced by Speusippus, and therefore 'an die substantielle Realität von intelligiblen Zahlen glaubte'; although Tarán (1981) criticizes this interpretation, Boethus' thinking about quantity does seem to have been formulated in response to such 'Pythagoreanizing' and 'Platonizing' difficulties about the *Categories*. Thus I would suggest that Boethus responded to 'Lucian', doctrinal concerns raised against the interpretation of the *Categories* favoured, perhaps, by Andronicus and Eudorus. The Nicostratans, by contrast, have a broader set of textual, rhetorical, and logical issues to discuss, which seem to have interested Atticus (30,16—22 = T5) as well as Porphyry and Iamblichus. However, they often share the more specific interests of the Lucians (e.g. T8, T9, T11). 'Nicostratan' ideas, particularly when they appear to overlay 'Lucian' questions, anticipate Plotinus (T9, T11, T16).

Here I would like to stress Lucius' role in developing criticisms that presuppose an ontological reading of the *Categories* (similar to that

adopted by Eudorus and Pseudo-Archytas), especially reflecting its limitations in addressing intelligible (not perceptible) beings such as the monad and the point. I also develop in more detail below (ch. 6) the suggestion that a commentary by Boethus may have been the original source for many of Lucius' *ἀπορίαι*.

Stoic Critique: Athenodorus and Cornutus

Seleucus. Well, then, what is the reason that impelled the philosophers of old to engage in disputes of every kind with each other on the subject of this Aristotelian writing which we call the *Categories*? For as far as I can see, neither have more numerous controversies occurred about any other topic, nor have greater contests been stirred up, not only by Stoics and Platonists trying to undermine these Aristotelian categories, but even among the Peripatetics with each other. . . .

Dexippus. Because . . . the subject (σκοπός) of this book concerns the primary and simple expressions (λέξεις) <and the realities> they signify. So since λόγος is useful to all branches of philosophy, and the first principles of this are *simple expressions* and their objects of reference, it is natural that much controversy has arisen. . . .¹

Dexippus in *Cat.* 5,16–22 (tr. Dillon 1990, lightly modified)

¹ α. Τί οὖν ποτε ἦν ἄρα τὸ ποιῆσαν τοὺς παλαιοὺς φιλοσόφους ποικίλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐσχηκέναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδας περὶ τούτου τοῦ Ἀριστοτελικοῦ συγγράμματος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν Κατηγορίας; σχεδὸν γὰρ κατανενόηκα, ὡς οὔτε πλείους ἀντιλογίαι εἰς ἑτέραν ὑπόθεσιν γεγόνασιν οὔτε μείζους ἀγῶνες κεκίνηνται οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς καὶ Πλατωνικοῖς σαλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦσι ταύτας τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους κατηγορίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς γε τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς πρὸς ἑαυτούς, τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῆς διανοίας τάνδρὸς ὑπειληφόσι, τοῖς δ' εὐπορώτερον λύειν οἰομένοις τὰ παρ' ἑτέρων ἀπορούμενα.

“Ὅτι, ὦ φιλομαθέστατε Σέλευκε, περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀπλῶν λέξεων, ὧν αὐταὶ σημαίνουσι, σκοπός ἐστιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι τῆς φιλοσοφίας χρήσιμος, τούτου δὲ ἀρχαὶ αἱ ἀπλᾶι λέξεις καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων σημανόμενα, εἰκότως πολλὴ γέγονεν ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς Ἀριστοτέλη διειληφέναι περὶ αὐτῶν (ed. Busse 1888).

This chapter focuses on criticisms of the *Categories* by the Stoic Athenodorus,² who, I suggest, presupposed that the *Categories* belonged to the rhetorical or grammatical subdivision of logical investigation, and that Aristotle failed in this field by omitting many parts of speech.³ (I also argue that Athenodorus' criticism had nothing to do with a contrast between the four Stoic 'categories' and Aristotle's genera of predication.) Athenodorus' complaint—like Lucius' critique of the *Categories* as an inadequate treatment of ontology—may have helped to inspire Boethus of Sidon's influential formula in response: the *Categories* concerns neither words as such (with Athenodorus) nor beings as such (with Lucius), but rather words qua significant of beings: thus some words, and some beings, will naturally fall outside its scope of reference.

In the course of this chapter, I also try to distinguish different critiques of the *Categories* introduced by Athenodorus and the later Stoic Cornutus.⁴ I argue that we can distinguish a critique of the coherence of the work's division (*διαίρεσις*) into chapters and themes, on the one hand, from a different critique of its division (*διαίρεσις*) of the ten genera of predication, although these two criticisms may be partially conflated in Simplicius' doxography. The latter critique belongs to Athenodorus, but I also suggest that Cornutus may have rejected this line of attack on the *Categories*, and along the way helped to lay the groundwork for Porphyry's later response to Stoic ἀπορίαι.

The Neoplatonic commentators represent 'Athenodorus' and 'Cornutus' as closely linked figures. Athenodorus is a Stoic (Porphyry *in Cat.* 86,20, cf. Dexippus *in Cat.* [in chapter heading] 1,9) who criticizes the *Categories* for failing to analyse its subject (*σκοπός*)

² For the historical tradition on Athenodorus, I rely chiefly upon the review in R. Goulet, *DPhA* (entries 496–8); Moraux 1984: 592–601; B. L. Hijmans, 'Athenodorus on the *Categories* and a pun on Athenodorus', 105–14 in J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk (eds), *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel* (Assen, 1975). For bibliography see *DPhA* entries 496–8, and especially entry 497 on Calvus.

³ That line of criticism, as I proposed earlier, might suggest that Athenodorus' criticisms belonged to a pre-Andronican stage in the *Categories*' history.

⁴ For the following discussion of Cornutus as an historical figure, I am indebted to the entry of Pedro Pablo Fuentes González in R. Goulet, *DPhA* (entry 190); Moraux 1984; and the overviews of Cornutus' allegorical practice in Boys-Stones (2007 and in Boys-Stones 2003b), in G. W. Most, 'Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis' in *ANRW* II.36.3 (1989), 2014–65 (with bibliography) and in A.A. Long, 'Stoic Readings of Homer' = 1996: 71–2. For comprehensive bibliography see Goulet 1994, *DPhA* entry 190.

adequately. Simplicius depicts Cornutus as following (62,25–7) or as amending (128,7; 129,1) the criticisms of Athenodorus. According to Porphyry, their followers (οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον) maintain that the *Categories* treats ‘verbal expressions insofar as they are verbal expressions’ (λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, in *Cat.* 59,5–14),⁵ and that the text omits many classes of verbal expression and therefore fails to treat its proper subject comprehensively (οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν, Simplicius 19,1). Athenodorus in particular is said to have rejected the ‘number’ of ten categories, either as too great⁶ or as too small.⁷

In at least one passage of Simplicius’ commentary (18,22–19,7), Athenodorus and Cornutus are also associated with criticisms of the literary composition of the *Categories*, referring to the text as a poorly organized ‘heap’ of speculations (παντοδαπῶν θεωρημάτων σωρεία) that opens with ‘logic’ (meaning the treatment of homonymy, paronymy, and synonymy) before executing a series of loose disciplinary transitions between theology, ethics, and physics. As I suggest below, it is not entirely clear that this criticism is rightly attributed to both commentators, as the passage in question is disjointed, and I hope to suggest some reasons for peeling the two apart. But modern critics certainly share these misgivings concerning the structural and thematic links of the *Categories*’ first chapter or ‘onymies’ and last five chapters or ‘post-praedicamenta’ with its core chapters.⁸ Simplicius situates this criticism as a failure to recognize the ‘division of chapters according to their natural joints’ (κατ’ ἄρθρα διήρηνται, 18,23). Since Athenodorus and Cornutus are claiming that the parts of the text migrate indiscriminately between logic, ethics, physics, and theology, this imagery may reflect the Stoic application of Plato’s ‘butcher’ analogy (*Phaedrus* 265E) to the articulation of philosophy as

⁵ In this respect they were at variance with Boethus of Sidon, whose alternative account that the *skopos* of the *Categories* was ‘significant sounds insofar as they are significant’ (περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν καθὸ σημαντικά εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, Porphyry in *Cat.* 58,5–6) would win the day in the Neoplatonic tradition. As I suggest below, however, the notion that spoken words are *directly* significant of realities is more Stoic than Aristotelian (*de Int.* 16^a3) or Platonic.

⁶ Hijmans 1975: 108 and following; cf. M. Pohlenz 1984(6), I, 294.

⁷ Moraux 1984: 588–9 and n. 18.

⁸ Contemporary critics who comment on the coherence of the chapters include John Rist (1989a: 94); Frede (1987: 11ff.); Barrington Jones (1972: 117); and Oehler (1984: 37–119). There is no evidence that the Stoics, like some contemporary critics, were led to question the authenticity of the text.

compounded of several disciplines, logic, ethics, and physics (DL 7.40 = SVF 2.41).

The fragments of Athenodorus and Cornutus on the *Categories* raise interesting challenges of interpretation, particularly concerning their motivations for commenting on this treatise in the first place. L. Annaeus Cornutus is known to have made a speciality out of linguistics and rhetoric (Porph. 86,21–2; Simplic. 62,25–6), especially ‘semantics’, and to have written a monograph on a related subject.⁹ Perhaps, then, his commentary upon the *Categories* emerged naturally from his own philosophical interests. But Cornutus apparently criticized some points in Athenodorus’ commentary, enough for his own work’s title to carry the phrase *Against Athenodorus* (Simplicius in *Cat.* 62,25). Athenodorus’ motivation for studying and refuting the *Categories* is more obscure. Indeed, it is not clear which among several Stoic philosophers of that name should be identified with the Athenodorus of the Neoplatonic commentators.¹⁰

Throughout the following discussion, I seek to support several claims about the commentaries of Athenodorus and Cornutus on the *Categories*. I propose that the defence deployed by Porphyry (and later by Dexippus, who follows Porphyry,¹¹ and Simplicius) against Athenodorus’ criticism of the *Categories* was itself constructed within a basically Stoic theoretical framework for understanding the ‘imposition’ of names on things. Athenodorus, I think, sought to define the subject matter of the ten categories in terms of the secondary (linguistic) subdivision of Stoic dialectic.¹² This then facilitated his assessment (as it was subsequently interpreted) that the σκοπός of the work was linguistic expressions-as-such (λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις) and that Aristotle’s analysis fell short of comprehending these. This reading of the *Categories* as pertinent to grammar or rhetoric is likely to have preceded the semantical reading of the *Categories* adopted by Andronicus and, in a more nuanced form, by Boethus. At

⁹ See D. Sedley, ‘Stoic Metaphysics at Rome’ (2005), J. Barnes, ‘Aristotle and Stoic Logic’ (1999), and *Peri Hektōn* in POxy 3649; see Hülser, *Die Fragmente* (1987): 1058–63.

¹⁰ See Griffin, ‘Which Athenodorus commented on Aristotle’s *Categories*?’ (2013b).

¹¹ For the close link between Porphyry and Dexippus, see Hadot 1990.

¹² See below for discussion and further literature, especially Allen 2005 and Long 2005, with Long and Sedley 1987: 31–8. K. Hülser (1987) collects the Stoic fragments on dialectic.

any rate, this direction of influence may seem slightly more plausible than the opposite hypothesis, that Athenodorus responded to an interpretation of the *Categories* as ‘teasing out’ the semantical relation between words and beings with a simple complaint that it failed effectively to carve up words as such, i.e. that it was a poor grammar textbook. In any case, there is some supporting evidence, I think, for dating Athenodorus earlier than is usually supposed, perhaps earlier than Andronicus; but the central historical suggestions that I would like to develop here are that Athenodorus treats the *Categories* as a basically *linguistic* work, that there is no evidence of a direct response to this interpretation by Andronicus, and that Boethus of Sidon will later take some trouble to rebut this view.

Subsequently, a second and distinct Stoicizing source, I will suggest, responded that the ten categories referenced the subject matter of the *primary* subdivision of Stoic dialectic, concerning the so-called sayables or λεκτά, then utilized this analysis to build an entirely different argument against the coherence of the *Categories*. According to this interpretation, the work lacked any unifying σκοπός and the subject matter of the ten categories could even be viewed as ‘theological’ and not linguistic at all. Simplicius appears to combine both arguments at 18,22–19,7, where they can be distinguished based on the structure and sources of the passage and its use of language (see below). I speculate that Cornutus is this second Stoicizing source, and that this difference constitutes the unidentified ‘disagreement’ represented by the title of his commentary *Against Athenodorus and Aristotle* and his occasional objections to Athenodorus’ ‘lexical’ account of certain categories such as the Relative (cf. Simplicius in *Cat.* 187,24–34).

Athenodorus’ line of attack, I believe, involved presuming (or arguing explicitly) that the *Categories* really occupied itself with a linguistic and lexical subject and not with the proper province of logic and dialectic—the λεκτά—and then proceeding to critique the *Categories* as an inadequate treatment of the former. Cornutus may have disagreed, and Herminus, the immediate source of Porphyry’s defence, certainly disagreed (cf. Porph. in *Cat.* 59,17–19). Herminus, here apparently following Boethus, responded by redefining the σκοπός of the *Categories* to clarify that it did not concern the kinds of reality (*pace* Nicostratus and Plotinus) nor λέξεις-as-such (*pace* Athenodorus), but instead concerned things that are said (τῶν λεγομένων, 59,22) and their significance (τὴν ἐκάστου οἰκείαν

σημασίαν, 59,26–7)—in Stoic terms, neither words nor realities, but the ‘sayables’ that somehow mediate between them. The views ascribed to Herminus by Porphyry also build on a narrative about the ‘double imposition’ of names that can be attributed to the Stoics and other Hellenistic schools.¹³

DL 7.43 reports the bipartition of Stoic dialectic into (a) λεκτά and (b) vocalization (cf. 7.62–3 for the precise association with λεκτά):¹⁴

Dialectic [according to the Stoics] falls under two heads: (a) that concerning signifieds and (b) that concerning vocalizations (τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινόμενων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον).

(a) And the signifieds fall under the following headings: concerning φαντασίαι and the λεκτά that arise from these, propositions expressed and their constituent subjects and predicates (κατηγορήματα) and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera or species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms, and fallacies . . .

(b) And the second main head mentioned above as belonging to dialectic is that of vocalization (φωνή), wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, division, and style (Loeb translation).¹⁵

¹³ In treating the Stoic and Platonic sources of the theory, I draw in particular on three recent studies in Frede and Inwood (2005): Allen (2005), Long (2005), and Ebbsen (2005). See also Sedley (1998), Frede (1989:2088–9 and 1987:301–62), and Boys-Stones (2001).

¹⁴ On this bipartition in particular, see Frede 1987: ch. 16 and *Die stoische Logik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1974). On the *lekta*, see S. Bobzien, ‘Stoic Syllogistic’, *OSAP* 1996, ‘Logic’ in the *Cambridge Companion* and in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds) 1999, *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (CUP). On Stoic logic in general, see also K. Döring and T. Ebert (eds) 1993, *Dialektiker und Stoiker: Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner). K. Hülser (1987) collects the Stoic fragments on dialectic more broadly.

¹⁵ Τὴν δὲ διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινόμενων (5) καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινόμενων εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὕφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωματῶν καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ (10) [p. 44] τὰ πράγματα σοφισμάτων ὧν εἶναι ψευδομένους λόγους καὶ ἀληθεύοντας καὶ ἀποφάσκοντας σωρίτας τε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις, ἐλλιπεῖς καὶ ἀπόρους καὶ περαίνοντας καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένους κερατίνας τε καὶ οὐτίδας καὶ θερίζοντας. Εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον (5) περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δέικνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρος, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ

In what follows, I aim to identify and examine the critiques of the *Categories* loosely attributed to the Stoics at large, Athenodorus, and Cornutus, and I attempt to peel at least some of these apart, particularly two criticisms of a ‘division’ (διαίρεσις) in the treatise (see II below). I also suggest, tentatively, that it may have been Cornutus who found some fault with Athenodorus’ interpretation of Aristotle’s *Categories* as a poor shot at (b) the second, grammatical class of dialectic, and that Cornutus himself rightly engaged with the text as a contribution to (a) the primary class of dialectic as well.

I. LIFE AND HISTORY

Athenodorus

The ‘Athenodorus’ who commented on the *Categories* is not precisely identified by Dexippus, Porphyry, or Simplicius. From these sources, we know that he was a ‘Stoic’ (Porph. *in Cat.* 86,20) who wrote his commentary before Cornutus composed a rebuttal to it (Simplicius *in Cat.* 62,26). As Cornutus’ lifetime is well documented, this provides a terminus ante quem for Athenodorus and establishes his activity before the second half of the first century CE. The tradition offers several historical candidates for identification with the Athenodorus described by Porphyry and Simplicius (who name him) and Dexippus (who does not). We know of multiple Athenodori of the Stoic school, all of whom appear to have lived prior to L. Annaeus Cornutus, and at least two of whom hailed from the city of Tarsus. One of the two best-documented candidates is the Athenodorus called ‘Cordylion’, a contemporary of Marcus Cato who became librarian at Pergamon and was accused of bowdlerizing Zeno’s *Republic* (DL 7.34); and the other is Athenodorus ‘Calvus’, identified as the son of ‘Sandon’, a tutor of Augustus and correspondent of Cicero. Strabo (14.5.14) informs us that these two Athenodori are best distinguished by their connections with Cato and Augustus, respectively; the suicide of Cato in 46 BCE establishes a terminus ante quem for the life of Cordylion, while the son of Sandon died in Tarsus at the age of

eighty-two, after advising Augustus well into his reign as emperor (cf. [Lucian], *Macrob.* 21).

Of the son of Sandon, we know a good deal historically due to his association with the young Octavian and the mature Augustus. (A full and descriptive analysis of the assignment of the biographical 'Athenodorus' fragments may be found in Goulet's *Dictionnaire*.) In addition to his candidacy as the author of a commentary against the *Categories*, Athenodorus Calvus is credited with a 'history of his fatherland'; with a work dedicated to Octavia Minor; with a work *περὶ σπουδῆς καὶ παιδείας*; and with a treatment of at least eight books on 'Peripatetics' (e.g. D.L. 9.42.4, although it is also plausible that this is Cordylion's). As the later sources were primarily interested in Calvus' association with Augustus, many anecdotes about his mentorship have come down to us, several of which may carry hints about his ethical doctrine. There is a famous anecdote that he instructed Augustus to recite the alphabet whenever he became angry, before he took any action. Whoever introduced this anecdote may have intended to reflect, and explain retroactively, certain traditions about the historical Augustus' *clementia*. But the anecdote may also reflect some specific interest on the part of Athenodorus in the Stoic doctrine of 'first motions' (on which see my chapters on Andronicus and Boethus).

We know less about the Athenodorus called Cordylion. Strabo mentions him as a Tarsian Stoic alongside Antipater, Archedemus, Nestor, and Athenodorus Calvus (Strabo 14.5.14, a list which bears comparison to the roster of Stoic logicians at DL 7.68).¹⁶ During his tenure as librarian at Pergamon, according to the rhetorician 'Isidorus of Pergamon', Cordylion attempted to excise passages from the *Republic* of Zeno: Isidorus presents the consequences in a rather unflattering light (*φωραθέντος τοῦ Ἀθηνοδώρου καὶ κινδυνεύσαντος*, DL 7.34). By 67 BCE, Cordylion had won renown as a Stoic, and had also developed a reputation for refusing the patronage of kings and politicians (Plutarch, *Cato Minor* 10,1–3). But a determined M. Porcius Cato succeeded in winning him over, and subsequently Athenodorus went to live with Cato in Rome (Plutarch 16,1; Strabo 14.5.14). He lived until 50–46 BCE.

¹⁶ The logician 'Athenodorus' mentioned by Diogenes Laertius 7.68 is also mentioned alongside Antipater and Archedemus.

Richard Goulet (in Goulet 2000) exercises caution in assigning ambiguous fragments to any single Athenodorus, noting the wide and poorly distinguished field of candidates. But there is some consensus among contemporary specialists, including Goulet, Moraux, and Hijmans, that the Athenodorus who commented on the *Categories* is the son of Sandon—chiefly because of Calvus’ late dating, taken in association with the date traditionally assigned to the publication of Andronicus’ edition of Aristotle (see for example Moraux I: 150). Hijmans presents a list of arguments in favour of this identification, and is followed in the main by Goulet. Hijmans narrows the candidates to the two Tarsians: the alternative candidates, such as the ‘Athenodorus of Rhodes’ mentioned by Quintilian (2.17.15), are said to be too obscure, and the earlier student of Zeno and brother of Aratus, ‘Athenodorus of Soli’, is hardly mentioned in the literature.¹⁷ Second, the Athenodorus cited by Diogenes Laertius (7.68) as a logician interested in assertion could well be identified with the son of Sandon (Hijmans 105, citing Zeller’s *History*, 1883: 607). Third, it appears probable that Athenodorus Cordylion died before Andronicus’ edition of the *Categories* was published.

The strength of these arguments in favour of the candidacy of Calvus is perhaps questionable, and I have argued elsewhere¹⁸ that it would be more effective to focus attention upon the ‘Athenodorus’ mentioned by Diogenes Laertius as a pioneering Stoic logician at 7.68, and to seek reasons internal to the text to identify this Athenodorus either with Calvus or with any of the other Athenodori in our record. At 7.68, ‘Athenodorus’ is said to have concerned himself with the distinction between simple and complex assertion, and to have included ‘categorical’ propositions (καταγορευτικά) within the rubric of ‘simple’ propositions (7.69–70). Why might this Athenodorus be relevant to the *Categories* commentaries? He held that a ‘categorical’ assertible (cf. 7.70) such as ‘Dion walks’ is a *simple* assertible. The Stoic critic of the *Categories* mentioned by Dexippus (*in Cat.* 12,3–11) contended that Aristotle, in the *Categories*, fails to account for propositions such as ‘Dion walks’ precisely as *simple*, categorical assertibles. Dexippus’ response is that this is a *complex* proposition and therefore excluded by the scope of the *Categories*. Of course, the

¹⁷ Goulet plainly states that he is unlikely to be the Athenodorus of DL 7.68, and he is not even mentioned by Hijmans.

¹⁸ I argue this in more detail in Griffin 2013b.

notion of logical ‘simplicity’ is fundamental to the *Categories* (e.g. 1^b25), but in quite a different way: the atomic units of the *Categories* are simple *terms*, whereas the atomic units of Stoic logic are simple *propositions*.

That distinction appears to have been played upon for polemical ends by both critics and defenders of the *Categories*, as Dexippus testifies. It may also be suggestive of the motives that led Stoic logicians such as Athenodorus and Cornutus to focus a series of commentaries on the problems raised by the *Categories*. Jonathan Barnes points out, for example, Alexander’s essay on negation (*in A.Pr.* 402,1–405,16), focusing on sentences such as *Καλλίας περιπατεῖ*.¹⁹ For Alexander, a negation-sign modifies the verb *περιπατεῖ* alone; but for his opponents (evidently Stoic logicians), a negation-sign modifies the entire propositional sentence, which should itself be viewed as ‘simple’. It is generally assumed that Alexander’s opponents here are ‘old Stoics’, but Barnes makes a case that ‘they may... have been later Stoics —Athenodorus and Cornutus, say—who determined to defend the old Stoic doctrine against its resuscitated Peripatetic rival’.²⁰ Comparing the passage of Dexippus noted above (and discussed in more detail below) adds some weight, I think, to this association.

For our purposes here, this connection is relevant because it links the professional interests of ‘Athenodorus’ at DL 7.68 with the criticism broadly ascribed to ‘Athenodorus’ by Porphyry, Simplicius, and (implicitly) by Dexippus—namely that the *Categories* omits many types of ‘categorical’ propositions it ought to include. A specific example of this failure—alongside many ‘lexical’ samples such as conjunctions and articles—is its inability to account for simple assertibles among ‘things said without combination’. This, while by no means a decisive link, is at least a textually grounded association between our Athenodorus and the logician of DL 7.68. The connection with the Stoic doctrine about simple assertibles might also offer some motivation for Stoic distrust of the *Categories*’ concept of assertion.

We may also note here that there is limited evidence of Boethus responding directly to Athenodorus, or articulating the kind of strong

¹⁹ Barnes 1999: 41–2; see also J. Barnes, ‘Peripatetic Negations’, *OSAP* 4 (1986), 201–14.

²⁰ Barnes 1999: 43.

and systematic response to his critique that he apparently offered to Lucius; this might weigh against Athenodorus being a very early figure already well established by Boethus' floruit, although this is by no means decisive (particularly given our uncertainty about the chronology of the work of Boethus himself). Whether the Athenodorus of the commentators is most plausibly identified with Calvus, Cordylion, or another candidate, it is clear that the historical record offers little information of value for augmenting and interpreting the remarks on the *Categories* assigned to Athenodorus. The point that I would like to stress here is that, regardless of historical associations, the Athenodorus of DL 7.68 is the only figure of that name in the textual tradition outside the Neoplatonic commentators that we know to have held views about logic that are relevant to, and compatible with, the criticisms ascribed to 'Athenodorus' by Porphyry and Simplicius.

Cornutus

In the case of Cornutus, there is only one candidate whose identification is broadly accepted. He is L. Annaeus Cornutus (whose praenomen is noted in Charisius, *Gramm.* 162,9, and nowhere else). For our purposes in this chapter, this identification will prove especially valuable as it associates Cornutus with the authorship of the *Epidrome*—a work of etymological exegesis (and not of 'allegory', as A.A. Long has stressed)—which demonstrates Cornutus' sensitivity to the Stoic doctrine of linguistic signification, and helps to link the criticisms assigned to 'Athenodorus and Cornutus' with the doctrine of linguistic meaning ascribed broadly to 'the Stoics' by authors such as Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus.

Cornutus is chiefly known to the historical tradition as the tutor of the silver-age poet Persius (*Satura* 5) and as an associate or instructor of the emperor Nero (see Cassius Dio 62.29.2 and following). While Persius' fifth satire is a well-known idealizing portrait of the philosopher, perhaps the most famous anecdote concerning Cornutus is the story relayed by Cassius Dio in the passage cited above:

[Nero] was now making preparations to write an epic narrating all the achievements of the Romans; and even before composing a line of it he began to consider the proper number of books, consulting among others Annaeus Cornutus, who at this time was famed for his learning

(εὐδοκιμοῦντα τότε ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ). This man he came very near to putting to death and did exile to an island because, while some were urging him to write four hundred books, Cornutus said that this was too many and nobody would read them. And when someone objected, 'Yet Chrysippus, whom you praise and imitate (ἐπαινεῖς καὶ ζηλοῖς), composed many more', the other retorted: 'But they are useful to the conduct of men's lives' (ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα χρήσιμα τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ ἐστίν). So Cornutus incurred banishment for this.²¹ (Loeb translation, slightly modified)

Among other things, this anecdote points to its source's respect for Chrysippus, and suggests that Cornutus may have displayed a similar respect. The exile of Cornutus, following this testimony, occurred between 63 and 65 CE. He is known to have published a *Πητορικαὶ τέχναι* and a *πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον*, both of which are mentioned by Porphyry (*in Cat.* 86,20f.) as containing arguments against Aristotle's *Categories*. He also composed a *Περὶ ἐκτῶν* (title in POxy 3649, ed. 1984), a Virgil commentary, and (within the 'secondary' subheading of Stoic dialectic, which overlaps with the discipline that we might call 'grammar') a *de figuris sententiarum*, and an *e enuntiatione vel orthographia*. But his major surviving work is the *De natura deorum* or *Ἐπιδρομή τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν* (θεωρίαν codd.) *παραδεδομένων*, which should likely be categorized as a work of Stoic 'physics'.

G.W. Most has discussed, in general terms, the value of Cornutus' *Epidrome* for the study of Stoic allegory (1989); more recently, George Boys-Stones has explored the historical implications of Cornutus' book (2003) and the function of his text as a work of ethical pedagogy (2007). It is a useful complete text and a remarkable example of schoolbook literature in the first century CE.²² A. D. Nock, who studied this text in detail in 1931,²³ suggested that the *Epidrome*

²¹ παρεσκευάζετο δὲ ὡς καὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων πράξεις ἀπάσας συγγράψων ἐν ἔπαισιν, καὶ περὶ γε τοῦ πλήθους τῶν βιβλίων, πρὶν καὶ ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν συνθεῖναι, ἐσκέψατο, παραλαβὼν ἄλλους τε καὶ Ἀνναῖον Κορνοῦτον εὐδοκιμοῦντα τότε ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ. καὶ αὐτὸν ὀλίγου μὲν καὶ ἀπέκτεινεν, ἐς νῆσον δ' οὖν ἐνέβαλεν, ὅτι τινῶν τετρακόσια ἀξιούντων αὐτὸν βιβλία γράφει, πολλὰ τε αὐτὰ εἶναι ἔφη καὶ μηδὲνα αὐτὰ ἀναγνώσεσθαι, καὶ τινος εἰπόντος 'καὶ μὴν Χρύσιππος, ὃν ἐπαινεῖς καὶ ζηλοῖς, πολλὰ πλείων συνέθηκεν' ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι 'ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα χρήσιμα τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ ἐστίν'. ὁ μὲν οὖν Κορνοῦτος φυγὴν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὤφλεν... (ed. Boissevain 1895)

²² Most 1989.

²³ 'Kornutos', *RE Suppl.* 5 (Stuttgart 1931), 995–1005.

was in pressing need of a new edition.²⁴ Nock established the links of the *Epidrome* with earlier Stoic works, and showed that the text was largely free from interpolation; work on the manuscript tradition in the 1970s established the text on a firmer footing.²⁵

For our purposes, however, the most relevant aspects of Cornutus' *Epidrome* revolve around his attitude towards etymology and the use of language. In his paper on 'Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis', Most explores the *Epidrome* from the perspective of Stoic exegetical practice. Cornutus follows Stoic tradition²⁶ and relies chiefly on etymological analysis in this text;²⁷ like Cleanthes,²⁸ Chrysippus,²⁹ and to a lesser extent Zeno,³⁰ Cornutus frequently explains mythical names and epithets in terms of their alleged etymological derivation. Unlike these earlier Stoics, however, he does not accept a *single* derivation for each word; rather, Cornutus marshals alternatives from the tradition (Most cites 1,1–2,4 and 74,18–21 as examples) and does not characteristically select a single 'correct' option or promulgate a specific science of 'true' etymology.

Cornutus' treatment of the poets, as Gill puts it, presupposes 'the Stoic theory that language has "natural" meaning and is not simply a set of conventional symbols'.³¹ Long also stresses Cornutus' dependence on etymology and the doctrine that names have an 'original meaning'.³² Boys-Stones has persuasively argued, however, that there is no recoverable evidence in the *Epidrome* itself for linguistic

²⁴ Certainly the writer of the *Epidrome* is an interesting case of an author widely appreciated by the ancients but largely panned, especially on matters of style, by the modern commentators. For Aulus Gellius (NA 2.6.1) Cornutus was one of the *grammatici* . . . *haud sane indocti neque ignobiles*; for Macrobius (Sat. 5.19.3) he was *tantus uir, Graecarum etiam doctissimus litterarum*.

²⁵ P. Krafft, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung von Cornutus' Theologia Graeca* = *Bibl. der klass. Altertumswiss. N.F., R. 2, Bd. 57* (Heidelberg, 1975).

²⁶ See Long, cited below, and previously F. Buffière, *Les Mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1956), 60–5; A. Le Boulluec, 'L'allégorie chez les Stoïciens', *Poétique* 23 (1975), 306 and following; J. Whitman, *Allegory. The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique* (Oxford, 1987), 36 and following.

²⁷ Most 1989: 2027; and see *Epid.* 2,4; 2,9; 65,8 for examples of Cornutus' own use of *ἐτυμολογία* and cognates.

²⁸ SVF 1.535, 540–3, and 546–7.

²⁹ SVF 2.1021, 1062–3, and elsewhere.

³⁰ SVF 1.103.

³¹ C. Gill 2003: 38. See also Long and Sedley 1987: 195, Boys-Stones: 49–59.

³² 'Stoic Readings of Homer', 53–4 = *Stoic Studies*, 71–2.

naturalism³³ of the kind that we might derive, for example, from Chrysippus' interpretation of etymology (see for example SVF 2.146 = Origen, *Contra Celsum* 1.24). In any case, we might reasonably suppose that for Cornutus, a true linguistic expression (say, 'Dion is walking') signifies a complete 'sayable' or λέκτον, namely the proposition that Dion is walking, which in turn picks out a state of affairs in the world, namely, the actual Dion in motion. That contrasts against the Aristotelian semantic theory that interposed concepts, or 'affections of the soul', between words and realities (*De Int.* 16^a3).

Stoics took assertibles, or propositions (ἀξιώματα), to be examples of self-complete λεκτά (cf. Sextus, *P.H.* 2.104, *DL* 7.63). One statement of the theory is given by Sextus, *Adv. math.* 8.11–12:

The Stoics say that three things are linked to one another: what is signified, what signifies, and what exists. Of these, what signifies is the sound, e.g. the sound 'Dion'; what is signified is the very thing which is suggested by the sound and which we apprehend to subsist with our thought (the barbarians do not understand although they hear the sound); and what exists is the external object, such as Dion himself. Of these things two are bodies, namely the sound and what exists, one is not a body, namely the thing signified, the λεκτόν, which also is true or false.³⁴ (tr. Mueller 1978)

We understand from the Neoplatonist commentators, including Porphyry (*in Cat.* 59,10–14) and Simplicius (18,28–19,1), that Athenodorus and Cornutus adopted the view that the *Categories* concerned 'linguistic expressions as such' (λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις). From the standpoint of such an 'orthodox' Stoic theory of dialectic, the locution λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις would imply that the *Categories* concerned the secondary, purely 'grammatical' aspect of dialectic, not the λεκτά or 'sayables' that are represented by words. (A good example of the

³³ G. Boys-Stones, 'The Stoics' Two Types of Allegory', in Boys-Stones (2003a), 189–216. I am grateful to Boys-Stones for conversations that helped me to temper my previous assumption of such naturalism in the text.

³⁴ καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαίνον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ὃν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἷον τὴν Δίω, σημαίνον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς δηλούμενον καὶ οὗ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρφυσισταμένῳ διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐπαίονσι καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες, τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίω. τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνήν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἐν δὲ ἀσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαίνον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτόν, ὅπερ ἀληθές τε γίνεται ἢ ψεῦδος (eds Mau and Mutschmann 1914).

kinds of subjects falling under the first heading is the work list of Chrysippus at DL 7.192, where a number of works that we might call ‘grammatical’ are headed *περὶ τὰς λέξεις*.) This distinction enabled the Stoics to critique the *Categories* as an almost absurdly deficient treatment of verbal expressions as such, in much the same way as other sources such as Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus, who interpreted its subject matter as ontological, would question its comprehensiveness as a treatment of being.

The response of Porphyry to this critique, apparently following Boethus of Sidon and the Aristotelian Herminus (cf. Porph. 59,16), is that the true subject of the *Categories* is ‘simple significant vocalizations, *insofar as they are significant of realities*’ (*περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικάί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων*). Porphyry, as we shall see below, justifies this response in terms of a distinction between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ impositions of verbal expressions (58,30–59,2). His distinction in fact matches perfectly with the twofold framework ascribed to ‘the Stoics’ by Diogenes and Sextus, with his ‘primary imposition’ corresponding to the use of *λεκτά*.

Yet Porphyry ridicules Athenodorus and Cornutus, both Stoics with professional interest in dialectic, for simply failing to recognize this division at work in the *Categories*. He suggests that Athenodorus and Cornutus are actually ignorant of it:

Q. Has everyone who has written about the *Categories* been aware of this distinction? A. Certainly not. Otherwise there would not have been those . . . who attacked the work and rejected the division of categories as being insufficiently comprehensive . . . the followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus, who took the objects of the investigation to be expressions qua expressions.³⁵ (59,5–14, tr. Strange 1992)

Athenodorus and Cornutus, as Porphyry read them, may not have mentioned the distinction of expressions-as-significant from expressions-in-themselves, or may have ignored it willfully. But they were

³⁵ {E.} Ἄρα οὖν τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην πάντες ἔγνωσαν οἱ περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν τι γράψαντες; {A.} Οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ὄντων προηγουμένως ὦντο ἐνταῦθα πραγματευέσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντέλεγον ἀθετοῦντες αὐτῶν τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς πολλὰ παριείσαν καὶ μὴ περιλαμβάνουσιν ἢ καὶ πάλιν πλεονάζουσιν. {E.} Τίνες εἰσὶν οὗτοι; {A.} Οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον οἱ τὰ ζητούμενα περὶ τῶν λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, οἷα τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικά καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, (διαφοραὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις εἰσὶ) τὰ τοιαῦτα οὖν προφέροντες καὶ ποίας ἐστὶ κατηγορίας ἀποροῦντες καὶ μὴ εὗρισκοντες ἑλλιπῆ φασιν εἶναι τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς ἂν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης (ed. Bodēüs 2008).

surely sensitive to the difference, despite Porphyry's allegation that Athenodorus and Cornutus were simply 'ignorant' of it (τὴν διαφορὰν . . . ἔγνωσαν . . . οὐδαμῶς, 59,3–5). Based on our knowledge of their work, not least of Cornutus' *Epidrome*, it is very unlikely that Athenodorus and Cornutus were simply unaware or naively disinterested in the Stoic division of dialectic into primary and secondary aspects.³⁶ Rather, Athenodorus and Cornutus must have intentionally associated the *Categories* with the secondary or purely verbal species of Stoic dialectic, but left that presumption sufficiently implicit or vague for Porphyry to take advantage of it to score his point in reply. More specifically, Athenodorus (for his particular criticism see Simplicius in *Cat.* 62,25)—or both Athenodorus and Cornutus—must have analysed the *first* chapter of the *Categories* as a purely linguistic or 'secondary' treatment of 'onymies' (18,22–19,7), and then proceeded to paint the entire text with the same brush.

The semantic assumptions that underlie Porphyry's defence against Athenodorus, so far as they are stated explicitly, are simple:

[Aristotle] adopted the word [κατηγορία], and chose to call those utterances in which significant expressions are applied to things 'predications' (κατηγορίαι). Hence whenever a simple significant expression is employed and said of what it signifies, this is called a κατηγορία. For example, this stone I am pointing at . . . is a thing, and when we say about it, 'This is a stone', the expression 'stone' is a κατηγορία, for it signifies that sort of thing, and is uttered about the thing we are pointing at, the stone. So too in other cases.³⁷ (56,6–13, tr. Strange 1992)

There is nothing especially 'Aristotelian' about the semantics here (in that the underlying theory does not allude, say, to the opening of the *De Interpretatione*, featuring παθήματα of the soul mediating between

³⁶ Cornutus' use of etymology in the *Epidrome*, and the titles of his other works in grammar, suggest that he was sensitive to—and, in his pedagogical practice, a subscriber to—this differentiation. Moreover, as I noted above, it appears probable that the commentators' Athenodorus (regardless of his historical identity) is also the logician concerned with simple significant propositions at Diogenes Laertius 7.68; it is highly unlikely that his argumentation regarding the *skopos* of the *Categories* was as unsophisticated as Porphyry suggests.

³⁷ λαβὼν αὐτὸς τὰς τῶν λέξεων τῶν σημαντικῶν κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀγορεύσεις κατηγορίας προσείπεν. ὥστε πᾶσα ἀπλή λέξις σημαντικὴ, ὅταν καθ' οὗ σημαίνεται πράγματος ἀγορευθῇ τε καὶ λεχθῇ, λέγεται κατηγορία, οἷον ὄντος πράγματος τοῦδε τοῦ δεικνυμένου λίθου, οὗ ἀπτόμεθα ἢ ὃ βλέπομεν, ὅταν εἴπωμεν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὅτι τότε λίθος ἐστίν, ἢ λίθος λέξις κατηγορία ἐστὶ· σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦνδε πράγμα καὶ ἀγορεύεται κατὰ τοῦ δεικνυμένου πράγματος λίθου. καὶ οὕτω ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων (ed. Bodéüs 2008).

verbal expressions and real things). As the rest of Porphyry's account shows, he relies here more on a theory of the 'imposition' of names on things that is at home in Stoic and Epicurean semantics (though there is also nothing uniquely Stoic or Epicurean here).³⁸

II. SOURCES FOR TWO διαίρεσεις IN THE CATEGORIES

We turn now to the direct sources for the commentaries of Athenodorus and Cornutus on the *Categories* of Aristotle. The main sources are the commentaries of Porphyry, Dexippus, and Simplicius. Dexippus 11,1–12,31 likely distils Porphyry's actual reply to Athenodorus and Cornutus in *Ad Gedalium*. The early passages in Simplicius (such as in *Cat.* 18,22–19,7) may represent Porphyry's opening discussion of Athenodorus and Cornutus, and specifically his effort to situate their criticisms in the context of the *skopos* of the *Categories*, represented also in the commentary *By Question and Answer*.

Porphyry, Dexippus, and Simplicius ascribe various critical remarks to Athenodorus, to Cornutus, or to both throughout the text of their commentaries *On the Categories*. The most widely reported group of comments relates to 'the division' or διαίρεσις. However, as I suggest below, διαίρεσις is an ambiguous term that was applied to two *distinct* lines of criticism, which are preserved in two (possibly independent) traditions but are amalgamated by Simplicius

³⁸ On the omission of concepts in the shorter commentary, which may be explained by its introductory nature, see for example Hoffmann 1987: 68–90 and Ebbesen 1990: 147. In Griffin 2012a, I suggest that the difference could also arise from different layers in the sources: the 'conceptless' account could derive from Andronicus, who would have omitted *De Interpretatione* as a guide to Aristotelian semantics at any rate (and may instead have deployed Hellenistic resources like the theories of 'imposition' rooted in Plato's *Cratylus*), whereas the version that includes concepts might belong to Boethus of Sidon's critique of Andronicus.

A further possible example of the 'Stoic' context of the defence against Athenodorus' criticisms is found in Dexippus (discussed below), where his example of the conjunction as a verbal expression omitted by Aristotle is countered by showing that the conjunction is 'co-significant of a break in thought' (ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοίας). This 'break in thought' is a 'syntactic' reality signified by a λεκτόν, and the terminology is Chrysippean (cf. *SVF* 2.184 and see also Sextus *PH* 2.176,5 and for the grammatical usage Apollonius Dyscolus *De adv.* 121,3 and *De const.* 402,2). But I would not press this too far.

in one passage. It is critical to distinguish (I.1) criticisms of the διαίρεσεις of the ten categories from (I.2) criticisms of the διαίρεσεις of the *Categories as a text* into three major sections (namely the onymies, predicables, and post-praedicamenta). The first criticism is reliably attributed to Athenodorus and Cornutus, but it is less clear that they are the source of the second. The word διαίρεσις appears to have been used (though possibly later) in both cases.

(1) The first line of criticism is associated with a definition of the σκοπός as ‘verbal expressions qua verbal expressions’, and is rebutted by Porphyry (as reported by Porphyry himself in the QA commentary, and also by Dexippus and Simplicius). According to this criticism, the ‘division’ of ten categories is unable to comprehend the entirety of significant verbal expression (τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὥς ἂν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης, Porphyry 59,14; τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὥς οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν, Simplicius 18,30; cf. Simplicius 62,26).

(2) The second line of criticism asserts the structural incoherence of the *Categories*, showing that it combines the disciplines of logic, physics, ethics, and theology, and perhaps lacks any coherent σκοπός; this criticism is rebutted by another source (likely Iamblichus, but possibly Porphyry in the lost commentary *Ad Gedalium*). This criticism focuses on the division of chapter headings (εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου, Simplicius 18,22), i.e. the tripartition of the major sections into three (εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελεῖν, τριμερὲς τὸ βιβλίον, Simplicius 19,9). This line of criticism is not ascribed with absolute certainty to both Athenodorus and Cornutus, as the central citation of their names might not be associated with the entire passage.

Simplicius generally distinguishes these two lines of criticism: for example, (1) is represented alone at 62,26 and 359,1. But some confusion arises from a single passage where Simplicius amalgamates both criticisms (18,22–19,9). Here Simplicius uses διαίρεσις in three different senses, referring first to the chapter division (εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως, 18,22), then to the tenfold division of categories, quoting Porphyry silently (18,27 and 18,30–19,1), and finally to the internal division of the onymies (διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων, 19,1), before returning to the chapter division at 19,9 (εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελεῖν, τριμερὲς τὸ βιβλίον). As I suggest below, this ambiguity arises from the combination of at least two sources in this passage.

Athenodorus and Cornutus on the ‘Division’ of the Ten Categories

Porphyry

The first main text is found in Porphyry’s surviving commentary *By Question and Answer*, where he expresses his position (58,3–7) in the context of a passage justifying the title ‘Categories’. (This text has also been treated above.)

The subject of this book is the primary imposition of expressions (περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων), which is used for communicating about things (τῶν πραγμάτων). For it concerns *simple significant words insofar as they signify things* (καθὸ σημαντικά ἐῖσι τῶν πραγμάτων) —not however as they differ from one another in number, but as differing in genus . . . (12) Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae, the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so classified. Thus predications (κατηγορίαι) are said to be ten in genus, just as beings themselves are ten in genus.³⁹ (tr. Strange 1992)

Porphyry stresses that Aristotle is concerned, in the *Categories*, to describe the *primary* imposition of expressions, and not the *secondary* imposition of expressions. He goes on to reiterate this point and to contrast the intention of the *De Interpretatione*:

Q. But if he here divides significant words into ten genera, why is it that in *On Interpretation* he divides them into two, namely nouns and verbs (εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα)? A. Because here he is discussing the *primary* imposition of expressions upon things (περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων), while in *On Interpretation* he is discussing their *secondary* imposition (περὶ τῆς δευτέρας), which is no

³⁹ ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, (5) καθὸ σημαντικά ἐῖσι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλήλων διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος· ἀπειρα μὲν<γὰρ> σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμὸν. ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς κατὰ ἀριθμὸν πρόκειται διελθεῖν λέξεις· ἐκάστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν<ἐν> σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων· ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ πολλὰ ἔστιν ἐν ὄντα τῷ εἶδει ἢ τῷ γένει, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων (10) καὶ τῶν σημαίνουσάν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὗρηται περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι. εἰς δέκα τοίνυν γενικὰς διαφοράς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐταὶ περιληφθεῖσαι. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ γένει δηλονότι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει (ed. Bodéüs 2008).

longer concerned with expressions that signify things qua signifying them, but rather with expressions that signify types of words, qua being of such types (περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων τοῦ τύπου τῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ τύποι εἰσὶ τοιούτων). For being a noun or a verb is a type of word, and whether an expression has its proper use (τὸ κυρίαν) or is metaphorical (μεταφορικὴν) or is in some other way figuratively used (ἄλλως τροπικὴν) also belongs to the second sort of inquiry about words, not to the first.⁴⁰ (58,30–59,2, tr. Strange 1992)

The theory of two sequential *θέσεις* of language had been formulated in the Hellenistic schools,⁴¹ and within the context of a broader debate, building around central passages in Plato's *Cratylus* (e.g. 421C–6C),⁴² about whether names were imposed by nature (φύσει) or by *θέσις* in the sense of *convention*.⁴³ In the Stoa, at least since Chrysippus,⁴⁴ it had been maintained that primary vocalizations signified πράγματα 'by nature'; so Origen informs us in a widely cited passage of the *Contra Celsum* (φύσει μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα: *Cels.* 1.24 = SVF 2.146 = Hülser FDS fr. 643).⁴⁵

⁴⁰ {E.} Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐνθάδε εἰς δέκα γένη διεῖλεν τὰς σημαντικὰς φωνάς, (30) πῶς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας εἰς δύο, εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα; {A.} Ὅτι ἐνθάδε μὲν περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας περὶ τῆς δευτέρας, ἣ οὐκέτι ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων τῶν πραγμάτων, καθὸ εἰσι τούτων σημαντικαί, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων τοῦ τύπου τῶν (35) φωνῶν, καθὸ τύποι εἰσὶ τοιούτων. τύπος γὰρ τῆς φωνῆς τὸ εἶναι ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα. καὶ τὸ κυρίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν ἢ μεταφορικὴν ἢ ἄλλως [p. 59] τροπικὴν τῆς δευτέρας ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν φωνῶν πραγματείας καὶ οὐ τῆς πρώτης (ed. Bodēus 2008).

⁴¹ In treating the Stoic and Platonic sources of the theory, I draw in particular on three studies in Frede and Inwood 2005: Allen 2005, Long 2005, and Ebbesen 2005; Griffin 2012a is a more detailed treatment of my views here. See also Sedley 1998, Frede 1989: 2088–9 and 1987: 301–62, and Boys-Stones 2001.

⁴² On the relevance of the *Cratylus* see Long 2005 and Sedley 1998. The first segment of this part of the *Cratylus* seems to discuss Porphyry's 'first imposition', but the second segment, where Socrates begins to discuss the theory of language, corresponds to Porphyry's 'second imposition'. For the first imposition, see for example τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων, 424B; πρώτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία, 423E.

⁴³ For this formulation of the question, see Sextus, *Adv. Math.* 1.143–4, cf. 37; *Adv. Math.* 11.241–2; *P.H.* 3.267–8; Aulus Gellius 10.4; Simplicius in *Cat.* 40.6 and 187,7; and Origen, *Exh. Mart.* 46.

⁴⁴ Chrysippus had already discussed the *θέσις* τῶν ὀνομάτων: see Eusebius, *PE* 6.8.1–10 = SVF 2.914; the phrase, as Allen 2005:18 argues from 6.8.11–24, seems to be Chrysippus' own.

⁴⁵ Platonists seem to have adopted this view, presumably (as in late antiquity) as an exegesis of the *Cratylus*. See Alcinoüs *Intr.* ch. 6; Proclus in *Crat.* 16.18 and 18.1–4 Pasquali; Stephanus in *Int.* 9,19–22 and 10,7; and see *Cratylus* 390A. The Epicureans

For the Stoics, as for Porphyry, the primary *θέσις* ‘by nature’ transpired in human prehistory.⁴⁶

Boethus of Sidon and Herminus are later cited as originators of this assessment, or at any rate as ‘agreeing’ with the line of interpretation Porphyry has just laid out (*καὶ Βόηθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας εἴρηκεν ταῦτα καὶ Ἑρμῖνος βραχέως*, 59,17–18). But Porphyry reports that several commentators took a different approach (59,5–14), exactly by *failing* to distinguish the primary from the secondary imposition of expressions upon things:

The followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus . . . took the objects of the investigation to be expressions qua expressions, that is, expressions as used properly and figuratively (*τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικὰ*) and so forth, for these are differentiae of expressions qua expressions. Fixing upon these, they raised the question of what category they belonged to, and finding none, they complained that the division (*διαίρεσις*) was incomplete, since it fails to include every sort of significant expression. (tr. Strange 1992)⁴⁷

For a detailed treatment of the arguments offered by Athenodorus and Cornutus to support this criticism, we must turn to Simplicius (who names them explicitly) and Dexippus (who does not).

Simplicius

Simplicius uses a similar manner of introducing Athenodorus and Cornutus, situating their arguments in the context of a debate regarding the *skopos* of the text. Porphyry certainly lies behind Simplicius’ treatment, but it is not entirely clear whether Simplicius is primarily reliant on the *Ad Gegalium*, or had direct access (as Strange suggests) to the commentary *By Question and Answer*, or has access to Porphyry via Iamblichus. In the next section, I will

also seem to have presented a narrative in which the primordial imposition of language was ‘natural’, although the sense was very different than that applied by the Stoics; perhaps what evolved naturally, like the faculty of speech, did so without ‘purpose’, until we found a use for it. See Lucretius 4.824, and Epic. *Ep. Hdt.* 75.

⁴⁶ With references above, see Frede (1989:2088–9) on Stoic ‘prehistory’.

⁴⁷ *Οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον οἱ τὰ ζητούμενα περὶ τῶν (10) λέξεων καθὼς λέξεις, οἷα τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικὰ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, (διαφοραὶ γὰρ ἐστί λέξεων καθὼς λέξεις εἰσὶ) τὰ τοιαῦτα οὖν προφέροντες καὶ ποίας ἐστὶ κατηγορίας ἀποροῦντες καὶ μὴ εὗρίσκοντες ἄλλω φασιν εἶναι τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὥς ἂν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν περιλαμβανομένης* (ed. Bodēüs 2008).

discuss these questions in the broader context of the Simplician passage. Here we quote his citation of Porphyry (Simplicius in *Cat.* 18,26–19,1) directly:

What is more, some contradict Aristotle and reject his division (ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν): of these, some claim that it is uselessly redundant, others that it omits many things (οἱ δὲ ὡς πολλὰ παρείσαν), like Athenodorus and Cornutus, who believe that the σκοπός concerns expressions insofar as they are expressions. They bring forward many expressions as examples, some literal (κυρίας), some figurative (τροπικός), and thereby think they refute the division, since it has not included all possible expressions.⁴⁸ (tr. Chase 2003)

The survey of Athenodorus' and Cornutus' views paraphrases Porphyry, as we find by comparing the corresponding passage from his commentary *By Question and Answer*.⁴⁹

Porphyry 59,10–14	Simplicius 18,28–19,1
Οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον οἱ τὰ ζητούμενα περὶ τῶν <u>λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις</u> , οἷα <u>τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικά</u> καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα . . . <u>ὡς ἂν μὴ πάσης φωνῆς</u> <u>σημαντικῆς εἰς αὐτὴν</u> <u>περιλαμβανομένης . . .</u>	Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος, οἷτινες περὶ <u>λέξεων</u> οἰόμενοι τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι καθὸ <u>λέξεις</u> εἰσὶν, πολλὰς λέξεις προβάλλοντες <u>τὰς</u> <u>μὲν κυρίας, τὰς δὲ τροπικάς</u> , ἐλέγχων οἷονται τὴν διαίρεσιν . . . <u>ὡς οὐ πάσας τὰς</u> <u>λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν . . .</u>

Previously at 17,3–7, Simplicius claimed to recite the ‘very words’ of Porphyry, but gave a version slightly different in wording from our text of the commentary by *Question and Answer*. Similarly here at 18,28–19,1, Simplicius delivers a nearly verbatim citation of Porphyry by *Question and Answer*. This may suggest either that he is citing our commentary from memory, or via an intermediary (such as

⁴⁸ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτῷ τινες ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν, οἱ μὲν ὡς πλεονάζουσιν μάτην, οἱ δὲ ὡς πολλὰ παρείσαν ὥσπερ Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος, οἷτινες περὶ λέξεων οἰόμενοι τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι καθὸ λέξεις εἰσὶν, πολλὰς λέξεις προβάλλοντες τὰς μὲν κυρίας, τὰς δὲ τροπικάς, ἐλέγχων οἷονται τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

⁴⁹ Notably, this comparison also suggests that the locution οἱ περὶ X was not read as historically or biographically significant by the commentators, for Simplicius (or Iamblichus before him) has simply reduced Porphyry's Οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον to Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος.

Iamblichus), or that he is citing the *Ad Gedalium*, which might put the same argument in slightly different words.

Simplicius expands substantially on this criticism of the ‘division’ later in his analysis, at 62,25 and following:

Many others disputed [the division into ten], denouncing immediately the division into such a multitude; as did Athenodorus in his book which, although it was entitled *Against Aristotle’s Categories*, only investigated the division into such a multitude. Both Cornutus, moreover, in the work he entitled *Against Athenodorus and Aristotle*, and Lucius and Nicostratus, and their followers spoke out against the division, as they did against practically everything else.⁵⁰

In the next lines, Simplicius proposes to ‘take up the opposing arguments in definite terms, making a threefold distinction of them: for some reproach the division with being excessive, others criticize it as being deficient; and a third group is constituted by those who consider that some genera have been introduced in the place of others’ (62,30–1). He proceeds to sketch these three groups of criticism as follows:

1. 63,4–64,12. *Those who accuse Aristotle of excess.* (i) Some [unnamed] argue that Aristotle should have combined ποιεῖν and πάσχειν under a single heading, κινεῖσθαι. (ii) Others [Xenocrates and Andronicus] include the ten categories under two: καθ’ αὐτό and πρὸς τί; others still under substance and accident.
2. 64,13–66,15. *Those who accuse Aristotle of deficiency.* (i) The followers of Nicostratus assert that Aristotle, if he distinguished ποιεῖν from πάσχειν, should have distinguished ἔχεισθαι from ἔχειν as well. (ii) The followers of Lucius ask why he omitted conjunctions and articles, which are significant λέξεις [Simplicius answers that they ‘co-signify’, συσσημαίνουσιν] and similarly negations, privations, the moods of verbs, and the monad and the point.

⁵⁰ Ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀμφεσβήτησαν, αὐτόθεν κατηγοροῦντες τῆς εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαιρέσεως, ὥσπερ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὰς (25) Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν Κατηγορίας ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ βιβλίῳ, μόνην δὲ τὴν εἰς τοσοῦτον πλήθος διαίρεσιν ἐξετάζοντι. καὶ Κορνήλιος δὲ ἐν οἷς Πρὸς Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐπέγραψεν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον δὲ καὶ τὸν Νικόστρατον, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα σχεδόν, οὕτως καὶ πρὸς τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀντειρήκασιν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

3. 66,16–31. *Those who accuse Aristotle of substitution* (ἀνταλλαγή). They contend that κίνησις should be taken up in place of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν.

Immediately after this third group is described, Simplicius introduces ‘the Stoics’ (οἱ δέ γε Στωικοί):

4. 66,32–67,9. ‘The Stoics’ believe that the number of primary genera should be ‘reduced’ (εἰς ἐλάττωνα συστέλλειν) to four, some of which they take over in an altered form (ὑπελλαγμένα).

Simplicius proceeds (67,9–69,1) to describe how one should go about responding to these critics, and in particular how the tenfold division is validated by Iamblichus and by ‘Archytas’.

Before examining this grouping of critics as a whole, it is worth noting that Simplicius’ discussion of ‘the Stoics’ does not seem to continue his third class.⁵¹ If anything, the desire of ‘the Stoics’ to ‘reduce’ the number of categories would seem to belong naturally to Simplicius’ first class of critics, but they are cited out of order and do not really belong to the classification at all. Thus it seems likely that Simplicius has finished with his source for the threefold division of critics, and is now introducing a different source. There is also no reason whatsoever to assume that οἱ Στωικοί are specifically οἱ περὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Κορνοῦτον; rather, the position associated with ‘the Stoics’ here is a position generically associated with the Stoic school. This new source for ‘the Stoics’ is quite possibly not a Stoic at all; it could well be a third-hand report of Stoic orthodoxy, coupled with a third-hand observation about how the Stoic school also propounded a doctrine about ‘the number of primary genera’ (τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμὸν, 66,32), which they divided into four. This passage does not demonstrate that any particular Stoic actually arrived at this view in the course of criticizing Aristotle’s *Categories*, or used it as an instrument to criticize Aristotle with. Thus there is no reason to deduce *from this passage* that Athenodorus’ criticism of ‘the division into such a multitude’ (62,25) actually referred to an *excessive* number of categories, viz. ten instead of four;⁵² all the other evidence suggests

⁵¹ It is true that they alter (ὑπελλαγμένα) Aristotle’s categories, but the main ‘action’ recommended by οἱ Στωικοί is εἰς ἐλάττωνα συστέλλειν, not just substitution.

⁵² Indeed, there is no evidence that the Stoics’ fourfold division of primary genera came into the commentaries of Athenodorus and Cornutus at all; if they had, one would hope that Simplicius and his sources would tell us something about that.

that Athenodorus criticized the ten categories as somehow deficient in number (namely, because they failed to encompass many parts of speech).

But this does not help us to identify any one of Simplicius' three main classes of critics with Athenodorus or with Cornutus. As their names were cited explicitly at the outset of the tripartition, we should expect to find their views represented by one of the three groups. Curiously, all three of Simplicius' groups launch their argument from a shared and rather specific *ἀπορία*: why did Aristotle not amalgamate *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν* into a single category, 'change'? The first group introduces this complaint (he should have amalgamated them); the second group, initially identified as the 'Nicostratans', elaborates upon it (he is inconsistent in failing to amalgamate *ποιεῖν* with *πάσχειν* because he does not distinguish *εἶχειν* and *εἴχεσθαι*); and the third group essentially repeats the question of the first with a trivial change of language (he should amalgamate *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν* under *κίνησις*). A number of seemingly independent commentators are classed under this tripartition for pedagogical convenience, including Xenocrates and Andronicus (who seem to have an entirely unrelated reason for reducing the categories to two, substance and accident) and Lucius (who points out various *λέξεις* that Aristotle has omitted, such as conjunctions).

I will return below to the question why all three lines of criticism begin from the distinction of *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν*. First, however, we should try to identify where within the tripartition of positions Athenodorus or Cornutus can be identified. If no names were provided, we would almost certainly assign to Athenodorus and Cornutus the view of the second group, expounded from 64,18–65,13 and explicitly assigned to 'the Lucians'. (1) First, this position holds that the *Categories* is concerned with significant *λέξεις*; we are told by Porphyry and by Simplicius that this was the position of Athenodorus and Cornutus, whereas Lucius elsewhere seems to maintain the incompatible view that the *Categories* is concerned with the genera of being, an apparent inconsistency for which he has even been

Instead, I think that Athenodorus introduced an argument, as Porphyry and Simplicius seem to make clear, that the number of categories was *inadequate* to encompass the entirety of verbal expression.

reproached.⁵³ (2) Secondly, the examples provided for the omitted λέξεις are just the examples supposedly offered by Athenodorus and Cornutus, such as conjunctions, articles, and so on. (3) Thirdly, the unusual verb συσσημαίνουσιν used here and first introduced by Plotinus in a related passage (*Enn.* 6.1.5,14) is also found in the answering passage of Dexippus (32,18–29); but it is introduced by Dexippus at 11,11, in a section headed ‘How not to be led astray by the difficulties raised by the Stoics’⁵⁴ and associated with the comments ascribed to Athenodorus and Cornutus by Porphyry and indeed by Simplicius himself. (4) Fourthly, the actual structure of Simplicius’ discussion is echoed in Dexippus 32,18–29, where Dexippus’ response is that the use of conjunctions is ‘not a *primary*, but a *secondary*, use of language’; so too Simplicius 64,20 (οὐτε προηγουμένη αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ σημασία, ἀλλὰ συσσημαίνουσιν). To this language compare Porphyry 58,30 and following (περὶ τῆς προηγουμένης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον): while it is unclear to whom Porphyry is replying in this portion of the QA commentary, it is ‘the followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus’ upon whom he next comments by name (59,10 and following), including them among those who can be refuted by this distinction. Porphyry’s defence is specifically levelled against their description of the σκοπός as λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις.⁵⁵

Despite these considerations that might lead us to credit Athenodorus with this complaint, Simplicius ascribes it to οἱ περὶ τὸν Δούκιον. Yet there are additional curiosities associated with the text. (5) Fifthly, Lucius is unusually named *apart* from Nicostratus (see ch. 4), and most oddly, he is here named immediately *after* Nicostratus *with a differing view*. Simplicius never elsewhere sets ‘Lucius’ and ‘Nicostratus’ against one another in this way, nor in this order. (6) Sixthly, immediately after the ascription to Lucius, but

⁵³ Moraux suggests that Lucius is in fact being inconsistent (1984: 532 f.) See also Chase 2003, n. ad loc.

⁵⁴ The chapter headings, of course, are almost certainly not by Dexippus. But J. Dillon, in his translation, comments that they are reasonably accurate, and in this case the heading is a good guide to the associations assigned by the later tradition to this section.

⁵⁵ Porphyry observes that this defence also applies to ‘those who take the investigation to be primarily about the genera of being’ (59,5)—but if that is meant to apply to the ‘Lucians’, it is all the stranger for Simplicius to assert, in a corresponding passage, that Lucius believes the *Categories* to be about *lexeis* and not about *genē tōn ontōn* at all.

before the Porphyrian answer that is elsewhere associated with the Stoics, the text of Simplicius has a lacuna,⁵⁶ which likely contained just the beginning of the argument distinguishing the ‘primary’ meaning of some λέξεις from the ‘co-signification’ of others, as preserved in Dexippus. The lacuna certainly need not cast doubt on the soundness of the surrounding text. It does show, however, that there may be problems in the manuscript tradition associated with the ascription to Lucius, and it is a significant coincidence that the lacuna intervenes right between that ascription and the argument elsewhere associated with Athenodorus and Cornutus. Moreover, in the answering passage of Porphyry (86,20–32), where a similar tripartition of views is expressed, *only* Athenodorus and Cornutus are mentioned explicitly.

Coupling (5) the peculiarity of Lucius’ appearance ‘opposite’ Nicostratus and (6) the uncertainty of the surrounding manuscript tradition with (1) the incompatibility of the position ascribed to Lucius at 64,18–65,13 with his views on the *skopos* as recorded elsewhere, and considering the positive identification of the cited view with that elsewhere accorded to Athenodorus and Cornutus, perhaps we could suggest that the name of either Athenodorus or Cornutus, or both, was originally present alongside, or in place of, or just after, the name of Lucius at 64,18. It is certainly possible that several of the views expressed here—especially those on the monad and the point (which open a new argument about the distinction of intelligible from sensible reality from 65,13 onwards)—should be credited to Lucius, although Dexippus deals with them under the same heading. But those preceding questions which focus on the inadequacy of the ten categories to comprehend all *lexeis*, and which are rebutted by the Porphyrian tradition with reference to the distinction of ‘primary’ from ‘secondary’ impositions of verbal expressions, should probably be ascribed to Athenodorus or to Athenodorus and Cornutus.

Dexippus

Dexippus *in Cat.* 11,7–12 and the related passage 32,18–29 are relevant in exploring the attribution of Simplicius 64,18–65,13.

⁵⁶ As Chase 2003 observes, this lacuna was already present in the edition used by Moerbeke.

Dexippus tackles the (evidently Stoic) argument that the *Categories* should include conjunctions among other ‘grammatical’ elements by remarking that the *Categories* considers only what is significant—and conjunctions are ‘co-significant’:

If we take an element of speech which is non-significant in itself, such as *blityri*, or if something is significant by reference to something else, as in the case of so-called ‘pronouns’...or if a term is co-significant (συσσημαντικόν) with something else, as is the case with articles and conjunctions (τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι), in no way would it be proper to include these among the predicates (ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις).⁵⁷ (Dexippus in *Cat.* 11,7–12, tr. Dillon 1990)

This term ‘co-significant’ (συσσημαντικόν) is unusual. We first encounter it in Plotinus’ treatment of the categories (*Enn.* 6.1.5,14), where voice is divided into the impact on air and the movement, one of which signifies while the other ‘co-signifies’. It recurs later in Dexippus at 32,18–29, the passage mirroring the text of Simplicius ascribed to Lucius above (which, I have argued, belongs rather to Athenodorus). Here we are given much more detail about the reason *why* conjunctions are such ‘co-signifiers’—they specifically co-signify ‘breaks in thought’ (συσσημαίνουσι τὸ ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοίας, 32,22), but on their own they mean nothing. The view that conjunctions ‘co-signify breaks in thought’ (συσσημαίνουσι τὸ ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοίας) is Stoic; ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοίας is a λεκτόν and the terminology is Chrysippean (cf. SVF 2.184 and see also Sextus *PH* 2.176,5 and for the grammatical usage Apollonius Dyscolus *De adv.* 121,3 and *De const.* 402,2). The argument is that conjunctions co-signify certain λεκτά. Thus I believe there is some evidence here, once again, that a primary defence against Athenodorus was made within a distinctively *Stoic* theoretical framework—and perhaps Cornutus, in his work *Against Athenodorus*, is a promising candidate for its source.

Dexippus’ entire treatment at *in Cat.* 11,1–16,13 takes the form of a thorough response to the contention that the *Categories* concerns λέξεις yet omits certain types of expression, such as conjunctions.

⁵⁷ οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἄσημόν ἐστι μόνιον καθ’ αὐτὸ οἷον τὸ βλέπτει ἢ κατὰ ἀναφορὰν ἐφ’ ἕτερον σημαντικόν ὡς αἱ οὕτως καλούμεναι ἐπαναφοραί, αἵτινες κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀόριστα μόρια ἀναφορὰν δηλοῦσί τι ὡς ἡ ἐκεῖνος φωνὴ ἐπὶ τὸ τίς ἀναγομένη, ἢ εἴ τι συσσημαντικόν εἴη μεθ’ ἑτέρου (10) ὡς τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι, οὐδαμῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις θείη ἂν τις δικαίως (ed. Busse 1888).

This treatment follows Porphyry in essentials.⁵⁸ Coupled with the introduction of Athenodorus and Cornutus in Porphyry's commentary *By Question and Answer* and with Simplicius' testimony, this text provides the clearest outline of the actual arguments mustered by Athenodorus, Cornutus, or both against the tenfold division of categories. The chapter heading assigned to 11,1–16,14 is 'how to identify the categories and not be led astray by the difficulties raised by the Stoics' (*Πὼς χρὴ τὰς κατηγορίας εὑρίσκειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάγεσθαι ταῖς τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἀπορίαις*; 1,9). Evidently the author of this heading meant it to apply to the entirety of 11,1–16,14, although the section naturally falls into two halves: Dexippus' long argument from 11,4–12,30, and the independent exchange by 'question and answer' from 13,1–16,14.

The first question raised by Dexippus' interlocutor Seleucus (11,1–4) is how we can distinguish those expressions (*λέξεις*) that *do* fall under the 'categories' of Aristotle, and so exclude other *λέξεις* that are not properly predicative. Dexippus approaches the problem by offering a definition of *κατηγορία*, then demonstrating that certain problematic cases of *λέξεις*—those raised by the critics as embarrassments for Aristotle's classification—are excluded by the definition. Here is a rough summary of Dexippus' answers to the problems raised by Seleucus, which are worth including in full:

*Part I: That certain problematic λέξεις are excluded
by a proper definition of predication.*

1. (11,4–11) We must first identify (a) the genus of 'the significant' (*τὸ σημαντικὸν πᾶν γένος*) and distinguish this from (b) the non-significant (*ἄσημόν*), such as 'blityri', and from (c) the co-significant (*συσσημαντικόν*), such as articles and conjunctions.
2. (11,12–17) A true *κατηγορία* enables us 'to show the realities to one another' (*τὰ πράγματα δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις*) and is thus distinguished (i) by its relation to a reality (*πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα σχέσεως*), (ii) by its differentiation from realities (*τῆς κατὰ τὰ πράγματα διαφορᾶς*), and (iii) most properly of all, by its capacity to receive form (*εἰδοποιεῖσθαι*). This definition excludes the following kinds of *λέξεις*.

⁵⁸ See Hadot 1990.

- 2.1 (11,18–20) If a λέξις draws its defining characteristic from its relation to its own parts (σχηματισθῇ... τοῖς οἰκείοις μέρεσι τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα χαρακτήρα ἀφορίζειν) it lacks the primary signification of *logos* and it is not a κατηγορία. Examples of such excluded λέξεις are διόθεν, οἴκοθεν, κάλλιστα, ὀρθότατα, σοφώτατα, and ποιητικώτατα.
- 2.2 (11,20–5) And if a λέξις draws its meaning from the relationship of the *objects of thought* to each other (κατὰ τὴν τῶν νοημάτων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐπιπλοκὴν) it is again not a κατηγορία. Examples of such excluded *lexeis* are the consequence of the hypothetical proposition ‘If it is day...’ and the alternative contradiction of the disjunctive proposition, ‘Either it is day...’
- 2.3 (11,25–30) Non-verbal movement of thought such as groans and roars (ἐπὶ τῶν στεναγμῶν καὶ βρυχημάτων), and indiscernible sounds (ἀφάνταστος φωνή), and names that represent no reality (ὄνομα μὴδὲν πρᾶγμα δηλώσειεν), are not κατηγορίαι.
- 2.4 (11,30–12,3) There is no higher predicate, neither real nor linguistic (ὃν ἢ λεγόμενον), that may be predicated synonymously of the highest genera of reality nor of the most generic *lexeis*. Therefore, ‘Being’ (τὸ ὄν) cannot be predicated as common to the highest genera (it is homonymous: 13,5), nor can ‘Motion’ or ‘Change’ (κίνησις) be predicated as common to ποιεῖν and πάσχειν.
- 2.5 (12,3–11) The defining characteristic of κατηγορίαι is simplicity (τὸ ἀπλοῦν) and non-compositeness (ἀσύνθετον). Therefore we must exclude composite expressions, quasi-composite expressions, invented words, and other expressions that belong properly to the study of verbal expression, which is secondary and not primary (ἄλλης θεωρίας τῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν καὶ δευτέρας). Examples of such excluded *lexeis* are Δίων περιπατεῖ and ξυστρόπων (sic: perhaps ξυστροποιεῖ with Dillon?).
- 2.6 (12,11–19) A κατηγορία must identify the *primary* signification of utterances (τὴν προηγουμένην σημασίαν, cf. Porphyry 58,30; Simplicius 64,20) and the *primary* essential commonalities of beings (τὰς προηγουμένας οὐσιώδεις κοινότητας), but not the *secondary* common concepts of them which are accidentally manifested. These include derivative forms and secondary concepts.

3. (12,19–26) This is the approach of ‘serious students of λόγος and of οὐσία’ (σπουδαζομέναις ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ τῆς οὐσίας φιλοθεαμόνων). Based on these guidelines, we must omit the following from consideration as categories, and as not conforming to the *skopos* of the *Categories* (σκοπῶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, 12,26):
 - 3.1 (12,20–1) Figurative and metaphorical expressions (τὸ τροπικὸν ἢ μεταφορικὸν ὄνομα) such as τὸ ‘ἀνεχαίτισεν’ or ‘πόδα νείατον Ἰδης’.
 - 3.2 (12,22–3) Modal expressions (οἱ τρόποι) such as τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης and ἐνδέχεται, and ὑπάρχειν.
 - 3.3 (12,23–4) Quantifiers (προσδιορισμοὶ) such as τὸ πᾶς and οὐδεὶς, and τὸ τίς, and οὐχί τις.
4. (12,26–31) The *Categories* are concerned with λόγος that encompasses truth and falsehood and so with ‘such portions of significant speech as, being taken together to form a simple predicative statement, give proper value to the terms out of which they are constructed’. (Notably this formulation differs slightly from that of Porphyry.)

*Part II: Various ἀπορίαι concerning predications
(to what category does X belong?)*

5. (13,3–6) Being belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
6. (13,7–10) ‘One’ belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
7. (13,11–15) Plurality belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
8. (13,16–23) Not-being belongs to no category. (i) Proper not-being is non-existent. (ii) Relative not-being is said homonymously in ten ways.
9. (13,24–7) ‘Is’ belongs to no category, but is said homonymously in ten ways.
10. (13,28–14,2) ‘Same’ and ‘Other’ belong to no category, but are said homonymously in ten ways.
11. (14,3–7) Each of the categories is ‘something’ (τι) homonymously in ten ways.

12. (14,8–19) ‘Definition’ (ὅρος) reveals the essence (τὸ τί ἐστι) of a thing by indicating its distinctive characteristic (ιδιότης), and this is said homonymously in ten ways.
13. (14,20–31) ‘Genus’ and ‘proprium’ (ἰδίου) are said homonymously in ten ways, as are differentia and species.
 - 13.1 (14,32–15,13) Defence against certain counter-arguments from the text of Aristotle. (i) Q. How can genus be homonymous in ten ways if Aristotle offers a single definition of it (*Top.* 1.4, 102a31)? A. Because the definition itself may be ambiguous. (ii) Q. How can ‘same’ be homonymous in ten ways if Aristotle defines it as said in only three ways, namely genus or species, or number (*Top.* 7.1, 152b31 and following)? A. Because each of these three is homonymous in ten ways.
14. (15,14–22) ‘Two ways’, ‘three ways’, ‘in two’, ‘in three’, ‘in four’ (τὸ διχῶς καὶ τριχῶς καὶ τὸ διχθὰ, τριχθὰ, τετραχθὰ) are *secondary* and not *primary* significant utterances and therefore need not belong to the categories.
15. (15,23–31) ‘Whole’ and ‘part’ (τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος) also belong to the *secondary* use of language and therefore need not belong to the categories. (If they do, however, they are relatives.)
16. (15,32–16,2) The phrases ‘universal’ and ‘once for all’, and ‘wholly’ (τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ καθάπαξ καὶ τὸ ἄρδην) are dependent upon the categories, in which they participate.
17. (16,3–11) ‘Same’, ‘other’, ‘proprium’, ‘incompatible’, ‘common’, ‘indefinite’, ‘ambiguity’, ‘synonymy’ (τὸ ταὐτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν τὴν τε ἀμφιβολίαν καὶ τὴν συνωνυμίαν) are said homonymously of all the categories, and also, as they describe names and concern the *secondary* use of language, properly ‘fall outside’ the categories.
18. (16,11–13) Having answered these questions, we may now turn to the study of the categories ‘at the highest level’ (πρὸς τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην).

From this series of thrusts and counter-thrusts, we can derive several important observations. The first useful point is the general

context of the argument, which establishes that at least some of the criticisms here originated with Porphyry's Athenodorus, Cornutus, or both. The general line of attack throughout Part I is that a number of 'significant' λέξεις are omitted from Aristotle's 'categories', including, for instance, articles and conjunctions (11,4–11) and figurative expressions (12,20–1). We know from Porphyry that this was precisely the line of attack adopted by both Athenodorus and Cornutus, and perhaps especially associated with Athenodorus (Simplicius 62,25). The author of the chapter headings in Dexippus clearly made the same connection. The defence against this argument is also that adopted by Porphyry against Athenodorus and Cornutus: it is critical to distinguish the *primary* from the *secondary* imposition of expressions on things (notably itself a Stoic doctrine), and the truly significant from the merely 'co-significant' or συσσημαντικόν. If we do so, the problematic λέξεις will be excluded from consideration as predications. Having thus defended against many examples of verbally significant λέξεις, Dexippus next tackles a host of philosophical terms that appear to be omitted from the 'categories' (13,3–16,13), mostly by pointing out that they are said homonymously in ten ways and belong to no category, occasionally with the aid of a reminder about the secondary and purely linguistic imposition of expressions. This is a broader criticism to defend against.

The second useful point is the actual specifics of the examples given by Athenodorus and Cornutus to support their criticisms of the text. Looking at the examples above, we know that either or both of them criticized the *Categories* along the following lines (for the scope of Part I above):

- Expressions relating to movement from place, such as διόθεν and οἴκοθεν, are wrongly omitted. (Compare Cornutus at Simplicius 359,1 and following: should διόθεν at Dexippus 11,18–20 be amended to the rarer Διωνόθεν of Simplicius 359,4?)
- Superlative expressions, such as κάλλιστα, ὀρθότατα, σοφώτατα, and ποιητικώτατα, are wrongly omitted.
- Stoic hypothetical propositions are wrongly omitted, such as 'If it is day . . .' (compare DL 7.69 and Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. 8.223).
- Stoic disjunctive propositions are wrongly omitted, such as 'Either it is day . . .' (compare DL 7.72).

- Stoic categorical propositions are wrongly omitted, such as *Δίων περιπατεῖ*. (Dexippus refers to this example as ‘composite’, but on the Stoic view such a proposition was in fact ‘simple’. Compare DL 7.70, where *Δίων περιπατεῖ* is an example of a Stoic simple ‘categorical’ proposition, and see Chrysippus at 7.65.)
- The categories *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν* are wrongly separated, and should be classed together under *κίνησις*. (Compare the three groups of critics of the *Categories* at Simplicius 63,4–66,41; these two categories are also called by Aristotle *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχον*, as at *An. Pr.* 83a22; and the Stoic *ἀρχαί* also have these names, as DL 7.134 informs us.)
- Metaphorical and figurative expressions are wrongly omitted, such as *ἀνεχαίτισεν* or *πόδα νεύατον Ἰδης*. (Compare Porphyry 59,5–14 and Simplicius 18,27 for the shared criticism by Athenodorus and Cornutus that the *Categories* omits ‘figurative’ expressions.)
- Modal expressions are wrongly omitted, such as *τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* and *ἐνδέχασθαι* and *ὑπάρχειν*.
- Quantifiers such as *τὸ πᾶς* are wrongly omitted.

These considerations, and especially the first set of criticisms regarding conjunctions and articles, roughly correspond to Simplicius 64,20–65,12. The second natural division of Dexippus’ treatment (Part II above), which overlaps with the first, is also loosely affiliated with the following section of Simplicius, from 65,13 to 66,31.

- The ten categories fail to comprehend a number of (chiefly logical and metaphysical) entities, including: being, the one, plurality, non-being, ‘is’, same, other, definition, genus, proprium, whole and part, and the overarching (Stoic) category *τι*.

Summary of criticisms of the ‘division’ of ten categories

Combining the sources that we have, we are able to piece together a broad picture of the combined criticisms of Athenodorus and Cornutus against the division of the ten categories. Through a close examination of the sources, we may also be able to distinguish Athenodorus from Cornutus in the tradition.

Porphyry (58,3–59,14) informs us that ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’ treated the *σκοπός* of the *Categories* as ‘expressions qua expressions’,

and sought to demonstrate that it failed in comprehending this subject. Porphyry also tells us (86,20) that their objections were chiefly advanced in three works: Athenodorus' *Against the Categories of Aristotle* and Cornutus' *Arts of Rhetoric* and *Reply to Athenodorus*, and Porphyry's compressed presentation may be taken to suggest that all three of the groups of criticism—excess, deficiency, and substitution—are to be found in these two Stoics. Simplicius (18,26) reiterates Porphyry's assessment, and explicitly distinguishes Athenodorus' *Against the Categories*, which criticized *only* the number or division of categories, from Cornutus' *Reply*, which bore a greater resemblance to the wide-ranging (πρὸς τὰ ἅλλα πάντα σχεδόν) critiques of Lucius and Nicostratus (62,24–63,3). Simplicius distinguishes Athenodorus' specific criticism about the number of categories (based on various excluded λέξεις), on the one hand, from the other criticisms of the text, such as its thematic consistency, which *might* be separately ascribed to Cornutus.

Dexippus then provides specific samples of criticism. I think it is possible that the first long section of criticisms and responses, expressed as a single disquisition by Dexippus and described as Part I above, corresponds to Athenodorus' criticism of the 'number' of ten categories and its inability to comprehend λέξεις, and so attracts a defence founded chiefly on the distinction of the 'primary' and 'secondary' imposition of λέξεις. Conversely, I think it possible that the second series of criticisms and responses, expressed as a question and answer dialogue between Dexippus and Seleucus and described as Part II above, may be part of Cornutus' wider critique, which also includes several factors discussed below under other sections.

The reasoning behind these criticisms is associated with a number of Stoic doctrines. The specific arguments in Dexippus make clear that a strong initial motivation for the criticism of the *Categories*—presumably as undertaken by Athenodorus—was the incompatibility of Aristotle's notions of predication with those espoused by the Stoics following Chrysippus. Thus the Stoics perhaps found that the *Categories* omitted hypothetical (DL 7.69) and disjunctive (7.72) propositions as well as what their theory regarded as 'categorical' propositions (7.70). More specifically, as I suggest above with reference to Barnes,⁵⁹ later Stoics such as Cornutus may have found

⁵⁹ 'Aristotle and Stoic Logic', 41–3.

particular fault with the ‘simple’ or atomic units of the *Categories* being terms rather than sentences or propositions.⁶⁰

Where Porphyry, Dexippus, and Simplicius feel compelled to focus is less on the particulars than on the broad distinction of the so-called ‘primary’ imposition of expressions (qua significant of beings) from the ‘secondary’ imposition of expressions as linguistic elements, in order to associate the *Categories* with the former. It is important to the defenders of the *Categories* to establish this distinction, and they appear to suggest that the Stoic critics of the *Categories* erred in failing to recognize it.

But as noted above in our initial treatment of Cornutus, this language and distinction, as wielded by Porphyry and his followers, is itself Stoic, answering to the Stoic distinction of dialectic into the λεκτά or ‘what is signified’ from the class of studies concerned with expressions or—for lack of a better word—with grammar.⁶¹ On the orthodox Stoic view, evidently pioneered or at least elaborated by Chrysippus, the signified λεκτά are separate from verbal expressions or λέξεις as such, which mirror the λεκτά (see DL 7.58). The ‘primary’ impositions with which Porphyry claims the *Categories* to be concerned might well be interpreted in a Stoic framework as the λεκτά, while the ‘secondary’ impositions of expression would be just the verbal expressions that signify them.⁶²

If the Stoics following Chrysippus made such a distinction as Porphyry seems to claim they neglected, it seems likely that either (a) Athenodorus ignored that distinction and ascribed a purely ‘verbal’ *skopos* to the *Categories* for polemical reasons, or (b) Athenodorus found reason in the *Categories* for interpreting the text within a purely linguistic scope. Indeed, some modern commentators have adopted the same approach.⁶³ As we find later in the tradition (e.g. Ammonius in *Cat.* 9,1 and following), those who argued that the *Categories* concerned words alone relied on *Cat.* 1a16, ‘of things that are said ...’ It is also possible that Athenodorus was drawn to this

⁶⁰ On this, see also M. Frede ‘Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic’, in Frede 1987.

⁶¹ See Frede 1987, ‘Principles of Stoic Grammar’: 30 and following.

⁶² For the Stoic position itself, see for example Barnes (1993), Allen (2005), Long (2005), Ebbesen (2005).

⁶³ Consider for example the difficulty of determining whether paronyms are entirely linguistic items, or non-linguistic, mixed-level items (Hintikka 1959: 141) whose relationship is described linguistically (Annas 1974: 151).

view by the apparently linguistic nature of the onymies; in the next section I develop this suggestion further.

Athenodorus and Cornutus on the ‘Division’ of Chapters

As I noted above, there are actually three species of ‘division’ at play in the single passage where Simplicius introduces the problem of *διαίρεσις* (in *Cat* 18,22–19,7): (1) the *διαίρεσις* of chapter headings in the *Categories*, a problem shared with the Alexandrian commentators and associated with Stoic criticisms against the structural coherence of the text of the *Categories*; (2) the *διαίρεσις* of the ten categories and their inability to comprehend all *lexeis*, drawn from Porphyry, and associated with Athenodorus’ and Cornutus’ distinctive position about the *skopos* of the work; (3) the internal *διαίρεσις* of the onymies and the question whether it is a division of names or of things, which is incidentally relevant to the preceding two problems. In this section, I will attempt to distinguish the sources of (1) and (2).

When Simplicius reports on ‘the book’s division into chapter headings’ (εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου, 18,22), he remarks that some commentators have failed to notice the ‘division [of the chapters] according to their natural joints’ (κατ’ ἄρθρα διήρηνται, 18,23) and therefore they suppose that the *Categories* is organized haphazardly like a hypomnematic work (18,22–6):

It remains for us to speak about the book’s division into chapters. Some commentators, paying no attention to how the chapters have been divided according to their natural joints and to how well they fulfil the purpose of the overall subject, nor to how they maintain their mutual continuity, consider that the chapters just lie there in the haphazard manner typical of hypomnematic writings. (tr. Chase 2003)⁶⁴

This remark apparently derives from a source common to the Alexandrian scholastic tradition on the ‘chapter headings’ of the *Categories*. Simplicius will return to that source at 19,9, where, in a passage

⁶⁴ Λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου λέγειν ὑπολείπεται, ἃ τινες μὴ ἐπιστήσαντες ὅπως τε κατ’ ἄρθρα διήρηνται καὶ ὅπως τὴν τε πρὸς τὸν ὅλον σκοπὸν χρειᾶν ἀποπληροῦσι καλῶς καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλλα συνέχειαν διασφύζουσιν, σοιβηδὸν κείσθαι νομίζουσιν τὰ κεφάλαια (25) κατὰ τὸν ὑπομνηματικὸν τρόπον (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

echoed in Alexandrian commentators such as Ammonius, Philoponus, and Olympiodorus,⁶⁵ he describes the structural division as 'tripartite' (ὡς εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελεῖν, τριμερές τὸ βιβλίον).

However, Simplicius first diverges into a separate subject and, perhaps, a different source. The divergence begins at 18,26 and is marked by a shift in the reference of the word 'division' (διαίρεσις). For context, here is the full text of 18,22–19,9 divided into four parts (with translations from Chase 2003 and Greek text from Kalbfleisch 1907):

(i) (18,22–6) It remains for us to speak about the book's division into chapters. Some commentators, paying no attention to how the chapters have been divided according to their articulations and to how well they fulfil the purpose of the overall goal (σκοπός), nor to how they maintain their mutual continuity, consider that the chapters just lie there in the haphazard manner typical of hypomnematic writings.⁶⁶

(ii) (18,26–19,1) What is more, some contradict Aristotle and reject his division: of these, some claim that it is uselessly redundant, others that it omits many things, like Athenodorus and Cornutus, who believe the goal (σκοπός) is about expressions (λέξεις) in so far as they are expressions. They bring forward many expressions as examples, some literal and others figurative, and thereby think they refute the division, since it has not included all possible expressions.⁶⁷

(iii) (19,1–7) These people also think that there is a division of names into homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms, and suppose that the book is a motley heap of logical, physical, ethical, and theological speculations. For them, the speculations about homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms are logical, as is, moreover, the one about opposites. Those about movement, they say, are physical, while those about virtue

⁶⁵ As found in Ammonius 14,3–15,2, Philoponus 13,6–33, Olympiodorus *Proleg.* 25,5–24, David (Elias) 134,29 and Arethas 138,21–139,12.

⁶⁶ Λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως τοῦ βιβλίου λέγειν ὑπολείπεται, ἃ τινες μὴ ἐπιστήσαντες ὅπως τε κατ' ἄρθρα διήρηνται καὶ ὅπως τὴν τε πρὸς τὸν ὅλον σκοπὸν χρῆιαν ἀποπληροῦσι καλῶς καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέχειαν διασφύζουσιν, στοιβηδὸν κείσθαι νομίζουσιν τὰ κεφάλαια κατὰ τὸν ὑπομνηματικὸν τρόπον.

⁶⁷ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτῷ τινες ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν, οἱ μὲν ὡς πλεονάζουσιν μάτην, οἱ δὲ ὡς πολλὰ παρείσαν ὥσπερ Κορνοῦτος καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος, οἵτινες περὶ λέξεων οἴοντο τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι καθὼς λέξεις εἰσίν, πολλὰς λέξεις προβάλλοντες τὰς μὲν κυρίας, τὰς δὲ τροπικάς, ἐλέγχειν οἴονται τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς οὐ πάσας τὰς λέξεις περιλαβοῦσαν.

and vice are ethical, just as the philosophical considerations about the ten genera are theological.⁶⁸

(iv) (19,7–9) In fact, however, the truth is otherwise. [Aristotle] is not carrying out a division (*διαίρεσις*) of names [in the onymies], for if he were, he would not have omitted heteronyms or polyonyms. If we are to divide it into large parts, the book is tripartite . . .⁶⁹

For the surrounding passages (i) (18,22–6) and (iv) (19,9) and following, the ‘division’ is of chapters (*εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαιρέσεως*) or of major headings (*εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελεῖν*). But during the intervening passage (ii), beginning from *καὶ δὴ καὶ* at 18,26, where Simplicius introduces Athenodorus and Cornutus, he turns to discuss the division of the actual *categories*, not the chapters, with specific reference to the subject (*σκοπός*) of the work. This intervening passage seems to draw upon Porphyry, as I noted above by comparing the *Question and Answer* commentary directly. At (iii) 19,1, however, the correspondence with Porphyry’s commentary *By Question and Answer* ends as abruptly as it began. Whereas Porphyry proceeds to describe the views of Herminius on the *skopos* of the *Categories*, Simplicius instead returns to the structural coherence of the text and the onymies in particular (see above). This is a different problem and a separate line of criticism than the contention that the *Categories* has omitted certain kinds of *λέξεις*. Porphyry’s smaller commentary also covers the affiliation of the onymies to the rest of the work from 59,34 onward. But Porphyry treats the topic quite differently than does Simplicius’ source for (iii) Simplicius’ source discusses the onymies in the context of a division of the *Categories* by its ‘joints’—namely, the Stoicizing organization of philosophy as an animal into the disciplines of ethics, logic, and physics.⁷⁰ This source is interested in the Stoic critics’ views on the relationship of the onymies (which are, according to the Stoics, ‘logical’) with the rest of the work (which is, in

⁶⁸ οἱ καὶ διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων οἴονται ποιεῖσθαι εἰς ὁμώνυμα καὶ συνώνυμα καὶ παρώνυμα καὶ εἶναι τὸ βιβλίον παντοδαπῶν θεωρημάτων σωρεῖαν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν λογικῶν τε καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν καὶ θεολογικῶν· εἶναι γὰρ τὰ μὲν περὶ ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων καὶ παρωνύμων σκέμματα λογικά, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, τὰ δὲ περὶ κινήσεως φυσικά, ἠθικά δὲ τὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ὥσπερ θεολογικά τὰ περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν φιλοσοφήματα.

⁶⁹ τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ διαίρεσιν ποιεῖται τῶν ὀνομάτων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἑτερόνυμα καὶ πολυνώνυμα παρῆκεν. ἀλλ’ ἔστιν, ὡς εἰς μεγάλα μέρη διελεῖν, τριμερὲς τὸ βιβλίον.

⁷⁰ DL 7.39–40.

their view, ‘ethical’, ‘physical’, and ‘theological’). For Simplicius’ source, the correct reply to the Stoics is that the first chapter of the *Categories* is not concerned with a ‘logical’ or linguistic subject (19,7–9 = iv above).

But this is not *Porphyry’s* reply. Porphyry’s response to the problem of the onymies, as given in the QA commentary, is that the onymies are a necessary propaedeutic for the rest of the work (Porph. 60,1 and following). In fact, Simplicius cites that very response of Porphyry later in his text (19,27 and following, where the questioners are ‘Lucius and Nicostratus’).

Passage (ii = 18,26–19,1) above, I think, draws from Porphyry, directly or indirectly: but the passages before and after it derive directly from a different source. I believe this source is Syrianus or Iamblichus. The source contends that the ‘onymies’ do not concern a linguistic subject, because they omit heteronyms and polyonyms. The argument that polyonyms and heteronyms belong to ‘linguistic’ study is directly associated with Syrianus in a later passage (23,13–15: *πρὸς λεκτικὴν <μᾶλλον> παρασκευὴν ὁρᾶν ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίβλεψιν*). Thus it appears likely that Syrianus is the immediate source of the argument at (iv) 19,7–9. Moreover, Simplicius’ citation of Syrianus distils ideas about the status and scope of the ‘onymies’ which are ascribed by name to Iamblichus (e.g., 23,25–34,5 and earlier at 22,1–2). This association seems well in keeping with Simplicius’ own statement of intent at 3,9, where he remarks that he is reducing Iamblichus much as Syrianus did, but less radically; and also with Simplicius’ comment at 13,17 that Syrianus ‘clarified’ (*σαφηνίζει*) Iamblichus on the true subject of the *Categories*, namely that the work treats significant words insofar as they are significant of beings.

For reasons outlined below, I believe it is important to pry these sources apart in the Simplician text. Simplicius’ references are divided as follows (again using the numeration above, for the first three items):

- (i) 18,23: *τινες* question the division of the chapter headings.
- (ii) 18,26: What is more (*καὶ δὴ καὶ*) *τινες* speak against the division of the categories. There are two groups, mirroring two of the three groups at 63,4–66,31:
- 18,27: Some (*οἱ μὲν*) claim the division is excessive

- 18,28: Others (οἱ δέ) such as Athenodorus and Cornutus hold that the division omits many *lexeis*, as the ten categories concern ‘verbal expressions’
- (iii) 18,31: ‘Who also’ (οἱ καὶ) criticize the internal division of the onymies and the disciplinary division of the work as a whole, as the onymies concern a linguistic subject, while the ten categories concern theology, etc.

The criticisms contained in this passage, taken together, appear to be inconsistent. The central lines (ii) contain criticisms explicitly ascribed to ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’, who hold that the σκοπός of the *Categories* is ‘verbal expressions insofar as they are verbal expressions’, divided into ten categories. But the critics represented in the following part of the passage (iii–iv) complain that the ten categories are *theological* speculations that confusedly follow the ‘linguistic’ onymies; this can hardly be consistent with the position of ‘Athenodorus and Cornutus’ that the σκοπός is ‘verbal expressions’. For Athenodorus and Cornutus, the *Categories*—and the central list of the ten categories in particular—have a clear linguistic σκοπός; for the critics of the chapter division, the ten categories are ‘theological’, and the work itself has no single coherent σκοπός at all, treading between logic, physics, ethics, and theology.

To summarize: the critics of the chapter division, represented in (i) and (iii–iv), may not be identical with Athenodorus and Cornutus, represented in (ii). Indeed, the passage ending at 18,26 could flow directly into 19,1 if the intervening passage (ii) were removed. The passages 18,22–6 and 19,1–8 treat the same subject (the structural coherence of the work) and are consistent with one another in their use of the term διαίρεσις. The intervening passage is associated with criticisms about the ‘division’ of the ten categories, where Simplicius is primarily drawing on Porphyry for his response; but the surrounding passages are associated with criticisms about the chapter division, where Simplicius is primarily drawing on Syrianus and Iamblichus for his response.

So who were the critics of the chapter division in (i) and (iii–iv)? After all, the criticism of the *Categories*’ chapter division as a blended ‘heap’ of philosophical disciplines is not a characteristically Stoic line of attack, at least judging from one report of school orthodoxy. For the Stoics, according to Diogenes Laertius, the disciplines of logic, physics, and ethics are ‘not independent . . . but all blended together

(μεμίχθαι αὐτά)’ in philosophical discourse; indeed, ‘it was not usual to teach them separately’ (7.40). Thus it is not especially obvious that a Stoically-inclined philosopher would, on doctrinal grounds alone, object to a text that mixed philosophical subjects in this way. We can establish with confidence that Athenodorus made no such criticism, as Simplicius elsewhere informs us (62,25) that Athenodorus criticized *only* the division of the ten categories and seemingly had nothing to do with the criticism of the structural coherence of the text. But Simplicius clearly sees enough connection—aside from the common word διαίρεσις—to link the lines and senses of 18,22–19,9 together. We do know that Cornutus’ criticisms were broader-ranging in his *Against Athenodorus and Aristotle* and his *Rhetoric*. Conceivably Cornutus alone criticized the chapter division, and the internal inconsistency of the argumentation in our passage is to be explained by a difference of opinion between Athenodorus and Cornutus—for we know that they disagreed, although we do not know what they disagreed about.

Indeed, there is some evidence that Cornutus, in contrast to Athenodorus, understood the ten categories as non-linguistic items. (He may, of course, have presented this interpretation as a mere side effect of the text’s poor organization or the author’s inability to distinguish consistently between use and mention, or between grammatical, dialectical, and metaphysical subject matter.) Simplicius directly compares the views of Athenodorus and Cornutus on the subject of what Aristotle meant by ‘relative’ (*in Cat.* 187,24–34). For Cornutus, it is appropriate to understand the Aristotelian relative in terms of its signification of reality (πρός τι εἶναί φησιν οἷς συμπροσπίπτει πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ σχέσις, οὐ μέντοι ἢ συντακτικὴ... ἀλλ’ ἢ πρὸς ὑπόστασιν...); the language suggests that the Relative is interpreted as a λεκτόν, directly significant of reality, rather than a λέξις-in-itself, that is, a linguistic item that is several steps removed from reality. As discussed below, this passage suggests that Cornutus holds a less strictly ‘linguistic’ view about the subject matter of Aristotle’s ten categories than does Athenodorus. Indeed, if Cornutus shared the position, presumably Athenodorus’, that the sole subject of the work was λέξεις καθὼς λέξεις, it would be difficult for him to argue coherently that the work also transgressed disciplinary boundaries between physics, ethics, and theology—that critique would seem to be at odds with the supposition that it was strictly linguistic. Perhaps, as I would suggest, the later commentators’ attribution to both Athenodorus and

Cornutus of an overly linguistic reading of the text should stick primarily to Athenodorus, and *might* even rely partly on Cornutus himself as an intermediary who entertained such criticisms.

Such an interpretation could be coupled with the evidence discussed earlier that the initial response to Athenodorus' criticisms was constructed within a purely Stoic framework—in which Athenodorus' (presumably intentional) error was to describe the ten categories without regard for the *primary* part of dialectic. Given this, we might suggest that Cornutus, in his *Against Athenodorus*, promoted the argument (against Athenodorus) that the ten categories involved *lekta* rather than λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις, but simultaneously promoted the argument (against Aristotle) that the *Categories* was accordingly incoherent, crossing boundaries between logic (in the onymies), theology (in the portion of the work where claims are made about the nature of *ousia*), ethics, and physics. This would account for the discontinuity of 18,22–19,9, with its two senses of διαίρεσις, as well as Simplicius' choice to combine them into a single report of the views maintained by 'Athenodorus and Cornutus'.⁷¹

III. CONCLUSIONS

Porphry (and Simplicius following Porphyry) imply that Athenodorus and Cornutus criticize the *Categories* because they do not recognize the distinction of the primary and secondary imposition of language on realities. But this distinction is traditional in the Stoic bipartition of dialectic. The historical figures referred to as 'Athenodorus' and 'Cornutus' would have written commentaries that were sensitive to this distinction.

Athenodorus, perhaps, identified the subject matter of the 'ten categories' with the second (linguistic) component of Stoic dialectic. He contended that the onymies were solely linguistic—as have some modern critics—and evidently founded a criticism of the *Categories* as linguistic (and so defective) upon this exegesis. In this connection,

⁷¹ For reasons of space, I omit here other challenges posed by Athenodorus and Cornutus to the characterization of specific categories; for these, see for example my discussion in Griffin 2009: ch. 6, and the surveys referenced in the opening footnotes to this chapter.

I think that we should assign to Athenodorus and Cornutus the counter-example of conjunctions ascribed to Lucius at Simplicius *in Cat.* 64,18–65,13—in light of doctrinal inconsistencies with the views of Lucius expressed elsewhere, coupled with the lacuna in Simplicius and the appearance of a similar argument under the ‘Stoic’ banner in Dexippus. I also suggest that it is unlikely that ‘the Stoics’ at 66,32–67,9 are directly related to Athenodorus and Cornutus, and they are not found in Simplicius’ major threefold partition of critics of the categories in 62,25–31. This is significant, because the division of four ‘categories’ attributed to the Stoics there may have had nothing to do with Athenodorus’ and Cornutus’ criticisms: we need not suppose that they were *motivated* by a desire to substitute a fourfold Stoic scheme of categories for Aristotle’s. Moreover, I have suggested that it might be reasonable to locate Athenodorus’ critical activity before Andronicus and the burst of attention drawn to the *Categories* over the first century; perhaps Athenodorus encountered the text in its guise as a proem to the *Topics* introducing simple terms as such, since his interpretation would miss the mark somewhat against an Andronican or Boethan exegesis of the text as *κατηγορίαι*.

There also appear to have been differences between the criticisms of Athenodorus and Cornutus, which were sometimes at odds. This is evident not only from the title of Cornutus’ book *Against Athenodorus*—or *Reply to Athenodorus*—but also from the fact that the arguments contained in 18,22–19,9 (in the numbering above, [i] and [iii] vs. [ii]) are incompatible. Therefore, I have contended that this well-known passage should be picked apart based on its multiple incompatible uses of *διαίρεσις*, one use referring to the division of ten categories, the others to the chapter division of the work; and I propose that Athenodorus criticized *only* the division of ten categories (thus focusing on the ‘lexical’ omissions of the text, cf. Simp. 62,25), whereas Cornutus amended this criticism, suggesting various cases where the *Categories* appeared to deal with *λεκτά* rather than *λέξεις*-as-such. Perhaps it is reasonable to locate Cornutus’ activity after Andronicus and Boethus, taking into account their more sophisticated, semantical interpretation of the treatise. But Cornutus also appears to have challenged the overall literary coherence of the work based on this interpretation. There is some (limited) evidence for this in Cornutus’ rebuttal of Athenodorus’ exegesis of certain categories.

Porphry's defence of the *Categories* may also have some Stoic roots with Cornutus. Porphyry treats its subject matter as (in effect) λεκτά rather than λέξεις καθὸ λέξεις, and I have suggested, tentatively, that Cornutus' own objections to Athenodorus may be a source of that defence, based on the inconsistencies in 18,22–19,9. We may also find in the testimony of Dexippus, and the identification of our Athenodorus with the Athenodorus of DL 7.68, evidence for a suggestion previously made by Barnes that it was the basic distinction between simple *term* logic and simple *propositional* logic that motivated some Stoic criticism of the *Categories*, at least in the Imperial period: in brief, the *Categories* account of 'things said without combination' may have been viewed (at least from a purely polemical standpoint) as somehow contradictory of the Stoic doctrine of 'simple assertions' (cf. Dexippus in *Cat.* 12,3–11).

Part C

Peripatetic Synthesis and Response

Boethus of Sidon

Some commentators, however, also applied deeper thoughts to the work, as did the admirable Boethus.¹

Simplicius, in *Cat.* 1,8 (tr. Chase 2003)

To any reader of Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*, Boethus of Sidon² appears to be a dominant figure, whose intellectual vigour left his interlocutors in the dust (11,23). Outside of the Neoplatonic tradition, however, the work of Boethus is scarcely attested in Greek. He has left little or no explicit record in Latin.³ In coming to grips with his life and thought, we are limited to deductions that may be drawn from later doxographies, and to a reference in Strabo's *Geography*. Despite all of this, he was arguably one of the first-rank thinkers of his age (Rashed 2013: 53).

¹ τινὲς μέντοι καὶ βαθυτέραις περὶ αὐτὸ διανοίαις κατεχρήσαντο, ὥσπερ ὁ θαυμάσιος Βόηθος (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

² On Boethus see recently Rashed 2013 and Chiaradonna 2013. Classic surveys include P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, I (Berlin, 1973) 143–79; H. B. Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD', *ANRW* II.36.2 (1987), 1107–10, 1116–19; and J-P. Schneider, 'Boéthos de Sidon', in Goulet (1994) vol. 2, 126–30. See also E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, T. III: *Die Nacharistotelischeanni Philosophie* (Fotomech, Nachdr. der 5. Aufl., Leipzig 1923), 1, 642 and following; K. O. Brink, 'Peripatos', *Paulys Realencyclopädie*, suppl. 7 (1940), cols. 899–949; F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (2nd ed. Basel, 1967–69); R. W. Sharples, 'The Peripatetic School', in D. J. Furley (ed.), *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol. 2: From Aristotle to Augustine (London, 1997), 147–87; and L. Tarán's helpful review of Moraux, 'Aristotelianism in the 1st century BC', in Tarán 1981 = L. Tarán, *Collected Papers* (Leiden, 2001), 479–524.

³ While citations of Boethus Stoicus are common in the Latin corpus, there is no certain citation of Boethus Peripateticus in Latin—unless Macrobius in *Somn. Scip.* 1.14.19 refers to Boethus Peripateticus; the reference is ambiguous.

In this chapter, I aim to sketch Boethus' responses to criticisms of the *Categories*, and his elaboration of Andronicus' interpretation of the treatise, with important additions and revisions. I have already argued (ch. 2) that Boethus valued the *Categories* as an introductory treatise, furnishing ὑπογραφαί of primary genera to untutored students before they have mastered technical definitions; I also argued in ch. 2 that Andronicus had taken a similar view, and that Boethus followed him. I have also argued that Lucius (ch. 4) attacked the *Categories* as an inadequate work of ontology, due to its omission of any account of intelligible being, while Athenodorus (ch. 5) criticized the treatise as an inadequate work of rhetorical or grammatical theory, due to its omission of many kinds of speech. Boethus, in response, maintained that the *Categories* concerns significant words just qua significant of beings: this is what restricts its scope in ontology to sensible beings, the referents of ordinary speech, and excludes intelligibles (see Simplicius in *Cat.* 78,5 for Boethus' position, and compare 74,3–17, 82,4–6).⁴ He restricts its scope in grammar and rhetoric to significant terms. (While this formula is broadly in agreement with the view that I attributed to Andronicus in ch. 2, Boethus also goes well beyond Andronicus, in adding a role for mediating concepts between words and beings. Here perhaps he was influenced by the first chapter of *De Interpretatione*, whose Aristotelian authorship had been rejected by Andronicus in the preceding generation, but would go on to a very distinguished career of influence in later philosophy.)

Treating the *Categories* as in part a work of ontology led Boethus to problematize the relationship between the *Categories* and the central

⁴ Ben Morison helpfully points out to me that this is an odd position for a reader of the *Categories* to adopt, given that Aristotle certainly does refer to non-perceptible items such as the soul in the treatise (for example, in ch. 2, 1a20–b9), to say nothing of time and number. Perhaps Simplicius could reply that by 'soul' Aristotle means the enmattered form of an animal, which is available to perception and ordinary language, and that the 'time' and 'number' under consideration here are again enmattered quantities that we can perceive. Boethus seems explicit, at Simplic. in *Cat.* 78,5, that the *Cat.* is not concerned with intelligible οὐσίαι; another passage (in *Cat.* 65,20–1) implies that Boethus wishes to distinguish clearly between intelligible, substantial number, on the one hand, and the sensible quantity, so perhaps he would have taken a line similar to Simplicius', namely, that the *Categories* addresses itself to the latter and not to the former. But in any case, the Neoplatonist commentators, and perhaps Boethus, seem to have found the sensible examples of primary substances (like Socrates and Bucephalus) strongly suggestive that Aristotle wrote *Cat.* to talk about sensible substances.

books of the *Metaphysics*, a development which would contribute to influential ontological interpretations of the *Categories* that have persisted until today. By restricting its subject or σκοπός and emphasizing that the scope of the treatise was limited to perceptible things, he also laid the groundwork for the exegesis of the text later adopted by Porphyry, which made it compatible with Platonism.

I. LIFE

Strabo (63/64 BCE–c.24 CE), writing in the early first century CE, reports that he ‘studied Aristotle’ with Boethus (συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν ἡμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια, *Geog.* 16.2.24). The word συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν may imply that Strabo was taught by Boethus, or that they read Aristotle as fellow-students of a common master.⁵ As Strabo’s birth can be fixed,⁶ Boethus’ activity is generally assumed, chiefly on the authority of this passage, to have fallen early in the first century BCE (if he was Strabo’s tutor), or later in the first century BCE (if they were contemporaries). The latter deduction seems more plausible, for reasons I suggest below. Some further information may be gleaned from *Geog.* 16.2.24: Strabo reveals that Boethus had a brother (ἀδελφός αὐτοῦ) named Diodotus, and proceeds to mention two ‘contemporary’ (καθ’ ἡμᾶς) Sidonian philosophers, Antipater of Tyre and Apollonius, the latter flourishing ‘a little before my time’ (μικρὸν πρὸ ἡμῶν). Both references confirm the approximate chronology of the first century. They may also suggest some Stoic associations.⁷ I assume here that Boethus is a Peripatetic from Sidon who is

⁵ Perhaps under Andronicus of Rhodes (cf. Strabo, *Geog.* 14.2.13), or under Xenarchus of Seleucia (cf. 14.5.4). For literature on the question, see the earlier chapter on Andronicus.

⁶ On Strabo’s dates, see W. Aly, ‘Strabo (3)’, *Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* 4 (1932), 76–155.

⁷ There were two Tyrian Antipaters who may answer to this reference, both Stoics, the younger of whom died just before 45 BCE (cf. Cicero, *de Off.* 2.24). This Apollonius, according to Strabo, ‘published a tabulated account (πίνακα ἐκθεῖς) of the philosophers of the school of Zeno, and their books’. Together with Boethus’ own namesake, the Stoic ‘Boethus of Sidon’ (discussed below), there was a clear Stoic trend in recorded Sidonian philosophy.

not to be identified with a Stoic from Sidon of the same name (see note in Appendix 1).⁸

From Simplicius, we may be able to hazard a guess that Boethus was active into the middle of the first century CE, and is therefore more likely to have been Strabo's fellow-learner than his mentor. For Boethus appears to have responded to certain criticisms of the *Categories*, many of which are ascribed by Simplicius to the critics Lucius and Nicostratus (e.g. Simplicius in *Cat.* 50,2, comparing 48,1; and see ch. 4 on Lucius and Nicostratus for discussion).

Relationship to 'Lucius and Nicostratus'

Each of Simplicius' eight references to Lucius and his 'school' is followed by a reply from Boethus (see ch. 4), implying that Lucius published the relevant criticism of the *Categories* before or during the life of Boethus. But the only reasonably firm point in this chronology is Nicostratus, for whom Praechter (1922) has persuasively suggested a date in the middle of the second century CE.⁹ Working backwards, we are told by Simplicius that Nicostratus 'came after' Lucius (μετ' αὐτὸν, 1,19) and 'took over' his ideas (τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ὑποβαλλόμενος, 1,19–20). Perhaps there is enough force in Simplicius' language to suggest that, in the view of his own sources (with Porphyry the nearest detectable authority), the lives of Lucius and Nicostratus overlapped, or at any rate that they were treated as part of the same circle. If Lucius was active sufficiently late that Nicostratus knew him, and yet Boethus responded to Lucius' *aporiai*, Boethus too must have been active into the middle of the first century or so.

This is shaky ground. As we shall find, such 'conversations' in Simplicius cannot always be taken as representative of historical discussions;¹⁰ it seems more likely that Boethus presented certain views that were later reinterpreted, for instance by the later second-century Peripatetic Herminius or by Porphyry, as useful positions to

⁸ I am grateful to Stephen Menn for conversations that have persuaded me, since 2009, that Boethus the Peripatetic is also the likely target of Porphyry's treatise *Against Boethus*.

⁹ Our Nicostratus, on Praechter's argument, was honoured by an inscription at Delphi (*Syll.* 3 868) in the middle of the second century CE, late in his life.

¹⁰ See in particular the 'table of responses' in my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus, and discussion of dates below.

maintain against later critics.¹¹ But as I argued in ch. 4, we can claim with some confidence that Boethus did write a book against the views that Simplicius ascribes to Lucius and his like-minded associates (*οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον*), and that the source of these views may have been a contemporary of Boethus, and certainly was not a contemporary of Nicostratus.¹²

Thus we might take the view that Lucius was still active in the latter half of the first century CE. If this is correct, then Boethus of Sidon, who answered him, must have lived well into the first century CE—long enough to spar with Lucius, and answer several of Lucius' criticisms of the *Categories*. This line of reasoning makes it unlikely that Boethus was significantly older than Strabo, and more probable that the two men studied together as fellow-students, dating the birth of Boethus to c.60 or 50 BCE.

Relationship to Andronicus

Boethus may have studied under Andronicus, as Philoponus says (*in Cat.* 5,16–19). Conversely, Boethus may have been a contemporary and intellectual equal of Andronicus, as Düring, following Brink, proposed.¹³ Boethus may also have taken up the scholarchate of the Aristotelian 'school', as the tradition held (Ammonius, *in An. Pr.* 31,11). The sixth-century testimonies can all be questioned, but there seem to be other reasons to treat Boethus as a follower of Andronicus. I have put some weight on Aspasius (*in Eth.* 44,24), who has Boethus cite and defend an adapted version of Andronicus' account of passion

¹¹ Our trust in the testimony of Simplicius for chronology may also be troubled by his habit of implying, if not explicitly stating, that Boethus energetically rebutted the problems raised by Nicostratus himself (58,14–28). But as I argue in the preceding chapter, the only place this occurs is more likely to be an oblique response to 'the Lucians', and in general I believe it is clear that Boethus is *only* represented by Simplicius as replying directly to Lucius' *aporiai*, or rather, to difficulties presented by *οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον*. Nevertheless it is certainly true, as Gottschalk (1990) writes, 'Many of the criticisms [Boethus] refuted were repeated by later writers, including Plotinus, to be refuted again by others reusing many of Boethus' arguments' (74).

¹² Even if Lucius is in some respects a mere construct of Simplicius' text, I will suggest that the Lucius source was equally a construct of a commentary by Boethus (that is, even if we cannot get to an historical Lucius, we can get to the Lucius that Boethus set out as an interlocutor, and this figure was not a construction of the later commentary tradition).

¹³ Düring (1957), 420–5; for earlier views see C.O. Brink in *RE* suppl. 7 (1940), 938.

verbatim against a criticism that was also used to attack Chrysippus¹⁴—this certainly does not prove anything, but it lends circumstantial support to the biographical tradition.

The tradition that Andronicus taught Boethus would suggest that their lives overlapped. (Proximity in time might also be loosely supported by the fact that we have no evidence for intermediaries between them.) We might also speculate that Lucius' life (if he was indeed a biographical individual) overlapped with Boethus' and with Nicostratus', if we can place such weight on Simplicius' language of 'following' and 'taking over'. We might even reconstruct a sequential chronology like that sketched in the following table, in which Andronicus overlaps with Boethus, Boethus with Lucius, and Lucius with Nicostratus:

	100–50 BCE	50–0 BCE	0–50 CE	50–100 CE	100–150 CE
Andronicus					
Boethus					
Lucius					
Nicostratus					

This is quite a speculative picture, and we cannot place much weight on it. But it seems to me as plausible as any other interpretation of the scarce evidence. According to this scheme (which would imply that each party grew rather old), Lucius commenced a programme of criticism of the *Categories* early in his career, perhaps motivated in part by its growing popularity in Platonist circles, and made a name for himself in this way. Boethus may have countered these criticisms towards the end of his own career. Such a chronology also allows for the interpretation that Boethus' early work on the *Categories* played a role in popularizing the text in philosophical circles, perhaps especially in Athens, and instigated a reaction from some Platonists, represented by Lucius as a young exegete who may (with Dillon) have belonged to the ascendant Neo-Pythagorean wing of the school.¹⁵ Lucius may have been active in the city of Athens, judging from the fact that Nicostratus—perhaps a member of his scholarly

¹⁴ See the earlier ch. 2 on Andronicus of Rhodes.

¹⁵ As Dillon (1977: 344–5) proposes that Lucius was a Pythagorean 'of the strict observance'.

circle—was active in Athens; it would be elegant, then, if Boethus were a ‘grand old man’ of Athenian Peripateticism early in Lucius’ lifetime, defending his own seminal work on the *Categories* against a younger critic in a magnum opus which would set the tone for centuries of discussion.

Boethus likely maintained that the *Categories* was appropriate to novices in logic, whose *πρόληψις* of the genera of predication requires articulation (since Herminus is following Boethus at Porph. *in Cat.* 59,17–33). He also maintained that the treatise offers helpful ‘delineations’ or *ὑπογραφαί* of the genera, sketches that are able to stir up our concepts and begin to excavate them (Simplicius *in Cat.* 159,10–15). So far as this he followed Andronicus. He did not follow Andronicus in taking logic to be the first step in the curriculum of philosophy (see discussion in ch. 2); but since he took the *Categories* to deal with sensible items, perhaps we could imagine that he allowed for it to be read as a work of *physics*, before the systematic pursuit of logic later in the curriculum.

II. WORKS

Referring to Boethus as an exegete (*ἐξηγούμενος*, 29,30), Simplicius bestows high praise upon his interpretive depth (1,18) and acumen (11,23, drawing upon Porphyry), suggesting that Boethus answered to Simplicius’ own criteria (7,23–8) for a capable exegete of Aristotle by combining a wide knowledge of the texts (*τῶν πανταχοῦ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γεγραμμένων ἔμπειρον*) with respectful impartiality (*ἀδέκαστον*) regarding the authority of Aristotle. (It is worth noting that Simplicius’ sources may not always be unanimous on Boethus’ success as an interpreter of Aristotle and as a philosopher, but the consensus from Porphyry onward certainly seems positive.)¹⁶

¹⁶ Shortly after stating that ‘I refuse to call him ignorant, such a respected man’ (*οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἵπομι ἂν ὅτι ἡγνόει ἁλλόγματος ἀνὴρ γεγινώς*, 159,14), Simplicius proceeds to do exactly that (*ἀγνοεῖν δὲ δοκεῖ*, 163, 19–20), which might possibly suggest some divergence among his sources. While it seems probable that Simplicius’ information concerning Boethus derives from Porphyry’s commentary *Ad Gadalium*, Boethus is sometimes (e.g. 339,19) closer to Iamblichus, and is allied closely with Iamblichus where Porphyry’s view differs slightly (342,23); and there are various cases where Porphyry replies directly to, or criticizes, a view attributed to Boethus (78,4). Huby

There is not yet a comprehensive edition of Boethus' fragments,¹⁷ which cover a wide range of topics.¹⁸ 'His main work', as Gottschalk comments, 'was a grand-scale commentary on Aristotle's writing on categories, but he had an encompassing interest in all areas of philosophy'.¹⁹ The perception that Boethus' 'Hauptwerk' concerned the *Categories*, however, is a natural consequence of the space accorded to Boethus by Simplicius in his *Categories* commentary, and the magnitude and influence of the later *Categories* commentaries themselves. This may reflect the interests of Porphyry and Iamblichus, upon whom Simplicius relies, rather than the primary focus of Boethus himself. In fact, to take the sparse citations in sequence, the attention of antiquity, or at least of the preserved sources, initially focuses upon Boethus' psychology, ethics, and occasionally syllogistic (second and third centuries for example with Aspasius) and his views on time and being (fourth century) before turning to positions that are explicitly associated with the *Categories* in the sixth century and the defences that he reportedly prepared against Lucius and Nicostratus. Thanks to that latest ancient tradition, we possess more information about Boethus' work on the *Categories* than about any other subjects that he may have treated during his philosophical career.²⁰ In what follows, I will focus just on Boethus' views on the subject matter of the *Categories* and his responses to figures like Lucius and Athenodorus,

(1981) notes that one possible fragment of Boethus overlaps significantly with Iamblichus in Simplicius' text, and it is likely that Iamblichus also played a significant role in Simplicius' value judgements on Boethus.

¹⁷ Marwan Rashed, Riccardo Chiaradonna, and Philippe Hoffmann are currently directing a collection of the fragments of Boethus of Sidon, embracing a wide range of intellectual topics, many of which converge upon themes that are relevant to his exegesis of the *Categories*.

¹⁸ In an earlier survey (Griffin 2009), I reviewed approximately fifty named citations in Greek which correspond with reasonable certainty to the Peripatetic Boethus of Sidon, roughly half of which derived from Simplicius in *Cat.*, and I included the treatment On the Category 'When' surviving in the fourteenth-century MS Laurentianus 71 and ascribed by P. Huby (1981) to Boethus (for a cautionary note on the attribution, see Rashed 2013: 71 n. 43).

¹⁹ 'Boethus (4)', *Der Neue Pauly*: 'Sein Hauptwerk war ein groß angelegter Komm. zu Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift, aber sein Interesse umspannte alle Gebiete der Philosophie.'

²⁰ His fragments cross the boundaries of logic, ethics, and physics, and nearly all of his fragments shed some light on his positions on the *Categories*; it is difficult, for example, to rule out the possibility that his positions on time or movement derive from his commentary on the category When or the argument that several categories should be collapsed under the heading of Motion.

omitting other areas of his thought (which I attempted to explore in some more detail in Griffin 2009: ch. 5).

We might distinguish two streams of work on the *Categories* by Boethus, and for convenience I will treat them in separation. (1) There is a set of comments offered on a line-by-line (κατὰ λέξιν) basis, which, as I argue in concluding this chapter, may have provided the structural model for Porphyry's *Ad Gedalium* and, eventually, for Simplicius in *Cat.* (2) There is also a series of responses to various *aporiai* raised against the *Categories*, which survives in named and unnamed jousts by *antilogia* (see for instance Simplicius in *Cat.* 63,2). As I suggest below, such a commentary might be visibly echoed in Porphyry's commentary *By Question and Answer*.

Evidence for Line-by-Line Study of the *Categories*

Simplicius observes that Boethus carried out a 'word-by-word exegesis' of the *Categories* (ἐξηγούμενος . . . καθ' ἐκάστην λέξιν, 29,30) and composed a 'whole book' *On the Relative* (ὅλον βιβλίον γράψας περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τι, Simplic. 163,6). This latter work presumably underlies seven explicit references to Boethus over forty pages of Simplicius' own treatment of the *Relative* (159,14–202,1; see also Luna 2013). The work *On the Relative* might have constituted a 'monograph' by Boethus, given Simplicius' description of a 'whole book' (ὅλον βιβλίον) devoted to the topic.²¹ However, Simplicius does not elsewhere use the phrase ὅλος βιβλῖος in the sense of an independent 'monograph', but rather to denote a sequentially numbered book within a complete text. Earlier in the *Categories* commentary (2,4), for instance, Simplicius describes Plotinus' work *On the Kinds of Being* (6.1–3) as existing 'in three whole books' (τρὶσὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις), and he repeats the phrase in this unambiguous sense in other commentaries, with the adjective ὅλος drawing attention to the magnitude of the scholarly undertaking involved.²² It is probable, therefore, that Boethus' 'book' on the *Relative* formed a portion of a larger work, either his 'word-by-word exegesis' of the *Categories* or the

²¹ On the force of this phrase, see Gottschalk (1990: 74), Moraux I (147–64), Prantl I (540 and following).

²² At *de Caelo* 366,25 Simplicius observes that 'Alexander supposed the first whole book [of the work] (τὸ πρῶτον ὅλον βιβλίον) to concern the whole cosmos', and the phrase recurs elsewhere in the same work (674,4).

commentary *per interrogationem et responsionem* that I attempt to distinguish below.

Moreover, Simplicius signals that it is a *whole* book in order to emphasize, rhetorically, the relative size of the work;²³ this suggests that Boethus' exegesis of the Relative was particularly elaborate in the context of his commentary, and that some of his other discussions, pertaining to certain other categories, were contained in less space.

Responses to ἀπορίαι about the Categories

In addition to this treatment of the *Categories* καθ' ἐκάστην λέξιν, Boethus comments specifically on a number of problems or *aporiai* raised about the *Categories* (which may or may not represent a separate publication). At least some of these *aporiai* were raised by commentators such as Lucius, and perhaps by Andronicus himself. That Boethus focused, in some one of his works, on addressing *aporiai* regarding the *Categories* is suggested by the reportage in Simplicius, where Boethus is often cited as defending the *Categories* against varied criticisms. This hypothesis is also bolstered by a specific passage in *Cat.* 58,27–59,4, where Boethus is described as 'giving in' to a certain problem (ἐνδοὺς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ) by amending the text of the *Categories*—suggesting that he typically responded to *aporiai* by staunchly defending the text. In addition, I describe below several places in Porphyry's commentary *By Question and Answer* where large tracts of discussion, and particularly responses to *aporiai* that bear the brand of Lucius, might be traced to Boethus. In fact, I will suggest that Porphyry's twin commentaries *On the Categories*—namely, the commentary κατὰ πρῶτον καὶ ἀποκρίσιν²⁴ and the word-by-word treatment *Ad Gedaliū*²⁵—are modelled on one or two analogous commentaries by Boethus.

²³ So, too, he emphasizes the scope of the work contained in Plotinus 6.1–3 by the phrase τρισὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις: see above.

²⁴ On which see S. Strange, *Porphyry: On Aristotle Categories* (London, 1992).

²⁵ On which see A. Smith, (ed.), *Porphyrii philosophica fragmenta* (Leipzig 1993) and now the unpublished dissertation of M. Chase, *Études sur le commentaire de Porphyre sur les Catégories d'Aristote adressé à Gédalios* (2000). Stephen Menn (forthcoming) argues attractively that Gedalius was a Jewish contemporary of Porphyry.

III. ON THE σκοπός OF THE CATEGORIES

The *Categories* is about Simple, Significant Terms (and Concepts)

Porphyry, following the second-century Peripatetic Herminius,²⁶ reports and endorses Boethus' view of the *skopos* of the *Categories*. (1) 'Boethus said what we say', Porphyry explains: the treatise is about 'simple significant vocalizations, insofar as they signify realities' (περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὼ σημαντικαὶ εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, Porph. in *Cat.* 58,4–7). Simplicius also adds Boethus' view (via Porphyry) that the *Categories* concerns words just insofar as they signify beings (11,23–9). Thus, as Boethus is reported almost verbatim:

[W]ith regard to nouns and verbs, the division [of the *Categories*] takes place as far as the elements of speech (λόγος), but according to the categories the division takes place in so far as expressions (λέξεις) have a relation (σχέσις) to beings, since they are significant of the latter. 'This,' he says, 'is the reason why conjunctions (σύνδεσμοι), although they are to be found within the vocabulary (λέξεις), fall outside of the categories. For they do not indicate any being, not substance, nor the qualified, nor anything of the kind.'²⁷

This strongly resembles a response to the objections raised by Athenedorus (ch. 5). But Simplicius later adds a slightly different point: Boethus held that the *Categories* concerned, not only vocalizations and things, but the *concepts* that mediate between them (Simplic. in *Cat.* 13,11–18). At 41,28, we also encounter Boethus citing with approval the view of the 'ancients' that only intellections (νοήσεις) are signified.²⁸ (Simplicius feels obliged to reply on behalf of the Neoplatonist consensus in favour of significant expressions.)

²⁶ On whose treatment of the *Categories* see for example Griffin 2009: ch. 7.

²⁷ προστίθησιν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ Βοήθου ὁ Πορφύριος πολλὰ ἀγκυροῖας γέμοντα καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντα τοῖς εἰρημένους. λέγει γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἢ διαίρεσις εἰς τὰ τοῦ λόγου γίνεται στοιχεῖα, (25) κατὰ δὲ τὰς κατηγορίας ἢ διαίρεσις γίνεται, καθὼ σχέσιν ἔχουσιν αἱ λέξεις πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, σημαντικαὶ τούτων οὔσαι. 'διό, φησὶν, οἱ σύνδεσμοι ἐν μὲν τῇ λέξει εὐρίσκονται, τῶν δὲ κατηγοριῶν ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων δηλοῦσιν, οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον' (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

²⁸ Boethus also maintained (Simplic. 41,28) that 'among the Ancients, the only things said or signified were intellections (νοήσεις), for truth and falsehood are not in

What generates this slightly different tradition about the reading that Boethus favours? Porphyry (in his short commentary) and Simplicius may be preserving a single view in a simplified version (for beginners), which *omits* mediating concepts, and a more accurate version (for advanced readers), which *includes* concepts.²⁹ I have tentatively argued elsewhere (Griffin 2012a; 2009: ch. 1) that the two versions of the σκοπός—words-things and word-concepts-things—derive from different original sources, Andronicus and Boethus respectively. Andronicus may have interpreted the semantics of the *Categories* based on Stoic or Epicurean theory, and this interpretation might be largely preserved in the arguments for the title κατηγορία preserved in Porphyry's shorter commentary (see ch. 2). In any case, Andronicus' interpretation did not provide an important role for mediating concepts. But the semantics sketched in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 1 came to dominate in the later tradition, and this may have started from Boethus. Boethus—who was generally sympathetic to the works of Aristotle as transmitted³⁰—rejected Andronicus' athetization (rejection of Aristotle's authorship) of the *De Interpretatione*, and welded a three-step (words-concepts-things) semantical theory onto the earlier theory (omitting concepts) that Andronicus favoured. In doing so, Boethus may have inaugurated the influential 'conceptualist' semantical interpretation of the *Categories* that Simplicius (and presumably Porphyry in his *Ad Geda-lium*) favoured, generating the kind of critique we encounter at Simplic. 41,28.

Boethus also said that realities are necessarily described by non-compound expressions (Simplicius in *Cat.* 41,14–19). Simplicius is here commenting on a lemma from *Cat.* 1a16: 'Of things which are said, some are said in combination . . .' Here, he asks what λεγόμενα might mean. He offers a fourfold answer:³¹ 'things said' might be (1) realities (πράγματα), or (2) notions (νοήματα), or (3) the significant

the realities, but in thoughts (διάνοιαι) and the developments (διέξοδοι) of the intellect.'

²⁹ For this interpretation, see for instance Ebbesen 1990, and the masterful treatment of Simplicius in *Cat.* 12,13–13,11 in Hoffmann 1987.

³⁰ Boethus generally defends against *aporiai* or *enstaseis* raised against the text of Aristotle and the positions adopted by Aristotle, so that it is an exception, rather than the rule, when he suggests that the text may be corrupt (Simplic. in *Cat.* 58,23–7).

³¹ Compare Sosigenes ap. Dexippum in *Cat.* 7,1 and following, and Moraux 1973: 151–2.

expression itself, or (4) any expression at all, even a meaningless one. We might suppose that it was option (3) that Porphyry and Boethus agreed to be the σκοπός of the *Categories*.³² At this point, Simplicius himself does not suggest that we should prefer one of these options, but cites Boethus on how they might be reduced:

‘What is said’ must be understood in [these] four ways in the case of non-compound expressions, but in only three ways [sc. thoughts, significant expressions, and non-significant expressions] in the case of those which have been combined. According to him, combined realities, such as ‘It is day’, are not what is said, not because the λόγος does not signify anything, but because it is not the name of a reality (πράγμα), as day is. It is not of the reality, but about (περὶ) the reality.³³ (41,14–19, tr. Chase 2003, lightly adapted)

Thus the *Categories* concerns simple, significant expressions qua significant—but not propositions expressive of states of affairs.

The *Categories* is about Sensible Beings (the Referents of Simple, Significant Terms)

Boethus also states that the *Categories* is not concerned with intelligible being (μη γὰρ εἶναι περὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, Simplicius 78,4–5), but with sensible being alone. (I argue, ch. 4, that Boethus is here replying to Lucius, who is chronologically the earliest figure named in association with this problem at 73,15–28.) Boethus does acknowledge the reality of intelligible beings, such as intelligible number (Simplic. in *Cat.* 65,20–1).³⁴ Based on his observation that

³² cf. Chase (2003), n. ad loc.

³³ ἀλλ’ ὁ γε Βόηθος ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀσυμπλόκων τετραχῶς, <ὥς> εἴρηται, τὸ λεγόμενον ἀκούειν ἀξιοῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν τριχῶς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ συμπελεγμένα πράγματα, οἷον τὸ ‘ἡμέρα ἐστίν’ λεγόμενον, οὐχ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τοῦ πράγματος ὄνομα, ὥσπερ τὸ ἡμέρα. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πράγματος (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

³⁴ Boethus’ resort to the notion of an intelligible, ‘asomatic’ number has struck some commentators as surprisingly Platonizing. It certainly shows his direct response, I take it, to the criticisms of the *Categories* from a ‘Platonizing’ or ‘Pythagoreanizing’ perspective. Thus Moraux (155) suggests that Boethus is here influenced by Speusippus and ‘an die substantielle Realität von intelligiblen Zahlen glaubte’. Tarán (1981) argues to the contrary, pointing out that the distinction of two kinds of monads may be Simplicius’ own (‘then, as Boethus would say [ὁ Βόηθος ἂν φαίη], the monad will also be twofold . . .’). Michael Chase (2003, ad loc.) proposes that the influence may go back further still, as Alexander of Aphrodisias (in *Met.* 56,20) cites a similar

the treatise concerns sensible being alone—a view which could reasonably be derived from the examples of substances (*οὐσίαι*) used in the *Categories*³⁵—Boethus suggests that some objections of Lucius and Nicostratus, and Plotinus (such as whether the *Categories* amply deals with the intelligible world) are redundant. This helps to illustrate how Boethus responded to criticisms of the *Categories* as an account of *οὐσία*.³⁶

A more interesting question, he proposes, involves the relationship of the accounts of *οὐσία* given in the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* (78,5–20). This inquiry leads to Boethus' famous and much-repeated suggestion (as Porphyry interprets him, at any rate) that form might qualify as a non-substantial accident of its matter, although in the context, we might wonder whether Boethus distinguished (perhaps like Alexander, *DA* 90,2–15) between sensible form, which can be understood in this way, and intelligible form. Boethus appears to acknowledge that entities such as 'intelligible number' exist as *οὐσίαι*—or at least Simplicius believes that he does (65,20–1)—and can be distinguished from quantities or relations which have the same name:

'But what about the one', they [*sc.* critics of the *Categories* following Lucius] say, 'and the monad and the point? How can they not fall outside the categories?' [...] If... number is twofold—one incorporeal, the other corporeal—then, as Boethus would say, the monad will also be twofold: one which is substance (*οὐσία*), and is in intelligible number—Aristotle also thinks that this one exists—and one which is a relative or a quantified. Later, however, Boethus says that perhaps it is better to call it a quantified, for as whiteness is to white, so is the dyad to two. If, therefore, the former are both qualified, then the latter are also quantified. (Simplic. *in Cat.* 65,13–24, tr. Chase 2003)³⁷

discussion from Aristotle *On the Good* (fr. 2 Ross) and references Plato. But in itself, Boethus' description of a non-bodily, intelligible nature is not uncharacteristic: at 78,4, Boethus similarly distinguishes between 'somatic and asomatic' *ousia*, and this passage is analysed further below.

³⁵ Examples like individual human beings and animals would seem to support this assumption, although examples of non-substances categories—like 'knowledge in the soul'—are more difficult to reconcile.

³⁶ For a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias' response, see Ellis (1994).

³⁷ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν, φασί, καὶ ἡ μονὰς καὶ τὸ σημείον πῶς οὐκ ἔξω πίπτει τῶν κατηγοριῶν; οὔτε γὰρ ποσὸν ἔστιν, ὥς ἂν τῷ δόξειεν· οὔτε γὰρ συνεχές ἔστιν, ἅτε ἀμερές ὄν, οὔτε διωρισμένον· πᾶν δὲ ποσὸν ἢ συνεχές ἢ διωρισμένον εἶναι προσήκει, καὶ εἰ διωρισμένον, ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον. ἢ καὶ ὡς ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ ὡς μέτρον ἐν τῷ

Boethus is here replying to critics of the *Categories*, likely Lucius, who argue that the number one and the geometrical point have no place among the ten categories described by Aristotle—which looks like a version of their standard objection that the *Cat.* has ignored intelligible οὐσία. Boethus' response might mean something like the following. Suppose I use the word 'one' to pick something out. I might pick out a substance: in that case, I am presumably naming the monad, something intelligible. Alternatively, I might use 'one' to pick out a sensible quantity, if I mean to refer to the quantitative singularity of something here in front of me (say, Socrates). In either case, I am referring to something that falls under the list of ten categories. But Boethus maintains that strictly speaking (cf. 78,4–5), the *Categories* is not about intelligible items, but about sensible items. Therefore, 'perhaps it is better' (as Boethus continues here) to locate 'one' in the category of quantity.

There are a number of puzzles about this passage: for example, where does Aristotle maintain that an intelligible, substantial number exists? Simplicius' editor, Kalbfleisch, suggests ad loc. that the reference may be to *An. Post.* 1.27, 87a26, but as Chase 2003: 147 n. 735 suggests, the reference may be to an earlier Pythagorean position described by Aristotle in *On the Good*. And again, why should Boethus endorse what looks like a Platonist view by entertaining the existence of intelligible, substantial number? Moraux (1973: 155) proposes that Speusippus, who seems to have influenced Boethus' approach to the *Cat.*, may lie behind this (but see Chase 2003: n. 176). A passage of Dexippus (*in Cat.* 45,3–30) might also be read as suggesting that Alexander and Boethus shared the view that the *Categories* is not about intelligible beings, but that there nevertheless are such beings (but against this interpretation, which I endorsed in Griffin 2009: ch. 5, see now Chiaradonna 2013).³⁸ (I will not go

πρὸς τι καταταχθήσεται, ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοκεῖ. εἰ δὲ διττὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὁ μὲν ἀσώματος, ὁ δὲ σωματικός, ἔσται, ὡς καὶ ὁ Βόηθος ἂν φαίη, καὶ ἡ μονὰς διττή, ἡ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ (20) ἀριθμῷ (τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ), ἡ δὲ πρὸς τι ἢ ποσόν. ὕστερον δὲ φησιν ὁ Βόηθος μήποτε ἄμεινον εἶναι ποσὸν φάναι· ὡς γὰρ λευκότης ἔχει πρὸς λευκόν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ δυὰς πρὸς τὰ δύο· εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνα ἄμφω ποιόν, καὶ ταῦτα ποσόν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

³⁸ I argued for this interpretation in Griffin 2009: ch. 5; but see Chiaradonna 2013 for a different, careful, and thoughtful reconstruction of the passage.

further into this question here, but for Boethus' metaphysics more generally, see now Rashed 2013 and 2007; on Rashed's view, Boethus' position is more materialistic than Alexander's, and Alexander reacts against him.)³⁹

For reasons of space and focus, I omit here Boethus' careful discussions of a range of other themes in the *Categories*, including the Relative (on which he wrote a full book, Simplic. 163,6, which is cited here and there by Simplicius through 159,14–202,1), Acting and Undergoing (302,16), When and Where vs. Time and Place (348,2, and see Huby 1981 for the attribution of another fragment on the When to Boethus, with caution in Rashed 2013: 71), and on Having (373,8), which I addressed in more detail in Griffin 2009. Still, it is worth stressing, if only briefly here, that Boethus defended a number of traditional doctrines of the *Categories*. He contended against innovations in the category of the Relative. He maintained the division of Acting and Undergoing as independent categories. He maintained the categories Where and When rather than Place and Time, perhaps, as Huby suggests, in the course of a dialogue with Andronicus which would later undergo revision at the hands of Plotinus. He maintained the category of Having, against the Stoics. On the other hand, he also seems to have credited some innovations as beneficial, or at least recognized developments outside the bounds of the text: for instance, he suggested that Speusippus, as well as more recent Stoics (τοῖς νεωτέροις), had developed a more complete collection of 'onymies'⁴⁰ than that represented at *Cat.* 1a1–15.

³⁹ With respect to Alexander's view on universals, Tweedale (1984) suggests that Simplicius—and other modern commentators who deny that Alexander ever treated universals as 'primary'—have simply misunderstood Alexander, and perhaps based their interpretations upon an insufficiently nuanced reading of the primary texts. Following Paul Moraux (1942) in some points, and himself followed in the main by Dillon (1990) and Sharples (2005), Tweedale takes S. Pines and the later Neoplatonic tradition on Alexander's universalism to task as follows (1984:290–1).

⁴⁰ That is, linguistic phenomena like homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy, which classify objects according to criteria such as whether they share a name or a definition. Boethus also took an interest in classifying the many meanings of words such as 'genus', 'species', and 'differentia', much as Porphyry did in the *Isagoge* (1.18–2.10, etc.): see Chiaradonna, Rashed, Sedley, and Tchernetska 2013, 14,4 and commentary p. 184.

IV. THE STRUCTURE OF BOETHUS' WORK: *ἀπορίαι* AND *λύσεις*

The clearest instances⁴¹ of *ἀπορίαι* to which Boethus responds by name can be credited to Lucius, or rather to the 'followers of Lucius' (οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον). As we noted above, Lucius is mentioned by name on eight occasions in Simplicius. In each case, Boethus is subsequently cited to deliver a reply. Porphyry is generally on the scene, frequently to boost the view propounded by Boethus, but occasionally to deliver an additional critique. Leaving aside the ambiguous cases,⁴² some solid examples of Lucius' *ἀπορίαι* in Simplicius are as follows (for what follows see also ch. 4):⁴³

- (1) 48,1. The followers of Lucius question how what is in a subject can be so 'not as a part'. After a solution from Porphyry, and a comment by Simplicius (49,1), the *ἀπορία* continues, culminating in the absurd conclusion (49,31) that Socrates appears, on Aristotle's argument, to be an 'accident of place'. Finally, Boethus is cited to offer his own solution to the dilemma (quoted in ch. 4).
- (2) 64,18. The section is headlined by the observation that Cornutus, Lucius, and Nicostratus all objected to the division of the ten categories (62,27). The best manner of response to these critics is 'by question and answer'. 'The followers of Lucius' question why Aristotle omitted conjunctions from the *Categories* 'if they are also significant expressions'. Simplicius delivers a reply, to which Lucius again furnishes a rejoinder: 'What about the one, the monad, and the point?' Boethus, finally, replies that the monad is twofold.

⁴¹ An interesting example of his *modus operandi* is Simplic. in *Cat.* 348,2–7, a passage that Huby reads as a submerged dialogue between Boethus and Andronicus: if this is correct, it is similar in structure and style to Porphyry's treatment by *Question and Answer*, in that it does not appear to represent a one-way criticism of a predecessor's views, but a dialectic debate.

⁴² There are also unnamed instances, such as 58,27, where Boethus 'gives way' to an *aporia* (ἐνδοῦς τῇ ἀπορίᾳ, cf. 58,23–7) which may also have been posed by the school of Lucius.

⁴³ Of the eight citations of Lucius ascribed to Simplicius, this list of five omits 1,19 (where he is merely mentioned as the predecessor of Nicostratus) and collapses 62,27 and 64,18 into (2).

- (3) 73,28. The followers of Lucius, in the company of Nicostratus and Plotinus (6.1), question whether 'Aristotle here divided and enumerated sensible and generated things alone, or whether he did so with all beings... and in general whether the intelligible genera are different from the sensible'. Simplicius replies that 'he is primarily discussing things of this world... which are those immediately signified by words' and observes that we should focus on the 'threefold division' of form, matter, and the compound (347,19–348,2); a source for this reply is not presently forthcoming, but the same view recurs within a few pages under the name of Boethus (348,2).
- (4) 125,16. The followers of Lucius criticize Aristotle on the grounds that he transfers body, which belongs to substance, to the category of quantity. On this occasion, the reply precedes the citation: Lucius' school is 'mistaken' to make this criticism, because 'a body, insofar as it is extended three ways and can by nature be measured, is a quantity; but insofar as it is a substrate, remains the same and one in number and is receptive of the contraries, in that respect it is a substance.' An allusion to a response also found in Porphyry's commentary (*in Cat.* 103,18 ff.) follows. But where does this reply come from originally? Each of the doctrines is maintained by Boethus elsewhere in a manner which suggests a reply to this ἀπορία: (1) an enmattered quantity can be regarded in two different ways, as substance *or* as quantity (65,20); (2) it is a substance in so far as it is receptive of the contraries and one and the same in number; (3) it is measurable.
- (5) 156,17. The followers of Lucius contend that quality is nearer (more οἰκεῖον) to *ousia* than is the relative, observing that it is better to identify Socrates by his qualities than by his relations. The priority of quality holds, they continue, if one divides the categories into καθ' αὐτό and πρὸς ἕτερον. To this Porphyry replies that the relative should come next, arguing (*in Cat.* 111,9–112,5) that (1) when length, depth, and breadth have come into existence, the larger and smaller supervene upon them, and these are relatives; (2) also because Aristotle needs to explain what relatives are, having introduced them in discussing quantity. Porphyry continues to explain what

relatives are, concluding with an observation, namely, that the definition given by Aristotle here is Platonic and was subsequently corrected. Simplicius (159,12–15) ascribed this correction to Boethus, which may imply that Boethus underlies much of this discourse, which is presented more fully by Simplicius at 157,23–158,27, also immediately preceding a citation of Boethus (159,14).

The pattern is consistent, and may be broadly sketched as follows here (but see the ‘table of responses’ in ch. 4 for an overview): (a) ‘the followers of Lucius’, sometimes followed by Nicostratus or Plotinus, present a problem with the text of the *Categories*, which is taken up in sequence with the *κατὰ λέξιν* exegesis; (b) Porphyry provides a response; (c) Simplicius provides a response, which may be his own, but sometimes appears to be a submerged source; (d) Boethus provides a response, with Simplicius typically citing him by name. Elements (b) and (c) are sometimes reversed. I think it is highly probable, in light of the considerations mentioned earlier, that element (c) typically represents the opinion of Iamblichus in his own commentary *On the Categories*, drawing in places on the text of ‘Archytas’. This pattern integrates and develops a ‘back and forth’ dialectic that sometimes resembles, albeit with greater maturity, the style and content of Porphyry’s commentary *By Question and Answer*. The same pattern may also be reflected in the dialogue ascribed to Andronicus and Boethus by Huby (1981) at 347,19–348,2.

This simplified stratigraphy suggests, in my view, several results. First, Simplicius’ most immediate sources are Iamblichus’ commentary *On the Categories*, the source for element (c), and, beneath it, Porphyry’s commentary *Ad Gedalium*, as he informs us in the pre-ambles to his commentary. Second, the parallel passages in Porphyry’s *Ad Gedalium* contained at least the following elements: (a) the view taken by the followers of Lucius (sometimes advanced by Nicostratus or Plotinus), (b) views expressed by ‘Porphyry’ himself, perhaps (as I suspect)⁴⁴ encapsulating a history of other predecessors’ works, such

⁴⁴ The closest referent in Porphyry’s *in Cat.* answering to the dialogue discussed by Huby is not, in fact, Boethus, but Herminius, who is often mentioned by Porphyry as sharing Boethus’ views. I discussed Herminius’ role in the transmission further in the opening chapter of Griffin 2009.

as those of Herminus,⁴⁵ and (d) Boethus, in that order, sometimes followed by (e) a correction of Boethus' view by Porphyry himself, surviving for us in fragments such as Simplicius in *Cat.* 78,4. It may be deduced that Boethus often had the last word in Porphyry's treatment, at least when Porphyry and Iamblichus were content with his position, a situation which persisted throughout much of Simplicius' treatment.

Why was this structure adopted? So long as the commentators were sympathetic to the solution maintained by Boethus, the stratigraphy in Simplicius suggests that Porphyry's and Iamblichus' commentaries successively interpolated content *between* Lucius' ἀπορία and Boethus' answer, generating elements (b) and (c). They maintained the integrity of Boethus' treatment as a λύσις of the ἀπορία, and did not amend it, but occasionally added a corrective response when Boethus ἀγχινοία fell short, so to speak, of the Platonic truth.⁴⁶

I infer that Boethus' commentary on the *Categories* κατὰ λέξιν may be the original source *both* for the Lucian ἀπορίαι and for Boethus' responses to them. This commentary, like Porphyry's, Iamblichus', and Simplicius' major works, treated the text in sequence, probably by lemmata, and investigated certain ἀπορίαι in the form of questions and answers. Many of these apories were traced by Boethus himself to the Lucian school, which he sought to answer. (Some of them may also have been raised by Andronicus; cf. Huby 1981). In general, Boethus' responses to these puzzles generated the content of elements (a) and (d) that survive in Simplicius, and perhaps many sections of unsourced dialogue.

Thus the stratigraphy of the underlying commentaries—each modelled on its predecessor and incorporating some new material—might follow this model:

⁴⁵ The teacher of Alexander who followed Boethus' views on the *skopos* of the *Cat.* for instance, 'albeit briefly' (Porph. *In Cat.* 59,17–18).

⁴⁶ This is particularly intriguing in the context of Michael Chase's (2003: 94) suggestion that Simplicius 'admired B[oethus] more than any other pre-Porphyrian exegete'. The epithet *thaumasios* bestowed upon him is exceptional, and in general the attitudes of the commentators imply that he was treated with some of the caution and respect accorded to a genuine Neoplatonist commentator. One might venture to suggest that Simplicius' sources' attitudes differed slightly, as one shies away from a direct criticism of Boethus' 'ignorance' (149,14) while the other is prepared to debunk it (163,3 and 163,15); in general, however, his arguments are left intact.

Simplicius	
Iamblichus	(Incorporating: Pseudo-Archytas)
Porphyry (AG)	(Incorporating: Nicostratus, Athenodorus, Cornutus, Herminus, Plotinus, and others)
Boethus	(Incorporating: Lucius, Andronicus)

Did Boethus, like Porphyry, compose two commentaries, one directed to a real or imagined pupil and adopting the form of questions and answers, the other directed against *ἀπορίαι* raised by historical objectors and adopting the *κατὰ λέξιν* form of close exegesis? It may be equally likely that these two formats were used in a single work. Porphyry's *Question and Answer* commentary, once it gets underway, develops its comments based on the quotation of individual lemmata, most of which are cited by his interlocutor (see for example 86,33–4), and many of which cite named historical figures such as Athenodorus, Cornutus, and Herminus. Conversely, Simplicius' pattern of presentation demonstrates that a *κατὰ λέξιν* commentary can also incorporate a dialogue format presenting aporetic questions and answers; indeed, Simplicius or his source, at 63,2, recommend the genre of 'debate' (τὸν τύπον τῆς ἀντιλογίας) to address the *ἀπορίαι* raised by Lucius and his successors.

Porphyry's commentary *By Question and Answer* is primarily pedagogical, and represents a work simpler than, but analogous to, his monumental treatment *Ad Gedaliū*.⁴⁷ Both commentaries address interlocutors who are otherwise unknown (but on Gedalius see now Menn forthcoming). Lucius is also a figure otherwise unknown: I speculated earlier (in my discussion of Lucius and Nicostratus) that he may be an interlocutor comparable to Porphyry's student in the *Categories* commentary.⁴⁸ Such speculation could not easily be supported against the testimony of the later sources, and particularly Simplicius, who views Lucius as an historical figure and the predecessor of Nicostratus.

⁴⁷ This could be argued citing comparanda in Porphyry's commentary by question and answer under the headings, for instance, 90,29–81,12, 95,16–38, 111,5–112,7; I argued along these lines in Griffin 2009: ch. 5.

⁴⁸ But given the poverty of the evidence, such speculation treads into the treacherous territory of replacing Homer with 'another man of the same name'!

V. CONCLUSIONS

The stratigraphy discussed above suggests that Boethus' responses to *aporiai*, including Lucius' problems and (perhaps) certain novel interpretations proposed by Andronicus, represent a general approach to the exegesis of the text that would go on to exercise considerable influence on the structure and content of future treatments. However, our review also suggests that Boethus' solutions were not immediately adopted; in fact, the shadowy commentators following Boethus, such as Nicostratus, appear to have challenged his answers to Lucius, and adopted and developed these *aporiai* as increasingly serious challenges. These succeeding philosophers who adopted and pursued the positions ascribed to Lucius may, perhaps, have been broadly characterized as οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον, the group to whom Simplicius ascribes each of the relevant *aporiai* cited above in the *Categories* commentary.

In the chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus, we also considered this tradition of commentary that immediately followed Boethus. The tradition appears to have been defined by engagement with Lucius' *aporiai* as well as Boethus' exegesis and solutions, and these responses evolved over time into a positive redefinition of the problem concerning the *genē* of being, represented in the culminating point of Plotinus' treatise 6.1–3.

We do not often find Boethus engaging directly or frequently with the 'linguistic' view of the *Categories* presented by the Stoic Athenodorus, except for the occasional but telling remark that the text doesn't address conjunctions because its target is semantics (Simplic. 11,23–9). However, as Porphyry's shorter commentary shows, Herminius did treat Boethus as maintaining a view capable of withstanding Athenodorus' objections, and Herminius himself sought to rebut those objections.⁴⁹

Boethus himself defended a view of the *Categories* according to which it had something to say about the structure of being itself, and not merely about language. His most explicit polemical concern is to deal with the objections of the 'Platonizing' critics such as Lucius. Later, Herminius would adopt the formula that the *Categories* concerns 'simple words significant of beings, insofar as they are significant',

⁴⁹ See also Griffin 2009: ch. 1.

and ascribe this formula to Boethus, but deploy it primarily in defence against the ‘linguistic’ criticism promoted by Athenodorus.

This chapter has very briefly surveyed the much larger plain of Boethus’ contribution to the tradition of philosophical commentary on the *Categories*.⁵⁰ Boethus does emerge as an historian of philosophy and as an original thinker who provoked strong responses among his contemporaries and in the school of later Neoplatonism that followed Porphyry. He developed the thought of certain predecessors, including Andronicus, in certain areas, but his greatest contribution was to maintain and revitalize a strong line of Peripatetic thought in an idiom and an intellectual context which was clearly understood by Stoics and Platonists as relevant, and inspired a re-engagement, sometimes contentious and sometimes familiar, with the esoteric treatises of Aristotle (discussed in ch. 2). In short, Boethus transformed the *Categories* into a rich repository of content that would occupy centuries of discussion. He raised critical challenges of interpretation that remain with us today, such as the problem of reconciling the *Categories*’ notion of *ousia* with the hylomorphism of the *Metaphysics*. Lastly, Boethus asked why Aristotle subdivided *ousia* into three kinds in the *Metaphysics*, namely Form, Matter, and the Compound, yet circumscribed *ousia* in a single genus in the *Categories*. This question is one of Boethus’ most lasting, and challenging, contributions to the tradition.

⁵⁰ I attempted to treat that contribution in more detail in Griffin 2009: ch. 5; see now Rashed 2013 and 2007 for outstanding introductions to Boethus’ metaphysics, and Chiaradonna 2013 for a reinterpretation of a crucial text in Dexippus.

The Second Century

*A Brief Overview*¹

This chapter briefly surveys subsequent developments in the tradition on the *Categories*.

I. SECOND-CENTURY PLATONISTS

Already following Plutarch (discussed briefly in ch. 3), by the middle of the second century CE, we find in Alcinous' *Didaskalikos* examples of Platonists using the ten categories. The author claims that Plato 'gave indications' of the ten categories in the *Parmenides* (although as Dillon 1993: 84 points out, the verb *ὑπέδειξεν* suggests that Plato is less than explicit).² We can see here a continuation of the spirit (if not the letter) of Eudorus' warmth to the *Categories* in principle, and Antiochus' ecumenical interest in the common dialectical tools of the Old Academy.

On the other hand, Atticus, who was active under Marcus Aurelius, takes a decidedly polemical line towards Aristotelianism. He wrote a critical tract 'Against those who interpret Plato's philosophy by means of Aristotle', some of which is preserved by Eusebius (*Praep.*

¹ A fuller list of the contemporary personae may be found in Sorabji and Sharples (2007).

² Proclus in *Parm.* 1083,37 would also later attribute to certain 'earlier' commentators the view that, in the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, the ten categories were denied of the One; see Did. 6.10, and Dillon 1977: 279 and 1993: 84–5 for commentary and list of relevant citations in the *Parmenides* itself.

Ev. bks 11 and 15).³ With respect to the *Categories*, Atticus is said by Simplicius (*in Cat.* 30,16; 32,19 = fr. 41–2 Des Places) to have offered two comments on the definition of homonyms and synonyms at the outset of the *Categories*. In the first, he elaborates the objection of Nicostratus; the second focuses on the relationship of analogical and metaphorical uses of terms. Atticus represents an approach different to that of, say, the author of the *Didaskalikos*, who seeks to show that Plato is the *source* of what is useful in Aristotle. In taking this line, Atticus appears to follow L. Calvinus Taurus (second quarter of the second century), who wrote ‘on the doctrinal differences’ of Plato and Aristotle (*Suda* T 166, v. iv p. 509.12 Adler).⁴

II. PERIPATETICS

In the early second century, Aspasius—who taught Herminus, who in turn lectured to Alexander of Aphrodisias—authored a commentary on the *Categories*; he (among many others) may have mediated the Boethan commentary tradition to Herminus and Alexander, important sources for Porphyry.⁵

We also know from Galen (*De libr. propr.* 42,20–43,1) that Adrastus of Aphrodisias wrote a commentary on *Categories* in the second century CE.⁶ Adrastus appears to have re-instituted the attachment of the *Categories* to the *Topics* (and presumably re-emphasized its value for dialectic in the *Topics* sense), while retaining its Andronican place at the outset of the curriculum. His arguments were evidently contained in a treatise entitled ‘Concerning the Order of Aristotle’s Treatises’ (Simplicius, *in Cat.* 16,1–4). Adrastus also revived the title ‘Before the *Topics*’ for the *Categories*—this may suggest that he was

³ Broadly, he argues against Aristotle’s doctrine of the *telos*, his alleged disbelief in *pronoia*, his teaching on the eternity of physical world, on the fifth *ousia* and motion of the heavens, and his supposed denial of the immortality of the human soul, in addition to Aristotle’s denial of the Platonic world-soul and *eidē*.

⁴ See Dillon (1977: 237 ff.), Dorrie and Baltes, 310–23, and Praechter 101 ff.

⁵ Indeed, Aspasius authored a series of commentaries, on the *Categories*, *De Int.*, *Physics*, *De Caelo*, *Metaphysics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Of these, just the last is (in significant portions) extant. For our purposes, he is a key source for the views of Andronicus and Boethus on *παθή*.

⁶ And from Simplicius (*in Phys.* 122,33) that he wrote a commentary on *Physics*.

responding directly to Andronicus (cf. Simplic. 15,30 and 16,14). Adrastus also discussed a second ‘version’ of the text of the *Categories*,⁷ suggesting that he had access to a diversity of textual traditions.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, His Teachers and Contemporaries

Simplicius, early in his commentary (13,11–18), offers this ‘compromise’ view about the σκοπός of the *Categories*, which is attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias as well as several of his teachers, suggesting the development of a consensus in the later second century:

It is thus clear from the preceding considerations that the goal [of the *Categories*], appropriate to the study of logic, is about simple, primary, and generic words (*φωναί*), in so far as they are significant of beings. Instruction is, at any rate, also given about the realities which are signified by them, and about notions (*νοήματα*), in so far as it is realities that are signified by words. This is also the view of the Alexanders [i.e. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Alexander of Aigai], Herminus, Boethus, and Porphyry; it was seconded by the divine Iamblichus, clarified by Syrianus, and accepted by our teachers. (tr. Chase 2003)⁸

Alexander himself is the central figure in this list, certainly the most prominent before Porphyry. Simplicius’ framing of the consensus suggests (chronologically) that Alexander’s treatment of the *Categories* integrated the views of Alexander of Aigai and Herminus, and Boethus (perhaps representing a commentary tradition with multiple layers dating back to Boethus: cf. Griffin 2009: ch. 1). Here we might say a few words about Alexander’s teachers, the link between the earlier commentary tradition that we have been treating, and Alexander. (Alexander himself falls outside the scope of this study; but on his role as a source, see also Appendix 1.)

⁷ On him, cf. Simplic. *in Phys.* 4.11, 6.4 ff; *in Cat.* 15.36, 18.16 ff.; cf. Zeller III 1, 809 n. 3; Moraux *Listes* 58 ff.

⁸ ἔστιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον, ὅτι ἐστὶν μὲν ὁ σκοπὸς οἰκείος τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὼς σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν, συνδιδάσκειται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα, καθὼς σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδροις καὶ Ἑρμίνῳ καὶ Βοήθῳ καὶ Πορφυρίῳ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλῆχος ἐπισηφίζει καὶ Συριανὸς σαφηνίζει καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι διδάσκαλοι ἀποδέχονται (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

Herminius, who lectured to Alexander sometime in the later second century CE, is a particularly important figure in the transmission of our story.⁹ His Aristotelian lectures were heard by Alexander of Aphrodisias,¹⁰ and he was described by his contemporary Lucian¹¹ as a man who ‘praises Aristotle, with a mouth full of his ten categories’. As Porphyry’s report of him clearly shows (*in Cat.* 59,17–33), Herminius endorsed the view that the *Categories* was a suitable introduction to philosophy, based on its ability to help articulate our natural *πρόληψεις* of the ten genera. I have argued elsewhere that Herminius was important for mediating the earlier tradition to Alexander, through whom Porphyry has his own reports of Herminius’ views.¹² I have also speculated that Herminius adopted a more ‘Andronican’ version of the *σκοπός* of the *Categories*, as addressing words that directly signify things (without conceptual mediation).¹³

Also in the later second century, Sosigenes¹⁴ lectured to Alexander (Alex. *in Meteor.* 143,13: ὁ διδάσκαλος ἡμῶν Σωσιγένης).¹⁵ Sosigenes framed the debate about the *σκοπός* of the *Categories* in a way that might have been particularly influential in the later commentary tradition, asking what Aristotle means by *λεγόμενον*, ‘what is said’: ‘word’ (*φωνή*), ‘thought’ (*νόημα*), or ‘object’ (*πᾶγμα*) (cf. Simplic. *in Cat.* 7,4–9,24; Dexippus 7,4). Sosigenes himself did not choose

⁹ On Herminius see Gottschalk (1987), 1158–60 and (1990), 79; Moraux (1984), II, 361–98; and Goulet (2000), III, 652–4. His fragments were collected by Schmidt (1907). Modern students of Aristotle’s logic have noted and criticized his views on the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics*; see for example Łukasiewicz (1951), 30–1; Patzig (1968), 118–22; Smith (1997), 141–2; Barnes et al. (1991); Flannery (1994); and Bochenski (1947), 64. For earlier studies on Herminius, see Prantl (1855–70), I, 545–6 (*Categories*), 584–50, 552–3; 555–7 and Zeller (III 1, 778, 1 and 783, 2).

¹⁰ Simplicius, *De caelo* 430,32–431,11 reports a comment of Alexander that ‘Ερμίνου δέ ἡκουσα, καθὰ ἦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἀσπασίου φερόμενον. Simplicius adds ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ τοῦ Ἑρμίνου κατὰ τὸν Ἀσπασίον εἰρημμένα. See also Moraux (1984), II, 361–3. As I suggest below, Herminius may have been known to the later commentators solely, or chiefly, through Alexander.

¹¹ *Life of Demonax* 56,1–6: τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη δ’ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ διὰ στόματος αὐτοῦ τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ἔχοντα. Lucian appears to imply that his readership would, like Demonax (εἰδὼς γὰρ . . . , 56,2), already be familiar with this *Fachgebiet* of Herminius.

¹² Griffin 2009: ch. 7.

¹³ Griffin 2009: ch. 1, 7; Griffin 2012a.

¹⁴ On him see Zeller 1990 (orig. 1856): 813; Rehm 1927, and Moraux 1973.

¹⁵ He wrote on optics, as Alexander tells us, and he wrote a detailed account of the theory of Eudoxus and Aristotle, and Callippus about the planetary spheres, explaining the use of epicycles (see Simplic. *in Cael.* 493–510; also Alex. *in Met.* 703–6).

between the three theses,¹⁶ but his scholastic way of carving up the argument fits the doxographical tendency of the later commentators.

Coming to Alexander's prodigious contemporary Galen (129–c.216 CE), we might just note in passing a few portions of his output of direct relevance to the *Categories*. First, Galen tells us of his own commentary, which does not survive, but demonstrates an interesting attitude towards his predecessors—an attitude of respect, which urges the reader to privilege the earlier commentaries on the treatise. We also meet this attitude in Simplicius when he enjoins us to prefer the commentaries of Iamblichus and Porphyry to his own. Galen writes:

On [Aristotle's] work on *The Ten Categories* I had not previously written any commentary, either for myself or for others; when subsequently somebody asked me for something on the solution posed on that work, <I wrote a commentary> with the firm instruction that he should only show it to students who had already read the book with a teacher, or at least made a start with some other commentaries, such as those of Adrastus and Aspasius.¹⁷ (*On My Own Books* 19.42–3 Kühn, translation after Singer)

Second, some fragments of Galen's own views on the categories do survive. In the first place, we know that he retained the 'ten' categories, but also added an eleventh, 'synthesis', which he suggests Aristotle omitted in error (*Inst. Log.* 13); thus, from Simplicius' standpoint, Galen would stand among those who, like Athenodorus, judged the tenfold division of the categories deficient.¹⁸ But this all goes to show that it was natural for a second-century polymath like Galen to comment on the *Categories* and to expect that they should be read by relative philosophical beginners with the help of a commentary and a teacher.

¹⁶ cf. Moraux in *Hermes* 95 (1967), p. 169 on Alexander.

¹⁷ τοῦ δὲ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν οὐκ ἐποίησάμην οὔτ' ἐμαντῶ τι τοιοῦτον ὑπόμνημα πρόσθεν οὔθ' ἑτέροις ἔδωκα καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' ὕστερόν ποτε τῶν ἐταίρων τινὶ δεηθέντι ὑπομνήματ' (15) ἔχειν <περιέχονθ'>, ὅσα [κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον] <ἀν>ήκουσιν εἰς τὰς τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζητουμένων λύσεις ***, κοινῶς νεῖν ἐκέλευσα τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ἐκείνοις μόνοις τοῖς ἀνεγνωκόσι παρὰ διδασκάλῳ τὸ βιβλίον ἢ πάντως γε προεισηγμένοις δι' ἑτέρων ἐξηγητικῶν, ὅποια τὰ τ' Ἀδράστου καὶ Ἀσπασίου ἐστίν (ed. Helmreich et al. 1891).

¹⁸ Elias (*in Cat.* 160,20) also ascribes a list of five categories (*ousia, poion, poson, pros ti, pros ti pōs echon*) to Galen, although Prantl (I 564 n. 85) takes this to be an error.

Conclusions

Our *Categories* was perhaps not unknown at the dawn of the first century, although it would have been known under a different title, *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων*, and interpreted perhaps as a source of a familiar, handbook list of basic question-types (similar to Quintilian's interpretation of the ten *elementa* at *Inst.* 3.23–34), or as an aid for correcting sophistical arguments based on category confusion and developing tests for finding the genus of a term (with criticism offered by those who troubled to interpret the text in detail at all, perhaps including Stoic philosophers like Athenodorus, who read it as a division of basically linguistic items).

As Aristotle's esoteric works began to attract some new interest in the limited circles represented by men like Tyrannio, and among Peripatetics like Andronicus and Ariston, we might see Andronicus as especially struck by the value of the *Categories* as a proleptic treatise able to 'tease out' and articulate our preconceptions. The *Categories* triggered this process at the level of ordinary language, illuminating the simple kinds relevant to definition and division. We might further speculate, based on his interest in recognizing and correcting equivocation in the *Categories*, that Andronicus was also interested in its utility for resisting sophistical arguments that threatened the possibility of dialectic and demonstration.

Andronicus, then, brought the treatise to the attention of a wider audience through his catalogue, paraphrase, and other work. Eudorus exemplifies that interest—representing a growing Academic, 'Platonizing' school of interest in Alexandria that makes the *Categories* not only a useful tool but a map of intelligible reality. That view sparked rival critique from Platonist quarters, including the criticisms offered by Lucius. Andronicus' pupil, Boethus of Sidon, replied to these criticisms (engaging in turn in a more detailed, metaphysical interpretation of the

Categories), but also replied to the linguistic reading of the *Categories* represented by Athenodorus, of whom Andronicus may not even have been aware, and at any rate by whose worries he does not seem to have been much bothered. Boethus' compromise interpretation, that the *Categories* concerns 'words significant of things, qua significant'—with the further rider that the 'things' initially signified by our ordinary words are *sensible* things—responds effectively to both 'Lucian' and 'Athenodoran' lines of criticism. He explains why the *Categories*' scope is restricted, whether it is treated as a work about language or being, and he introduces a fundamentally new way of understanding the *Categories* as a treatise about *semantics*. This Boethian reading would prevail until Porphyry, with, in the intervening years, Nicostratus and Plotinus taking up Lucius' problems, and Cornutus also responding to Athenodorus; Iamblichus would perhaps return, as briefly discussed below, to the Eudoran view that the *Categories* might offer a useful map of intelligible being. (For the difference between Iamblichus' and Porphyry's interpretations of the *Categories*, see Chiaradonna 2007b; I also discuss the interrelationship of the later sources in Griffin 2009: ch. 1.)

This is the story that I have primarily sought to trace in this book. But interest in the *Categories* continued to develop. Later, the Stoic division of the first and second parts of dialectic may have influenced the second-century Peripatetic Herminus in his influential distinction of the 'first' and 'second' imposition of language, itself constructed around earlier Hellenistic theories of language. The 'second' imposition, after all, concerns discussion of linguistic expressions in themselves (the second compartment of Stoic dialectic), while the 'first' imposition concerns discussion of the entities that they signify, insofar as the linguistic expressions signify (the first compartment of Stoic dialectic). Herminus' defence against the Stoic attacks on the *Categories*, and his revitalization of Boethus' formulation of the *skopos*, may represent the inauguration of the 'story' told by Porphyry, where some historical figures were partisans of the *Categories* as a (poor) account of being, others of the *Categories* as a (poor) account of language, and only Boethus and Herminus got it right as a (good) account of both. Certainly Herminus conveyed, and perhaps inaugurated, the view that the *Categories* was a pedagogically suitable introduction to the quest for knowledge. But even as Herminus lectured, Sosigenes discussed an alternative 'history', namely a 'tripartition' of historical sources that included a mediating

‘conceptualist’ view of the subject matter of the *Categories*. Unlike Herminus, however, Sosigenes did not take a position on which of the sources was correct.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, I think,¹ incorporated both of his lecturers’ views—Herminus’ and Sosigenes’—on the *Categories*. Porphyry, then, adopted Alexander’s account wholesale in his own commentary *in Cat.*, including both Herminus’ defence and Alexander’s critique of it. It is fair to presume that Porphyry added and subtracted considerable detail and innovation, perhaps partly motivated by the approach taken toward the *Categories*, or rather toward the exegetical tradition on the *Categories*, in the school of Plotinus. In the longer commentary *Ad Gedalium* that served as a basis for future commentators, there was room for a comprehensive discussion of the positions reported and taken by Alexander. In the shorter commentary *in Cat.* that has survived, there was room only to report Herminus’ position, and (in keeping with Porphyry’s own practice of simplification, discussed early in the *Isagoge*) to omit difficulties about the real *nature* of the entities discussed in the *Categories*.

Iamblichus² then came to add both ‘noeric *theōria*’ and the views of ‘Archytas’ to Porphyry’s commentary. In so doing, we may note, Iamblichus was in many ways reverting to an alternative, non-dialectical reading of the *Categories* that originated in the first century BCE, at least as early as the Andronican reading, with Eudorus, ‘Archytas’, and Lucius, and which is preserved in Plutarch (*An. Proc.*) and Philo, among others who also viewed Plato as an early proponent of this use of the ‘ten categories’. But Iamblichus reapplied this exegetical approach to the *history of scholarship* on the *Categories* as well as to the text itself, describing the ‘tripartition’ of views on the σκοπός as significant of three ‘levels’ of interpretation, with his own commentary serving as a corrective to Porphyry’s. There he draws the reader ‘upward’ to the truest and most genuine interpretation—as he himself puts it, ‘leading the simples to the Ten, as did Archytas, with whom Plato was in agreement’ (τὰ δὲ ἀπλὰ εἰς δεκάδα συνήγαγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὡς Ἀρχύτας, ᾧ καὶ Πλάτων συγγέγονεν, 13,22). Although Iamblichus’ approach appears to be a dramatic change of style and emphasis in the treatment of the *Categories*, it would also go

¹ On the theory that I sketched in Griffin 2009: chs. 1, 7.

² As I also argued in Griffin 2009: ch. 1.

on to contribute to the later Neoplatonic respect for the ‘usefulness’ of the *Organon*. And finally Simplicius, drawing Iamblichus’ lofty and noeric exegesis to a level ‘accessible to the multitude’ (3,6–7), came to produce the exhaustive commentary that we now possess, in which the stratigraphy above, or something like it, is still encoded.

Throughout this long exegetical history, the *Categories* maintained the ‘pole position’ that Andronicus granted it at the outset of the Aristotelian reading list, functioning as a beginner’s guide to the *πρόληψεις* and *ἐννοιαι* of the ten genera of predication that we all share. Without the interest that Andronicus’ and Boethus’ interpretation started, we may never have come to regard the *Categories* as holding a crucial role in understanding Aristotle’s thought and metaphysics. Thus Andronicus, regardless of the influence of his editorial work, has been responsible for a major factor in the development of subsequent Aristotelianism.

Appendices

APPENDIX 1

Persons and Sources

I. Main Persons Treated

Andronicus of Rhodes (fl. after 43 BCE?). Ch. 3. A first-century BCE Peripatetic, said by some later sources to have been scholarch in Athens, who is widely credited with the publication of Aristotle that reintroduced his esoteric works (the school treatises which we now possess, in contrast to the popular dialogues that Aristotle also published but are now lost) to the contemporary public. Among his works was a seminal catalogue of Aristotle, and a *paraphrasis* of the *Categories*. Several unorthodox views of Andronicus about the text have come down to us: for example, his replacement of the categories ‘When’ and ‘Where’ with those of ‘Time’ and ‘Place’.

Eudorus of Alexandria (fl. c.50 BCE?). An ‘Academic’ (on the use of the term here, see Bonazzi 2013) and Neo-Pythagorean who discussed the *Categories* in the first century BCE, perhaps prior to or contemporary with Andronicus’ *paraphrasis*. He may have introduced the criticism of the *Categories* as an inadequate account of being, and specifically ‘intelligible’ being. At the same time, Eudorus may have found in the *Categories* a congenial analogy for certain aspects of (Neo-Pythagorean) metaphysics. The emphasis of his fragments suggests that Eudorus read the *Categories* primarily as a work with something to say about the structure of being.

Ariston (fl. c.50 BCE?). A rival of Eudorus in Alexandria, if he is to be identified Ariston of Alexandria, who joined the Peripatos alongside Cratippus of Pergamon. He shared many of Andronicus’ views, for example on the definition of the Relative.

‘**Archytas**’¹ (fl. c.50 BCE?). The name given to the author of certain influential Neo-Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, to signify their authorship by the fourth-century Pythagorean and Academic Archytas of Tarentum; the ‘Pseudo-Archytan’ corpus is strongly influenced by Eudorus. At least three of ‘Archytas’ texts dealt with the subject matter of the *Categories*, and the Neoplatonic philosopher Iamblichus (see below) held that his works were written prior to the *Categories*, and could profitably be employed in order to obtain a higher understanding of the subject matter of the *Categories*.

¹ See the introduction to T. A. Szlezák (1972) and M. Frede in *Der Neue Pauly*, as well as Dörrie, *Platonica minora*, 300. I have also found the synopsis in Dillon (1977/1996) and Bonazzi (2007) useful, with other literature given in chs. 3 and 3.1.

Philo of Alexandria² (20 BCE to 50 CE). The great Jewish philosopher, exegete, and polymath is mentioned briefly in ch. 3 and elsewhere, particularly as a follower of Eudorus in some areas of his treatment of the *Categories*. He is not separately treated as a major subject of this study, although there is much of interest for future research in Philo's use of the ten categories (although not necessarily of the *Categories*) throughout his corpus.

Lucius (fl. later first century BCE?). Apparently a Platonizing critic of the *Categories*, perhaps datable before or contemporary with Boethus of Sidon; Lucius' fragments survive only from Simplicius *On the Categories*. He seems to have broadly followed Eudorus, especially in his criticism of the *Categories* as an inadequate treatment of intelligible being, and set the stage for the discussion in Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.1. However, as I argue in ch. 4, there is very little evidence for an historical figure Lucius, and the name *may* serve to represent an entire Platonic–Pythagorean 'school' to which Boethus replied under this name.

Boethus of Sidon (fl. first centuries BCE–CE). An especially diligent and influential Peripatetic reader of the *Categories* and (according to late sources) disciple of Andronicus, who defended the text against the arguments of Lucius, among others. Boethus sought to rebut the allegation that Aristotle had failed to provide an adequate account of intelligible being, and is the first scholar on record to ask instead how the *Categories* account of *ousia* can be reconciled with that of the *Metaphysics*. He also reasserted the canonical views of Aristotle in certain respects against the less orthodox positions of Andronicus, for example, reinstating 'When' and 'Where' in the roster of ten categories. Boethus' formulation that the *Categories* concerns 'simple verbal expressions significant of beings, insofar as they are significant' was later adopted by Herminius—perhaps, as I suggest, in response to Athenodorus and Cornutus—and became foundational for Neoplatonic and later semantics. In general, I think that the texts I have attributed to Boethus unambiguously belong to the Peripatetic Sidonian and not to the Stoic of that name.³

Athenodorus [of Tarsus?] (fl. c.50 BCE or earlier?). A Stoic philosopher, perhaps to be identified with the mentor of Octavian, who criticized the *Categories* as dealing inadequately with the parts of speech.

L. Annaeus Cornutus (fl. c.60 CE). Cornutus is chiefly known to the historical tradition as the tutor of the silver-age poet Persius and as an associate or instructor of the emperor Nero. Among other subjects, he

² On Philo of Alexandria, see Runia in *Der Neue Pauly* [I 12], with extensive bibliography. On his use of Peripatetic material, see Gottschalk, 1141 and 1145–6.

³ In my original approach to Boethus (Griffin 2009: ch. 5), I exclude 10 of the 11 fragments in SVF under the name of Boethus Stoicus, which clearly stand apart from the fragments collected above as representative of Boethus Peripateticus. An ambiguous passage is Boethus Stoicus fr. 11 = Simplic. in *De An.* 247,24.

wrote extensively on grammar and Stoic allegory (the latter work is extant), and he composed a work of commentary that challenged both Athenodorus and Aristotle on the *Categories*. Cornutus may, as I suggest, have defended the *Categories* against the attacks of Athenodorus by pointing out that it should be viewed as a contribution to the second 'part' of Stoic dialectic, rather than the first (linguistic) part; this defence was then taken up by Herminius and combined with Boethus' formulation of the *skopos*.

Plutarch of Chaeronea (46 to c.122 CE). The prodigious writer Plutarch is a helpful philosophical source for Eudorus of Alexandria (in *Proc. An.*, discussed by Dillon 1977: 226 and by Karamanolis 2006: 124-5) and as an historical source for Andronicus of Rhodes. A remarkable passage in his *Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*, which refers to Eudorus frequently, suggests that Plato anticipated the full doctrine of *Categories* in the *Timaeus*, and in fact has a more complete and accurate picture of it than does Aristotle; this is also the view taken by Eudorus and (implicitly) 'Archytas', but it survives explicitly in Plutarch.

Nicostratus (early second century CE). Like Lucius, whose views he endorses, the fragments of Nicostratus survive solely in Simplicius *On the Categories*. Praechter identifies him persuasively with the Nicostratus honoured in an inscription at Delphi (*Sylloge* II³ Nr. 868). He shares Lucius' concern with the adequacy of the *Categories* as an account of intelligible being, and it is likely that Plotinus found these difficulties expressed in Nicostratus, directly or indirectly. But Nicostratus also demonstrates (either through his own interests or through the accidents of preservation) a stronger interest in the rhetorical coherence and internal consistency of the *Categories*, and appears to be equally concerned with these problems as he is with matters of doctrine.

Achaïcus and Sotion (later first to early second century CE?): see Moraux 1984: 211. Not dealt with in a separate chapter. Scattered comments on the *Categories* are ascribed to each, although we do not know the form that their treatments took. According to Simplicius, both A. and S. held that we should only speak of 'relatives' in the plural, never in the singular (*in Cat.* 159,25); notably, they criticize 'the ancient commentators', namely 'Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus, Eudorus, and Athenodorus', for failing to make the distinction. Later, Achaïcus also appears to respond to Andronicus and Boethus regarding the definition of the Relative (203,1). Other comments of Achaïcus and Sotion are noted by Simplicius. Their treatment of earlier sources *might* suggest that A. and S. played some role in conveying the views of the 'ancient' commentators; see also Porphyry *in Cat.* 111,22 and Ammonius *in Cat.* 66,14. Both A. and S. are only briefly treated here, and are not considered in our discussion of the *skopos* of the text.

Alcinous⁴ (second century CE). The author of the *Didaskalikos* follows the earlier Platonizing tradition of claiming the categories for Plato—that is, Plato anticipated Aristotle in his account of the ten categories. This syncretizing and Platonizing attitude is common to this text as well as Eudorus, ‘Archytas’, and Plutarch.

Atticus (later second century CE). By contrast, the Platonist Atticus wrote a polemical tract ‘Against those who interpret Plato’s philosophy by means of Aristotle’, some of which is preserved by Eusebius (*Praep. Ev.* bks 11 and 15). In taking this line, Atticus appears to follow L. Calvinus Taurus (second quarter of the second century), who wrote ‘on the doctrinal differences’ of Plato and Aristotle (*Suda* T 166, v. iv p. 509.12 Adler).⁵ Both mark a more polemical stance toward Aristotle.

Aspasius (early second century CE). Aspasius—who taught Herminius, who in turn lectured to Alexander of Aphrodisias—authored a series of commentaries, on the *Categories*, *De Int.*, *Physics*, *De Caelo*, *Metaphysics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Of these, just the last is (in significant portions) extant today. For our purposes, he is a key source for the ‘pathology’ of Andronicus and Boethus, for which see the discussion in their chapters above.

Adrastus of Aphrodisias (early second century CE). We know from Galen (*De libr. propr.* 42,20–43,1) that Adrastus wrote a commentary on the *Categories*, and from Simplicius (*in Phys.* 122,33) that he wrote a commentary on the *Physics*. An important position associated with Adrastus is the decision to place the *Topics* immediately after the *Categories* at the head of the Aristotelian corpus; he appears to have defined their relationship in a work entitled ‘Concerning the Order of Aristotle’s Treatises’ (Simplic. *in Cat.* 16,1–4). He also revived the title ‘Before the *Topics*’ for the *Categories*—this may suggest that he was responding to Andronicus, who explicitly rejected the placement of the *Categories* (with the post-praedicamenta) before the *Topics*, and with it, the title *Ta pro tôn topôn*. Adrastus notably discussed a second version of the *Categories*, which the later commentators, following Porphyry, dismiss.⁶ Aside from his work on the *Organon*, Adrastus also did work in astronomy (cf. Sorabji in Sorabji and Sharples 2007: 579–80).

Herminius (later second century CE). Herminius is perhaps best known today as a lecturer to Alexander of Aphrodisias. He has not attracted the most charitable reviews from modern scholars; already Prantl (1855) judged him an ‘offenbar höchst bornierter Mensch’, and Moraux (1983: 363–4) finds

⁴ See Dörrie and Baltes (III, 2002), 341; Dillon (1993); Whittaker in ANRW II 36 1; and bibliography in *Der Neue Pauly* for Albinus and Alcinous.

⁵ See Dillon (1977: 237 ff.), Dorrie and Baltes, 310–23, and Praechter 101 ff.

⁶ On A. cf. Simplic. *in Phys.* 4.11, 6.4 ff; *in Cat.* 15.36, 18.16 ff.; *Anon Prol in Cat.* 32b36 Brandis; cf. Zeller III 1, 809 n. 3; Moraux *Listes* 58 ff. See recently Sorabji (2007b).

him almost wholly derivative of Boethus. I tried (2009) to suggest that Herminus' importance for the tradition on the *Categories* has been underestimated. He is the first on record to claim that the *Categories* should come first in the Aristotelian curriculum for *pedagogical* reasons. He is, as I suggest, the forefather of Porphyry's influential theory of 'double imposition'; he moulds the 'narrative' of the historical dialogue regarding the *Categories* that has come down to us, pitting Boethus of Sidon against the partisans of the *Categories* as concerning 'being', and the partisans of the *Categories* as concerning 'language'. In so doing, he succeeds in revitalizing Boethus' formulation of the subject matter of the work, and offers a theory of signification (although we can only reconstruct bits and pieces of this) which deploys a Stoic or Epicurean concept of 'natural' significance to displace the mediating role of concepts (*noêmata*) found in the opening lines of the *De Int.*, which he broadly rejects. I also suggested that Herminus left (so far as we can tell) no written works to posterity, and that Porphyry was reliant on Alexander's lost *in Cat.* for Herminus' views. In connection with this, I proposed (Griffin 2009: ch. 6) that there is some cause to reconsider the identification of the Peripatetic Herminus with a Stoic Herminus mentioned by Longinus (preserved by Porphyry, *Vita Plotini*).

Sosigenes⁷ (later second century CE). Sosigenes, who also lectured to Alexander, raised an important question for the *Categories*, inquiring what is meant by 'what is said' (*to legomenon*): 'word' (*phônê*), 'thought' (*noêma*), or 'object' (*pragma*) (cf. Simplic. *in Cat.* 7,4–9,24; Dexippus 7,4). His 'tripartite' approach contrasts with the 'bipartite' approach of Herminus (who considers only 'words' and 'objects'). As we shall find, in the discussion of ch. 1 and broadly in ch. 7, this inquiry would have a far-reaching influence. Sosigenes himself did not choose between the three arguments (Dexipp. 7,4; cf. Moraux, *Hermes* 95 (1967), 169 on Alexander).

Aristoteles (later second century CE). Perhaps teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias, as argued for by Moraux⁸ (but see now Opsomer and Sharples, 2000); he is mentioned by Galen as 'a man preeminent in Peripatetic philosophy'; Syrianus also mentions him as 'the younger Aristotle, interpreter of Aristotle the philosopher' (Galen *Peri eth.* 11,4 Müller; Syrianus *in Met.* 100,6).

Alexander of Aigai. On one occasion Simplicius ascribes to this Alexander the same view as Alexander of Aphrodisias about the *skopos* of the *Categories* (*in Cat.* 10,19–20), and at *in Cat.* 13,11–18 again refers to the view of 'the Alexanders' (cf. Moraux II, 222). Simplicius at *in de Cael.* 430,32 states

⁷ On him see Zeller III 1, 813; Rehm RE III A 1, and Moraux.

⁸ He is apparently mentioned in Simplicius *in de cael.* 153,16; Alex. *De an.* II (Mantissa) 110,4; Moraux discusses him in 'Aristoteles, der Lehrer des Al. v. Aphr.', *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 49 (1967), 169–82. See also P. Accattino, 'Alessandro di Afrodisia e Aristotele di Mitelene', *Elenchos* 6 (1985), 67–74, who suggests (73) that Alex *in Met.* 166,19–67,1 follows one of Aristoteles' lost discussions.

that the Aphrodisian Alexander cited Alexander of Aigai on Aristotle's argument at *de Cael.* 2.6, 288b22; see Moraux II, 223–5.

II. Main Sources

A much more comprehensive bibliography on the later ancient commentators may now be found in the *Sourcebook* produced by Richard Sorabji (2005a–c, three volumes), and in Sellars (2004); likewise, a more comprehensive discussion of philosophers active during the first centuries BCE may be found in Sorabji and Sharples (2007). Most of the figures mentioned here are also discussed in detail in Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed* (1990).

Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second to third centuries CE). While Alexander himself, the exemplary 'commentator' on Aristotle, is not systematically treated in the course of this study (with some exceptions, e.g. ch. 1 and 5), a number of his commentaries serve as sources. Unfortunately, Alexander's own commentary *On the Categories* is lost to us; but I suggest in ch. 1 that some aspects of his discussion of the *skopos*, including his criticism and development of his teachers Herminius and Sosigenes, may be identified in the later sources. Several other works of Alexander are used in the chapter on Boethius, in discussing the status of universals.

Galen (late second to third centuries CE). Like Alexander, the work of Galen himself falls outside the scope of the current study. However, his texts are cited in several places in this treatment.

Plotinus (c.204–70 CE), especially *Enneads* 6.1–3. The founder of the philosophical tradition that we regard as Neoplatonism, Plotinus is here chiefly referenced in the discussion of Lucius and Nicostratus, although he does not cite them directly, and their fragments are drawn exclusively from Simplicius.

Porphyry of Tyre (c.233–309 CE). Later sources rely mainly on Porphyry's lost commentary *Ad Gegalium* for their account of the *Categories* and its earlier critics and defenders (cf. Smith 1993, Hadot 1990b, Chase 2003), although Iamblichus also introduced other sources not used by Porphyry, such as 'Archytas'. A portion of Porphyry's lost commentary may now have been recovered in the Archimedes Palimpsest: see Chiaradonna et al. 2013. (For Porphyry's alleged 'debate' with Plotinus regarding the status of the *Categories*, see my chapter on Lucius and Nicostratus, with recent bibliography.) Porphyry's lesser 'introductory' commentary *in Cat.* is used throughout this study (text in CAG; translation and commentary in Strange, 1992), as is his *Isagoge* (see the excellent introduction and detailed commentary in Barnes, 2003). With respect to Porphyry's logical influence, I have made heavy use of Lloyd (1990) and several treatments by Sten Ebbesen (see bibliography).

Iamblichus (c.242–325 CE) According to Simplicius in *Cat.*, Iamblichus took over Porphyry's commentary *Ad Gedaliū* and (i) added an exegetical approach called *noëra theōria*, a 'higher criticism' which reinterpreted the *Categories* in the mould of Neoplatonic metaphysics (see my ch. 1 and Dillon 1997); (ii) adduced 'Archytas' for Neo-Pythagorean metaphysics, supporting (i). The interpretation of the *Categories* as a text with something to say about Platonic or Pythagorean metaphysics may be traced all the way back to Eudorus (ch. 3.1), and Iamblichus evidently followed 'Archytas' in adopting a similar view of the work. However, the earlier Neo-Pythagoreans such as Eudorus and 'Archytas' (cf. 22,31 and 31,5 Thesleff) held that the *Categories* concerned the sensible world only; Iamblichus seeks to show, as in several examples discussed above, that the text can also lead the reader 'upward' to the noetic realm. Iamblichus' own commentary on the *Categories* is now lost, but was heavily used by Dexippus (as Simplicius informs us), by Simplicius himself, and by Olympiodorus.

Dexippus (mid-fourth century CE). A pupil of Iamblichus, Dexippus' brief surviving commentary in *Cat.* (text: CAG; translation and commentary in Dillon, 1990) combines some of the defences of the *Categories* found in either or both of Porphyry and Iamblichus (as Simplicius informs us). Dexippus does not name names of sources as consistently as Simplicius, but he can be a very useful guide and occasionally provides a fuller discussion of the arguments used to refute a criticism. A prime example is his fuller discussion of the views of Athenodorus and Cornutus (see ch. 6); although he does not name them explicitly, the answering passage of Simplicius gives us their identity, and Dexippus provides more detail. Dexippus can also be useful to us for identifying where Iamblichus has added something to Porphyry's basic account.

Ammonius (c.435/45–517/26 CE). A disciple of Proclus of Lycia, the towering Athenian Platonist of late antiquity (412–85 CE), Ammonius taught the last great generation of Neoplatonist commentators—including Simplicius, Olympiodorus, and Philoponus, among others. He was an influential holder of a chair in pagan philosophy at Alexandria at a time when such a position was rather controversial (cf. Westerink 1990). One commentary in *De Int.* is known to survive from his pen; a commentary in *Cat.* constitutes a student's notes, as does the commentary *On Prior Analytics I*. I have made some use of all of these commentaries in the following chapters. See Hadot (1991) on the Alexandrian introductions to Aristotle, and see Westerink (1990) and Wildberg (1990) on Ammonius.

Boethius (c.480–524/5 CE). Boethius followed Marius Victorinus in translating Greek philosophers into Latin. I have made considerable use of his *De Divisione* in discussion of Andronicus (see ch. 2, where I discuss the likelihood that the proem and conclusion are 'Andronican'), and I have also made

use of his commentaries *Peri Hermeneias* and *in Cat.* (and to a lesser extent his commentary on the *Isagoge*), particularly in ch. 1.

Simplicius of Cilicia (c.490–c.560 CE). As his commentary *in Phys.* is invaluable for the recovery of Presocratic fragments, the commentary *in Cat.* by the Neoplatonist Simplicius is the single most valuable source for the earlier tradition on the *Categories* that reaches him from Porphyry and Iamblichus. As we found above, he even informs us of the process that he uses in comparing and reporting earlier commentaries now lost to us, which is a great aid in evaluating his sources. And unlike many of the other later commentators, such as Ammonius, Simplicius explores and reports the views of earlier figures in detail, often with their names attached. We are entirely reliant on Simplicius for the supposed existence, let alone the positions, of some of the commentators who appear in his pages. The CAG text of Simplicius *in Cat.* has been translated into English and annotated in four volumes in the *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* series (1–4 in Chase 2003; 5–6 in Fleet 2001; 7–8 in Fleet 2002; 9–15 in Gaskin 2000). I have found the most recent introductory material and notes in Chase (2003) especially exemplary and useful. The *Categories* commentary has also been closely studied and translated into French by Hoffman and Hadot (1990), with valuable comments on the problem of the *skopos*. The study given in the next chapter surveys an example of the ‘stratigraphy’ in Simplicius’ text.

Olympiodorus of Alexandria (c.495–570 CE). A student of Ammonius, Olympiodorus the Younger was among the last pagan philosophers to teach at the Alexandrian school in the sixth century CE; he may, in fact, have been the last pagan philosopher to hold the chair. Wildberg (2008b) and Westerink (1990) are both useful introductions to Olympiodorus’ life and times, with bibliography. His *Prolegomena to Aristotle’s Logic* and *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories* (Busse’s text in CAG) are used extensively in my discussion of the *skopos* of the treatise. Again, see Hadot (1991) on the Alexandrian introductions to Aristotle in general. I have translated some excerpts of Olympiodorus *in Cat.* in ch. 1.

John Philoponus (c.490–570 CE). Philoponus was also a pupil of Ammonius—although, unlike Olympiodorus, he did not succeed Ammonius in a chair. A Christian philosopher who brought innovation to the commentary form elsewhere, his commentary *in Cat.* was relatively orthodox (cf. Hadot 1991); I have made several references to it, but my case studies of the Alexandrians following Ammonius have chiefly focused on Olympiodorus.

David (Elias) (later sixth century CE). The writings on the *Categories* ascribed to ‘David’ mention Olympiodorus several times, and their author may have been his student. They may have been written during Olympiodorus’ life, or later (cf. Westerink 1990; Wildberg 1990; Wildberg 2008b).

APPENDIX 2

Andronicus' Publication and Works

I. Publication and Catalogue of the Aristotelian Corpus

A broader survey of the general problems associated with Andronicus of Rhodes' alleged 'Roman edition' of Aristotle may provide a useful context for the questions associated with the *Categories*. This appendix is divided into two sections: the first will briefly survey the sources for Andronicus' 'publication' and *pinakes*, with critical discussion, and the second will offer an assessment of the evidence within the narrower confines of the reception of the *Categories*.¹ (Subsequently, I briefly review evidence for some of Andronicus' other important works.)

Sources and Discussion

Despite Barnes' salutary reminder of the poverty of the direct evidence, the 'legend' of Andronicus' formative collection, publication, and organization of Aristotle and Theophrastus must have begun somewhere. Like so much of our information about the first-century Peripatetics, this particular story may have gained currency with Porphyry (*Vita Plotini* 24), who tells us that 'Andronicus, the Peripatetic, divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises (*πραγματείας*), collecting related material (*τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις*) into the same [place]', and that Porphyry himself followed suit in his edition of Plotinus. Barnes, reasonably enough, keeps Porphyry waiting 'in the wings' while he tackles the earlier sources such as Strabo and Plutarch, but he also introduces *Vita Plotini* 24 as 'the text upon which Andronicus' reputation as the founder of modern Aristotelian scholarship ultimately rests' (37).

It takes at least three separate but overlapping pieces of testimony to establish the 'orthodox' narrative of Andronicus as the individual responsible for the first reliable publication of Aristotle's school works, and, by extension, as the individual who deserves credit for the first-century revitalization of the Peripatos. These are Porphyry's evidence (*VP* 24.7), coupled with Strabo's report that the Hellenistic Peripatos lacked Aristotle's school treatises until

¹ Here I reiterate my conclusions in Griffin (2009). This ground has recently been excellently covered by Hatzimichali (2013) and Chiaradonna (2013); I find myself in broad agreement with them. Natali (2013: 101–4) offers a clear summary of the story; see also Too 2010: 25–31.

the first century (13.1.54), when they were inundated by damaged and inferior copies, and Plutarch's addition (*Sulla* 26.1–2) that 'the Rhodian Andronicus, gaining ready access from Tyrannio to the copies, made [them] public (εἰς μέσον θεῖναι), and composed the catalogues that are now in circulation (τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας).' The later tradition took the same line, presumably following Porphyry; but there is a reasonable argument, as Tarán observes, for tracing the later Neoplatonic reports back to the same brief textual notices now in our possession, namely Strabo, Plutarch, and Porphyry, or something very much like them. These notices might bear multiple interpretations.

There are several reasons not to dismiss Strabo's tale of the Hellenistic history of the 'library' itself as a fabrication. Some of its essentials are independently ratified. Neleus did take possession of the books of Theophrastus, according to the latter's will (Diog. Laert. 5.53); and according to Andronicus' countryman Posidonius (ap. Athenaeum 5.214d, if the attribution is correct), Apellicon did purchase some 'library of Aristotle' several centuries later. Moreover, the Arabic translation of Ptolemy's catalogue of Aristotle, which *may* be a kind of digest of Andronicus' *pinakes*,² refers to a collection of books 'found in the house of a man called Apellicon', perhaps, with Barnes 1997, as a section title.

Posidonius, as preserved by Athenaeus, may be the source of the entire story reported by Strabo and Plutarch. On the other hand, Athenaeus himself claims elsewhere that Neleus sold his books to Ptolemy for the Library at Alexandria (1.3a),³ which is difficult to reconcile with the 'Posidonian' tale. Perhaps, as Gottschalk suggests (1987: 1085), Athenaeus tried to harmonize Strabo's story with a different tradition that recalled Ptolemy purchasing the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus in Rhodes and Athens, in a way that would maintain the pre-eminence of Alexandria itself. Alternatively, there may have been two 'libraries' in play. Neleus, perhaps, sold Aristotle's βιβλία to Ptolemy, but kept Aristotle's own writings aside; or perhaps it was Aristotle's 'exoterica' that circulated, while Neleus managed to maintain a portion of the collection, comprising the unpublished 'esoteric' texts that allegedly vanished into the underground of Skepsis.⁴ (Admittedly this is not directly supported by either source.)

² The Arabic text itself suggests that the author composed the *pinakes* from memory, as his copy of Andronicus was not to hand—from which it is reasonable, though not necessary, to infer that the author's catalogue is loosely based on Andronicus' own.

³ cf. H. B. Gottschalk, 'Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs', *Hermes* 100 (1972), 335–42.

⁴ So Schweigäuser on Athenaeus, Stahr, *Aristotelia* II, 55 and following; O. Regenbogen, Theophrastus v. Eresos, *RE Suppl.* 7 (1940), 1377 and following; I. Düring, 'Ariston or Hermippus? A Note on the Catalogue of Aristotle's Writings, Diog. L. v. 22', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 17 (1956), 13.

In either case, it may strain the bounds of credibility that *all* of the original texts of Aristotle's lectures were lost, as Strabo indicates, and that the intellectual treasury of the Lyceum was borne away in a single copy. The 'letter of Aristotle to Alexander' preserved by Aulus Gellius (20.5; cf. Plezia 1961, 42 and 127), presumably circulated by Andronicus himself among the 'letters of Aristotle', suggests that someone thought the esoteric works were circulating during Aristotle's lifetime, and that *Andronicus* credited this report with authenticity.⁵ Stahr's and Zeller's collections of the evidence for Hellenistic reading of the Aristotelian works,⁶ coupled with Barnes' careful survey (1997), agree that several of the school treatises, including the books now collected as the *Analytics*, were available to read in several locations under the Hellenistic kingdoms, including Rhodes. Hermippus, working at Alexandria, had enough material to compile a catalogue of Theophrastus' oeuvre (see fr. 54 Wehrli). Diogenes Laertius also records the contents of a Hellenistic catalogue of Aristotle including logic, rhetoric and ethics (5.22–7, and 42–50). Notably that earlier catalogue demonstrates a different organization than our 'standard' edition.⁷

About what information, then, can we be confident? (1) It is reasonably uncontroversial that *a* copy of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus passed to Neleus, as Strabo suggests, bolstered by the circumstantial support of Theophrastus' reported will; this should have happened before the 270s BCE. (2) It is also uncontroversial that *a* copy of the works of the school came down to an Apellicon of Teos in Athens, sometime around 90 BCE. (3) Finally, it is reasonably uncontroversial that the Rhodian Andronicus published *a* copy of the works of the school some decades later in the first century BCE, accompanied (presumably, though not necessarily, at the same time) by a significant catalogue (*πίνakes*) that had displaced its Hellenistic predecessor or predecessors by the lifetime of Plutarch, and would win the respect of Porphyry in the third century.

It is on the interstices between these three events that criticism centres. There are no obvious reasons to doubt the reports themselves—the will of Theophrastus bequeathing books to Neleus, the purchase of the books of Neleus for Alexandria, the sale of an Aristotelian library to Apellicon in the first century—but perhaps a fictional fabric of continuity has been woven to

⁵ cf. Gottschalk (1088) and M. Plezia, *Aristotelis Epistularum fragmenta cum Testamento* (Warsaw, 1961), 42f., 127 ff. Of course, as Peter Adamson has kindly pointed out to me, we can hardly rule out the possibility that Andronicus invented some of the letters himself.

⁶ Stahr, *Aristotelis* II, 92 and following, and Zeller, II.2, 144 and following, with references, collect the evidence for Hellenistic citations of the treatises; Gottschalk (1085) points out that many of those held to have consulted the school treatises were old enough to have done so at the Lyceum before their removal to Skepsis.

⁷ See P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1951), 313.

relate them, positing that all three report the history of a single collection of books, the autograph of the first Peripatetic Masters. Such a fabric would, after all, make the story far more interesting, and provide narrative continuity. On the assumption that a single library was involved, some original source of Strabo's story may have asked: what happened during the long gap between Neleus' receipt of the books and their appearance in the hands of Apellicon of Teos two centuries later? If one knew something of Neleus' reported family history, or was aware that the texts purchased by Apellicon were full of holes, or had some polemical axe to grind against the Attalids, one could easily come up with a clever story such as the romantic 'tunnel' of Strabo, where the scrolls were hidden away to protect them from prying Pergamene eyes. On the other hand, if one were keen to promote the scholarly prestige of Alexandria, as Gottschalk (1987) suggests that Athenaeus was, one might well imply that it was *these very books*, the autographs of Aristotle himself, that were purchased by Ptolemy from Neleus and employed to produce the well-known Alexandrian catalogues of Aristotle and Theophrastus.

The catalogue of Ptolemy, which now survives only in the Arabic version ascribed to 'Ptolemy the unknown', lends some report to the story. At no. 92, AB p. 230 (see Düring 1957, incl. commentary p. 245), Andronicus himself—again, on the assumption that the digest of Ptolemy is a decent representation of Andronicus' catalogue—appears to include a heading 'Books found in the library of a man called Apellicon'.⁸ If Strabo's source constructed a romance in which Apellicon's mysterious scrolls represented, not just a few tattered pages of dubious provenance, but the long-lost autograph of the Master, then Andronicus' possession of copies of these same texts would serve to explain the superiority of his publication. In reality, one might suggest, Andronicus was a capable Aristotelian scholar and philologist who collated many extant copies from around the Mediterranean, including copies of works then regarded as not particularly interesting, or mingled with spuria, and produced a text which came to be accepted as superior in the fullness of the next century. But this, it seems to me, would be to grant that it really was *the quality of the texts*, particularly in the modern sense of an *editio princeps*, that got Andronicus' generation and its successors excited about his publication; in reality, what evidence we have suggests that the later tradition, including Porphyry and the second-century Peripatetic Herminius, found Andronican readings to be less authoritative than what they read as the paradosis (cf. Porphyry ap. Simplicium, in *Cat.* 30,3; Simplicius in *Phys.* 440,13).

⁸ On Düring's view, this embraces certain items (93–9), which are not particularly interesting and not philosophical; the heading may refer to books found *only* in Apellicon's library.

In fact, the entire story of Sulla's capture of the texts from Athens could be a fabrication. Our fabricator, perhaps, knew that Andronicus collaborated with the grammarian Tyrannio in Rome before producing his edition. How did they get hold of the 'library of Aristotle'? Apellicon was in Athens; the great general Sulla sacked Athens shortly after he procured the collection, and brought spoils back to Rome; any reader of Cicero knows about Sulla's library; Sulla is the obvious candidate to have taken the books to Rome, and his library the ideal place for them to have languished for several decades longer. If this particular part of the story was mere romantic invention, it would readily explain why Cicero never mentioned these seminal tomes lurking in his friend's library; perhaps they were never there at all. For that matter, it would readily explain why Strabo never mentions Andronicus in connection with his Skepsis story. Like the rest of the story, there are several genuine events that have been linked together by bright imagination. Such a line of criticism would father such inventions on Strabo's and Plutarch's sources. In fact, Plutarch was accused of some such invention by Diels and Susemihl, focusing on Andronicus' work in Rome.⁹ Perhaps the best testimony against such a sceptical line is the mention of Apellicon in the catalogue of Ptolemy the Unknown, but this too is susceptible to scepticism.

Was there anything original about Andronicus' publication? Other testimony seems to imply that the esoterica were available in some form before Andronicus—for example, Philodemus provides fairly good reasons to believe that Epicurus read some *Analytics* of Aristotle,¹⁰ and Andronicus himself preserves the so-called 'letter of Alexander' claiming that Aristotle had published the *Metaphysics* in some form. If Andronicus held the letter to be authentic, presumably he himself could not have claimed originality for his publication of the *Metaphysics*. Barnes (1997: 50–63) demonstrates the difficulty of relying on the *structure* of various texts to show the importance of the Andronican publication; there is no evidence, Barnes argues, that Andronicus played a major role in the formation of the *Physics* (cf. Simplic. 924,18, 1036,18, on the seventh book); it appears that a *Rhetoric* like ours was available before Andronicus, and Cicero writes of Antonius reading *Τόποι* in the nineties bc (*de Orat.* 2.36.152); Cicero himself clearly knew the *Topics* (*Topica* 1.1) in some form, possibly directly.

Assessment of Andronicus' Role

Interest in Andronicus' originality as an *editor* (in the sense of producing something like an *editio princeps* by collating manuscripts) may be a modern

⁹ H. Diels (1879) and F. Susemihl, *Die Lebenszeit des Andronikos von Rhodos*, *Neue Jahrb. F.cl. Philologie* 151 (1895), 226 ff.; cf. Moraux I 48 f.

¹⁰ Philodemus in *P. Herc.* 1005, fr. 111.

invention,¹¹ not unreasonably drawn from Strabo and Plutarch. The ancient tradition demonstrates no special interest in Andronicus' activity as a textual critic. (On the contrary, Porphyry and Simplicius tend to brush off 'Andronic' readings that are contrary to their *paradosis*.)¹² An example of modern embellishment might perhaps be spotted in the Loeb translation of one key passage in Plutarch: 'The greater part of the collection passed through the hands of Tyrannio the grammarian, and Andronicus the Rhodian, *having through his means the command of numerous copies* (εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων), made the treatises public.' But the Greek εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων does not need to say anything about the *numerousness* of copies available, which, in the English translation, might lead us to infer that the availability of multiple manuscripts was somehow relevant to the quality of the publication. Rather, τὰ ἀντίγραφα are presumably exactly those copies made from Tyrannio's single set of (tattered) originals, which were just mentioned; and εὐπορήσαντα could refer merely to the fact that Andronicus possessed ready and convenient access to those copies (unlike earlier Peripatetics), not that he had a great *quantity* of copies to compare. Barnes' careful critique of the view that Andronicus produced an authoritative *text*, then, certainly removes a modern layer of interpretation, by showing that Andronicus' enterprise did not necessarily presage that of Immanuel Bekker. For Plutarch in *Sulla* 26, it is the information that Andronicus made the texts widely *available* (εἰς μέσον θείναι) and that his catalogue *became current* (τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας) that deserves attention, not the readings in the text and how he arrived at them.

Porphyry's testimony in the *Life of Plotinus* (24.7) provides more detailed and direct information about Andronicus' process. Thus from Porphyry's famous observation that Andronicus τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διείλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταυτὸν συναγαγόν, and that Porphyry himself (at least partly) followed Andronicus' model in his own publication of Plotinus' *Enneads*, it has sometimes been inferred that Andronicus was responsible for 'pulling together' the *books* of, say, the *Metaphysics* or the *Topics*, or the *Physics* into their current collected form as free-standing works, perhaps adding cross references and bridge passages for coherence. But Barnes has effectively undermined that hypothesis as well,¹³

¹¹ Hatzimichali offers a very useful discussion of the notions of editorial activity that could be applied in antiquity (2013: 1, 19–23).

¹² For example, Porphyry seems to have brushed off the authority of Andronicus' text in a critical passage of the *Categories*, preferring the authority of the second-century Peripatetic Herminus 'and just about everyone else' (*in Cat.* 30,3). Simplicius *in Phys.* 440,13 notes an Andronican reading (if that is what the comment amounts to) as a curiosity, upon which Andronicus built an innovative but unusual interpretation of one lemma.

¹³ Barnes also suggests that Porphyry's own method was not to 'invent' treatises as Andronicus is supposed to have 'invented' the *Metaphysics* by ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταυτὸν

which similarly seems to be a relatively modern layer on the tale. It is certainly not self-evident that this is what Porphyry means. What Porphyry himself did in the *Enneads* was not, in any case, to *invent* treatises by pulling together previously unrelated material and adding bridge passages or cross references, but simply (as he himself claims) to pull self-contained treatises into the same collection, wherever he believed they contained similar subject matter, and within each collection to organize the treatises in such a way that easier or 'lighter' material came first (ἐκάστη δὲ ἑννεάδι τὰ οἰκεία φέρων συνεφόρησα δούς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, 24.14–16).

This final point, I think, deserves somewhat greater emphasis: giving τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, the *starting* position to the *lighter* material, is also the reasoning that Porphyry endorses in explaining the location of the *Categories* at the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum (*in Cat.* 59,21–2), and the argument that Porphyry provides for the introductory nature of his own *Isagoge* (1,8–9) as a precursor to the study of categories (εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν, 1,2–3). As Porphyry says that he followed this principle on Andronicus' authority, and Porphyry himself applies it to the *Categories*, we might speculate that Andronicus took a similar line in the organization of the Aristotelian corpus, and that his argument for the location of the *Categories* in the reading of Aristotle provided impetus to this tradition. Indeed, we are told elsewhere that Andronicus argued for the introductory role of logic (*Philop. in Cat.* 5,15–20), although we do not know exactly how he argued.

For our purposes, then, we can leave aside the attractive touches of Andronicus the textual critic and the compositor of the *Metaphysics*, and focus on his status as a publisher and a cataloguer, but perhaps most importantly an *organizer*, of the corpus. The primary texts do seem to permit some inferences about the influence of an Andronican 'publication', but that influence appears to have had (relatively) little to do with the readings that Andronicus chose, or with the internal structuring of *pragmateiai* made up of multiple books, like the *Topics* and *Metaphysics*. Rather, what seems to have been most influential is the *order* in which Andronicus presented the works of Aristotle, and the arguments that Andronicus made in favour of that order.

συναγαγόν. (Of course, in a different sense that answers to the other half of Andronicus' alleged activity, εἰς πραγματείας διείλε, one might argue that Porphyry *did* invent treatises.) Thus, for example, Porphyry seems to have split the longer treatises of Plotinus such as *On the Soul*, and indeed 6.1–3 *On the Genera of Being*, into separate books—perhaps in order to arrive at the number of fifty-four individual works. Perhaps we should understand that Andronicus found *pragmateiai* with divisions that struck him as nonsensical, and organized them to have more rational partitions.

Andronicus certainly published a catalogue (πίνακες) of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. We can, I think, take a confident line not merely about the existence of this catalogue, but about its material influence. It was 'now current' on the cusp of the second century (Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1–2), and this is just the kind of point on which a polymathic, well-travelled scholar like Plutarch should be able to advise us. More than a century later, Andronicus' stylistic example was followed by Porphyry—and presented, as the *VP* passage implies, in order to underwrite and *justify* Porphyry's own approach to the *Enneads*. The passage of Ptolemy the Unknown,¹⁴ however else we may put it to use, shows that a catalogue carrying Andronicus' name possessed 'canonical' status in Ptolemy's own lifetime (whenever that might have been), and that it was not like the Hellenistic catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.22–7)—which, notably, omits our *Categories* (under that title) altogether.¹⁵

More specifically, we can infer from later reports that Andronicus' catalogue opened with the *Organon*, and that here, or elsewhere, Andronicus provided some justifications for the position of 'logic' at the propylaea of Aristotelian studies (discussed in ch. 2); this organization of the corpus was also to prove influential. Indeed, it was one area where the later tradition, including Porphyry and the Neoplatonists, favoured Andronicus' view over that of his 'pupil' Boethus (cf. Philop. *in Cat.* 5.15–20), who recommended commencing the study of Aristotle with physics. As we have at least some evidence that Andronicus felt the need to *argue* for the usefulness and importance of logic in his effort to build an Aristotelian 'system' based on the corpus, we may infer that this was not taken for granted, and that Andronicus played something of an original role in asserting (or reasserting) the importance of logic in Peripateticism, and of Peripatetic logic in general. This would be supported by the evidence that Andronicus paid special attention to the *Categories*, if this is not merely an artefact of the later sources.¹⁶

¹⁴ See the edition of the catalogue of Ptolemy by Hein (1985); I am indebted to Stephen Menn for pointing me to this work. The name 'Ptolemy the Unknown' or 'the Stranger' likely derives from the misunderstanding of Πτολεμαῖος Χέννος as Πτολεμαῖος Ξένος; see Rashed 2005: ccvii, Hatzimichali 2013: 19 n. 57. The catalogue had at least five books, if not more (see item 97 in Düring 1957: 230); Littig 1894: 18–25 offers a reconstruction, and Plezia 1946: 16–35 studies it in detail, as does Moraux 1973: 58–94. For the importance of Diogenes' catalogue, and the fact that it is more than a mere 'library list', see Hatzimichali 2013: 23–4.

¹⁵ See Moraux 1951: 131, Düring 1957: 69, and Gottschalk 1987: 1103.

¹⁶ We are aware that Andronicus provided a 'paraphrase' of the *Categories* (so Porphyry via Simplicius: *in Cat.* 26,17, 30,3), and we are not directly aware of any other such 'paraphrases'; this may merely be an accident of preservation, but in other cases where Andronican 'readings' are cited, such as the *Physics* (cf. Simplic. *in Phys.* 440,13) it appears that Andronicus has offered a reading of the Aristotelian text rather than an interpretive paraphrase. This too might suggest some special concern with logic.

It is sometimes pointed out—*against* the enduring influence of the 'Andronican' ordering of the corpus—that the *De Interpretatione* appears in the later catalogues and discussions, but Andronicus athetized it (presumably, he marked it in his catalogue as not written by Aristotle, with an explanatory note; cf. Alexander in *An. Pr.* I 160,28–161,1; Ammonius in *Int.* 5,28, 7,13; Philoponus in *Cat.* 27,18–26 and 45,8–12).¹⁷ Yet such an argument appears to assume that Andronicus' athetization entailed the deletion of the work from his catalogue, a kind of *damnatio memoriae*. It seems much more likely that the *De Int.* was accompanied by a marginal siglum in the Andronican catalogue pointing the reader to discussion of Andronicus' view that someone other than Aristotle had written the work (and in this discussion, presumably, Andronicus explained how the author of the *De Int.* cross-referenced a *De Anima* that did not appear to be the *De Anima* he published under the name of Aristotle). We know that these *pinakes* of Andronicus included titles, *capita*, and comments on authenticity; it is presumably here that Andronicus questioned the *De Interpretatione*. Later scholars could perfectly well continue to use Andronicus' catalogue whilst ignoring (or rebutting) his associated comments against its Aristotelian authorship.

Moreover, although Andronicus suspected that the *De Interpretatione* was by some other philosopher, there is no evidence that he thought there was something *wrong* with it, or held its contents to be somehow philosophically suspect. He simply doubted that Aristotle wrote it. But Andronicus did not think that Aristotle had all the answers when it came to Aristotelian logic. We have multiple examples of Andronicus' efforts to improve and innovate on Aristotle's ideas, especially in the *Categories*.¹⁸ And we have some evidence that Andronicus sought to distinguish himself from the 'earlier' Peripatetos in the field of logic;¹⁹ moreover, he held strong views about the

¹⁷ Cf. Moraux 1973: 117–19.

¹⁸ For example, he famously replaced Aristotle's categories of Where and When by Place and Time (*Simplic. in Cat.* 134,5, 342,23, 357,28). He added a fifth kind of quality to Aristotle's own list (263,19–22). He seems to have suggested—if this is not a textual criticism but a philosophical point—that Aristotle could have expressed himself more clearly at *Cat.* 6a37, as his extant definition of the relative is circular (202,5). All of these innovations sparked defences of Aristotle by Andronicus' successors, especially Boethius. For Andronicus' attitude to Aristotle more generally, see also Moraux 1973: 99.

¹⁹ In the opening to Boethius' *De Div.*, Andronicus is cited as remarking on the value and *utilitas* of logic, and (see discussion in Magee) he *may* be seen as the source of criticism of 'earlier Peripatetics' for failing to differentiate accidents, on the one hand, from genera and species, and differentiae, on the other hand. Indeed, throughout Boethius' *De Div.* everything is divided into a *per se* and *secundum accedens* dichotomy, a point that *may* be fruitfully compared to Andronicus' view that the ten categories can be reduced to something like substance and accident.

way in which the *Organon* should be organized in order to present a coherent and systematic picture of Peripatetic logic. Indeed, setting aside the observation that Andronicus believed someone other than Aristotle had written the *De Interpretatione*, we have every reason to suppose that Andronicus is the source, or at least the proximate source, of the ordering *Categories–De Int.–Prior Analytics–Posterior Analytics–Topics* that appears in the catalogue of Ptolemy and is assumed by the Neoplatonists. Similarly, we may plausibly assume that Andronicus endorsed or originated the associated pedagogical view that the *Organon* systematically builds from terms to propositions to syllogisms to demonstration.²⁰ (For the influence of this organization, perhaps stemming from Stoicism, see Bodéüs 2001: xiv–xvi.) Andronicus felt sufficiently strongly about this organization to argue against those who would place the *Categories* before the *Topics*, a view which, he felt, had caused chapters 10–15 to be appended (wrongly) to the *Categories* in the first place (see Simplic. in *Cat.* 379,9–11).

All in all, Andronicus' most lasting influence appears to reside in his organization of the corpus Aristotelicum—that is, the order in which he placed the works, and the *account* that he gave of why they belong in that order. Perhaps we can press this further to include the account that he may have given of how they produce a coherent *system* in that order. His views on how the texts should be read relative to each other appear to have been far more influential than his views about specific readings in any given text, or even the correct attribution and authenticity of the *De Interpretatione* or the post-paedicamenta to the *Categories*. Due to the emphasis that Porphyry, and so the successors of Porphyry, placed on the *Categories* itself, we have the best evidence for Andronicus' approach to the *Cat.* as opposed to, say, the *Topics*. Certainly some of his contemporaries seem to have followed his lead in certain respects, as did Ariston and perhaps 'Archytas' on the redefinition of relation (Simplicius in *Cat.* 202,5, 203,4–6), and Eudorus on the replacement of Where and When by Place and Time (206,10 and following).²¹ It may be difficult to be sure who is influencing whom. Nonetheless, these cases may reflect Andronicus' own interest in the *Cat.*, if indeed he carried the *Categories* to the head of the curriculum in order to create a systematic progression.

²⁰ Thus Andronicus seems to have argued, against some unnamed predecessor, that the *Categories* should not come immediately before the *Topics* (cf. Simplic. in *Cat.* 379,9–11), and for reasons we discussed in ch. 2, he seems to have placed the *Categories* at the outset of the curriculum.

²¹ With Szlezák (1972), we find that 'Archytas' relies on several points that (to our knowledge) originate with Andronicus. For instance, he and Ariston both follow Andronicus' apparent redefinition of Relation (Simplicius 202,2). In other respects, however, 'Archytas' differs from Andronicus: he does not place the category of Relation last, but rather fourth.

II. Other Works of Interest

Andronicus' Book 'On Division'

Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronici, diligentissimi senis de diuisione liber editus; et hic idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus et in libri Platonis, qui *Sophistes* inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab eodem per hanc introductionis laudata in Categorias utilitas. Dicit enim necessarium fore generis, speciei, differentiae, proprii, accidentisque peritiam, cum propter alia multa tum propter utilitatem quae est maxima partiendi. (Boethius, *De Divisione*, Proem)

Boethius' monograph *On Division*²² begins with a short notice about 'Andronicus the Peripatetic', an 'ancient' and exceedingly 'careful' philosopher (*senis . . . diligentissimus*) who also published (*editus*) a book *On Division* (4,3–11). Boethius takes Andronicus as his authority for the usefulness of the science he will expound (*quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi*, 4,3) and for its enduring value in the 'Peripatetic' tradition (*quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia*). According to Boethius, Andronicus' book was praised by Plotinus and adapted by Porphyry in his own commentary on the *Sophist*; indeed, Porphyry's essay is almost surely the source for Boethius' knowledge of Andronicus and for the main contents of the *De Div.* (see Magee 1998, Plezia 1946, Moraux 1973, Littig 1890, cited above).

Moreover, Littig (1890: iii.10) had suggested that Andronicus may be the original model for the entire work, a view that Moraux and Magee have argued against convincingly. Nonetheless, the proem is strongly suggestive that Andronicus provided a model of sorts for Porphyry's essay on division in the latter's *Sophist* commentary, while Boethius in turn used Porphyry's essay to construct his own. And while we cannot be at all sure which details in Boethius are Andronican (or pre-Porphyrian), the basic expression of value for *diairesis* at the outset of the work should be attributed to him. Moreover, when Boethius suggests that 'earlier' Peripatetics had failed to make a sufficiently clear distinction between the two major modes of division

²² On which see the introduction of Magee, especially 'Boethius, Porphyry and Andronicus', and notes to the prologue and final lines of the work. It is also studied by Plezia 10–15, 44–6 and Moraux i.120–32. Littig (ii.12–15), followed by Plezia, argues that Boethius' *Div.* was not only an homage to, but also closely modelled on, the work of Andronicus. In fact, if there appears to be Stoicism at work in the *De Div.*, Andronicus may have been influenced by Posidonius (Littig iii.10).

under discussion, *per se* and *secundum accidens*.²³ He credits the correct recognition of that contrast to 'later' Peripatetics (48,26–50,5 Magee), and Magee makes a strong case (ad loc.) that these 'later' Peripatetics include Andronicus. This might suggest that the central concept of the *De Div.*, that is, the strong emphasis on this bipartition of *per se* and *secundum accidens*, does go back to Andronicus.²⁴ The terminology of 'earlier' and 'later' Peripatetics may have particular relevance to Andronicus' own role (compare Aspasius in *EN*. 44,20 and following, where 'earlier' and 'later' seems to mean pre-Andronican and post-Andronican, and Aspasius explicitly makes Andronicus and Boethus 'later').

That evidence might be compared to another fragment studied above (Simplicius, in *Cat.* 63,22–8), where we learn that Andronicus believed the ten categories might be reduced to just two groups, namely 'by itself' (*kath' hauto*) and 'relative' (*pros ti*). In that passage, Andronicus is (puzzlingly) named alongside Xenocrates, an Old Academic, while Simplicius compares a similar bipartition into *substance* and *accident*, respectively analogous to *kath' hauto* and *pros ti*. We also encounter various examples of Andronicus pointing to problems caused (perhaps) by an apparent failure to sufficiently distinguish genera, species, and differentiae, on the one hand, from accidents, on the other (e.g., Simplic. in *Cat.* 54,8–21; cf. Chiaradonna et al. 2013: 177–9). Combining these testimonies, we might infer that Andronicus made some comment to the effect that all ten modes of predication need to be clearly distinguished into the *kath' hauto* and *pros ti*, lest one fall into the errors of the 'earlier' Peripatetics.

Possibly an immediate source for this division in Andronicus is Aristotle himself, in passages like *Met.* 5.6, 1015b16 and 5.7, 1017a7, where he appears to distinguish predication *kath' hauto* from predication *kata sumbebekos*, and points to the example of the 'musical' as something that can take on another property *kath' allo*. Plato in the *Sophist* (255C12–D7) is the ultimate source for the twofold division of beings along these lines:²⁵

²³ It is on this ground that the book *De Div.* seeks to render an account of the science of 'division'. In a core passage (6,17–8,2), division is itself divided into two forms, (A) *per se* and (B) *secundum accidens*. These two forms are then respectively broken down further, as (A) (i) genus into species, (ii) whole into parts, (iii) verbal expression into significations, and as (B) (iv) subject into accidents, (v) accident into subjects, (vi) accident into accidents.

²⁴ Magee notes that the distinction of 'earlier' and 'later' Peripatetics could hardly go back to Andronicus himself, if he means to refer to himself as a 'later' Peripatetic. But certainly later sources refer to Andronicus as a 'later' Peripatetic (τῶν δὲ ὕστερον Ἀνδρόνικος, Aspasius, in *Eth.* 44,18–45,5), and Andronicus need not have used the word 'later', *husteron*, simply to distinguish himself from 'earlier' Peripatetics.

²⁵ See Reinhardt (2007:518–21), Sharples (2008:281–2) and, on the *Sophist* passage itself, Brown (1986).

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' οἰμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα αἰεὶ λέγεσθαι . . . Τὸ δέ γ' ἕτερον αἰεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον·

Visitor: But I think you'll agree that among beings, some are said by themselves (*kath' hauta*), but some are always said in relation to other things (*pros alla*) . . . but the different is always in relation to another . . .

Thus it is quite appropriate that Porphyry's discussion of Andronicus' favour for division (and perhaps of Xenocrates' as well) should have occurred in his commentary on the *Sophist*. We also know that this passage of the *Sophist* was read in antiquity (e.g. by Eudemus, ap. Simplic. in *Phys.* 99,25–31) as a *locus classicus* for the distinction between substances and accidents. Porphyry, then, may have picked up Andronicus' remarks and noted Andronicus' view both in his *Categories* commentary and in his essay on division in the *Sophist*. In further circumstantial support of this, we might point to a passage of Alexander on the *Metaphysics* (in *Met.* 242,15–16 and 243,3), where the bipartition of substance and accident is said to be the 'first division' found in the *Categories* (τῇ πρώτῃ διαιρέσει τῶν ἐν Κατηγορίας). I discuss the preserved testimonies to Andronicus on this question in ch. 2.

Andronicus' Paraphrase of the Categories

We also know of a paraphrase of the *Categories*, which was treated in more depth in ch. 2 above. One reliable fact about Andronicus, upon which the sources agree, was his focus upon the *Categories* as a foundational text of Aristotelian studies, and his work to make it, and Aristotelian logic in general, more comprehensible and systematic. Plotinus, judging from Simplicius 270,2 and 347,19, appears to have respected Andronicus' treatment, and Simplicius himself refers to it at length (cf. Plezia 1946: 6–10); it is not mentioned in Simplicius' full 'honour roll' (Barnes) at 1,3–2,29, where the limelight is won by Boethus, and when Andronicus is mentioned with others he does not have first place (63,21, 159,32, 202,1–5, 203,4). Simplicius calls this a *paraphrasis* (26,17–20), a fairly generic term, and 'Andronicus the paraphrast' contrasts with 'Boethus the exegete' at 30,3–5. It is not clear whether this paraphrase included the post-predicamenta, which Andronicus is said to have disconnected from the rest of the work; but as I have suggested above, Andronicus does not appear to have doubted that the post-predicamenta were *by* Aristotle, merely whether they belonged where he found them.

It may be possible that Andronicus made some of his critical or corrective comments about the *Categories* in his paraphrasis—where he found Aristotle's language ambiguous (Simplic. in *Cat.* 202,5) or insufficiently precise (54,8–21).²⁶ For example, he may have offered an alternative and remarked

²⁶ See also the anonymous commentary in the Archimedes Palimpsest, 6,9–7,7 Chiaradonna et al. 2013, with commentary; Luna 2001b: 436–7; and Barnes 2003: 360–1.

on the need for the alteration. However, the comments on the text that we find in Simplicius could just as well come from a commentary that Simplicius does not mention.

Andronican Spuria

Also ascribed to Andronicus are a first-century or second-century CE study inscribed *On Affections* (*Περὶ Παθῶν*, ed. Thirry, 1977) and a much later, Renaissance text inscribed with his name. Thirry discusses the authorship of the *Περὶ Παθῶν* in detail, and as we shall see below, the tradition demonstrates a very real interest in Andronicus' 'pathology'. Despite the apparent inauthenticity of the *Περὶ Παθῶν*, Andronicus does appear to have offered a real definition of *παθῶς* that attracted the attention of later philosophers, noted above (Aspasius, in *Eth.* 44–5), and made favourable remarks about Xenocrates' definition of the soul (ap. Themistium in *de an.* 32,23).

The *Peri pathōn* can be divided into two parts (cf. Gottschalk 1987, 1130 and Moraux I, 138 and following), the first a catalogue of passions and the *eupatheiai* that the Stoic sage might feel, and the second a longer section of virtues and vices. The first part seems thoroughly Stoic; the second a mixture of Peripatetic and Stoic material. First in the second part comes the chapter on the virtues, with lists of Stoic definitions; next a chapter entitled *Kata Chrysippon*, giving Chrysippus' definitions of phronesis and subordinate virtues (though this is omitted in the oldest MSS and bracketed by Glibert-Thirry: it states that *aretē* is a mean, giving a reference to *EN* 2 at c. 2–6).

Letters of Aristotle

Andronicus appears to have included a number of 'Aristotelian' letters in his edition, including the famous letter of 'Aristotle to Alexander' (Aulus Gellius 20.5; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 7, 668bc, with Simplicius in *Ph.* 8,21–9), which he himself uses to credit Aristotle with the publication of his esoteric works. Olympiodorus, writing in the sixth century CE (6,11–13) indicates that Andronicus and Artemon 'collected' these letters; the text of Ptolemy the Unknown (no. 96) suggests that Andronicus actually found these letters himself. In any event, if he included them in his collection it follows that he (almost certainly) viewed them as genuine witnesses. As these letters suppose the publication of various Aristotelian school treatises during Aristotle's own lifetime, Andronicus might well have believed that such contemporary publications really existed.

APPENDIX 3

An Outline of Aristotle's *Categories*

The structure, textual unity, authenticity, and function of the *Categories*, as well as its place in Aristotle's philosophy, have been considered in much greater detail elsewhere.¹ My intention here is just to survey the organization of the treatise as it presented itself to the readers discussed throughout this book, beginning with Andronicus of Rhodes.

1. **The Ante-paedicamenta.** The opening section, traditionally labelled the 'ante-paedicamenta' (literally 'what comes before the categories'), comprises the first three traditional chapter headings (corresponding to Bekker numbers 1a1–15, 1a16–1b9, and 1b10–24 respectively).
 - a. **Chapter 1: The 'onymies'.** Ch. 1 (1a1–15), sometimes called the 'onymies' in modern scholarship, introduces three kinds of items. These items are labelled, respectively, 'homonyms', 'synonyms', and 'paronyms'. Roughly speaking, this chapter explores how, in ordinary Greek, one term successfully picks out multiple referents, either equivocally (homonymy), univocally (synonymy), or with a change in the grammatical accidens of the term (paronymy). Things are then carved up from the perspective of these ordinary linguistic phenomena: for instance, a human being and an ox can both be called 'synonyms' because, in ordinary Greek, they are both correctly addressed by the term 'ζῷον' (animal).
The chapter proceeds as follows:
 - i. 'Homonyms' are items that are related to each other *only* in that they can be addressed by the same referring term (τοῦνομα) in ordinary Greek. The examples offered are a human being and a painting, both of which can be validly referred to by the noun 'ζῷον' (which in ancient Greek is equivocal between 'animal' or 'painting'). Besides the fact that I can validly address that painting and that person using the word 'ζῷον', the painting and person have nothing in common.
 - ii. 'Synonyms' are items that are related to each other in two ways: like homonyms, they can be addressed by the same term in Greek, but they are also related in that they share something

¹ Frede 1987: 11–48, Bodéüs 2001: xi–clxxxviii, Mann 2000, Wedin 2000, and Menn 1995; see also Ackrill 1963 for English translation and commentary.

called a 'λόγος τῆς οὐσίας' in common. It has been contentious since antiquity just what a 'λόγος τῆς οὐσίας' is, and English translations vary, but 'statement of being, i.e. definition' may not be far off. The examples offered are a human being and an ox. They may both be addressed by the term 'ζῶον', but they also share a definition in common, namely the definition answering to the term 'ζῶον': both persons and oxen *are* animals, i.e. animated beings.

- iii. 'Paronyms' are items that can be addressed by a name derived from something else, with a difference of ending. For example, a grammarian is so-called from grammar, and a brave person is so-called from bravery.

It is today,² and was in antiquity, hotly debated why the *Cat.* begins with this chapter. Around the first century BCE, for instance, Andronicus argued that some preliminary notion of homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms was valuable for understanding the rest of the treatise (Simplicius *in Cat.* 21,21–4), while various critics, such as Lucius and Athenodorus, contended that the first chapter failed to cohere with the rest of the work. An editor may have tacked it on to the central portion of the treatise because he believed its explanation of unfamiliar concepts or words would be useful for the remainder. (That is more or less the explanation offered by the commentators, although it is worth noting that the terminology of the first chapter is not employed regularly throughout the rest of the treatise.)

- b. **Chapter 2: 'Things that are spoken' and 'things that exist'.** The second chapter heading deals with two groups of things in sequence:
 - i. **Things that are said (which may be said *with combination* or *without combination*).** First (1a16–19), Aristotle considers 'things said' (λεγόμενα). These are divided (perhaps exhaustively) into two:

² Michael Wedin (2000: 11–37) cites this as a question posed by early scholars: 'The book begins without introductory remarks that give its purpose and object' (Brandis 1833: 267), while this peculiar introduction makes for 'the lack of any very definite information as to Aristotle's precise object in formulating' the theory of categories (Ross 1924, 1, lxxxii). It is also posed by Simplicius. One answer is found in Ackrill (1963: 69), who follows the ancient Greek and Latin commentary tradition in describing 1a1–15 as containing 'certain preliminary points and explanations' presupposed by the main body of the work. John Rist (1989a: 94), by contrast, lays aside 1a1–15 as 'loosely connected' with the rest of the text. According to other interpretations, as Barrington Jones rhetorically suggests (1972: 117), the first chapter appears as 'an incidental excrescence on the work'. Yet many critics, such as Jones (1972), Dancy (1975), Frede (1987), Furth (1988), Lewis (1991), Wedin (2000), and Mann (2000), hold that a coherent account of 1a1–15 is valuable for the interpretation of the text.

there are things said 'without combination', i.e. single terms considered on their own, such as 'person' and 'runs'; and there are things said 'with combination', i.e. complete sentences that include both a noun and a verb, such as 'person runs'. This division is echoed in the *De Interpretatione*, where it is explored in much greater detail.³ It is very important to Andronicus and the later philosophers discussed in this book, who consider the former class ('things said without combination, i.e. simple terms signifying simple items) to be the scope of the *Categories*, and anticipate the Neoplatonic argument that for this reason the *Categories* describes the building blocks of Aristotelian logic—since Aristotle proceeds in *De Int.* to construct from these building blocks 'combined' sentences (signifying states of affairs), then syllogisms (*Prior Analytics*), and finally demonstrations (*Posterior Analytics*). (For a thoughtful criticism of these arguments, see Morison 2005; for their historical origins, see Bodéüs 2001: xiv–xvi, and the introduction to Hadot 1990.)

- ii. Things that exist (which may be SAID-OF but not IN a subject, or IN a subject but not SAID-OF a subject, or both SAID-OF and IN a subject, or neither SAID-OF nor IN a subject). In this part of ch. 2 (1a20–b9), Aristotle seems to be concerned with real beings (*ὄντα*), chiefly those whose names⁴ can validly stand in the predicate position of a sentence like 'Socrates is human.' He is interested in sentences that include a subject term ('Socrates'), a copula (the verb 'is'), and a predicate term ('human'): schematically, 'A is B.' (It seems clear that Aristotle means to talk about predicative sentences, although the technical verb *κατηγορεῖται* does not appear

³ Just what Aristotle means by 'things spoken' here is also a matter of heated discussion: they may be the objects or states of affairs signified by linguistic utterances, or the utterances themselves. The latter would be a reasonable guess, since the 'combination' described seems to apply more intuitively to words (the noun 'person' and verb 'runs' are 'combined' to make a sentence) than to things.

⁴ I try to distinguish clearly here between use and mention. As for the modern complaint that Aristotle disregards the use–mention distinction, one might agree with Bäck (2000) when he remarks that Aristotle appears to 'switch back and forth from speaking about words to speaking about real things' and does so 'quickly and blithely' with confusing rapidity (133–4). Two recent approaches to this ambiguity are evident in Wedin (2000) and De Rijk (2002:I). As a policy, Wedin will 'follow Aristotle's practice of disregarding use–mention boundaries in formulating a number of his theses' (12 n. 6). By contrast, De Rijk, who expresses this equivocation as 'the absence of a clear-cut borderline between a linguistic expression [...] taken as a linguistic tool, and its significate', proposes that Aristotle exploits it intentionally and systematically, and christens this 'the rule of indiscriminate reference' (63–4)—a necessary law and 'main rule' for his exegetical approach to Aristotelian semantics.

until 1b10.) He divides beings whose names can stand in the predicate position of such a sentence into four kinds. This fourfold division is constructed from two relationships that these beings might hold towards the being whose name stands as the subject (*ὑποκείμενον*) of the sentence.

1. The two relationships: SAID-OF AND IN

- a. The first relationship is called being SAID-OF⁵ something as a subject (*καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται*). It indicates an ontological relation that is typically, but not invariably, reflected in everyday speech. In general, B is SAID-OF A as a subject just in case we validly talk about 'A' as 'a B' (in Greek, about 'A' as 'B τις'). Thus Socrates is *a* human, human is *an* animal, and grammar is *a* (branch of) knowledge.⁶ (Interestingly, Aristotle takes the fact that one can validly say 'A is a B' in ordinary Greek as a good indicator, at least heuristically, that A really *is* a B.) In the framework of ten *κατηγορίαι* that Aristotle will later outline, the SAID-OF relationship operates intra-categorically, or so to speak 'vertically': it relates the universals *within* a category (those items which are 'said of many things', *De Int.* 17a39–40)⁷ to the items of which they are said in the same category. For instance, within the category of REALITY (*οὐσίαι*, traditionally rendered 'substance'),⁸ genera like 'animal' are SAID-OF species like 'human', while species are SAID-OF individual members of the species, which are primary realities like Socrates (ch. 5, 2a11–18); likewise, in the category of QUALITY (*ποιά*), knowledge is SAID-OF a piece of grammatical knowledge. Andronicus of Rhodes (ap. Simplicius in *Cat.* 54,8–21) noticed that Aristotle's linguistic heuristic fails to guarantee this intra-categorical relation in some cases: for example, we can validly say that 'Socrates is

⁵ I am here following Lewis (1991) and Mann (2000) in capitalizing these names to flag their technical usage by Aristotle.

⁶ For example, Aristotle states that human (*ἄνθρωπος*) is said-of an individual human being (*τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου*), like Socrates, as a subject, and knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) is said-of an individual branch of knowledge, like grammatical expertise (*τῆς γραμματικῆς <ἐπιστήμης>*). More examples follow in ch. 3 (1b10–15), now using the technical verb 'predicate': 'human is predicated of the individual human (*ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται*), and animal of human ...'

⁷ Items that can be 'said of many things', in the language of *De Int.* 17a39–40.

⁸ I will sometimes avoid the traditional Latinate label 'substance', although it is firmly entrenched, just because it is rather misleading in English; see Loux 1991: 15–16. Best of all is to leave *ousia* untranslated, but that can also be off-putting to the Greekless reader. As Loux points out, 'reality' is too much like 'being' to clearly draw out Aristotle's distinction between *ousia* and *on*, but it has the advantage of being an abstract noun in English, and it is reasonably clear.

an Athenian', implying that Athenian is SAID-OF Socrates—but 'Athenian' seems to pick out something in the category of QUALITY, while 'Socrates' picks out a REALITY.

- b. The second relation is called being IN a subject (*ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ*), which Aristotle describes as being 'in something, not as a part, and unable to exist apart from what it is in'. For instance, some grammatical knowledge is IN my mind, and pallor is IN Socrates' body (assuming his body is pale). Aristotle's description stresses that the pallor is not *constitutive* of Socrates' body—the body is not a whole of which this colour is a constitutive part—and likewise, my knowledge of Greek (say) is not *constitutive* of my mind. This relation is trans-categorical: it applies in cases where some quality, quantity, or another of the latter nine categories 'inheres' in a reality (*οὐσία*) such as Socrates or Bucephalus. There is a linguistic check that we can deploy to confirm this, since inherence of B in A applies when I can say that 'A is B' but I cannot say that 'A is a B': Socrates is not *a* pale (but pallor is in him), and my mind is not *a* knowledge (but knowledge is in it).

This distinction between two kinds of predication was taken to be crucial in antiquity, especially as interest in Aristotelian logic began to collect momentum after the first century BCE. Someone who accepts this subdivision of predication into the SAID-OF and IN relations, based on the linguistic heuristics that Aristotle highlights, might then be more willing to distinguish the ontological inherence of a *non-essential* feature in a subject (such as pallor in Socrates) from a subject's *essentially* belonging to a kind (such as Socrates' belonging to the human species). In this way, these relations also pave the way for essentialism, which is critical for subsequent Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. Ancient Peripatetics like Alexander of Aphrodisias criticized the Stoics for failing to appreciate just this distinction in their logic, and treating all attributes as equal (Alex. *in Top.* 42,27–43,2: see LS 32E). I argue in ch. 2 that Andronicus placed considerable weight on the lessons of this chapter, and was partly motivated by the perceived failure of

his predecessors to take proper stock of the difference between essential and accidental predication.

2. The fourfold division

<i>Cat.</i> 2, 1a20–b9	Beings IN a subject	Beings not IN a subject
Beings SAID-OF a subject	Genera and species of items in non- <i>οὐσία</i> categories	Genera and species of primary <i>οὐσίαι</i> (i.e. secondary <i>οὐσίαι</i>)
Beings not SAID-OF a subject	Individual items in non- <i>οὐσία</i> categories, such as ἡ τις γραμματικὴ ('some particular knowledge of grammar')	Primary <i>οὐσίαι</i> , individuals, e.g. ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ('some particular human being')

a. Aristotle next uses these relations to produce a grid⁹ of four kinds of beings, illustrated in the following table (adapted from Reinhardt 2007: 515).

- i. Beings that are IN a subject will prove to belong to the non-*οὐσία* categories (quantity, quality, relation, and so on), and may be universals (if they are SAID-OF a subject) or particulars (if they are not SAID-OF a subject).
- ii. Beings that are not IN a subject are realities (*οὐσίαι*), and may also be universals (if they are SAID-OF a subject) or particulars (if they are not SAID-OF any subject). This latter class—beings that are neither IN nor SAID-OF a subject—are called 'primary *οὐσίαι*': these are particular beings such as Socrates and Bucephalus.

One of the most influential implications of this fourfold division in antiquity was the statement that particular beings, such as Socrates and Bucephalus, count as 'primary realities'. Some Platonist critics of the *Categories* discussed in this book, such as Lucius and Nicostratus (ch. 4), were alarmed, partly on this basis, that the *Categories* omitted the intelligible Platonic Forms as primary beings altogether. Aristotelian readers, like Boethus of Sidon (ch. 5), introduced the question how this account of primary *οὐσία* as 'neither SAID-OF nor IN a subject' could jibe with the hylomorphic analysis of *οὐσία* in terms

⁹ This may not literally have been intended as a diagram, although it is possible: for Aristotle's use of diagrams and tables in teaching, see recently Natali 2013: 114–15.

of Form and Matter in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Simplicius in *Cat.* 78,4–20).

2. The Praedicamenta.

- a. **Initial list.** With *Cat.* 4 (1b25–2a4), Aristotle introduces a list of ten items 'said without any combination', which signify (σημαίνει) either (1) realities (οὐσίαι), (2) quantities, (3) qualities, (4) relations, (5) where, (6) when, (7) position, (8) having, (9) acting, or (10) being acted-on, and provides examples of each. We seem to have here not just ten, but twenty, items. First, there are ten kinds of simple, referring terms ('things said without combination', which, as Aristotle stresses from 2a4–10, cannot produce an affirmation or denial). Secondly, there are ten kinds of beings to which these terms refer. This latter list of ten falls under the fourfold division just offered above: the οὐσίαι are those predicates that are not IN any subject; the remaining non-οὐσία items are those predicates that are IN subjects. (Within each categorial 'silo' there will also be universal items SAID-OF more specific items in the category.) The use of the verb σημαίνει, coupled with the preceding divisions of 'things said' and 'things that are', suggests that we have to do here with a relationship between simple words meaning things. This implication was especially important in antiquity, as the entire treatise *Categories* was taken to be concerned with how simple words signify or refer to simple things—that is, to be primarily concerned with semantics (cf. Simplicius in *Cat.* 13,11–18), or with referring terms just insofar as they refer.
- b. **Detailed descriptions of the distinguishing characteristics of the categories.** These collected reflections on what is *distinctive* of each category do not seem to constitute a proper *definition* of any one of them, in terms of genus and differentiae, but then it would seem to be impossible to 'define' an ultimate genus, which has no differentiae. The ancient critics with whom this book is concerned, such as Boethus of Sidon (ch. 6), also seem to have found in these descriptions a valuable, non-technical 'sketch account' that could serve to 'actuate' beginners' preconceptions of the highest genera, beginning the road to logic.¹⁰ As Menn (1995) suggests, these brief, non-technical discussions of the most distinctive features of each genus are certainly helpful in a

¹⁰ I refer several times in this book to Simplicius in *Cat.* 159,10–15, where Boethus argues that it was not possible to give proper, formal definitions of the primary genera at the early stage represented by *Cat.*, but that Aristotle provides ὑπογραφαί or sketch descriptions that can actuate or 'stir up' (ἀνακινεῖν) our concept (ἐννοία) of a category like the Relative. (That the central idea is Boethus', I think, is strongly suggested by this passage and others like 163,28–9; I also think that the verb ἀνακινεῖν is Boethus' own, although it could also be a paraphrase by Simplicius or his source; it has strong undertones in the Platonic tradition.)

pragmatic way, providing a set of rules of thumb for a dialectician to recognize the genus to which a given term belongs.

- i. **Chapter 5: οὐσίαι.** Aristotle states that primary οὐσίαι are distinguished by being neither SAID-OF nor IN a subject (2a11–18, etc.)—which sparked some of the Platonist criticisms mentioned above, by readers such as Lucius and Nicostratus. Species and genera of οὐσίαι are real, but secondary to the primary realities themselves. Aristotle goes on to describe several other distinguishing features or propria of οὐσίαι: for instance, Aristotle notes that everything that carries the name of an οὐσία is so named synonymously (3a33–b9, picking up the vocabulary of ch. 1); that every οὐσία seems to signify a certain ‘this’ (3b10, suggesting that again we might have to do here with both a word, such as ‘human’, and a being, *this Socrates right here*, and the semantic relationship between them); that nothing is contrary to οὐσίαι (3b24–32); (iv) that they do not admit of a more or less (3b33–4a9); and most of all, that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries (4a10–21).
- ii. **Chapter 6: QUANTITY.** Aristotle divides quantities into the discrete and continuous, and those composed of parts with position and those that are not so composed; he also gives a number of examples. Among the distinguishing features of quantity that he mentions, he notes that quantity has no contrary (5b11) and does not admit of more and less (6a19). There were some criticisms of Aristotle’s account of this category in antiquity, especially the decision to include time and place under quantity; but they did not have the broad range of the more fundamental questions about substance, essentialism, and the general purpose of the book, noted above.
- iii. **Chapter 7: RELATIVE.** Aristotle offers a short, crisp description of a relative at 6a36–7: ‘We call *relatives* all such things as are said to be just what they are, *of* or *than* other things, or in some other way *in relation to* something else’ (tr. Ackrill). He gives examples such as the ‘larger’, which is larger *than* something, and offers another selection of distinguishing features of the category: relatives have contrariety (6b15); they admit of more and less (6b19); they must reciprocate (if slaves are of masters, then masters are of slaves, 6b28 and following); they are simultaneous by nature (7b15). But Aristotle raises a problem about whether the description given at the start of the chapter can show that relatives are never spoken of as substances, and this prompts him to offer what looks like a *second* and different description of the relative at 8a28–34, as items ‘for which *being is the same as being related to something*’. This second description prompted all sorts of trouble in antiquity; Andronicus

and his contemporary Ariston, for example, proposed that it was circular (because the definition contained the definiendum), and advanced an alternative definition of the relative as that whose being was somehow related to something *different* (see ch. 2).¹¹

- iv. **Chapter 8: QUALITY.** Aristotle divides qualities into states and conditions, capacities and incapacities, affective qualities and affections (which seem to have interested Andronicus, although this is largely beyond the scope of the present study), shape, and (as a borderline case) texture. He uses the terminology of paronymy from ch. 1 to explain the relationship between a quality (like pallor) and the qualified (the pale man), and offers an interesting reflection on cases where ordinary language fails to reflect the ontological reality (10a27–b11). Some of the features of qualification include the following: it admits contrariety (10b12) and more and less (10b26), and most distinctively, only in virtue of qualities 'are things called similar and dissimilar' (11a15–19).
- v. **Chapter 9: ACTING and BEING ACTED ON.** Very briefly (11b1–9), Aristotle offers an account of two important features of these two categories: they admit of contrariety and more and less. The rest of the chapter (11b10–14)—which explains why there is no further account of the categories' position, when, where, and having—is an interpolation.
3. **The post-praedicamenta** ('what comes after the categories'). After a short interpolated introduction, which simply states that 'something must be said about opposites . . .' (11b15–16), a new discussion begins, treating opposition, priority and simultaneity, kinds of movement or change, and the usage of the word 'have'. Andronicus of Rhodes already maintained that this section was appended 'against the purpose of the treatise' (ap. Boethius in *Cat.* 263B).

¹¹ Other ancient readers began the tradition that the first 'definition' of the relative might apply *secundum dici*, cued by the introductory phrase 'We call . . .', while the later 'definition' might apply *secundum esse*.

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